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Abstract
This study is an empirical investigation of the formation process of global strategic 
alliances between local and foreign companies in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Its 
main aim is to provide a better understanding of the process of forming global strategic 
alliances in a developing economy environment and to develop a theoretical framework 
that may help in the formation process of global strategic alliances in similar countries. 
Based on a case study approach, data were collected through the use of in-depth interviews, 
structured interviews (self administered questionnaires), and documentary research. The 
analysis of the data collected has revealed six main findings in relation to the formation 
process of international strategic alliances within the UAE enterprises. They are: i) the 
identification and justification of motives for forming a strategic alliance, selecting alliance 
partners, selecting the alliance form of structure, managing the alliance and evaluating the 
performance of the alliance are basic phases of the formation process of global strategic 
alliances; ii) strategic alliances are formed in reaction to organizational and environmental 
factors and become part of corporate strategy; iii) the process of partners’ selection in 
strategic alliances passes through three stages which are search for partners, evaluation of 
partners and selection of a partner, and is carried out by employing evaluation and selection 
criteria; iv) strategic alliance processes are extensively influenced by trust and confidence 
based on previous relationships between partners; v) the formation of strategic alliances is 
widely influenced by the partners’ culture; and vi) the performance of strategic alliances is 
evaluated by all partners. These findings have various implications in theory and in practice 
for policy makers, practitioners and managers of strategic alliances in developing countries.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction
l.lThe Rationale for the Study
In an increasingly competitive and globalising international economy, the formation of 
strategic business partnerships between companies has become essential to their survival 
and growth. Increasing complexity, uncertainty, risk, and discontinuity are the obvious 
hallmarks of the present networked business environment. Additionally, the changing 
market conditions intensified global competition, and increasingly shorter product life- 
cycles. This means that firms have had to re-examine their traditional methods and 
strategies for doing better business (Ohmae, 1989a). However, any one firm, by itself, 
often does not possess all the necessary resources and capabilities to compete effectively 
in such global competition (Das and Teng, 1998b). Strategic alliances (SAs) offer an 
alternative approach to such firms, whereby they could join forces with other firms in the 
pursuit of opportunities that would otherwise be beyond the firm’s current capabilities. 
Thus, SAs have emerged and proliferated in recent years as a popular strategy in an 
environment in which fast access to cutting-edge technology and emerging markets is 
more critical than ever before (Yoshino and Rangan, 1995).
Since the early 1970s there have been an increasing number of SAs and joint ventures 
(JVs) taking place throughout the world and across a wide range of industrial sectors 
(Glaister and Buckley, 1995; Ghemawat et al., 1986). This proliferation received much 
attention both in the media and in academic circles (Doz and Hamel, 1998; Dussauge et
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al., 2000; Li et al., 2001). Alliance formations have been increasing at approximately 25 
per cent per year since 1985 (Harbison and Pekar, 1998; Allio and Pekar, 1994; Mol,
2000). Many researchers suggest that is not unusual for a large corporation to have up to 
30 alliances in operation compared to zero ten years ago (Cravens et al., 2000). Strategic 
alliance activity is no longer on the periphery of corporate strategy (Gulati et al., 1994). 
Druker (1995) suggests that the greatest change in the way business is being conducted 
will be through the relationship/networks over ownership. Some factors directly led to the 
proliferation of the phenomenon of SAs. These factors may include the globalization of 
markets, appearance of emerging markets, intensification of competition and appearance 
of new global competitors, acceleration of technology advancements, enlargement of 
required investment, and government deregulations (Hiroshi, 2005; Contractor and 
Lorange, 2002; Pett and Dibrell, 2001; Das and Teng, 1998; Deeds and Hill, 1996; 
Mitchell and Singh, 1996; Yoshino and Rangan, 1995; Beamish and Delios, 1997; 
Robson, 2002a). At the organizational level, one of the main driving forces behind 
entering strategic partnerships is the need for a strategic development of partner 
companies (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; 
Hoffmann and Schlosser, 2001).
Therefore, the rationale behind this study is three fold. Firstly, the ISAs discipline is a 
favoured topical theme of the current business research and studies. Moreover, the ISAs 
discipline in the Arab countries suffers from a shortage in specialised human resources; 
therefore, the PhD degree would offer me an opportunity to advance my academic and 
research career with a minimal competition.
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Secondly, nowadays, many companies are experiencing real business challenges in the 
networked business paradigm; they are seeking for better solutions to increase their 
visibility in the business domain with minimal risks. Many of these companies are much 
believed in the strategic alliances (SAs) among the best business options to enhance their 
respective activities and brands. Therefore, understanding the factors that associated with 
alliance formation and success might be helping the managers to establish robust 
international partnerships in the future. Moreover, there is a steady growth of 
multinational companies in the Middle East, especially in the UAE. This globalisation of 
business shall increase market competition to put more stress on the national companies 
to realise the nature and formation process of SAs. Yet, this advanced study would 
therefore, enhance my skills in ISAs consultancies in the non-academic business domain.
Thirdly, the study was driven by the fact that most of the management theories -  ISAs 
theories being no exception -  have generally taken their roots in the developed countries, 
most notably North America and Western Europe (Schwenk, 1995; Miller et al., 1998). 
The point of view indicates that there is a gap worth filling in the literature resulting from 
the lack of studies in developing context. Considering the uniqueness of the UAE’s 
economic, political and socio-cultural contexts, this study would contribute to filling that 
identified gap.
1.2 The research problem
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear how SAs are becoming an important factor 
for companies to compete and survive in a complex and uncertain business environment.
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Although SAs are attractive, they are not simple or easy to create, develop, and maintain 
(Buckley and Casson, 1987). There are many implementation problems. In this respect, it 
is often argued that while many organizations rush to jump on the bandwagon of SAs, 
only a few succeed (Michelet and Remacle (1992). It has been also reported that two 
thirds of all alliances experience severe problems in the first two years of their 
formation and that the failure rates range as high as 70 per cent (Das and Teng, 2000b; 
Beamish, 1985). Similarly, other researchers argue that the success rate of SAs is much 
lower than those of non-alliances, such as mergers (Bleeke and Ernst, 1991; Kent, 1991), 
while other scholars generally equate alliance failure with alliance termination (Beamish, 
1985; Harrigan, 1986; Kogut, 1988).
Therefore, while many writers have been celebrating their many cooperative advantages, 
empirical studies often present a more dismal picture (Das and Teng, 1998). Many of the 
failures are very costly for the partner companies (Killing, 1982). Hence, those 
companies that opt for the international joint venture (IJV) mode of entry are choosing an 
option that historically has a very high rate of dissolution. Therefore, the logical question 
now is: “what makes these alliances fail?” The reasons for this high rate of failure have 
been related, according to a number of studies, to the following factors:
1. The lack of a clear vision and underlying rationale. Many firms go for SAs just 
because they like to go this route. Koza and Lewin (1999) argue that their experiences 
and research with countless alliances of every type, have led them to conclude that 
the root cause of alliances failing to realize the hoped for potential can be traced to 
failure to grasp and articulate the strategic intent for the alliance, including the failure
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to consider and recognize alternatives to entering into an alliance to begin with. Many 
companies enter SAs where other investment vehicles would be more appropriate 
(Reuer and Zollo, 2000). Another common reason involves lack of recognition of the 
close interplay between the overall strategy of the company and the role of an alliance 
in that strategy.
2. The lack of readiness. Lack of preparedness in terms of competent personnel and 
alliance formation guidelines and processes, and inappropriate strategic decisions 
regarding alliance structure, alliance partner(s) selection, and alliance governance is 
another important reason for alliance high failure rate. When asked why the alliance 
was dissolved or why it failed, managers often cite inadequate advance planning, 
wrong choice of partner or wrong initial strategy, too much detailed negotiations and 
too little managing of the actual alliance, lack of organizational capabilities and 
resources to manage cooperative relationships, strategic mismatch, size mismatch, 
cultural mismatch, and change in the strategy of one partner (Koza and Lewin, 1999). 
Therefore, companies must begin to address this important alliance management 
challenge.
3. The factors linked to relationship issues. Many of the problems in managing alliances 
stem from a lack of attention to relationship issues (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; 
Coopers and Lybrand, 1997; Glaister and Buckley, 1999). The underlying logic of 
such strategies is that combining the distinctive capabilities of two or more 
companies enables each participant to obtain greater productivity from its skills 
and resources, while at the same time sharing external risks and uncertainties 
with partners. Yet, there is a significant element of internal risk involved in agreeing
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to form an alliance with a partner or partners (Kale et al., 2000). The key 
disadvantage of alliances appears to be associated with giving up partial control to 
other companies. It becomes less clear that who is in charge, who owns what, who 
should contribute what, and who should get what of the joint outcomes (Glaister and 
Buckley, 1999). Research is also beginning to explore the interaction between 
potential gains from the alliance as compared to increased risk of opportunistic 
behaviour by a partner (Kale et al., 2000). High rates of SAs failure are attributed to 
opportunistic behaviour (deceitful behaviour) of the member firms. The objective of 
deceitful behaviour by a partner firm is to seek gain for itself at the expense of other 
members in the alliance. Withholding or distorting information and shirking or failing 
to fulfil promises or obligations is an example of deceitful behaviour. The threat of 
potential deceitful behaviour hinders the collaborative efforts of member firms in 
alliances, destroys inter-partner trust and confidence, injects uncertainties about 
alliance performance, and leads, eventually, to alliance termination (Das, 2005). Such 
behaviour leads to loss of trust between alliance partners. Lack of trust is likely to 
undermine advantages of alliances. Also the alliance flexibility can be hampered by 
more or less control “deadlocks” when corporate partners have difficulty in agreeing 
(Gulati et al., 1994).
4. Cultural differences between alliance partners. The majority of the literature agrees 
on the potentially negative effects of national cultural differences on the formation of 
SAs. For example, national cultural distance has often been linked to alliance conflict 
(Lane and Beamish, 1990), misunderstandings (Lyles and Salk, 1996), collaborative 
problems (Mowery et al., 1996), knowledge transfer problems (Hamel, 1991), and
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poor performance or even failure (Meschi, 1997). Culture differences between the 
partners of an international strategic alliance and inappropriate strategic decisions 
regarding choice of entry mode, partner selection and/or venture governance have 
usually been considered a major factor that might influence venture failure or 
unsatisfactory performance (Harrigan, 1985; Cartwright and Cooper, 1993).
Although there has been a large amount of research into ISAs, most studies have tended 
to focus on the motives behind alliance formation, partner selection and the 
characteristics of the resulting cooperation (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Hennart, 
1988; Kogut, 1988; Harrigan, 1988; Bleeke and Ernst, 1991; Parkhe, 1993a; Gulati, 
1995; Vyas et aL, 1995; Glaister and Buckley, 1996). Meanwhile, studies focusing on 
success are still growing (Parkhe, 1993a; Glaister and Buckley, 1999). What studies have 
been undertaken have focused on various factors that may have an impact on alliance 
performance, including ownership, structure and the control-performance relationship 
(Luo and Chen, 1997). Indeed, the high failure rate of SAs has placed major emphasis on 
developing robust alliance formation guidelines and processes, as well as attempting to 
identify what types of firms form effective alliances and the underlying rationale. Also, 
Spekman et al. (1998) maintain that there is a huge gap in our understanding of alliance 
management. Therefore, more systematic empirical research is considered necessary as 
there are many unanswered questions regarding the formation process of such strategic 
alliance (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994; Saxton, 1997; Smith et al., 1995; Glaister et al., 
1998).
7
C hapter 1: In troduction
1.3 Research questions
This study attempts to answer an important question relating to the process of forming 
and managing ISAs in a developing context, more specifically the UAE. This research 
question could be broken down into sub questions as below:
1. How do firms in developing countries select their international strategic alliance’s 
partners? What selection criteria are used by local firms in developing countries? 
Does partner(s) selection affect alliance formation and operation in developing 
countries?
2. How do alliance partners in developing countries choose between different forms 
of SAs’ structure? What factors do affect managers’ decisions? Are these factors 
similar to the one that affect their counterparts in developed context?
3. How do alliance partners in developing countries jointly manage their alliances?
4. How does increasing knowledge of and trust between alliance partners affect 
alliance management and performance?
5. How do alliance partners jointly evaluate the performance of their alliances? 
What performance evaluation criteria are used?
6. How do differences and similarities in partners’ culture affect the formation 
process and management of SAs?
1.4 Aims and objectives of the research
Based on the research problem and research questions above, this study aims to step 
inside the UAE’s enterprises to explore a central managerial process namely “the
8
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formation process of IS As”. The intention is to achieve a better understanding of the 
processes by which IS As are formed within two UAE’s major enterprises and to generate 
a guiding framework that could help in understanding this process within a similar 
developing context. Since this study is the first of its kind in the UAE, its primary aim is 
to provide exploratory findings rather than concrete conclusions. To achieve this aim, the 
study attempts to achieve the following objectives:
1. To describe and explain the formation process of ISAs within the two identified 
enterprises in the UAE.
2. To develop a guiding framework, in the light of the literature reviewed and the 
findings of the study, which could help academics and practitioners understand 
and form successful alliances in the context of a developing country.
1.5 Importance of the study
This study is important for managers, policy makers and practitioners involved in the 
formation of international strategic alliances because the understanding of the formation 
process of ISAs and the factors that contribute to the success and/or failure of such 
alliances will help firms to form successful alliances. Also, since this study also is 
conducted in a developing country it will lead to a better understanding of the formation 
process in such a context which is relatively overlooked in the literature on ISAs.
Therefore this study will bridge the gap in the literature pertaining to ISAs in developing 
countries in general and in the UAE in particular. In other words, this study opens a new
9
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field of research related to ISAs in developing countries where local and foreign 
companies come together to form an alliance.
On a personal side, this study is very important for the researcher and his university. As a 
lecturer of management in the College of Business and Economics in the United Arab 
Emirates University, this study is important for the researcher to develop his career as a 
lecturer, researcher and consultant.
1.6 The conduct of the study
Based on the nature and the aim and objectives of the study, a realism approach is used 
for conducting this research. Realism embraces a middle ground in a dichotomy 
identified as Positivism and Phenomenology (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Knor-Cetina, 
1981; May, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Stiles, 1995). This approach is utilized 
because it takes the advantages of both positivism approach and phenomenology 
approach and helps to understand the process by which people interpret the world (Stiles,
1995). In this respect, Stiles (2003) argues that for the purpose of exploratory research 
into strategic alliance partnerships, the realist paradigm presents the most appropriate 
basis from which to develop a specific method of enquiry. The realism approach also 
calls for the utilization of the qualitative approach. The qualitative research approach is 
designed to enable researchers to obtain a detailed description and to attain in-depth 
information for a better understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (Yin, 
1989; Eisenhardt, 1989).
10
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In addition, methodologists have strongly argued that qualitative methods are suitable and 
vital when the research is exploratory (Darlington and Scott, 2002; and Yin 2003) and 
when the research questions are of what is, how or why type (Amaratunga et al., 2002; 
Spencer et al., 2003; and Yin, 1994). This approach relies on semi-structured interviews 
or group observation and case studies to enable the collection of rich, subjective data 
(Stiles, 2003) Therefore, the research method used in this research is the case study based 
on in-depth interviews, structured interviews (self administered questionnaires), and 
documentary analysis, which is referred to as triangulation. Multiple sources of data are 
used in case studies to increase validity and reliability (Yin, 1994). Semi-structured 
interviews were thus used because such a method would, according to Denzin (1989), 
adequately provide for a combination of objectivity, flexibility and depth. Unlike semis- 
structured interviews, structured interviews (self administered questionnaires) utilize 
closed questions. Closed questions were used in this study in order to save interviewees’ 
time, establish exact facts, and confirm an opinion. Documentary evidence sought to 
“corroborate and augment evidence from other sources” (Yin, 2003:31). Information 
derived from documents also can be used to generate interview questions or identify 
events to be observed. To ensure that the right persons were interviewed and the right 
questions asked, a pilot study was conducted as explained in the methodology chapter.
For the purpose of data analysis, this study utilized some of the procedures and 
techniques suggested by the within case and across case analysis recommended by 
Eisenhardt (1989) and the replication logic suggested by Yin (1989) to detect similarities 
and differences between cases. All in all, the data analysis stage is divided into three
11
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phases. The first phase includes generation and description of propositions. The second 
phase involves interpretation of the generated propositions; and the third phase deals with 
elaboration and reflection of these propositions. The process of data collection and 
analysis is described in full in chapter five.
1.7 The structure of the thesis
Thesis is organized in nine chapters as follows:
Chapter one, “Introduction”, introduces the rationale for the research topic, the research 
problem and questions, aim and objectives, as well as the importance of the study. An 
introduction to the research methodology is also provided in this chapter.
Chapter two, “Conceptual analysis”, establishes the theoretical basis for SAs. The term 
strategic alliance is defined from different perspectives and the types of SAs are also 
described with more emphasis on the most common type, joint ventures (JVs). In this 
chapter the way that SAs emerged and evolved over time is also provided.
Chapter three, “Theoretical analysis”, presents the theoretical framework for the study. 
The major theories of SAs are reviewed and critically analyzed. Among these theories are 
the transaction cost theory, resource-based theory and its extension knowledge-based 
view of SAs. Also, a theoretical framework of the formation process of SAs is developed 
from the major models found in the literature and then described in this chapter.
Chapter four, “The context of the UAE”, focuses on the context within which this study 
is performed. It starts with a brief discussion and analysis of the historical, political and 
economic background of the UAE. The chapter focuses on the economic background
12
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with more emphasis on the global business environment of the UAE and its role in 
enhancing foreign direct investments and foreign trade.
Chapter five, “Research methodology”, presents the research methodology. The chapter 
begins with describing and justifying the research approach used for this study and then 
critically discusses and describes the research methods for data collection. It also contains 
an explanation of the techniques that were employed in analyzing the data.
Chapters six and seven, “Description and analysis of findings”, explore the formation 
process of ISAs within two UAE’s firms. Chapter six provides a description and analysis 
of findings within Abu Dhabi Liquefaction Company (ADGAS). Chapter seven provides 
the same within Emirates Telecommunication Corporation (Etisalat).
Chapter eight, “Discussion of findings”, provides a discussion of findings presented in 
chapters six and seven. In doing so, it identifies and discusses the main characteristics of 
the formation process of ISAs in the UAE and reflects upon such characteristics from the 
perspectives of existing theories of SAs. The discussion is presented around the research 
questions and thus enabled the researcher to make recommendations on how to form 
successful ISAs.
Chapter nine, “Summary, Conclusions and Suggestions for further Research”, presents a 
summary of the study, draws pertinent conclusions, highlights the contributions of this 
study to knowledge, makes recommendations, enumerates some limitations of the study 
and presents a discussion of future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2
Strategic alliances: A conceptual analysis
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to provide a conceptual analysis of the concept of SAs. It starts 
by reviewing the nature of SAs including the definition of strategic alliance from 
different perspectives, the scope and types of SAs, the reasons behind the emergence of 
strategic alliances and the way they have evolved over the recent years. The chapter ends 
with remarks summarizing the outlines of the chapter.
2.2 The nature of strategic alliances
To start with, this section provides the definition of strategic alliance from different 
perspectives in order to capture the meaning and intentions of SAs from different angles 
which in turn helps in achieving the research objectives. Characteristics of SAs are then 
derived from these definitions in order to gain more understanding of the term. Types and 
scope of SAs are also discussed in order to set the boundaries of this study because some 
types of inter-firm collaboration are considered outside the area of SAs. A special 
attention is given to joint venture as a form of SAs due to its importance and 
commonality. However, the terms SAs and JVs are used interchangeably in this study to 
denote inter-firm collaborative partnerships. Also the evolution and the reasons behind 
the emergence of strategic alliances are discussed.
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2.2.1 What is a strategic alliance?
The definition of strategic alliance is problematic (Sulej, 1998). In this regard, Sulej
(1998) states that there is considerable debate within strategic alliance and joint venture 
research as to what is actually meant by these terms and the way in which they are used. 
However, the researcher observed that the best way to define the term strategic alliance is 
by looking at its characteristics because this helps in gaining a deeper understanding of 
the term. This research relied on a number of definitions proposed by different authors 
who have different views of SAs, as follows:
2.2.1.1 A strategic alliance is a rationale process for pooling resources
Van de Ven (1976) noted early on that the process of inter-organizational relationships 
can be studied as a flow of resources among organizations. Based on Van de Ven’s 
(1976) work, Kogut (1988) argues that a joint venture is formed when two or more firms 
pool a portion of their resources within a common legal organization. Similarly, Hamilton 
(1996) defined a strategic alliance as a durable relationship established between two or 
more independent enterprises, involving the sharing or pooling of resources to create a 
mechanism (corporate or otherwise) for undertaking a business activity or activities of 
strategic importance to one or more of the partners for their mutual economic advantage.
2.2.1.2 A strategic alliance is a collaborative arrangement
The process of pooling resources for the purpose of alliance formation requires certain 
types of collaborative arrangements, agreements, or linkages (Abdou and Kliche, 2004). 
Such a collaborative arrangement is emphasized by some researchers in their definitions 
of SAs. For example, Gulati (1999) defined a strategic alliance as any voluntarily 
initiated cooperative agreement between companies that involves exchange, sharing or
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co-development, and it can include contributions by partners of capital, technology, or 
firm-specific assets. Similarly, Buckley and Casson (1998) defined SAs as inter-firm 
collaborations over a given economic space and time for the achievement of mutually 
defined goals, where the venture must be collaborative in that there must be some input 
of resources from at least two companies. By economic space and time it is meant that 
the essence of an alliance is that it operates across the boundaries of the companies, the 
alliance can range from local to global, and that alliances can operate in some defined 
real time or until certain goals are achieved.
2.2.1.3 A strategic alliance is a way to achieving competitive advantage
Researchers such as Jarillo (1988), Burgers et al. (1993), Das and Teng (1998), and Hitt 
et al. (2000a) agree that SAs are formed between two or more partners for the purpose of 
achieving strategic goals as well as enhancing the competitive advantage of all 
organizations in the alliance.
2.2.1.4 International strategic alliances agonist domestic strategic alliances
The global dimension of SAs was proposed by Parkhe (1991) who defined SAs as 
relatively enduring inter-firm cooperative arrangements, involving cross-border flows 
and linkages that utilize resources and/or governance structures from autonomous 
organizations headquartered in two or more countries, for the joint accomplishment of 
individual goals linked to the corporate mission of each sponsoring firm. Therefore, SAs 
can be domestic or international in their nature. They are global if operations are located 
outside the country of one or all partners (Parkhe, 1991).
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2.2.2 Characteristics of strategic alliances
The following characteristics of SAs are derived from the above definitions as follows:
1. The essence of an alliance is that it operates across the boundaries of the companies.
2. SAs can be understood as collaborative arrangements in which there must be some 
input of resources pooled or flowing between two or more companies.
3. A strategic alliance involves at least two partner companies that remain legally 
independent after the alliance is formed, share benefits and managerial control, and 
make continuing contributions in one or more strategic areas.
4. There must be a mutual economic advantage for the alliance partners, such as 
improving competitive position and performance, in order for the relationship to 
continue.
5. SAs do not just happen; typically they are the result of conscious intentions of 
proactive actions.
6. A strategic alliance is a selective process that involves a number of decisions which 
are strategic in their nature. There is a joint choice of partners, forms of structure, 
and control systems.
7. SAs may have formal substance, typically in documentary or contractual form. This 
documentation may specify objectives, priorities, alliance scope, and control 
methods.
8. Alliances can operate in some defined real time or until certain goals are achieved.
9. The alliance can range from local to international.
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2.2.3 Types of strategic alliances
It is some ambivalence when it comes to precisely classifying what types of cooperative 
arrangements can be termed SAs (Acedo et al., 2006). Researchers (such as Varadarajan 
and Rajaratnam, 1986; Borys and Jemison, 1989; Forrest, 1992; Lei and Slocum, 1991; 
Murray and Mahon, 1993; Stafford, 1994) who are in favour of a more inclusive 
approach maintain that virtually all kinds of inter-firm arrangements should be called 
strategic alliances. Varadarajan and Rajaratnam (1986) argue that SAs can range from 
handshake agreements to licensing, mergers, and outsourcing and equity JVs. Therefore, 
in this approach, under the concept of strategic alliance, there are various kinds of 
arrangements: mergers and acquisitions; JVs; licensing; joint research and development 
arrangements; technology swaps; buyer-supplier relationships, and others. In contrast, 
other researchers such as Acedo et al., (2006), Devlin and Bleackley (1988) and Yoshino 
and Rangan (1995) have adopted a more restricted view, and have sought to make a 
distinction between SAs and other cooperative arrangements. Yoshino and Rangan 
(1995) argue that many types of partnerships would not be considered SAs. Mergers and 
acquisitions, for example, would not be considered SAs, nor would wholly owned 
subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs), because they do not involve two or 
more independent companies sharing benefits and control over a continuing period of 
time. In a similar vein, Acedo et al. (2006) opine that SAs refer only to those deals in 
which the parent companies are tied to each other in a substantive manner (i.e., long-term 
interdependence, shared control, and continued contributions by the parents). Thus, in 
this narrower conception, only a few selected kinds of cooperative arrangements would 
qualify as SAs, and would include JVs, equity investment, joint research and 
development, and joint marketing (Acedo et al., 2006). This view is also supported by
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Contractor and Lorange (2002) who argue that alliances are any inter-firm cooperation 
that falls between the extremes of discrete, short-term contracts and the complete merger 
of two or more organizations. Figure 2.1 shows that complete mergers, acquisitions or 
Greenfield subsidiaries are excluded from the types of SAs.
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F ig u re  2.1: T ypes o f  stra teg ic  a lliances
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Todeva and Knoke (2005) are in line with Contractor and Lorange (2002) who found that 
there are 13 basic forms of inter-organizational relations in the literature. These forms can 
be perceived as a continuum where the first and the last forms represent the two extremes 
of this continuum and are not forms of SAs. In between these two extremes are 11 
general strategic alliance forms that combine varying degrees of market interaction and 
bureaucratic integration. Table 2.1 below shows 13 forms of inter-organizational 
relationships where only forms 2-12 are considered as SAs:
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T ab le  2.1: F orm s o f  in ter-organ iza tion a l re la tion sh ip s
N
0
F orm s o f
in ter-organ iza tion a l
rela tion s
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1 Hierarchical relations Through acquisition or merger, one firm takes full control of 
another’s assets and coordinates actions by the ownership rights 
mechanism.
2 Joint ventures Two or more companies create a jointly owned legal organization 
that serves a limited purpose for its parents, such as research and 
development, production or marketing.
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3 Equity investments A majority or minority equity holding by one firm through a 
direct stock purchase of shares in another firm.
4 j Cooperatives A coalition of small companies that combine, coordinate, and 
manage their collective resources.
5 Research and 
development consortia
Inter-firm agreements for research and development 
collaboration, typically formed in fast-changing technological 
fields.
6 Strategic cooperative 
agreements
Contractual business networks based on joint multi-party 
strategic control, with the partners collaborating over key 
strategic decisions and sharing responsibilities for performance 
outcomes.
7 Cartels Large corporations collude to constrain competition by 
cooperatively controlling production and/or prices within a 
specific industry.
8 Franchising A franchiser grants a franchisee the use of a brand-name identity 
within a geographic area, but retains control over pricing, 
marketing, and standardized service norms.
9 Licensing One company grants another the right to use patented 
technologies or production processes in return for royalties and 
fees.
10 Subcontractor networks Inter-linked companies where a subcontractor negotiates its 
suppliers ’ long-term prices, production runs, and delivery 
schedules.
11 Industry standards groups Committees that seek the member organizations’ agreements on 
the adoption of technical standards for manufacturing and trade.
12 Action sets Short-lived organizational coalitions whose members coordinate 
their lobbying efforts to influence public policy making.
13 Market relations Arm’s-length transactions between organizations coordinated 
only through the price mechanism.
Source: A d op ted  fro m  T od eva, E  and  K n ok e , D . (2005), “S tra teg ic  a llian ces and  m odels o f  
co llab ora tion ” , M anagem ent Decision  43: 123-148
Based on Williamson’s (1975) work, Todeva and Knoke (2005) suggest that the principal 
dimension ordering this classification is that, from bottom to top, collaborating 
companies experience increasing integration and formalization in the governance of their 
inter-organizational relationships. Governance refers to combinations of legal and social
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control mechanisms for coordinating and safeguarding the alliance partners’ resource 
contributions, administrative responsibilities, and division of rewards from their joint 
activities. The bottom of the list shows pure market transactions requiring no obligation 
for recurrent cooperation, coordination, or collaboration among the exchanging parties. 
The top of the list represents hierarchical authority relations in which one firm takes full 
control, absorbing another’s assets and personnel into a unitary enterprise. In between 
these extremes of market and hierarchy are 11 general strategic alliance forms, or 
“hybrids” that combine varying degrees of market interaction and bureaucratic 
integration.
Joint ventures
In this section the term joint venture is described in more details. The reason for choosing 
joint ventures is that it is considered the most dominant and the most important form of 
SAs. For example, Beamish (1994) argues that joint venture, the most common form of 
strategic alliance, is the dominant strategy used in emerging markets by multinational 
companies. JVs occur when two or more legally separate bodies form a jointly owned 
entity in which they invest and engage in various decision-making activities. 
Geringer (1988; 1991) asserts that JVs involve two or more legally distinct organizations 
(the parents), each of which actively participates, beyond a mere investment role, in the 
decision-making activities of the jointly-owned entity.
It is interesting to distinguish between equity JVs and non-equity JVs. On the one hand, 
Geringer (1991) and Harrigan (1985) have observed that equity joint ventures are created
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when two or more partners join forces to create a newly incorporated company in which 
each has an equity share and each thereby may expect an appropriate allocation of 
dividends as compensation, representation on the equity JVs board of directors, and 
active participation in the decision-making activities of the venture. On the other hand, 
Contractor and Lorange (1988) described non-equity joint ventures as agreements 
between partners to cooperate in some way but they do not involve the creation of a new 
firm.
To sum, only inter-firm collaborations that result in companies that remain independent 
after collaboration are considered SAs. According to this principal criterion, some 
mergers and acquisitions will be kept outside the boundaries of SAs. This research adopts 
the restrictive view of inter-firm collaboration and hence excludes mergers and 
acquisitions from the field of study.
2.2.4 Emergence and evolution of strategic alliances
The use of SAs has always been part of the social and political fabric, yet recent history 
has recorded a marked increase in the use of alliances as a strategic business tool (Lloyd 
and Varey, 2003; Ohmae, 1989). In this respect, Demirbag and Mirza (2000) argue that 
the use of SAs in doing business domestically and globally is scarcely new. They are 
among the oldest organizational forms in existence and were originally used as a 
commercial device by the merchants of Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia to conduct 
overseas commercial transactions. What is new in the modem era, however, especially 
since the 1970s, is the apparent growth in the frequency of the use of joint ventures, their
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geographic extent, and the unique propositions and problems they raise because of their 
occurrence in an international and inter-cultural context (Demirbag and Mirza, 2000). 
Equity joint venture formations for all countries were recorded in the Co-operative 
Agreements and Technology Indicators Information System (CATI) database over the 
period 1945-1989. The CATI was developed by The Maastricht Economic Research 
Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT) at the University of Limburg in 
Holland. According to Duysters and Hagedoom (2000) the CATI states that joint venture 
formation took place at relatively low levels between 1945 and 1970, steadily increasing 
to 1987 and then rising steeply between 1987 and 1989. One of the most notable 
developments of the 1990s has been observed increase in the number of emerging 
opportunities and challenges for cross-border direct investments and cooperative ventures 
(Dunning, 1993a). Much of the rise in the use of SAs can be explained by changing 
conditions in the world economy and the need for organizations to gain rapid access to 
technology and new markets in order to remain competitive on a global basis (Bartlett 
and Ghoshal, 1989; Ghemawat et aL, 1986; Glaister and Buckley, 1995). The 
convergence of several trends, including global proliferation of technology, 
reorganization of economic boundaries, and intensified global competition, have 
profoundly altered marketers’ notions about the firm, markets, and competition. Product 
and process life cycles have become significantly shorter, eroding product-based 
advantages and forcing companies to develop continuous streams of innovation. In 
addition, consumers and organizational buyers have become more sophisticated, 
demanding differentiated and better-quality products. Other forces have helped shape this 
transformation. Relatively stable domestic competition of the 1970s has now been
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replaced by global competition in many industries. Revolutionary advances in 
transportation, communication, and information technologies, (Czinkota and Ronkainen, 
2001; Robson et al., 2002), helped many multinational firms, headquartered in both the 
developed and the newly industrializing nations, are sourcing from several countries, and 
are aggressively and simultaneously entering a variety of markets. Industry structures are 
evolving rapidly, forcing firms to develop new marketing strategies in order to compete 
effectively and to survive. Economic liberalization in developing countries and the 
increasing liberalization of national trade policies have also emerged as major 
phenomena that have accelerated the growth in cooperative activity between MNEs and 
local private firms in developing countries (UNCTAD, 1995).
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These factors made managers realize that, no matter how strong and resourceful their 
firms might be, they are no longer able to maintain a competitive advantage at every step 
in the value chain in all national markets, nor are they able to maintain a cutting edge in 
the wide range of technologies required for the design, development, manufacture and 
marketing of new products (Kauser and Shaw, 2004). In this regard, Beamish and Killing 
(1996) suggest that it is time to “consolidate the current and future thinking” on 
international cooperation. Druker (1995) also argues that the greatest change in corporate 
culture, and the way business is being conducted, may be the accelerating growth of the 
relationships based not on ownership but on partnership. Thus IS As have become an 
important means of ationalizing operations to overcome potential difficulties and to help 
firms regain and maintain their competitive position in international markets (Ohmae,
1989).
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ISAs are a popular strategy for firms for sharing risks and exchanging resources, 
accessing new markets, achieving economies of scale and obtaining synergy and 
competitive advantages (Dacin et al., 1997). They may also serve as an exchange 
arrangement for partners to learn and acquire from each other the technologies, 
skills and knowledge that are not available within their own organizations. Although 
most studies on strategic alliances focus on advanced countries where strategic 
resources are abundant, such alliances are also useful for companies in developing 
countries as a means of gaining access to new technologies and new markets. For 
example, Gilroy (1993) attributes the success of some East Asian developing countries 
to inter-firm linkages established by indigenous companies with counterparts in the 
more advanced countries. These linkages provide technologies, entrepreneurial and 
managerial know-how and market access, to aid an export-oriented development strategy.
2.3 Summary and conclusion
When defining the concept of SAs, it should be thought of as a process of pooling 
resources, a collaborative arrangement, a way to achieve competitive advantage, a long 
term agreement and as being domestic or international in its nature. While some 
researchers follow a narrow conception of SAs by excluding mergers and acquisition in 
particular from the domain of SAs, others believe in a wider concept. It is worth noting 
that a joint venture (both equity and non equity) is the major form of SAs because it is 
more durable, requires more commitment of resources, and needs more control than other 
forms of SAs. Although SAs were originally used as a commercial device by the 
merchants of Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia to conduct overseas commercial
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transactions, it is only since the 1970s that their unique characteristics and problems, 
growth, and geographic extent have experienced significant changes. The effect of 
globalization and the presence of international organizations such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), as well as the development in information technology followed by 
a reduction in communication costs and an increase in the intensity of competition are 
among the major reasons that led to the emergence and evolution of SAs.
The next chapter will be devoted to reviewing the major theories of SAs and explaining 
the process of strategic alliance formation.
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CHAPTER 3
Strategic alliances: A theoretical analysis
3.1Introduction
To account for the emergence of SAs and their operation, the major theories and studies 
of SAs are reviewed in this chapter. The chapter is made of two parts. In the first part, 
theories of strategic alliances are analyzed and discussed. The dominant transaction cost 
theory is reviewed critically by evaluating the views of its major contributors, among 
them are Williamson (1975, 1985), Buckley and Casson (1988), Hennart (1988, 1991), 
Ring and Van De Ven, (1992) and Oxley (1997). The resource-based theory (Barney, 
1986, 1991; Wemerfelt, 1984; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; 
Das and Teng, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003; Mahoney, 2001) and its extension, 
knowledge-based theory (Hamel, 1991; Parkhe 1993a; Yan and Gray, 1994; Kogut, 1998; 
Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Inkpen, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996) are also reviewed. Part 
two is devoted to analyzing and discussing a theoretical framework of the formation 
process of SAs which involves major phases as well as factors affecting the process. The 
chapter ends with some remarks summarizing the features of the theoretical framework.
3.2 Theories of strategic alliances
In this part, the major theories of SAs are presented and analyzed. These theories are 
transaction cost theory, resource-based theory and its extension knowledge-based theory. 
It is important to analyze these theories because they set the bases for understanding the 
reasons for forming SAs and the way they are operated and managed.
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3.2.1 Transaction cost theory
According to Williamson (1981) a transaction occurs when a good or service is
transferred across a technologically separable interface. One stage of activity terminates
and another begins. Using an example, he conceptualized the term transaction cost:
“With a well-working interface, as with a well working machine, these 
transfers occur smoothly. In mechanical systems we look for frictions: do the 
gears mesh, are the parts lubricated, is there any needless slippage or other 
loss o f energy? The economic counterpart offriction is transaction cost: do 
the parties to the exchange operate harmoniously, or are there frequent 
misunderstandings and conflicts that lead to delays, breakdowns and other 
malfunctions? ” (1981:552).
In transaction cost economics, a firm’s ownership decision centres on minimizing the 
sum of transaction costs and production costs (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975). Hence, 
in business transactions there are two kinds of costs needed to be considered; transaction 
costs and production costs. While transaction costs refer to costs that are incurred from 
activities necessary for an exchange (such as writing and enforcing a contract), 
production costs come from coordinating activities in-house, in terms of learning, 
organizing, and managing production (Das and Teng, 2000b). Furthermore, Gulati (1995) 
observed that alliance transaction costs include those concerned with negotiating and 
writing contingent contracts, monitoring partner performance relative to the contract and 
dealing with the breaches of contractual commitments. While production costs may vary 
from firm to firm according to proprietary knowledge, abilities to learn, and economies of 
scale, transaction costs may vary from transaction to transaction according to the 
expenses incurred for writing and enforcing contracts. Should the sum of these two costs 
be higher if a transaction is carried out in the market, the market will be internalized. The 
firm will expand its boundaries to include the specific transaction for as long as this
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comparison of relative costs holds. In contrast, the market will be the preferred 
mechanism for carrying out the transaction when the opposite occurs (Williamson, 1981). 
Some transactions will, thus, be internalized, while others will be carried out through the 
market (Hemphil and Vonortas, 2003). High transaction costs are, therefore, the result of 
incomplete contracts. A contract is incomplete when it does not fully specify the actions 
of each party in all states of the world. The inability to write complete contracts will often 
lead to a decision to overcome high market costs by internalizing the market, in other 
words by expanding the boundaries of the firm. It should be stressed that a firm might 
find it optimal to think strategically and internalize a transaction even if currently 
carrying out the transaction through the market is the least expensive way. This, for 
example, can happen if the firm expects opportunistic behaviour by the other party in the 
transaction. Therefore, hierarchical governance structures (i.e., firms) are better than 
market contracting when opportunistic behaviours are probable, and therefore, 
transaction costs are high (Williamson, 1975).
Scholars such as Gulati (1995) and Kale et al. (2000) consider SAs as an alternative to 
internalization on the one hand and market exchanges on the other. Since internalization 
(e.g., mergers, acquisitions, and internal development) controls transaction costs 
effectively, this will be preferred when transaction costs of an exchange are high. In 
contrast, market exchanges bear transaction costs but avoid production costs, so that they 
will be used when transaction costs are low and production costs are high. SAs combine 
the features of internalization and market exchanges because they partially internalize an 
exchange (see Figure 3.1). Therefore, alliances can be viewed as “reflecting semi- 
intemalization” where contracts will still be needed, but since they are often incomplete,
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much of the activities will be left to joint coordination. As a result, researchers suggest 
that alliances will be preferred when the transaction costs associated with an exchange 
are intermediate and not high enough to justify vertical integration and when they 
minimize the firm’s transaction cost (Gulati, 1995; Jarillo, 1988; Hennart, 1988). 
However, Gulati (1998) and Gulati and Singh (1998) opine that central to the transaction 
cost economics argument is the firm’s ability to control alliance coordination costs 
incurred in decomposing tasks among partners and coordinating actions through 
integrated decision networks and their associated communication patterns. Buckley and 
Casson (1988) claim that from a traditional transaction cost/intemalization perspective, 
firms form alliances only when internalizing one or more markets in intermediate goods 
provides benefits for the SAs, and when significant barriers to a merger exist. Thus, it is 
widely assumed that firms establish SAs only when the perceived additional benefits 
from SAs outweigh expected extra costs (Geringer, 1991). In what follows benefits 
accrued from forming SAs, or in other words motives for forming SAs, are discussed.
F ig u re  3.1: S tra teg ic  a lliances as com b in a tion  o f  in tern a liza tion  an d  m ark et exch an ges
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3.2.1.1 Motives for forming strategic alliances from a transaction cost perspective
Firms enter into SAs when synergy benefits are likely to be achieved (Abdou and Kliche,
2004). Synergy exists when the companies’ value of resources and assets combined is 
greater than the value of resources and assets of the single companies. Several sources of 
inter-firm synergy have been discussed in literature. The most important synergy sources 
are: exploiting economies of scale; learning from competitors; managing risk and sharing 
costs; facilitating tacit collusion; low-cost entry into new markets; low-cost entry into 
new industries and new industry segments; and managing uncertainty (Abdou and Kliche,
2004). However, Lorange and Roos (1991) suggest that firms form alliances for both 
offensive and defensive reasons. Offensive alliances focus on accessing or creating 
markets, defining or setting industry standards, anticipating or preparing for new political 
developments, and/or, competitive actions (Bronder and Pritzl, 1992; Doz, 1992). 
Defensive alliances focus on protecting or (solidifying) an existing market position; 
sharing the financial risk of an expensive technology; or gaining economies of scale often 
by combining processes and or production capabilities (Lorange and Roos, 1991; Ohmae,
1989). Alliances are formed also to facilitate learning (Hamel, 1991; Lei and Slocum,
1992). For example learning may involve gaining access to innovative new technology; 
or to financial, marketing; and production expertise (Teece, 1992). One outcome of this 
approach is to speed time to market. Therefore, SAs are used to combine complementary 
inputs (e.g. know-how) held by two separate firms, when the market (purchase) of these 
inputs is subject to high transaction costs. This is supported by the results of a study made 
by Hennart (1991) about the Japanese subsidiaries in the United States of America (USA) 
which suggested that as predicted by the transaction cost theory, Japanese parent 
companies joint venture in the USA when they need to combine with other firms
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intermediate inputs which are subject to high market transaction costs. This is occurring 
in three instances. First, when they are venturing outside their main industry and thus 
they need complementary inputs from firms active in that industry. Second, when they 
enter the USA market for the first time and therefore they may need to acquire the tacit 
knowledge on how to operate and sell in the USA. Finally, Japanese firms join their USA 
affiliates when they seek access to resources held by their USA partners. Thus, alliances 
are intended to minimize total transaction costs, are employed for reasons of strategy, and 
for exchanges of competencies.
Glaister and Buckley (1996) claim that motives for SAs identified in the literature are risk 
sharing; product rationalization and economies of scale; transfer of complementary 
technology and exchange of patents; shaping competition; conforming to host 
government policy; facilitating international expansion and vertical linkage. Neither 
partner in the alliance bears the full risk and cost of the alliance activity (Porter and 
Fuller, 1986). More broadly, Contractor and Lorange (1988) identified the ways in which 
alliances can reduce a partner’s risk. These include: i) spreading the risk of a large project 
over more than one firm; ii) enabling product diversification and thus reducing market 
risks associated with being reliant on only one product; iii) enabling faster market entry 
and quicker establishment of a presence in the market; and iv) when the cost of the 
partnership is less than the cost of investment undertaken by each firm alone. Strategic 
alliances enable partners to rationalize their products and reach economies of scale 
through the use of comparative advantage of each partner and the selection of the more 
advantageous location while producing in large volumes which finally provide further 
reduction in average unit costs (Contractor and Lorange, 1988). Also, alliances may be
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used to bring together complementary skills and talents and exchange technology which 
covers different aspects of know-how needed in high technology industries, a result 
which is unlikely to be achieved by one firm acting alone (Contractor and Lorange,
1988). One of the oldest rationales for SAs has been building links with local companies 
in order to accommodate host government policy. Many governments in developing 
countries insist that access to the local markets can occur only if the foreign company 
works in cooperation with a local partner (Beamish, 1988). Strategic alliances also 
facilitate international expansion for many companies which lack international 
experience. A firm may, for example, have the production capability but lack knowledge 
of foreign markets for which it depends on partners (Glaister and Buckley, 1996).
It is interesting to note here that benefits from SAs will accrue only through the selection 
and retention of a partner that can provide skills, competencies, capabilities, and 
knowledge that assist the focal firm in accomplishing its strategic objectives (Buckley 
and Casson, 1988; Hamel, 1991). Put it in different words, the specific motive for 
alliance formation is likely to have an impact on the partner selection process, as firms 
are likely to value differently the capabilities of a potential partner based on this initial 
motive (Nielsen, 2003). For instance, if the main motive for forming an alliance is to 
reduce costs by expanding output (economies of scale), selection criteria associated with 
access to materials and natural resources and (cheap) labour may be most important. 
Conversely, if the main motivation for alliance formation is international expansion or 
market entry, selection criteria pertaining to knowledge about the local, foreign market, 
such as local market knowledge and/or regulatory knowledge, may be valued higher 
(Nielsen, 2003).
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To summarize, companies do not form SAs unless there are benefits to be accrued from 
such relationships. These benefits work as the motives which induce firms to form SAs. 
From the transaction cost perspective these motives are: exploiting economies of scale; 
learning from competitors; managing risk and sharing costs; facilitating tacit collusion; 
low-cost entry into new markets; low-cost entry into new industries and new industry 
segments; facilitating learning and to speed time to market entry.
3.2.1.2 Criticism of the transaction cost theory
The transaction cost theory is criticized by a number of authors for its limitations. In what 
follows the criticism of the transaction cost theory is presented and discussed.
1. The transaction cost theory is criticized on the ground that it does not assign a 
significant role to partner firm resources in theorizing about SAs (Das and Teng, 
2000b).
2. The theory is also criticized for paying exclusive attention to cost minimization 
and neglecting value-creation in SAs. Zajac and Olsen (1993) argue that the 
attention should be shifted to the processes by which alliance partners create and 
claim value.
3. Many organizational issues are assumed away by the theory such as the effect of 
trust and culture on SAs. For example, Gulati (1995) argues that the problem with 
transaction cost theory is the exclusion of inter-firm trust. Accordingly, perhaps 
the most condemning criticism of transaction cost economics is that it may not 
matter to actual decision makers (Hyder, 1999).
4. Although the transaction cost theory has proven to be useful in understanding 
SAs, the logic of minimization does not capture many of the strategic advantages
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of alliances such as learning, creation of legitimacy and fast market entry 
(Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996).
3.2.2 Resource-based theory
The resource-based theory stresses the internal aspects of a firm. Barney (1991) and 
Tsang (1998), for example, argue that in the management discipline, a recent 
development is to examine and develop a firm’s strategy by focusing on its resources 
instead of the external environment. The resource-based advocates, therefore, claim that 
rather than being defined by the competitive environment, the parameters of a firm’s 
competitive strategy are critically influenced by its accumulated resources. Before 
embarking into explaining and discussing the resource-based theory, the notion of 
resources will be discussed below.
Wemerfelt (1984: 172 defines resources as “those (tangible and intangible) assets which 
are tied semi-permanently to the firm ”). Other scholars have proposed a number of 
resource typologies. While Wemerfelt (1984) enumerated two kinds of resources: 
tangible and intangible resources, Barney (1991) classified firm resources into three 
categories: physical capital resources, human capital resources, and organizational capital 
resources. However, Miller and Shamsie (1996) suggest that all resources may be 
classified into two broad categories based on the notion of barriers to imitation, these are 
property-based resources and knowledge-based resources. Therefore, the resource-based 
theory seems particularly appropriate for examining SAs because firms essentially use 
alliances to gain access to other firms’ valuable resources (Barney, 1991). Focusing 
exclusively on the resource-based theory of strategic alliances, Eisenhardt and
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Schoonhoven (1996) found essentially that alliances are more likely to be formed 
when firms in the alliance are in vulnerable strategic positions; in other words in need of 
resources or when they are in strong social positions, for example possessing 
valuable resources to share. The rationale of the resource-based theory is that valuable 
firm resources are usually scarce, imperfectly imitable, and lacking in direct substitutes 
(Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Thus, the trading and accumulation of resources becomes 
a strategic necessity. When efficient market exchange of resources is possible, firms are 
more likely to continue alone and rely on the market (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven,
1996). However, although market transactions are the default mode, efficient exchanges 
are often not possible on the spot market. Certain resources are not perfectly tradable, 
as they are either mingled with other resources or embedded in organizations (Chi,
1994). Hence, mergers, acquisitions, and SAs are variously employed. Thus, the 
resource-based theory considers SAs and mergers and acquisitions as strategies used to 
access other firms’ resources for the purpose of gamering otherwise unavailable 
competitive advantages and values to the firm (Das and Teng, 2000b). Therefore, the 
overall rationale of resource-based theory for entering into a strategic alliance is to 
aggregate, share, or exchange valuable resources with other firms when these resources 
cannot be efficiently obtained through market exchanges or mergers and acquisitions.
3.2.2.1 Motives for forming strategic alliances from a resource-based view
Kogut (1988) and Das and Teng (1998) suggest that there are two related, but distinct, 
motives for firms to use SAs: (1) to obtain others’ resources; and (2) to retain and 
develop one’s own resources by combining them with others’ resources.
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Obtaining Resources: Firms may use alliances to obtain resources possessed by other 
firms that are valuable and essential to achieving competitive advantage. In this 
respect, Glaister and Buckley (1996) found that access to complementary resources rather 
than the sharing of risks and development of economies of scale were the primary reasons 
firms form alliances. In the international arena, multinational companies may seek the 
resources of their local partners, such as local facilities, knowledge, and connections, by 
forming international joint ventures (Beamish and Banks, 1987; Yan and Gray, 1994). In 
new product development, SAs are used to pool the technological know-how and 
expertise of different firms (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Teece, 1992). For example, E.R. 
Squibb, a pharmaceutical company (USA), joined with NOVO, a small insulin and 
enzyme manufacturer (Denmark), to market a new insulin product that had been five 
years ahead of the market. NOVO supplied product and production technology while 
Squibb provided the sales and distribution network for the North American market as 
well as the expertise needed for compliance with US government regulations pertaining 
to NOVO’s newly developed injection system. Likewise, BMW invested in an automated 
machine-vision inspection system for automotive parts developed for them by American 
Cimlex (USA). Through the alliance, BMW gained rapid and effective access to a highly 
innovative product and a fast track from the laboratory to a marketable commercial 
prototype. American Cimlex, a much smaller company, gained access to otherwise 
unobtainable financial resources and to BMW’s manufacturing know-how and global 
marketing capabilities (Barney, 1991; Hamel, 1991).
Thus, while alliances and mergers and acquisitions can accomplish the objective of 
obtaining a selected firm’s resources, the resource-based theory suggests that
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alliances are favoured over mergers and acquisitions when not all the resources 
possessed by the target firm are valuable to the acquiring firm. Some of the less 
valuable or redundant resources in a merger and/or acquisition can not be easily disposed 
of without taking a loss (Ramanathan et al., 1997). Hennart and Reddy (1997) reason that 
when unwanted assets are mixed with needed assets, and the two are not readily 
separable, acquisitions inevitably result in unneeded assets. When non-desired assets are 
not easily separable, SAs allow the partner firms to access only the assets each desires 
while bypassing non-desired ones, thereby augmenting overall value.
Moreover, when a firm is only interested in learning about one competence among the 
many possessed by the firm it aims to join, then mergers and acquisitions become 
virtually meaningless (Badaracco, 1991). For example, in 1983 General Motors (GM) 
established a 50-50 jointly owned venture, called New United Motors Manufacturing Inc. 
(NUMMI), with Toyota in the USA. Up to that point, GM had worked at developing a 
compact car with its “Saturn Project,” assembling technicians from around the world 
drawn from its subsidiaries such as Opel and Vauxhall. However, it was unable to arrive 
at a compact car prototype with a concept that worked in the world market. But via the 
inter-organizational learning mediated by its alliance with Toyota, GM could accumulate 
the development know-how based on the Corolla and Camry, and was able to rapidly 
introduce a compact car into the market. Moreover, GM learned a management system 
for automobile production from Toyota and succeeded in raising a productivity that 
initially paled markedly by comparison with Japanese competitors. On the other hand, by 
constructing a partnership with the United Automobile Workers (UAW), Toyota was able 
to transplant the Toyota production style to America. In the beginning, Japanese makers
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such as Honda and Nissan already had factories in America, but NUMMI was the first to 
recognize UAW’s representational rights. By virtue of this alliance, Toyota was able to 
take from GM a variety of information and know-how concerning the American workers, 
parts makers, government, and so forth. With such things as the establishment the 
following year in Kentucky of a subsidiary in which it held a 100 per cent share, it 
applied the information it had accumulated in its subsequent North American expansion 
and was able to advance its operations in North America more rapidly and smoothly than 
the other Japanese competitors (Akio, 2004). Thus, the distinct benefit of SAs is to have 
access to precisely those resources that were needed, with minimum superfluity (Das and 
Teng, 2000b). In support of this argument, Hennart and Reddy (1997: 4) found that 
“firms prefer acquisitions when the desired assets are digestible ”
To summarize, there are some resource characteristics that encourage firms to form SAs. 
These characteristics have been identified as: imperfect mobility, imperfect imitability, 
and imperfect substitutability (Barney, 1991; Chi, 1994; Dierickx and Cool, 1989; 
Peteraf, 1993). Imperfect mobility, imperfect imitability, and imperfect substitutability 
of firm resources are essential for sustained resource heterogeneity as well as being 
instrumental in the formation of strategic alliances. Imagine a firm whose resources 
are perfectly or easily mobile, imitable, and substitutable. Clearly, other firms would be 
in a position to bid desirable resources away from such a firm in factor markets. There 
would then hardly be a need to form SAs. Should all desirable resources be available for 
acquisition in factor markets at fair prices, it would be foolhardy for firms to get involved 
in SAs, which usually entail high governance costs (Osborn and Baughn, 1990) and some 
sacrifice of organizational control (Lyles and Reger, 1993). A fairly self-evident premise
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for this argument is that resources that are not perfectly mobile, imitable, and 
substitutable can be obtained through alliances. The point is that the more imperfect 
the mobility, imitability, and substitutability of a firm’s resources is, the more 
likely that others will be interested in forming alliances with it. For example, Intel 
Corp. (USA) and NMB Semiconductor Co. (Japan) enjoyed several years of an excellent 
working relationship supplying each other with a variety of electronic items. They have 
teamed up to build a semiconductor foundry in Japan. The new facility will give NMB 
access to Intel’s worldwide sales and marketing network, an area where NMB has been 
weak. On the other hand, it will give Intel an assured source of high quality memory 
chips (Kuhn, 1989). Thus, these alliances are examples of the benefits that can be derived 
from a long-term commitment made by the members of the alliance. In order to develop 
complex technology and properly introduce it into, in many cases, a foreign market, an 
extended time frame is required. Such an alliance may last for an extended time period, 
often ten years or more, and will often produce numerous new products.
Retaining Resources: Whereas the motive of obtaining resources is to reach others’ 
resources, the motive of “retaining resources” is to keep one’s own valuable resources 
securely in the firm. Kogut (1988) suggests that firms may wish to. maintain certain 
resources but lack the setup to make use of them. For example, sometimes there may 
be an excess of research personnel, without sufficient meaningful work at hand. 
Rather than laying these individuals off, firms out-source them by seeking projects that 
can be carried out in conjunction with the resources of other firms, such as financial and 
physical resources. To that end, SAs may help retain those resources that are currently 
under-utilized internally. Nelson and Winter (1982) maintain that, to prevent their
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know-how from decaying, firms sometimes need to engage in alliances, in order to avail 
themselves of opportunities to keep using these capabilities or remembering-by-doing. In 
this case, the choice between alliances and mergers and acquisitions is about whether one 
should relinquish one’s resources permanently (mergers and acquisitions) or for a 
specified period only (alliances). The possible advantage of SAs over mergers and 
acquisitions is that the firm only temporarily relinquishes its resources, which remain 
available for future internal deployment (Kogut, 1988). For example, Winbound 
Electronic Corporation, Taiwan’s third largest semiconductor maker formed an alliance 
with NCR Corporation (USA). Under the agreement Winbound would sell NCR’s chip 
products in the Taiwanese market and NCR would sell Winbound integrated circuits in 
the US market. Both companies are gaining access to the other’s home distribution 
network (Whenmouth, 1993).
3.2.2.2 Criticism of the resource based theory
The resource-based theory has been criticized by a number of authors for its limitations. 
In what follows are some of the criticisms:
1. The resource-based theory is criticized on the basis of its claim that it assumes an 
absence of opportunism. Mahoney (2001) argues that the claim that resource-based 
theory assumes an absence of opportunism was not correct. Such an assumption 
may simplify matters greatly but it comes at an obvious loss of realism with 
uncertain gains in predictive power. However, Williamson (1991) maintains that to 
assume an absence of opportunism will miss much of the action.
2. The concept of “valuable resources” is an ambiguous benchmark with which to 
measure the competitive advantage of a firm. In the resource-based theory the
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valuable endowments of a firm are taken as given. Also the concept of “rare 
resources” does not necessarily ensure the competitive advantage of the firm, even 
if these resources generate a large “rent” due to its relative scarcity (Contractor and 
Lorange, 1988).
In summary, the resource-based theory has provided a powerful theoretical perspective 
within which a substantial body of international business research is embedded (Peng,
2001). International business research historically has been critiqued as phenomenon- 
driven with scattered, unconnected topics. The resource-based theory helps address this 
criticism, by presenting a unifying framework through which a large number of diverse 
research topics can be theorized as subscribing to the same set of underlying theoretical 
and competitive logic. In other words, the resource-based theory has made international 
business research more theoretically rigorous (Peng, 2001). In this respect, Barney 
(2001) suggests that the resource-based theory represents an “innovation”. An 
innovation is “an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual” 
(Rogers, 1983:11). According to this definition, Peng (2001) believes that even the 
resource-based theory’s critics would accept that it represents a theoretical innovation.
3.2.3 Knowledge-based view of the resource-based theory
The expansion of markets, both domestically and internationally, intensifies 
environmental turbulence, impelling firms to enhance flexibility (Volderba, 1996) and to 
improve their level of knowledge of exploration (March, 1995).. In this context, 
knowledge has became one of the most strategically significant resources (Grant, 1996) 
and there is increasing recognition that the competitive advantage of firms depends on
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their ability to create, transfer, utilize and protect knowledge asset (Teece, 2000). As an 
extension of the resource-based perspective, the knowledge of a firm’s employees and the 
knowledge that is subsequently built through it may be the most enduring source of 
competitive advantage, especially in complex competitive environments (Foss, 1999; 
Grant, 1996; Liebeskind, 1996; Birkinshaw, 2001). In the same way that the knowledge- 
based theory of the firm has grown out of resource-based theory of firms (Grant, 1996) 
knowledge-based explanations of the formation of strategic alliance formation have their 
roots in resource-based approaches to alliances.
Several studies of SAs (such as Inkpen and Crossan, 1995; Kale et al., 2000; Khanna et 
al., 1998; Larsson et al., 1998; Lyles, 1988; Glaister and Buckley, 1996; Lei et al., 1996; 
Mowery et aL, 1996; Simonin, 1997, 1999; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; Grant and Fuller, 
2004) found that the sharing of knowledge including technology, know-how and 
organizational capability, and learning from partners are the dominant objectives of SAs. 
The knowledge-based view of SAs claims that at least partly through learning, alliances 
help companies overcome limitations in their own resource set (e.g., competence 
limitations), solving internal environmental problems, and extend the application of their 
core competencies to achieve competitive advantages (Hagedoom, 1995; Mitchell and 
Singh, 1996). Thus, companies seek to establish through alliances a resource bundle that 
is valuable, rare, and difficult to imitate (Gulati et al., 2000). A resource bundle might 
include, for example, the integration of cutting edge technological resources held by one 
partner with another firm’s complementary resources such as access to and knowledge of 
specific markets (Stuart, 2000). Also it is argued that in IS As, companies must contribute 
valuable and rare resources. However, the types of resources contributed may differ from
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local to foreign partners. For example, it would be unusual for the local partner not to 
contribute some local knowledge such as understanding of local market, cultural, and 
environmental conditions but this may not be the only contribution (Inkpen and Beamish,
1997). In contrast, the primary knowledge contribution of the foreign partner generally 
involves technology, management expertise, and global support (Yan and Gray, 1994).
3.2.3.1 Inter-organizational learning and knowledge transfer
Alliances provide a platform for organizational learning, giving companies access to the 
knowledge of their partners. Through shared execution of the alliance task, mutual 
interdependence and problem solving, and observation of alliance activities and 
outcomes, companies can learn from their partners. Inter-organizational learning is based 
on the absorptive capacity, which is the ability of the firm to value, assimilate, and make 
use of new external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Absorptive capacity 
depends on the knowledge bases, organizational structures, and dominant logics of 
companies that cooperate (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998). Moreover, firms with a greater 
absorptive capacity will invest more on research and development through alliances 
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Know-how access is another main reason for firms in 
technology-intensive industries to carry out cooperation agreements because it makes 
possible the quicker development of innovations and makes easier their market 
introduction in a short period of time, giving important advantages and encouraging 
learning (Stuart, 2000).
Nevertheless, not all characteristics of alliance learning are positive. Hamel (1991) argues 
that alliances yield opportunities for learning races between partners and that the outcome
44
Chapter 3: Strategic alliances: A theoretical analysis 
of acquisition of partner’s knowledge and learning may be a “competition for learning” 
where each alliance member seeks to learn at a faster rate than its partner in order to 
achieve a positive balance of trade in knowledge (Hamel, 1991). The partner who first 
learns the desired capabilities can then dissolve the alliance even if the other partner has 
not completed learning the desired know-how. By the same token, Inkpen and Beamish 
(1997) argue that a firm’s motivation and need for an alliance is reduced after reaching its 
learning objectives. In some cases, this may lead to less cooperation and even alliance 
dissolution. More worse, a partner may turn into a competitor as was described by 
Yoshino and Rangan (1995). Using an example, Yoshino and Rangan (1995) explained 
this situation by describing an alliance between an American and a Taiwanese firm. They 
stated:
“After secretly collecting considerable technological information from its 
American partner in their two-year alliance, the Taiwanese firm entered the 
United States market and became a direct competitor” (1995: 128).
Similarly, Hamel (1991) provides an example regarding a Japanese firm’s hidden agenda 
of secretly capturing its partner's technology. In time, the Japanese firm reached a 
position to be able to ask "Now what are you going to do for us" (Hamel, 1991:88). In 
situations like this, existing bargains will tend to become obsolete and the termination of 
the alliance becomes more probable. However, Peng (2001) observed that some alliances 
(for example, those between Toyota and its suppliers) are designed to exploit 
relationship-specific assets (Dyer, 1996; Peng et al., 2001) and the threat of a “learning 
race” is not significant.
45
Chapter 3: Strategic alliances: A theoretical analysis
It is interesting to note here that differences in level of economic development can 
produce differences in alliance motives. In this regard, Dacin and Hitt (1997) argue that 
the objectives of alliances’ partners often differ when one partner is from a developed 
country and the other is from a lesser developed or developing country. Companies from 
developed countries frequently seek out new market opportunities for their products. 
Partners from developed countries look to partners from developing countries to provide 
access to local knowledge, including customs and business practices, political 
connections, as well as the ability to satisfy the host government’s foreign investment 
requirements. In contrast, partners from lesser developed or developing countries seek 
access to technology, export opportunities, and the opportunity to gain international 
alliance experience. The Joint venture between General Electric and Malaysia Airlines 
exemplifies the different motives of alliance partners from developed and developing 
countries. The venture called the “Aero Centre of Excellence” was to overhaul airplane 
engines in Malaysia. Malaysia Airlines’ goal was to upgrade its aerospace technological 
capabilities, whereas General Electric was to gain access to a new market (General 
Electric Aircraft Engines News Release, 1996).
3.2.3.2 Criticism of the knowledge-based theory
Some authors observed that knowledge transfer and organizational learning is not as 
straight forward as the knowledge-based theory suggests. In what follows are the 
problems of knowledge transfer and organizational learning in SAs which are used as a 
ground for criticism.
1. It is often argued in internalization theory that the more knowledge-intensive the 
firm, the lower the propensity to form alliances for fear of misappropriation of
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knowledge by allies who could become competitors (Contractor and Lorange,
2002).
2. The transaction cost theorists argued that corporate knowledge is sometimes so 
deeply embedded or “sticky” in the organization, and partially inarticulable, that its 
transfer to another ally firm is far from costless or instantaneous (Williamson, 1985; 
Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Von Hippel, 1994). Thus the formation of alliances is 
impeded by fear of misappropriation and cost of knowledge transfer. However, 
Contractor and Lorange (2002) claim that these fears are mitigated by two 
regulatory and environmental factors that favour alliances: i) the global spread of 
the system of intellectual property protection under protocols of the World Trade 
Organization, which reduces the fear of misappropriation; and ii) greater 
articulation and codification of knowledge, which reduces the costs of its transfer to 
allies.
3. There are some difficulties in relation to knowledge transmission and sharing, 
especially when knowledge is specific, complex, and tacit. This kind of knowledge 
is difficult to keep and transmit because it depends on the context, experience, 
language, and previous accumulated knowledge (Grant, 1996; Oliveira, 1999).
4. Firms are especially reluctant to share knowledge with companies that may become 
competitors in the future. If an adequate level of trust is attained it is possible to 
create and exchange new knowledge, especially that which is tacit (Inkpen, 1998).
5. The lack of common routines, clear lines of authority, and little hierarchical 
organizational forms can make cooperation difficult, along with sharing of 
knowledge and learning of the members of the alliance (Oxley and Sampson, 2004).
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However, some solutions are proposed by Inkpen (1998) to resolve the problems of 
sharing and transferring knowledge in alliances. To achieve solutions to organizational 
knowledge management problems, some key factors must be considered. The generation 
of an optimal environment for collaboration can be achieved through training, previous 
experience, organizational culture and willingness to cooperate, the level of trust, the 
capability of transforming tacit into explicit knowledge, and the capability of learning 
from the companies that cooperate are all important factors to be considered.
3.3 A theoretical framework of the formation process of strategic alliances
The process of strategic alliance formation is known for its complexity and delicate 
nature, leading many theorists to divide the process into several stages. Pett and Dibrell 
(2001), for example, argue for a four-stage model for strategic alliance development. 
These stages are: exploration stage; recurrent contract stage; relational contract stage; and 
outcome stage. Reid et al. (2001) propose a three-stage model including pre-formation 
stage, formation stage, and evaluation stage. Brouthers et al. (1997) argue that the 
cooperative venture literature can be divided into five main stages. These are entry mode 
selection or deciding whether cooperative venture are the best way to service a market; 
partner selection; negotiation of a cooperative agreement with the potential partner; 
managing the venture; venture evaluation. Das and Teng (1997) propose a seven-stage 
model. The stages are: considering SAs; selecting alliance partners; negotiating the 
alliance agreement; setting up the alliance; operating the alliance; evaluating alliance 
performance; and modifying the alliance. Ring and Van de Ven (1992) suggest three 
sequential steps in forming SAs: negotiation; commitments; and executions. Devlin and
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Bleackley (1988) provided guidelines for successful strategic alliance formation in terms 
of three stages: the decision to form a strategic alliance; the choice of an alliance partner; 
and the planned management of the alliance. Various other models provided by 
researchers like Whipple and Frankel (1998) and Spekman et al. (1996) also suggest 
different processes for the formation of SAs. Despite differences between these models, 
major similarities and commonalities are found between them. Based on these similarities 
and differences, a theoretical framework is developed examining the process of SAs 
formation and is discussed in the following section. The framework is divided into five 
phases namely the recognition of the motives for forming the alliance, selection of the 
alliance’s partners, selection of the alliance’s form of structure, alliance’s management, 
and the alliance’s performance evaluation. These phases are influenced by two major 
factors, namely partners’ trust and partners’ national and corporate cultures.
Figure 3.2: Phases of strategic alliance formation process
Figure 3.2 above shows a framework for the formation process of strategic alliances. It 
presents the key phases as well as the factors affecting the process as discussed in the
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literature. The strategic alliances literature divides the process into three major stages 
namely; pre-formation-stage, formation stage, and outcome stage. The Pre-formation 
stage deals with finding the reasons or motives for forming a strategic alliance. The 
motives for forming a strategic alliance were found to be influenced by two major 
factors; the firm’s resource endowments and market factors. Formation stage includes 
three phases: the selection of alliance partners which is directly influenced by two 
factors; partners’ culture and trust between partners, the selection of alliance form of 
structure which is directly influenced by trust between partners, and the alliance 
management which is directly influenced by two factors; partners’ culture and trust 
between partners. The outcome stage includes the evaluation of alliance performance. 
The following part gives more explanation of each phase as well as the factors 
influencing the formation process.
3.3.1 Phase 1: Motives for strategic alliance formation
This step involves two major questions. First, does the firm need to make any changes in 
its strategy? In other words, is the firm motivated by the desire to gain some benefits or 
the need to compensate for the absence of, or weakness in, a (perceived) needed asset or 
competency? (Das and Teng, 1997). Once it is perceived that the firm is motivated to 
change its strategy, a second question that arises is: Should we choose SAs as a strategic 
option, along with other alternatives such as vertical and horizontal integration and 
market-based transactions? (Das and Teng, 1997). The answers to both questions are 
already discussed in this chapter from three different perspectives namely transaction 
cost, resource-based, and knowledge-based views (see Part 3.2). However, some brief 
explanations are provided in the following section.
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Any change initiative begins with awareness of a problem or need (Bennis, 1987). In this
respect, Whipple and Frankel (1998) argue that alliance conceptualization begins when a
firm determines a change in business strategy and practice is justified (need awareness).
This realization is triggered by competitive forces such as globalization, industry
consolidation or declining profit/sales volume. However, Mintzberg et al. (1996)
maintain that, problem awareness is not enough to induce change. Whipple and Frankel
(1998) provided more explanation of the strategic alliance initiative:
“The organization must be convinced the possibility for an improved system 
exists. Given the belief that improvement is possible, a firm must then 
establish goals as the basis for its revised strategy. In other words, a firm 
must identify what goals constitute an improved system. Based on these 
goals, the firm develops initial expectations regarding the benefits o f the new 
strategy. Examples o f initial expectations include gaining competitive 
advantage, new product development, and entering new markets ” (Whipple 
and Frankel, 1998:339).
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Similarly, Ring and Van de Ven (1992) assert that in forming SAs, organizations attempt 
to fill gaps either in their technology, resources, or markets that a member in its own is 
unable to gain or acquire. Lack of resources or technology can come in various forms, 
including some natural resources, technological inability, or cost of production 
(Contractor and Lorange, 1988). By having organizations coordinate efforts through SAs, 
it is often believed that these unmet needs can be satisfied (Pett and Dibrell, 2001). 
Motives for forming SAs are fully discussed in Part 3.2. of this chapter.
Having convinced strategic change is necessary, the firm may need to find justifications 
for choosing SAs. This can be done by comparing SAs with other alternatives such as 
internalization strategies, which include mergers, acquisitions, and internal development
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on the one hand and market transactions on the other hand (see Part 3.2). In this stage, the 
organization has to examine the potential advantages and threats of entering into a 
strategic alliance. To recap, SAs are a special mode of conducting inter-firm transactions, 
in that sense the companies internalize some of the inter-firm transactions into a 
somewhat formal structure, while conducting the rest of the transactions via price 
mechanisms (Burgers et al., 1993). Therefore, SAs combine the features of 
internalization and market exchanges because they partially internalize an exchange, 
examples include equity and non-equity joint ventures. As compared to market 
transactions, SAs have the advantage of eliminating the risks and uncertainties of market 
transactions which include demand uncertainty and competitive uncertainty. Markets 
could fail because these uncertainties cost the companies extra in order to secure the deal. 
It seems clear that when the uncertainties of inter-firm transactions are high, it is more 
efficient to conduct the transactions within the organization (internalization) or through 
SAs (Das and Teng, 1997). However, SAs are not free of threats. The biggest threat to 
alliances arises from the fact that they are cooperative by nature, so that they inevitably 
generate problems in managing the inter-firm relationships (Mohr and Spekman, 1994). 
Therefore SAs are a viable option only when substantial benefit accrued from partially 
integrating two firms; otherwise, they should be avoided because of their managerial 
complexity (Das and Teng, 1997).
3.3.2 Phase 2: Alliance’s partner(s)’ selection
After a firm has made the decision to engage in an alliance, selection of an appropriate 
partner is the next critical decision (Hitt et al., 2000a; Koot, 1988; Geringer 1991; Das 
and Teng, 1997; and Tatoglu, 2000). For example, Das and Teng (1997: 52) argue that:
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“The choice o f an alliance partner has a profound impact on the 
sustainability o f the alliance, just as the choice o f a spouse largely 
determines the fate o f a marriage ” (1997:52).
A logical question here is why the decision of partner selection is so important to the 
management and performance of SAs. A dominant motivation behind the formation of 
inter-organizational alliance is to gain access to valuable partner-held resources (Reid et 
al., 2001). However, Brouthers et al. (1995), claim that an ideal partnership should 
involve two or more companies with complementary resources and skills, compatible 
objectives in the alliance, and a certain level of inter-firm trust. Similarly, Geringer 
maintains that:
“prior research has suggested that the choice o f a particular partner is an 
important variable influencing international joint venture performance, since 
it influences the mix o f skills and resources which will be available to the 
venture and thus the international joint venture’s ability to achieve its 
strategic objectives ” (1991:42).
In a similar vein, Cavusgil and Evirgen (1997) point out that any inappropriate or 
incomplete assessment of the prospective partners may result in a poor fit, leading to 
adverse monetary and strategic effects. They opine that potential conflicts between 
partners can be avoided if they are anticipated before the venture is established. At a 
minimum, the partners should be able to provide complementary capabilities that, in both 
the short and the longer term, are necessary to enable the venture to be competitive. In 
that sense, Das and Teng (1997) argue that emphasis on complementary resources and 
skills of the partners ensures that the intended synergy sought to be created by combining 
two firms is not an illusion.
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Moreover, researchers such as Gullander (1976), Killing (1983), Harrigan (1985), 
Buckley and Casson (1987), Dymsza (1988), Geringer (1991), A1 Khalifa and Peterson
(1999) concluded that it was vital that a partner be “complementary” since such a choice 
depends upon the balance of resources and skills and hence the success or failure of a 
venture in reaching its objectives. Das and Teng (1997) also argue that partners must 
have compatible objectives in the alliance in order that the alliance is beneficial to both 
partners. Obviously, incompatible objectives of the partners will tend to bring the alliance 
down in short order. In addition to complementary resources and compatible objectives, 
Das and Tang (1997) claim that a sense of inter-firm trust is a vital factor in the success 
of strategic alliance. Only a sense of trust may allay the firm’s suspicion of each other 
and postpone expected returns to a future period.
Thus, it seems important to identify and classify the selection criteria employed as well as 
their relative importance (Nielsen, 2003). The selection of an alliance partner is 
hypothesized by Spekman (1988) to be a two-step approach. The first step involves 
creating evaluative criteria to develop a “threshold” level. These criteria represent the 
characteristics a firm must possess in order to be considered as an alliance partner. This 
threshold level is essentially the first cut that provides a smaller “pool of potential 
strategic partners”. The second step final selection. The development of refined 
expectations helps a firm to identify strategic and operational characteristics that another 
firm should possess to qualify as a potential alliance partner.
Criteria for partner(s) selection
The aforementioned discussion implies that partners enter in collaborative ventures with 
certain expectations and objectives and thus, it is critical for managers to identify and
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understand effective partner selection criteria prior to the alliance formation. A relatively 
early study of the selection procedure undertaken by Tomlinson (1970) related to the 
strategic alliance process in Pakistan and India tried to simplify the selection criteria by 
grouping them into six categories of which it was generally agreed by his respondents 
that “favourable past association” was the most important, while not being enough in 
itself to ensure sound SAs performance. Four categories, “resources”, “facilities”, 
“partner status” and “forced choice” were seen as being about equal in standing. Geringer
(1991) distinguished between “task related” and “partner related” criteria. The former 
criteria apply to the operational skills and resources needed by a venture to achieve 
success in the market, and the latter are related to the effectiveness of co-operation 
between the partners. On the one hand, “partner related” criteria are concerned with 
variables which are specific to the character, culture and history of the partners involved. 
For example, past association between partners, compatibility between the partners' 
management teams, the national or corporate culture of the partners, a partner's 
organizational size or structure. In this regard, Gyenes (1991) argues that potential 
partners should list their strengths, available resources, strategic needs, and expectations. 
These two lists should then be set side by side and assessed in terms of two questions: (i) 
do the strength of each partner fulfil the needs and expectations of the other? (ii) are the 
combined resources of the partners sufficient to achieve their expectations? If the answer 
to either question is no, stand up, shake hands, and walk away. You have made the right 
decision. Conversely, if the answer to both questions is yes, proceed to the next step. On 
the other hand “task related” criteria relate to those variables which focus on operational 
and performance characteristics. Such variables include patents, technical knowledge, 
experience of management, access to marketing and distribution systems, financial
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resources, in other words a wide range of variables, tangible or intangible, human or non­
human. Al-Khalifa and Peterson’s (1999) research indicates that the partner-related 
factors are significantly more important than task-related factors in selecting a partner. 
They argue that task-related factors are dominant in the decision to engage in a strategic 
alliance as a strategic device, the choice of partner to implement the decision is 
dominated by partner-related factors. However, many alliances are formed by chance 
meetings or through previous experience with the partner. For example, Texas 
Instruments and Hitachi developed a joint venture to produce memory chips. However, 
the two firms first began a working relationship in 1988 by conducting joint research. 
Thereafter, they incrementally expanded their relationship (Hitt et al., 1997).
Factors influencins the choice of partner (s) selection criteria
Criteria used by companies to evaluate and select their strategic alliance partners differ 
between these companies. Three major factors are responsible for the variation in partner 
selection criteria used by companies. These factors are differences in the national context 
between partners’ countries; differences in economic development level between 
partners’ countries; and differences in the technological development level between 
partners’ companies. 1
1. Differences in the national context between partners’ countries
A research by Hitt et al. (1997) demonstrated differences in the criteria utilized by USA 
and Korean executives in strategic decision making. This work suggests that companies 
from different countries tend to approach strategic problems in different ways largely as a 
function of variances in their strategic orientations. For example, the joint venture
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between General Motors (GM) of the USA and Daewoo of Korea was unsuccessful, 
largely because the two companies had different strategic orientations and goals and as a 
result were largely incompatible. Because of these differences, Daewoo was seeking 
growth and access to new markets while GM’s overriding goal was to achieve reasonable 
financial returns. Because the financial returns were negative, GM management was 
unwilling to make further investments to achieve the growth desired by Daewoo. As a 
result, they ended their partnership, both losing substantial investments in the joint 
venture (Hitt et al., 1995). Coming, Inc. is a leader in forming successful SAs with a 
simple approach to evaluating potential partners. According to them “(We) go and sniff 
their hindquarters and see if they smell like us” (Booth, 1995). While this quote may 
seem somewhat vulgar or disgusting, it really is a very simple way of stating that they 
prefer to form partnerships with those companies whose management philosophies, 
strategies and ideas most similar to their own. Indeed, differences in corporate partners’ 
personalities, like differences in spousal personalities, can often lead to tragic results 
(Elmuti and Kathawala, 2001). However, Inkpen (2001) argues that the perceived value 
of each of the parent companies need not be the same, although each alliance partner 
must gain some benefits for an alliance to be the preferred option. For example, General 
Motor’s strategic objective for its successful joint venture, NUMMI, with Toyota may 
have included access to North American production of high quality small cars for the 
United States market and access to Toyota’s manufacturing technology. Toyota’s 
objectives were very different. As Toyota’s first attempt at building cars in North 
America, the joint venture provided the company with an opportunity to develop an 
understanding of the North American manufacturing environment. Despite differences in 
objectives, this strategic alliance is a success story.
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2. Differences in economic development level between partners’ countries
A study by Hitt et al. (1998) of international partner selection of companies from 
emerging markets (Mexico, Poland and Romania) and developed markets (Canada, 
France and USA) showed that the set and importance of partner selection criteria varied 
across emerging and developed market contexts. Emerging market companies emphasize 
financial assets, technological capabilities, managerial capabilities, and the willingness to 
share expertise in selecting partners of ISAs. In contrast, developed market companies try 
to leverage their resources through partner selection. In particular, they emphasize 
complementary capabilities, market knowledge access, cost of alternatives, unique 
competencies in the selection of international strategic alliance’s partners. However, In 
their study of the partner selection process in IJVs in the Kingdom of Bahrain, Al Khalifa 
and Peterson (1999) found that the critical factors in strategic alliance partner selection 
criteria were related to the reputation, experience and personal knowledge of the partner 
organizations as well as to some of the personal characteristics of their Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO).
3. Differences in resource endowment between partners’ companies
Ireland et al., (2002) reported that companies search for partners having specialized
resources that are not readily available from others (Doh, 2000). Specialized resources 
can involve management teams with significant and specialized experience (McGee et 
al., 1995) or unique technological know-how (Nagarajan and Mitchell, 1998). In that 
sense, Stuart (2000) found that large companies with leading technologies were 
considered highly valuable partners, particularly for younger and smaller companies 
often without the resources that could allow them access to such technology.
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Additionally, it is found that companies from emerging markets with lower access to 
technology use technological capabilities as a primary partner selection criterion (Hitt et 
al., 2000a).
Searchins for and evaluatins alliance vartner(s)
Companies that actively search for alliance partners are more likely to come across more 
potential candidates and to obtain more information about them. In this regard, Tatoglu
(2000) contend that active search for alliance partners will generate additional, more 
specific information increasing the chance of identifying a partner who meets company 
criteria. Tatoglu (2000) also argues that experience is a key factor influencing the 
organization and management of the information process. Experienced managers will 
know better than inexperienced managers which sources to use and how to assess 
different alternative partners. Therefore, the more extensive a company’s previous 
experience with finding partners in emerging markets, the more likely it will find 
satisfactory trading partners. However, small and medium-sized companies may lack 
infrastructure and contacts, making it extremely hard to find good trading partners. Small 
and medium-sized companies often lack the resources to engage in extensive research, 
especially to collect information from external sources (Souchon and Diamantopoulos, 
1996a).
It is worth noting here the distinction between the search for partners and the 
evaluation/selection of partners. With regard to search, both the number of different 
sources consulted (the breadth of search) and the extent to which each source is used (the 
depth of search) will have an effect on the outcome (Tatoglu, 2000). The more sources
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the company consults, the more likely it is to find reliable information about alternative 
partners. Hitt et al., (1998) also contend that a company’s involvement in 
internationalization will affect the search and evaluation/selection process for trading 
partners. More specifically, the greater a company’s involvement in international markets 
the more likely a company is to devote effort to the search process and hence to find an 
appropriate trading partner. However, extensive search does not automatically imply 
extensive evaluation, although on the contrary, extensive search is a prerequisite for 
extensive evaluation and selection. Based on this concept, Tatoglu (2000) further 
considered two observations. First, the broader and the deeper the evaluation and 
selection process the more likely a company is to find a satisfactory trading partner. 
Second, an extensive evaluation/selection process will enhance the positive effect of a 
deep search process on the outcome of the partner selection process.
To sum up, allying firms use different criteria for partner selection. However, the choice 
and use of these criteria is determined by a number of factors. Once selection criteria are 
decided, companies start searching for, evaluating and selecting their allying partners. 
Having partners elected, the allying companies start negotiating and making future 
strategic decisions concerning the formation of the alliance and negotiating the alliance 
agreements.
3.3.3 Phase 3: Selecting a form of structure and crafting a plan
This phase involves a discussion of what forms of structures are available for partners to 
choose when they form a strategic alliance and how partners should agree on a plan. This 
is another important phase we need to understand in the study of strategic alliance
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formation because like making the right choice of partners, developing a clear plan and 
making the right choice of the alliance’s structure are fundamental for value creation in 
SAs.
Selecting a form of structure
Strategic alliances are known for the variety of their agreements relating to their 
governance structure. Among the common structures are JVs, equity investment, research 
consortia, joint research and development, joint marketing, and others (Das and Teng,
1997). One underlying issue seems to considerably matter alliance partners in the choice 
of the governance structure is how much flexibility and embeddedness the alliance should 
have. Flexibility serves as a key benefit of SAs, as compared to traditional hierarchical 
organizations (Das and Teng, 1997). The importance of flexibility in SAs is explained by 
Parkhe (1991). According to Parkhe, with SAs, the partners may be involved in a project 
partly, without contributing any or all the needed capital, technology, and human 
resources. As a result, it becomes easier for the partners to exit from the alliance, if things 
do not work out as expected (Das and Teng, 1997). These alliances are termed “non­
equity alliances”. Embeddedness, nevertheless, is also a necessary element for sustaining 
alliances. This is true for three reasons. First, to embed the partners in the alliance helps 
align the interests of the partners, as the partners realize that they are in the same boat. 
Second, deeply embedded partners are discouraged from behaving opportunistically. 
Third, a sense of trust may be generated by embeddedness, as the partners become more 
committed to the alliance. As opposed to non-equity alliances, equity alliances (including 
joint ventures and equity investment) can be used to ensure embededness (Das and Teng, 
2001).
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In discussing the way companies choose between equity and non-equity forms o f SAs 
this researcher has been inspired by the work of Das and Teng (2000b). Das and Teng 
(2000b) discussed how the resource type (property-based resources and knowledge-based 
resources) would determine the structural preferences in terms of four major categories o f  
alliances (equity joint ventures, minority equity alliances, bilateral contract-based 
alliances, and unilateral contract-based alliances). In so doing, they choose the resource 
typology of Miller and Shamsie (1996), which classifies all resources into two broad 
categories: property-based resources and knowledge-based resources. Property-based 
resources, including financial capital, physical resources, human resources, etc. cannot be 
easily obtained by partners, because they are legally protected through property rights in 
such forms as patents, contracts, and deeds o f ownership (Miller and Shamsie, 1996). 
Because others cannot take property-based resources away, alliance partners will not be 
concerned about unintended transfers o f such resources. Knowledge-based resources such 
as tacit know-how, skills, and technical and managerial systems are not easily imitable 
because they are vague and ambiguous. Thus, they are not protected by patents. Because 
others can get adequate access to knowledge-based resources, alliance partners will be 
concerned with losing their knowledge-based resources through an alliance (Hamel 1991 
and Mowery et aL, 1996).
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T ab le  3.1: R esou rce  types and a f ir m ’s s tru ctu ra l p referen ces
Partner Firm (B)
Firm (A) Property-Based Resources Knowledge-Based
Resources
Property-Based Resources Unilateral Contract-Based Alliances Equity Joint Ventures
Knowledge-Based Resources Minority Equity Alliances Bilateral Contract-Based 
Alliances
Source: D as, T . K ., and  T eng, B . (2000b) “A  resou rce-b ased  th eory  o f  stra teg ic  a llian ces” , Journal o f  
M anagem ent 26: 31-61
Das and Teng (2000b) synthesize a four-part alliance typology which is similar to 
Gulati’s typology (1999): (1) joint ventures; (2) minority equity alliances; (3) bilateral 
contract-based alliances; and (4) unilateral contract-based alliances (see Table 3.1). They 
argue that the type of resources is a key dimension in predicting the structural preferences 
in the prospective alliance. From a resource-based view, companies are interested not 
only in obtaining their partners’ valuable resources, but also in retaining their own 
valuable resources. Thus, the partners’ structural preferences will be based on balances o f  
the two issues: being able to procure valuable resources from another party without 
losing control o f one’s own resources. In what follows a description of each form and the 
situations in which it is preferred over the other forms if  provided.
Equity joint ventures
When the partners work shoulder to shoulder in the same entity for an extended period, 
it becomes difficult to keep partners from accessing one’s tacit know-how 
(Hamel, 1991). Consequently, equity joint ventures provide the best opportunities to 
acquire partners’ tacit knowledge and other knowledge-based resources because o f  
the significant extent to which partners are exposed to each other (Mowery et al.,
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1996; Kogut, 1988). Therefore, they are preferred to the firm if  knowledge-based 
resources are its partner’s primary resource in the alliance. Therefore, the advantage o f  
a joint venture for a particular firm will be limited if  its partner contributes mainly 
property-based resources. Furthermore, although companies will ordinarily want to 
acquire their partners’ know-how, they are also wary about losing their own knowledge- 
based resources in a highly integrated operation characteristic of a joint venture. Thus, 
they prefer equity joint ventures only when knowledge-based resources are not 
their primary resource type in the alliance.
Minority equity alliances
In minority equity alliances, one or more partners take an equity position in others. Das 
and Teng (2000b) believe that firms will prefer minority equity alliances when they 
have primarily knowledge-based resources to contribute to the alliance and their 
partners have primarily property-based resources. Contract-based alliances will be less 
attractive in such cases because they do not offer sufficient safeguards against 
opportunistic behaviour regarding knowledge-based resources. In this situation, equity 
joint ventures are also not preferred for two reasons. First, there are no substantial 
knowledge-based resources contributed by the partners available for exploitation. 
Second, there are altogether too much o f one’s own knowledge-based resources that the 
partner could potentially appropriate, making it too risky to form a joint venture.
Bilateral contract-based alliances
These alliances require partners to put in resources and work together on a continuing 
basis, so that they are integrated in a tighter manner. Joint research and
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development, joint marketing and promotion, joint production, and enhanced supplier 
partnership are some good examples o f bilateral contract-based alliances (Mowery et al., 
1996). Because equity joint ventures facilitate the process o f transferring knowledge- 
based resources, they can be a disadvantage if  both partners have substantial knowledge- 
based resources in an alliance. Thus, equity joint ventures may be too risky a choice in 
such situations. Scholars suggest that once learning has been accomplished, alliances are 
likely to be intentionally terminated (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Hence, contract-based 
alliances, which are much easier to dissolve, will be preferred over equity joint ventures 
and minority equity alliances.
Unilateral contract-based alliances
Alliances are unilateral contract-based when they embody a well-defined transfer o f  
property rights such as the “technology for cash” exchange in licensing agreements. 
Licensing, distribution agreements, and research and development contracts are the main 
forms of unilateral contract-based alliances. The key feature here is that individual firms 
carry out their obligations independently o f others. Such contracts tend to be complete 
and specific, and partners are expected to perform on their own accordingly, without 
much coordination or collaboration. In unilateral contract-based alliances such as 
licensing agreements, the transfer of tacit knowledge will be difficult “because the 
very knowledge that is being transferred is organizationally embedded” (Kogut, 
1988:323). Following this logic, Das and Teng (2000b) argue that unilateral contract- 
based alliances will be preferable when both partners intend to contribute primarily 
property-based resources to a prospective alliance.
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To summarize, when the need for internal stability (e.g., aligned interests, inter-firm trust, 
and satisfactory co-operation) outweighs the need for controlling uncertainties in the 
competitive environment, equity alliances should be preferred. Exit clauses are needed 
more in equity alliances while lawsuit provisions and detailed monitoring procedures are 
needed more in non-equity alliances.
Craftins an alliance plan
In addition to selecting an alliance form of structure, partners also need to agree on a 
future plan. In this regard, Gynes (1991) argues that in addition to providing direction for 
those later assigned to manage the venture, and to providing a basis for comparing and 
analyzing the results o f future business operations, carefully crafted and clearly stated 
plan will also confirm that the intended partners share similar expectations for their 
collaborative efforts. Thus, the idea is to provide a vision and sense of direction to the 
strategic alliance. The initial plan should focus on the development o f a mission 
statement and the determination o f the venture’s strategic objectives (Gynes 1991). On 
the one hand, a carefully crafted mission statement tells everybody the direction in which 
the company wants to go. It answers the simple question, “who are we?” At least, it 
should: (i) provide the rationale for the existence o f the venture (its purpose); (ii) describe 
the external perception that the partners are attempting to create (how others will see 
them); (iii) establish the standards that the business and its employees will be expected to 
uphold. It should also serve as a constant reminder to the partners of their shared 
commitment to the venture. On the other hand, strategic objectives articulate the vision o f  
a venture’s future. These objectives respond to the question, “Where do we want to go?” 
and are directly related to the motives for the alliance formation as discussed earlier in
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Part 3.2 of this chapter. Das and Teng (1997) also propose three important issues that 
partners should discuss and agreed on them during the planning or “alliance set up stage”. 
These issues are: controlling the alliance; staffing the alliance; and blending partners’ 
cultures. Control becomes a critical means o f keeping the alliance on track. According to 
Das and Teng (1997: 56):
“By assigning your own people to the key positions in the alliance, the 
partners exercise managerial control o f the alliance. Partners often fight 
hard for the post o f general manager in the joint venture. However, letting 
one firm have a predominant position in the alliance could discourage the 
other partners, whose commitment to the alliance may ebb in consequence. A 
reasonable share o f controlling power that encourages positive involvement 
is more desirable” (1997:56).
Besides controlling the alliance, staffing and human resource issues also largely 
determine the sustainability of alliance and therefore should be agreed on at earlier 
stages. In his model, Whipple and Frankel (1998) use the term managerial imbalance to 
refer to a situation when alliance partners fail to provide equivalent managerial support in 
terms o f the number of key participants assigned to the alliance and/or their 
organizational level. This imbalance creates the perception that one firm is less 
committed to the alliance than the other, causing the partners to question their continued 
effort. Devlin and Bleackley (1988) state that one factor o f a successful alliance is the 
assurance that partners “contribute equally” to the alliance. When this does not occur, and 
a managerial imbalance is created, strategic effectiveness is negatively affected. Finally, 
to set up a sustainable alliance, the partners should work consciously toward blending 
their cultures. Cultural differences between the partners have caused the failure of many 
alliances, as the partners found themselves unable to compromise and assimilate enough
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(Das and Teng, 1997). Being aware of the potential harm, the partners should work hard 
to set up an alliance that harmonizes their cultures.
Besides the agreement on the alliance goals and objectives, there are other contractual 
arrangements that to be negotiated, including exit clauses, arbitration clauses, lawsuit 
provisions, and details of co-operation and monitoring. These arrangements affect the 
degree o f flexibility and embeddedness as well. For example, exit clauses facilitate the 
process of terminating alliances, and therefore give the partners an extra degree of 
flexibility. By comparison, lawsuit provisions and detailed monitoring procedures attach 
more embeddedness to the alliance (Das and Teng, 1997).
3.3.4 Phase 4: Operating and managing the alliance
During the operation stage partner firms collaborate and implement all agreements of the 
alliance. Alliance operation and management issues include the choice of governance 
mechanisms, enhancing trust and reciprocity between partners, managing the integration 
of project staff from different organizational cultures, and resolving conflicts which may 
arise among partners with divergent expectations about contributions to their 
collaboration (Todeva and Knoke, 2005). Thus operating and managing SAs is basically 
centred on maximizing cooperation between alliance partners while minimizing 
competition, a process that requires mutual understanding, commitment, trust/confidence, 
and sharing of control (Das and Teng, 1997; Todeva and Knoke, 2005). In what follows, 
cooperation as a critical factor in SAs management is discussed.
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Role o f  cooperation in manasins stratesic alliances
Strategic alliances seem to be particularly troublesome in operation. One major reason is 
that the partners have to strike a simultaneous balance between two seemingly 
contradictory themes: cooperation and competition. On the one hand, inter-firm 
cooperation is the hallmark o f SAs (Das and Teng, 1998). Cooperation is defined as “the 
willingness o f a partner firm to pursue mutually compatible interests in the alliance 
rather than act opportunistically” (Das and Teng, 1998:492). Opportunism, defined as 
“self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1975:9), can be seen as the opposite o f  
partner cooperation in SAs. Whereas opportunistic behaviour in alliances is exemplified 
by cheating, shirking, distorting information, misleading partners, providing substandard 
products/services, and appropriating partners’ critical resources, partner cooperation is 
characterized by honest dealing, commitment, fair play, and complying with agreements 
(Das and Teng, 1998). Nevertheless, partners often have trouble in nurturing a high level 
of cooperation, due to either a lack o f trust or the pursuit of self-interest (Ring and Van de 
Ven, 1992). Moreover, stimulating cooperation in SAs requires enhancing some factors. 
Cooperation requires understanding and commitment (Sharma, 1998), share o f control 
(Glaister and Buckley, 1995; Inkpen, 2001), and trust/confidence (Ring and Van de Ven,
1992). In what follows the concepts o f understanding, commitment, control and trust as 
crucial factors in the development o f cooperation will be discussed.
Understanding is reached through interaction (Anderson and Weitz, 1992). Sharma 
(1998) emphasized the importance o f interaction to reach understanding between 
partners. Through interaction, partners in a strategic alliance gain understanding of each 
other’s goals; resources and competencies. In his model for governance in IS As, Sharma
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(1998) contends that interaction in SAs can be described in four dimensions: frequency, 
surface area, variety, and the medium used. Frequent interaction means that little time 
elapses between the assessment o f one exchange and the occurrence o f the next. Parkhe 
(1993a) found a positive relationship between strategic alliance success and frequent 
interaction between alliance partners. The more intensive and regular the interaction is in 
an alliance, the better the coordination o f the production, marketing, and other activities.
The surface area of the interaction refers to the number o f people belonging to the 
alliance partners who are involved in the interaction. A wide contact area implies a 
multiplicity o f contact points and channels. As the contact area widens, the soft 
knowledge acquired becomes multi-faceted and the relevance and credibility o f the 
exchange improve. Variety implies that people from different functional areas interact. 
Increasing variety improves the quality of the exchange between the alliance partners 
(Sharma, 1998). The concept o f interaction between alliance partners and its importance 
in developing understanding and cooperation between partners could be further illustrated 
by using the example of the Scandinavian Chemicals (ScanChem), a middle size 
transnational corporation. According to Sharma (1998), in 1973 ScanChem entered into a 
strategic alliance with AsianChem. The initial alliance was for a period of five years. 
During this period the workforce of ScanChem was around 1,000 people. AsianChem 
employed around 150 people. During the first year of the alliance two to three people 
from ScanChem interacted with the people in AsianChem. In two to three years time 
some 70 people from ScanChem and an equally large number of people from AsianChem 
were working together on the same floor in the same building and interacting. The people 
from ScanChem belonged to a number o f different functions such as marketing,
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purchasing, production, and general management. A number o f employees from 
AsianChem regularly visited the head office o f ScanChem for discussions. The exchange 
of information was face-to-face, rapid and regular. Frequent interaction, using rich 
interaction media and involving a large number o f people from both sides, allows the 
partners to understand each other’s goals and resources and to avoid conflicts.
Commitment is another important factor in enhancing cooperation between alliance 
partners. Empirical evidence suggests that committed partners are willing to invest 
valuable resources and time in a cooperative agreement and can be relied on to perform 
essential functions in the cooperation (Anderson and Weitz, 1992). Sharma (1998) argues 
that two conditions must be satisfied for commitment to be realized. First, there must be a 
willingness on the part of the alliance partners to pool their resources. Second, the 
alliance partners must possess and be able to invest alliance-specific resource. Xerox is 
an example o f a company which has demonstrated high level o f senior management 
commitment to SAs. Xeroxe even has executives with titles such as Senior Vice President 
for Corporate Strategic Alliances and Vice President for Worldwide Alliances (Ernst and 
Stem, 1996). In addition, alliance-specific investments such as partner’s invested time 
and resources in developing alliance-specific knowledge and installing hardware and 
machinery to facilitate the exchange of resources with a specific alliance are examples o f  
partners’ commitment (Sharma, 998). Alliance-specific investments also support 
continuity in SAs. This is evident from the experience o f Scandinavian Equipment 
(ScanEq), a multinational firm manufacturing dairy and farming equipment. ScanEq has 
production units in over ten countries. In the middle of 1970s, ScanEq came into contact 
with Arab Dairy which had decided to establish a dairy and farming operation costing
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around US$2 million. Arab Dairy lacked the technical and managerial expertise needed 
to procure dairy equipment from the international market and to manage such a large 
investment. ScanEq was interested in supplying equipment to this project. In order to 
show its commitment to Arab Dairy, ScanEq accepted two conditions. For the first time 
ScanEq agreed to manage the business operations of its client. As a result, ScanEq 
invested non-recoverable resources to acquire new areas of expertise in dairy and farming 
operations, and marketing dairy and farming products. Secondly, ScanEq acquired 12.5 
per cent of the equity in Arab Dairy. ScanEq investment was enough to prove 
commitment to the buyer and to establish a long-term relationship with Arab Dairy. This 
was useful in obtaining future procurement contracts. A few years later, Arab Dairy 
expanded its operation and invested around US$700 million. A major portion o f the 
supply orders went to ScanEq. The alliance was extended for another seven years period. 
Gradually, a third major expansion was implemented and ScanEq was the largest supplier 
of equipment (Sharma, 1998).
Control is another critical factor for successful management and performance o f cross- 
border SAs (Glaister and Buckley, 1995). Control in alliance context refers to the process 
by which partner firms influence an alliance entity to behave in a manner that achieves 
partner objectives and satisfactory performance (Inkpen, 2001). Geringer and Hebert 
(1989) identified three dimensions o f alliance control: i) the mechanism by which control 
may be exercised; ii) the extent of control exercised over a strategic alliance; and iii) a 
focus dimension. With regard to the first dimension, the mechanisms o f control, partners 
were found to frequently rely on majority ownership or on voting control (itself 
determined by majority equity shareholding) to achieve effective management control o f
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alliance activities (Glaister and Buckley, 1995). However, Friedman and Beguin (1971) 
suggest that control is not a strict and automatic consequence of ownership because a 
variety of mechanisms are available to firms for exercising effective control such as right 
of veto, representation in management bodies, and special agreements related to either 
technology or management. A partner might also be able to rely on its technical 
superiority and managerial skills, as a means of guaranteeing participation in the 
management of the alliance’s operations (Glaister and Buckley, 1995). In this respect, 
Gyenes (1991) argues that control o f the alliance should be granted on the basis of 
operational and financial risks. The means o f exercising managerial control can also be 
found in the nomination of one o f the parent firm’s managers as the alliance general 
manager, as well as the employment o f different ownership structure arrangements (Rafii, 
1978; Gullander, 1976). Hence, sharing control would improve cooperative arrangements 
between alliance partners.
The extent of control is the second dimension o f strategic alliance’s control. The 
difficulty of managing SAs arises from the fact that such alliances have more than one 
parent. These parents, moreover, unlike the shareholders o f a large, publicly owned 
company are visible and powerful and can and will disagree on just about anything. The 
extent of control is measured by the extent to which an alliance was dominated by either 
of its parents by focusing on the way in which decisions were made and, in particular, by 
determining how much influence each parent had on various types o f decisions (Killing, 
1982, 1983). In this respect, Brouthers et al. (1997) also argue that there are three styles 
of management in SAs. The first style is the dominant management style where one of 
the partner firms is assigned or assumes responsibility directly to oversee the operations
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of the venture. The second style is dual management which functions when both partners 
share management responsibility of the venture. This is the most difficult management 
style to implement effectively, because there is the likelihood that dual managers will 
interfere with each other or give conflicting instructions to employees, thus making the 
venture inoperable. The third style proposed by Brouthers et al. (1997) is termed 
independent management. Independent management is desired for those ventures where 
neither partner has specific management expertise that can be easily transferred directly 
to the venture. In this style of management, managers o f the cooperative venture are 
responsible for managing the activities, setting goals, establishing policies, etc. The 
partners monitor the activities o f these managers through a board of directors. This 
method relies on managers being very competent and in a high level o f inter-firm 
cooperation.
The third dimension, focus of control, emphasizes whether alliance partners seek to 
control the overall alliance or target specific activities or processes perceived as crucial 
for achievement o f the alliance or the partners’ strategic objectives. In this regard, several 
studies (see Geringer and Hebert, 1989) found that the exercise of effective control 
should emphasize selective control over those dimensions a parent company perceives as 
crucial rather than attempting to control the entire range of the alliance activities.
Besides understanding, commitment, and control, researchers contend that having inter­
firm trust and confidence is another important factor in partner cooperation (see Ring 
and Van de Yen, 1992). A certain minimum level o f inter-firm trust is indispensable for
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any strategic alliance to be formed and to function. Obviously, the more the partners 
believe in the goodwill and reliability o f each other, the more confidence in cooperation 
between the partners (Das and Teng, 1998). Generating trust among alliance participants 
is crucial to overcoming partners’ initial suspicions about possible partner opportunism, 
which may prevent effective implementation of their collaborative agreement (Todeva 
and Knoke, 2005). Researchers (for example Goel, 1994; Chaudhuri, 1995; Brousseau 
and Quelin, 1996; Lin and Germain, 1998) argue that imbalances in organizational 
power, indicated by disparities in the resources contributed and controlled by each 
partner organization, can impede trust creation due to the partners’ unequal capacities to 
fulfil their obligations. However, inter-firm trust and social knowledge of the partners 
may well serve as a substitute for control (Das and Teng, 1997). Once both partners gain 
mutual confidence through continual testing, then “informal psychological contracts 
increasingly compensate or substitute for formal contractual safeguards as reliance on 
trust among parties increases over tim e” (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994:105). This 
indicates that repeated SAs among experienced partners are more likely to rely on inter- 
organizational trust than on formal safeguards against potential partner opportunism. 
However, managing SAs is not an easy task because managers confront a number o f  
difficulties in managing such alliances. These difficulties are discussed in the following 
part.
Potential difficulties associated with manasins strategic alliances
Inevitably, conflicts will arise in strategic alliances (Gyenes, 1991). Zineldin and
Dodourova (2005) and Johansson (1997) found that dissimilar objectives, inability to 
share risks, and lack of trust lead to an early alliance demise. Similarly, Elmuti and
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Kathawala (2001) and Zineldin (2000, 2002) concluded that problems that alliances face 
are: i) lack of clear goals and objectives; ii) lack of trust and opportunistic behaviour; iii) 
clash of cultures and “incompatible personal chemistry”; iv) lack o f coordination between 
management teams; v) differences in operating procedures and attitudes among partners; 
vi) possibility o f creating a future local or global competitor; and vii) performance risk 
as a result o f external and internal factors. Gyenes (1991) argues that conflicts between 
alliance partners usually take on either o f two forms. The first arises out of conflicting 
operational priorities. These usually revolve around which projects or activities will 
receive the most attention. The second involves financial priorities. In these instances, 
financial pressures within either or both partners’ businesses may influence or postpone 
important decisions. Similarly, A1 Khalifa and Peterson (2004) discussed two major 
problems associated with strategic alliances. First, opportunism, which is a common 
characteristic o f inter-firm behaviour, although it is not inevitable (Williamson, 1975, 
1983; Kogut and Zander, 1993; Madhok, 1995). However, A1 Khalifa and Peterson
(2004) argue that a major method o f avoiding opportunistic behaviour is to engender trust 
between the parties concerned and to place emphasis on long, rather than short term, 
commercial success. Second, leakage of information when strategic alliances can suffer 
drainage of efficiency through leakage of information, and this puts partners at a 
disadvantage relative to direct market entry and hierarchies (Agarwal and Ramaswami, 
1992; Nanda and Williamson, 1995; Bleeke and Ernst, 1995; Pan, 1996).
To sum up, some authors such as Harrigan (1985), Kanter (1994), and Killing (1983) 
contend that the essence o f alliance management is to work toward harmonious 
relationships by various means like sharing power, enhancing communication, building
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trust, and so forth. For an alliance to operate and proceed efficiently, initial disorder and 
conflicts of interest created by working with partner firms need to be severely curbed. If 
inter-partner conflicts get out o f control, the alliance will be in the way towards 
reformation or termination (Das and Teng, 2002). Collectively, to contribute to alliance 
success and be a source of competitive advantage, managers at all levels must work 
together to find ways to balance their interests with those o f their counterparts in partner 
firms, and to learn how to effectively manage the tension between cooperation and 
competition (Douma et al., 2000).
3.3.5 Phase 5: Alliance’s performance evaluation
The literature on strategic alliance performance has been reviewed from two 
perspectives: first, measures o f performance; second, determinants and factors affecting 
performance (Boateng and Glaister, 2002). In this part, determinants and factors affecting 
alliance performance is discussed first, followed by a discussion of criteria used for 
alliance performance evaluation.
Factors affectins alliance performance
Many alliances have been plagued by unsatisfactory cooperation and poor performance. 
According to some researchers, about 69 per cent o f alliances can be considered as 
failures (Beamish, 1985; Das and Teng, 2000b). Performance may negatively be affected 
because of risks associated with strategic alliances. Das and Teng (1998) suggest that 
there are two distinctive and equally important types o f risk that may influence the 
performance of SAs: relational risk and performance risk. Relational risk is concerned 
with cooperative relationships, or the probability that the partner does not comply with
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the spirit of cooperation. Opportunistic behaviour of the partners (Williamson, 1983,
1985) is a typical source of relational risk. On the other hand, performance risk refers to 
the probability that intended strategic goals of an alliance may not be achieved, even 
though cooperation between the partners is satisfactory. The presence o f these risks 
would affect the outcome o f the strategic alliance. There are four possible outcomes 
namely stability, reformation, decline or termination (Das and Teng, 2002). An alliance 
may need to be restructured or reformed if  the expectations o f the partners are not met. 
Decline may well call for similar actions although it may be a prelude to termination (Das 
and Kumar, 2007). However, many alliances are showing successful records. Elmuti and 
Kathawala (2001) maintain that a survey by Technology Associates and Alliances (1999) 
asked 455 CEOs to rank the importance of certain success factors for SAs aiad the results 
were that these factors are senior management commitment, similarity of management 
philosophies, effective and strong management team, frequent performance feedback, 
clearly defined, shared goals and objectives, thorough planning, clearly understood roles, 
international vision, partner selection, communication between partners and maintaining 
relationships.
Criteria for measuring alliance performance
Brouthers et al. (1997: 41) maintain that “one o f the most difficult questions to answers is 
‘how is the cooperative venture performing?” Evaluating performance of ISAs is a 
complicated process for two reasons. Firstly, because alliances are formed for a variety o f  
purposes and often operated in highly uncertain settings (Contractor and Lorange, 1988). 
Secondly, because firms from different countries and cultures generally apply divergent 
success criteria (Si and Bruton, 1999; Yan and Zeng, 1999). An example o f how difficult
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it is to judge venture performance is the KLM (Netherlands) and Northwest (United 
States) airline venture. By all financial appearances this venture should be deemed a 
success by its owners, profits top $200 million, and market value exceeds $2 billion. 
However, neither partner was happy with the arrangement. KLM approached other US 
airlines as possible replacements for Northwest (Brouthers et al., 1997). Hence, the 
measurement o f alliance performance has bedeviled alliance researchers for decades 
(Inkpen, 2001). A major issue of considerable debate is the yardsticks to be used for 
assessing strategic alliances performance (Glaister et al., 2005). Performance of SAs can 
be measured in several different ways. These include alliance longevity (Beamish and 
Banks, 1987); profitability (Reuer and Miller, 1997); growth and cost position (Geringer 
and Hebert, 1991); and the state of the alliance such as harmony, morale, productivity, 
and learning (Das and Teng, 1998). In this respect, Hyder (1999) distinguished between 
tangible returns such as profit, market share, etc., and intangible returns, such as partners’ 
relationship, local market know-how, local identity, etc. Therefore, practitioners and 
academicians often measure long-term alliance success by examining the extent to which 
alliance objectives have been met (Geringer and Hebert, 1991; Das and Teng, 2000b). 
Motorola’s Semiconductor Sector provides an instructive example o f SAs evaluation 
procedures. Several years ago, when Motorola began partnering in earnest, senior 
management devised a one-page “Statement o f partnership goals” that summarized what 
Motorola expected to achieve for both itself and key customers from the partnership 
process. The key objectives spelled-out in this partnership can be briefly paraphrased as 
follows:
• All partnership programs (for example co-design or joint development) will result in 
profits for both Motorola and its partner firm;
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• Motorola’s sales to the partner firm will be substantial and/or exhibit significant 
growth potential;
•  Motorola should have a significant, if  not exclusive, share o f the partner’s business;
• The partnership should contribute significantly to the achievement of Motorola’s 
“technology roadmap goals”.
Periodically, senior management compares outputs from each o f the Semiconductor 
Sector’s approximately 60 partnerships to the goals specified on the partnership 
statement. In order to gauge the benefits o f the partnership to the customer firm, 
managers examine results o f Motorola’s annual customer satisfaction survey. The survey 
summarizes Motorola’s performance from the perspective o f partner firm’s managers 
from such functional areas as manufacturing, engineering, purchasing, and research and 
development. Following consultation with customer managers, partnerships that do not 
meet objectives are “downgraded”.
Measuring alliance performance becomes more complicated when partners begin to 
consider complementary goals (common benefits) as well as conflicting goals (private 
benefits) in measuring performance and success. According to Khanna et al., (1994) 
complementary goals are common and shared collectively by all participants whereas 
conflicting goals are individualistic in nature and accrue only to a subset of participants. 
In that sense, studies (such as Dollinger and Golden, 1992; Thomas and Trevino, 1993) 
have evaluated alliance performance in terms o f meeting the objectives o f individual 
partner firms. However, other studies do not consider success unless common goals are
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achieved as well (Khanna et al., 1994). Therefore, the partners should decide ex ante 
what type of benefits they wish to measure, whether only common benefits or both types 
of benefits. In some alliances such as joint research and development and joint marketing, 
the partners tend to receive more private benefits than common benefits from the deal. In 
other types of alliances, such as JVs, common benefits are more prominent than private 
benefits (Das and Teng, 1997). In that sense, the partners may have either a short-term 
orientation or long-term orientation. A short-term orientation regards the alliance as 
transitional, so that it is expected to dissolve sooner or later. Special emphasis is placed 
on the prompt, current financial performance o f the alliance. On the contrary, firms with 
a long-term orientation tend to theory the alliance as semi-permanent, and they pay less 
attention to the current performance of the alliance. Many alliances dissolved because the 
partners took a short-term orientation, or expecting too much too soon, so that partners 
did not have the patience to wait for the results. Therefore, partners should decide ex 
ante what type of benefits they wish to measure, whether only common benefits or both 
types of benefits.
Moreover, Das and Teng (2002b) argue that there are four possible outcomes of SAs, 
namely: stability; reformation; decline; or termination. If the alliance has met the 
expectations o f its partners it will be stable and may even expand and would, 
consequently, tend to reaffirm their trust and commitment to each other. An alliance may 
need to be modified or reformed if  the expectations of the alliance partners are not met. 
Modifying the alliance along the way at least provides a means for correcting some o f the 
inappropriate decisions. Das and Teng (2000b) distinguished between positive 
modification and negative modification. Positive modifications refer to those that are
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intended to give the alliance a second chance for survival. In contrast, negative 
modifications are those that tend toward termination of the alliance. Decline may well 
call for similar actions although it may be a prelude to termination.
3.3.6 Factors influencing the formation process of strategic alliances
Despite the fact that SAs are influenced by several factors such as government policies 
and level o f economic development of the partners’ countries, the prominent two, as 
found in the literature, are trust among partners and partners’ national and corporate 
culture. Although trust and commitment were discussed above as an important factor to 
develop cooperation for the purpose of operating and managing SAs (see step 4 in the 
process), they are also discussed as factors influencing the whole process o f forming a 
strategic alliance.
3.3.6.1 Partners’ culture
For the purpose o f this study, the term culture is based on the definition o f Hofstede that 
“culture is the programming o f the mind acquired by growing up in a particular country” 
(1991:5). Therefore, the collective programming o f a nation leaves an imprint on a 
person’s process for daily living including work, leisure, and social skills. Consequently, 
individuals living in a particular country tend to share similar values, and that they bring 
these values to the firms for which they work. In contrast, individuals living in different 
countries are expected to have different values (Hofstede, 1980, 1997). For example, 
Japan has a collectivistic culture, whereas the USA has an individualistic culture 
(Hofstede, 1980, 1991). Tihanyi et al. (2005) also define culture as the homogeneity o f  
characteristics that separates one human group from another, and submit that it 
characterizes the norms, values, and institutions of a society. Hofstede found that cultures
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of the nations differed along four primary dimensions and that various business and 
consumer behaviour patterns can be closely linked to these four dimensions:
1. Power distance: “the extent to which the less powerful members o f institutions 
and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed 
unequally” (1991:28).
2. Uncertainty avoidance: “the extent to which the members o f a culture feel 
threatened by uncertain or unknown situations ” (1991:113).
3. Individualism versus collectivism: ranges from “societies in which the ties 
between individuals are loose” to “societies in which people from birth onwards 
are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups” (1991:51).
4. Masculinity versus femininity: ranges from “societies in which social gender 
roles are clearly distinct” to “societies in which social gender roles overlap” 
(1991:.82).
Therefore, national culture is a macro level concept. Consequently, for national culture to 
play a role in an organization’s decision making process, a link must be made between 
national culture and organization (Pett and Dibrell, 2001). In that sense, it is argued that 
the organization is a reflection of the national culture (Clark et al., 1979). Accordingly, 
McDermott and O’Dell (2001) argue that each organization has its unique culture, which 
develops overtime to reflect the organization’s identity in two dimensions: visible and 
invisible. The visible dimension o f culture is reflected in the espoused values, philosophy 
and mission of the firm while the invisible dimension lies in the unspoken set o f values 
that guide employees’ actions and perceptions in the organization. Therefore,
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organizational culture can be defined as the shared, basic assumptions that an 
organization learnt while coping with the environment and solving problems of external 
adaptation and internal integration that are taught to new members as the correct way to 
solve those problems (Park et al., 2004). However, Pett and Dibrell (2001) argue that if  
the organization is molded and constrained by national culture, then the top management 
team can also be influenced by national culture. For example, if  a Japanese organization’s 
top management team perceives, based on its cultural background, that the long-term gain 
is a higher priority than the short-term, then an organization will emphasize a long-term 
strategy. Conversely, if  a US organization’s top management team perceives that the 
short-term gain is a higher priority than the long-term, then a US organization will 
emphasize a short-term strategy (Pett and Dibrell, 2001). Other researchers (for example 
Franke et al., 1991 and Katz et al., 2000) argue that culture is strongly related to an 
organization’s perception of its environment and therefore can be reflected to its strategy. 
Thus, an organization’s country o f origin will play a significant role in how top 
management in organizations perceive and react to SAs.
Based on the aforementioned discussion it is expected that cultural differences between 
alliance partners are reflected in fundamental differences in goals and strategies (Chung 
et al. 2000; Yoshimura and Anderson, 1997; Hitt et al., 1997) which in turn will make it 
more difficult for alliance partners to agree on common goals, to solve problems, and to 
resolve conflicts than if  they come from the same country (Smith et al., 1995). 
Consequently, other researchers contend that national cultural differences have been 
often linked to alliance conflict (Lane and Beamish, 1990), misunderstandings (Lyles and 
Salk, 1996), collaborative problems (Mowery et al., 1996), knowledge transfer problems
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(Hamel, 1991), and poor performance or even failure (Meschi, 1997). The end result, o f  
course, is reduced revenues and profits, and increased bureaucratic inefficiency which 
obviously affects the basic operation of the strategic alliance as well as its chance for 
success. Similarly, a study by Wilson (2003) o f participants from various cultural 
backgrounds (Japanese, Americans, Southeast Asians and others), have indicated that the 
inability to manage culturally diverse employees leads to unproductive meetings, 
presentations, teamwork, product marketing and development, and decision making.
Thus, cultural differences often create problems in making strategic alliances work -  
especially between Asian and Western companies (Vyas et al., 1995). Moreover, 
strategic alliance parents who come from different countries will also often have different 
mother tongues, and this can be expected to cause communication difficulties. Verbal 
communication may suffer from both perceptual and encoding/decoding gaps (Root, 
1994). Hence while a context o f a meeting may be quite unimportant in a low-context 
culture such as the U.S., a cheap and hurried lunch offered by an American host will be 
interpreted as lack of interest by a Japanese top executive (Hennart and Zeng, 2002). Yet 
effective communication between strategic alliance parents is crucial for strategic alliance 
management for at least two reasons (Doz, 1996). First, strategic alliance parents do not 
usually start their collaboration with full understanding of each other’s goals, capabilities, 
and behaviours. Failure by parents to quickly learn about each other may lead to 
misunderstanding and suspicion, and eventually to lower commitment, poor economic 
results and dissolution (Doz, 1996; Inkpen and Birkinshaw, 1994; Shenkar and Zeira,
1992). Second, in most cases unanticipated events render the initial strategic alliance 
agreement quickly obsolete and require it to be renegotiated. Therefore, close interaction
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is crucial for partners’ mutual understanding. To illustrate, Texas Instruments (TI) and 
Hitachi managers had to bridge their cultural differences and learn to work together over 
time prior to the development o f their memory chip joint venture (Hitt et al., 1997). This 
was due to significant differences in their decision-making processes. TI managers used a 
common American approach whereby managers would meet to discuss an issue, 
brainstorm solutions and then make a decision. Alternatively, Hitachi managers often 
held informal discussions and agreed on a decision prior to a formal meeting where the 
decision was ratified.
Companies from western countries may also experience difficulties in managing their 
partnerships. Perhaps this is best illustrated by reviewing the turbulent strategic alliance 
of KLM from Netherlands and Northwest from the USA. The relationship between these 
two companies has been described by KLM’s president as a classic clash in cultures, a 
collision of two diametrically opposed philosophies o f doing business. It is the European 
way versus the American way (Tully, 1996). The differences were so strong between the 
two companies that the senior management o f the two organizations fought constantly, 
eventually ceased virtually all communications, and began a battle for control of the 
organization. The philosophical differences o f KLM and Northwest were, in part, due to 
cultural differences, so there is significant potential for other cross-border alliances to 
include such wide spread differences in managerial philosophies as well (Elmuti and 
Kathawala, 2001).
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Therefore, in order to ensure the best chance o f success, companies should either seek 
partners who do have similar management philosophies, or draft an alliance agreement 
that adequately addresses the differences, and provides for their resolution (Ernst and 
Stem, 1996). However, Park and Ungson (1997), Luo (1997) contend that a successful 
partnership does not require two closely matched cultures. For example, in a study o f  
Japanese-US SAs, Park and Ungson (1997) found that organizational measures o f 
compatibility were not important in dissolution rates. Surprisingly, they also found that 
JVs between Japanese and U.S. parents survived longer than those between two U.S. 
parents. They attributed this finding to the fact that Japanese managers have higher trust, 
longer term orientation and are keen to uphold their good reputation. Gary (2004) 
contends that the Fuji-Xerox partnership is now in its 42nd year, and Samsung and 
Coming have been working together since the 1970s. Similarly, Wilson (2003) concluded 
that culture in general or in particular as measured by Hofstede, might not be 
powerful enough to explain success or failure of strategic alliances. Fey and 
Beamish (2001) also looked at 24 SAs between Russian and Canadian, American, British 
or Finnish parents. They found that the cultural distance between the home base o f the 
foreign parent and Russian did not affect the performance o f the alliance. Other factors, 
such as competition, political constraints, tax situation might have at least the same 
influence on the alliance.
3.3.6.2 Trust among partners
In an alliance context, partners’ trust is defined as an individual’s belief or a common 
belief among a group o f individuals that another individual or group: i) makes good-faith 
efforts to behave in accordance with any commitments both explicit and implicit; ii) is
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honest in whatever negotiation preceded such commitments; and iii) does not take 
excessive advantage of another even when the opportunity is available (Cumming and 
Bromiley, 1996). According to Cumming and Bromiley (1996) trustworthy behaviour 
means that individuals actually behave according to i), ii) and iii) stated above. Cullen et 
al. (2000) further argue that mutual trust and commitment are central for ISAs for several 
reasons.
First, no contract or other agreement, no matter how complete or detailed, can account for 
every issue or every contingency that might arise. Formal contracts can never anticipate 
and identify all the events and changes that occur over the lifetime o f the strategic 
alliance. Likewise, it is not feasible that partner companies rewrite an agreement every 
time a new issue or situation arises. Necessarily, much o f what happens between partners 
in alliances develops informally in the alliance relationship. Ultimately, especially in 
evolving or long-term alliances, managers must default to trust and commitment, the 
social fabric of the relationship, to fill the gaps in the formal agreement and to keep the 
relationship running smoothly.
Second, the alliance of two or more companies creates a strong potential for 
dysfunctional conflict and mistrust. Companies often differ in strategic goals and 
objectives for the alliance. They differ in the extent and type of experience with alliances. 
Companies also differ in organizational cultures and management philosophies and in 
their routine policies and procedures. When the partners are from different national 
cultures, these differences are magnified and commonly generate misunderstandings.
88
Chapter 3: Strategic alliances: A theoretical analysis
Without a sense of mutual commitment to each other, partners often fail to work out the 
inevitable problems of cross-national alliances.
Third, mutual trust is important because successful cooperation requires alliance 
participants to contribute quality inputs into the alliance organization. When partners do 
not trust each other, they hold back information or take unfair advantage of each other if 
given the opportunity. If this happens, the alliance seldom produces all the mutual 
benefits possible from the cooperation. Unreliability, unfairness, and opportunistic 
behaviour by partners set the alliance on a path not only of sub-optimization, but also 
toward dissolution.
Fourth, the reason that trust and commitment are important in SAs is learning, which 
often cited as one of the major benefits and motivations for SAs. According to Inkpen
(2005), firms within an alliance can learn from their partners’ past experiences and 
transfer their knowledge and experiences back to the parent organization. In that sense, 
trust is essential in order for alliance partners to be willing to share key information on a 
strategic and operational level (Whipple and Frankel, 1998). Partners share information 
with confidence because of the development of trust (Koka and Prescott, 2002). If 
partners do not trust each other and are not committed to the alliance, technology transfer 
is greatly inhibited.
To sum up, the benefits of inter-firm trust in strategic alliances include lowering 
transaction costs (Gulati, 1995), improving desirable behaviour and quickly transfer
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resources and competencies to realize the value and achieve the objectives of the 
relationship (Madhok, 1995), gaining full cooperation and transferring resources between 
partners (Ireland et al., 2002), reducing the extent of formal contracts (Larson, 1992), and 
facilitating dispute resolution (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994) and ultimately improving 
alliance performance (Inkpen and Currall, 1997; Zaheer aL, 1998). However, the lack 
of trust and suspicion are common in business. Lack of trust is viewed as a reason for 
alliance failure and, as such, is important to alliance performance (Larson, 1992; 
Sherman, 1994). Lack of trust could be attributed to several factors. Hitt et al. (200Id), 
for example, maintain that cultural, economic, and institutional differences across 
countries increase the difficulty of developing trust between partners with home bases in 
separate countries. To illustrate, consider the example of Toshiba (Japan), IBM (USA), 
and Siemens AG (Germany). Although they are traditional competitors, these firms 
united in a Research and Development strategic alliance to produce the next generation of 
computer chips. Over 200 scientists from these culturally different companies and 
countries work in the IBM research facility in New York. In theory, the cultural diversity 
and varied backgrounds were supposed to foster creativity and dramatic advances. 
Unfortunately, not all went smoothly. Initially, the Japanese found it difficult to work in 
small isolated offices. The closed cubicles were totally different from their accustomed 
open office spaces. The Germans were horrified that Japanese slept in meetings when a 
topic did not concern them. The IBM staff complained that the Germans planned too 
much and were slowing things down. Difficulties with communication in English, lack of 
sufficient cross-cultural training, and differences in management styles also affected the 
venture. The result was a lack of trust, a withdrawal of the Japanese, Germans, and 
Americans into their own teams and, perhaps more important, the belief that the other
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companies’ scientists and engineers held back information and did not share ideas 
(Browning, 1994). In the above example, trust and commitment did not build so that 
cultural differences could be bridged and communication problems could be solved. 
Browning (1994) argues that firms often begin a relationship suspicious of each other’s 
motives. For example, typical fears and questions include the following: Do they want to 
steal our technology? Are they trying to take us over? Are we creating a new competitor? 
Are we giving away too much proprietary knowledge? Will they or can they provide 
what we agreed on? If this reluctance is apparent in the firm’s behaviour and interactions 
with the partner firm, it can be interpreted, perhaps rightly so, as distrust. However, Arino 
et al. (2001) argue that in achieving the objectives of SAs, reliance on trust is not 
sufficient since trust is a complex issue and management should focus on a broader 
concept -  the quality of the alliance and the critical success factors of enhancing the 
overall quality of the alliance. More specifically, by defining relational quality as “the 
extent to which the partners feel comfortable and are willing to rely on trust in dealing 
with one another” (Arino et al., 2001:111), the scholars clarify that relational quality 
encompasses a broader concept than trust, such as the degree of compatibility of 
corporate culture and decision-making style, and a convergence of worldviews.
3.4 Summary and conclusion
Three major theories describing the rationale for the formation of strategic alliances have 
been reviewed in this chapter. These theories are the transaction cost theory, the resource- 
based theory, and the knowledge-based theory of strategic alliances. Transaction cost 
theorists argue that strategic alliances help firms minimize the sum of both transaction 
costs and production costs. While transaction costs refer to costs that are incurred from
91
Chapter 3: Strategic alliances: A theoretical analysis
activities necessary for an exchange (such as writing and enforcing a contract), 
production costs come from coordinating activities in-house, in terms of learning, 
organizing, and managing production (Das and Teng, 2000b). Therefore, from transaction 
cost perspective, firms enter into SAs for several reasons such as risk sharing; cost, 
sharing; product rationalization and economies of scale; transfer of complementary 
technology and exchange of patents; shaping competition; conforming to host 
government policy; facilitating international expansion and vertical linkage. The 
resource-based advocates claim that a firm’s competitive strategy is influenced by its 
accumulated resources rather than being defined by the competitive environment. The 
essence of the resource-based theory is gaining access to other firms’ valuable resources. 
Valuable firm resources are usually scarce, imperfectly imitable, and lacking in direct 
substitutes. Therefore, the overall rationale of resource-based theory for entering into a 
strategic alliance is to aggregate, share, and exchange valuable resources with other firms 
when these resources cannot be efficiently obtained through market exchanges or 
mergers and acquisitions. SAs are used to pool the technological know-how and expertise 
of different firms. Thus, the distinct benefit of SAs is to have access to precisely those 
resources that are needed while retaining those resources that are currently under-utilized 
internally. Recently, there is an increasing recognition that the competitive advantage of 
firms depends on their ability to create, transfer, utilize and protect knowledge asset. 
Advocates of the knowledge-based view of strategic alliances argue that the sharing of 
knowledge including technology, know-how and organizational capability, and learning 
from partners are the dominant objectives of SAs. Therefore through learning and sharing 
valuable knowledge with partners, the knowledge-based view of SAs claims, strategic 
alliances help companies overcome limitations in their own resource set, solving internal
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environmental problems, and extend the application of their core competencies to achieve 
competitive advantages.
Researchers provided various models for the formation of strategic alliances. Despite 
differences between these models, major similarities and commonalities were found 
between them. Based on these similarities and differences, a theoretical framework is 
developed examining the process of SAs formation. The framework is divided into three 
major stages which involve five phases, namely: motives for forming the alliance; 
selection of the alliance’s partners; selection of the alliance’s form of structure; alliance’s 
management; and the alliance’s performance evaluation. The phases were found to be 
influenced by two major factors, which are partners’ cultures and partners’ trust.
In the next chapter the context within which this study is conducted, The United Arab 
Emirates, will be presented and analyzed.
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CHAPTER 4
The context of the United Arab Emirates
4.1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the context in which this study takes place. The 
historical, political, and social background of the UAE is presented. The economic 
context is also analyzed in details with more emphasis on the global business 
environment of the UAE. Such background information helps to uncover factors that 
have led to the emergence and evolution of the phenomenon of SAs. The chapter consists 
of four parts. To start with, a general overview of geographical and demographic 
information about the UAE is given in the first part. The second part reviews some 
significant historical events in the state prior to the federation in 1971. In the third part a 
description of the UAE during the federation is provided including related political, 
social, and economic dimensions. The fourth part, the main part of the chapter, analyses 
the global business environment of the UAE and its role in enhancing foreign direct 
investments and foreign trade. More emphasis is made on this part because it directly 
relates to the study problem and objectives. The chapter ends with concluding remarks.
Throughout the chapter the currency referred to is United States Dollar (US$), although 
most of the figures were originally in United Arab Emirates Dirham (AED). For the 
reader, however, the use of US$ makes it less complicated to compare the figures from 
the UAE with other figures, and at the same time be familiar with the numbers. I
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consequently use the rate at the time of this thesis which is fairly stable at 1 US$ = AED 
3.67.
4.2 Geographical and demographic background
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is located in Southwest Asia and in the Eastern block 
of the Arab World. It lies on the South-eastern side of the Arabian Gulf sharing borders 
with Qatar to the Northwest, with Saudi Arabia to the West and South, and with Oman to 
the east and Northeast (UAE Yearbook, 2007). The total area of the UAE is 83,600 
square kilometres (including approximately 200 islands). The largest emirate, Abu Dhabi, 
occupies 67,340 square kilometres which accounts for 87 per cent of the UAE’s total area 
(World Bank Fact Book, 2006).
The demographic structure of the UAE has been changed considerably by sharp rise in 
population over the last three decades. The population censuses and estimates conducted 
over the period 1975-2003 explain the demographic situation in the UAE over the years. 
Table 4.1 below demonstrates the rapid population growth rates of both nationals and 
non-nationals. It is important to note that official UAE statistics data on population of the 
years 1968, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1995 are available but the data of the years 2001 and 
2003 are based on official estimates only due to the lack of official statistics data.
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T ab le 4.1: P op u la tion  grow th  (1968-2003)
Year UAE Nationals Percentage Non-Nationals Percentage Total
1968 114,444 63.5% 65,782 36.5% 180,266
1975 187,366 30.0% 390,521 70.0% 557,887
1980 290,544 27.9% 751,555 70.0% 1,042,099
1985 399,707 28.9% 982,757 71.1% 1,382,464
1995 588,294 24.4% 1,822,747 75.6% 2,411,041
2001 768,000 22.0% 2,720,000 78% 3,488,000
2003 808,200 20.0% 3,023,200 80.0% 4,041,000
Source: C en tra l S ta tistica l A d m in istra tion , M in is try  o f  E con om y an d  P lan n in g-U A E , (2004)
According to the UAE Year Book (2006), the UAE’s population is rising at a rate of 
around 6.9 per cent, reaching 4,320,000 in 2004 compared to 4,041,000 in 2003. A strong 
economy, healthy social development and political stability have all supported steady rise 
in population, making the UAE one of the fastest growing nations in the world. 
Additional factors supporting this growth include the influx of foreign workers and 
investments, a sharp drop in infant mortality rate and a comparatively higher birth rate.
4.3 Historical background
Very little is known about pre-Islamic civilizations except that trading activity at Julfar 
(to day called Emirate of Ras Al-Khaimah) and Dibba (today belongs to Emirates of 
Shaijah and Fujairah). This trade activity brought both people and goods from the far and 
near east to the region since before the recorded history (Potts, 1990:339). However, the 
first known foreign invasion took place in this region was that of the Portuguese under 
Vasco De Gama. In the early 16th century Vasco De Gama found maps produced by Ibn 
Majid (d. c. 1500) and Sulaiman Al-Mahri (d. c. 1553) (Tibbetts, 1971) and then 
launched a brutal invasion and occupied the coast and region for nearly 143 years (1507-
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1650) (Adam, 2003). The Portuguese were driven out of the region in 1633 when they 
lost control of the Strait of Hormuz. Then the Dutch and the British fought each other to 
gain control of the Gulf until the British drove the Dutch out of the region in 1766. The 
British invasion was based on their desire to control the maritime routes of trade between 
the Gulf and India (Al-Qasimi, 1986). While the British competed for regional 
supremacy, a local uprising by the Qawasim (local tribe) was gathering strength and built 
up a fleet of over 60 large vessels and could put nearly 20,000 sailors to sea. In the first 
two decades of the 19 century a series of clashes between the two sides ended in the 
virtual destruction of Qawasim fleet and the consolidation of British influence in the Gulf 
region (UAE Year Book, 2007). Following the defeat of the Qawasim, the British signed 
a series of agreements with the sheikhs (rulers) of the individual emirates that later 
augmented with treaties on preserving a maritime truce and to protect the British ships in 
the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean (Al-Fahim, 1995).
In 1892 another treaty signed between Britain and the respective chiefs of the 
sheikhdoms of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Shaijah, Ajman, Fujairah, Umm Al-Quwain, and Ras 
Al-Khaimah. Under this treaty, the sheikhs agreed not to enter into any agreement or 
correspondence with any power other than the British and not to cede, sell, or mortgage 
any part of their territory to anyone other than Britain without British consent. In return, 
the British promised to protect the Trucial Coast from all aggressions by sea and to help 
out in case of land attack (Washington Institute, 1991). In 1952 Britain recommended 
that the rulers of the seven sheikhdoms establish the Trucial Council to encourage the 
adoption of common policies in administrative matters, possibly leading to a federation 
of states (Federal Research Division, 2006).
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In the early 1900s, fishing and pearling were the major occupations of the population. It 
was the export of pearls that paid for most of the country’s imports, but by the late 1930s 
the pearl trade had slumped and never recovered. Able-bodied men left the more densely 
populated areas along the coast to find work elsewhere, while inland, a number of 
nomadic tribes maintain their simple lives on a diet of dates and camel milk. The 
discovery of oil a few years later, and its production from 1962, were the catalyst for the 
UAE’s development into one of the world’s wealthiest countries, with per capita GDP 
being US$ 44,000 in 2007 (UAE Year Book, 2009).
In 1968 the British announced that it would withdraw from the Gulf. Its somewhat 
special protective relationship with the sheikhdoms would end in the year of 1971 
(Hudson 1977:196). The British decision to leave the Gulf came as a surprise to the rulers 
and the people of the Trucial States. They were not prepared to face the unresolved 
territorial claims, to defend the growing oil wealth, to deal with the ideological trends 
sweeping the Arab world, or to guard against the possibility of subversion (Heard-Bey 
1999:129). In 1971 six of the Trucial States (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Shaijah, Ajman, 
Fujairah, and Umm Al-Quwain) agreed on federal constitution for achieving 
independence as the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The seventh emirate, Ras Al- 
Khaimah, formally acceded to the new federation on 10 February 1972 (UAE Year 
Book, 2007)
4.4 The UAE under the federation
This part reviews the UAE after the federation in 1971. It is made of three subparts. Part 
one when reviews the political life and system of the state and its development since
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federation to date. Changes and developments in the social life are covered in part two. 
The last part is dedicated to the economic features and development. The importance of 
discussing the socio-economic and political features of the UAE stems from the fact that 
they directly affect the global business environment of any state. Political stability and 
socio-economic development affect the competitive advantage and attractiveness of any 
economy for foreign investments.
4.4.1 Political background
The UAE is governed by hereditary rule, namely the Supreme Council of Rulers, which
is made up of the rulers of each Emirate, along with the Crown Princes and deputies of
each ruler. The Economist Intelligence Unit states that:
“The Supreme Council o f Rulers is the highest federal authority in the 
country. It has the power to decide policy, elect the federal President and his 
deputy, admit new embers to the federation, and appoint and dismiss the 
Prime Minister and the judges o f the Federal Supreme Court” (2006a: 7).
The Supreme Council elects the Cabinet that is headed by the prime minister, a position 
currently held by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al-Maktoum, the vice president of the 
UAE and the ruler of Dubai. In 1994, Sheikh Mohammed was appointed Crown Prince of 
Dubai. In 2006, Sheikh Mohammed became ruler after the untimely passing of his 
brother Sheikh Maktoum, who had held the position previously. Sheikh Mohammed has 
been a driving force behind the economic development of the country, particularly Dubai, 
as the UAE moves to reduce the level of dependence on oil and diversify into 
manufacturing, tourism, trade, logistics, and services. The Cabinet initiates legislation 
and also approves the federal budget and oversees the federal government (Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 2006a:8).
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The UAE’s political system, as a unique combination of a traditional and modem system,
has underpinned political stability and success, enabling the country to develop a modem
administrative structure while at the same time ensuring that the best of the traditions of
the past are adapted and maintained (Rees et al., 2007). The philosophy behind the state
was declared and explained in a statement that was released on 2 December 1971 when
the new state was formally established. The philosophy states that:
“The United Arab Emirates has been established as an independent state, 
possessing sovereignty. It is part o f the greater Arab nation. Its aim is to 
maintain its independence, its sovereignty, its security, and its stability, in 
defence against any attack on its entity or on the entity any o f its member 
Emirates. It also seeks to protect freedoms and rights o f its people and to 
achieve trustworthy cooperation between the Emirates for the common good. 
Among its aims, in addition to the purpose above described, is to work for the 
sake o f the progress o f the country in all fields, for the sake o f providing 
better life for its citizens, to give assistance and support to Arab causes and 
interest, and to support the Charter o f the United Nations and international 
morals ” (UAE Year Book, 2006:45).
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Under the provisional Constitution of 1971, each emirate reserves considerable powers, 
including control over its own oil and mineral wealth and some aspects of defence and 
internal security, although the Federal Government asserts primacy in most matters of 
law and government. In this milieu, federal powers have developed slowly. Traditional 
mle in the emirates has generally been patriarchal, with political allegiance defined in 
terms of loyalty to the tribe leaders (The Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and 
labour, 1997).
The UAE is a federation of seven emirates, each with its own mler. The rulers of the 
emirates are all members of the Supreme Council, the highest authority of the state. The 
Supreme Council elects the Cabinet that is headed by the prime minister. The Cabinet is
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the executive body of the Federation and is responsible for foreign and internal affairs in 
accordance with the Constitution and Federal laws. The cabinet also approves the federal 
budget and oversees the federal government (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2006a: 8). The 
National Federal Council (NFC), the Parliament, has legislative functions. The NFC is 
constituted of the representatives of the emirates, and each emirate has the right to 
nominate its own representatives. Parliamentary elections for 20 seats on the 40-seat 
NFC, the first in the UAE, were held in December 2006. The remaining 20 
representatives were appointed by the rulers in the respective emirates. In total, Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai have eight seats each; Shaijah and Ras A1 Khaimah have six seats each; 
and Ajman, Umm A1 Quwain, and Fujairah each have four seats. The NFC is responsible 
for reviewing drafts of federal laws and global agreements and discussing the public 
issues that concern the federation.
4.4.2 Social background
Thirty years ago, only people in the major towns had access to education or medical 
services. In 1971, the population of the UAE was slightly over 180,000 and only 46 
nationals had a university degree (Kirkwood, 1995), most of which were gained in the 
United States, Britain and other Arab countries, because the UAE did not have its own 
university until 1977. In 1980, over half of men over the age of 45, and over three 
quarters of women were illiterate (Wilkins, 2001). Over the same period of time, only a 
handful of tarmac roads existed and the high rise building was virtually unknown. Today 
modem and impressive high-rise buildings, well equipped hospitals, dependable 
electricity and water supplies, educational establishments, modem transportation 
networks are many examples of how the rulers have transformed the UAE (Rees et al.,
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2007). The UAE government has adopted a development strategy that aims to develop 
the human capital in the first place, and at the same time to exploit oil revenues to build 
the infrastructure for the industrial, service, and agricultural sectors. As a result, many 
industrial and services projects have been carried out as part of successive development 
plans. These projects included the building of houses, the construction of integrated 
modem cities, and the establishment of hospitals, clinics, schools, universities, and basic 
frameworks of infrastructure including bridges and roads that connect the different cities 
of the UAE. The projects also included laying down water pipes and electricity grids in 
all cities, creating transportation and communication services, and providing other basic 
service utilities to ensure the progress of the country and satisfy the aspirations of 
nationals for prosperity, security, and stability (Kirkwood, 1995). A considerable part of 
these projects are planned and implemented in joint venture form by local UAE and 
foreign companies.
4.4.3 Economic background
According to the UAE Year Book (2009), the UAE’s real economic growth rate in 2007 
was 5.2 per cent compared to 11.5 per cent in 2006 (see Figure 4.1). Meanwhile, nominal 
GDP (based on current prices) grew by 16.8 per cent in 2007 compared with 28.7 per 
cent in 2006 and 25.6 per cent in 2005, GDP at current prices in 2007 reaching Dh729.73 
billion compared with Dh624.62 billion in 2006. The Growth Competitive Index for 
2004, a composite of macroeconomic environment, state of public institutions, and 
technology readiness, ranks the UAE 16th in the world with a high score of 5.21 and at 
the top of the list among the GCC countries (The IMF Country Report No. 05/269, 2005). 
The country remained one of the fastest growing economies in the world. This was not
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solely due to a rise in value of the oil and gas sectors, which increased by 18.2 per cent in 
2007, related in part to a 13.1 per cent hike in average oil prices. The non-oil sector also 
performed impressively, reaching Dh467.9 billion, equivalent to 64.1 per cent of overall 
GDP. Key factors influencing growth in the economy were (based on Central Bank 
statistics) increases in the construction and building sector (25.6 per cent), along with 
significant growth in manufacturing and industry (19.8 per cent); real estate (16.9 per 
cent); the financial sector (11.5 per cent); transportation and communications (8.3 per 
cent); and tourism, which continued its steady growth at a rate of 6.4 per cent. Added to 
these positive influences, the state maintained its strongly supportive role through 
investment in government services, electricity and agriculture. Indeed, the government 
services sector output actually increased by 22.7 per cent in 2007, reaching a figure of 
Dh49.27 billion.
On October 09, 2007 the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
concluded Article IV consultation with the United Arab Emirates and issued Public 
Information Notice (PIN) No. 07/125 which reviewed the IMF’s economic findings on 
the UAE. The report concludes that:
“The rapid economic expansion in the U.A.E. has continued uninterrupted 
for the fourth consecutive year, with non-hydrocarbon GDP growth 
averaging in excess o f 10 per cent. This has been aided by an outward- 
oriented development strategy, a favorable business climate, and sustained 
high oil prices. The fiscal and external surpluses remain large, allowing for 
further accumulation o f official foreign assets. However, strong demand 
growth and housing shortages have led to sharp increases in rents and 
contributed to upward pressure on other prices. As a result, consumer price 
inflation exceeded 9 per cent in 2006. The medium-term outlook is very 
positive with real GDP growth projected to remain strong in 2007” (2007:5).
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Executive Directors of the IMF commended the United Arab Emirates for pursuing 
prudent macroeconomic policies, the prudent management of oil resources, and an 
outward-oriented development strategy, which have resulted in low inflation and high 
growth, as well as sizeable fiscal and external current account surpluses, a comfortable 
international reserve position, and the accumulation of foreign assets.
Figure 4.1: UAE’s GDP contributions of economic sectors for the Years 2006 and 2007
GDP BY SECTOR (in m illions of dirham s)
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4.4.3.1 Investments and economic diversification
The late President of the UAE established a program of economic reform and 
liberalization that has received high consideration and approval ratings from key 
international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF 
Country Report No. 06/257 states that:
“Based on the oil dependency ratio, measured by the ratio o f the oil revenues 
as a share o f total government revenues to oil exports as a share o f total 
exports, the UAE has gone from being one o f the most oil dependent 
economies ‘about 90 per cent’ in 1980 to one o f the least oil dependent 
economies by 2004 “about 50—60per cent” (2006:4) (see Figure 4.2).
F igu re 4.2: P ercen ta g e  ch an ge in  rea l U A E ’s G D P  grow th
Source: T h e IM F  C ou n try  R ep o rt N o. 06 /257  (2006)
Prompted by such a conviction as “economic growth should ideally occur with 
productive investments in all sectors” (Ministry of Economy and Planning-UAE, 2006), 
the country was ever keen to diversify investments as illustrated by the various projects 
which covered all economic and social sectors. In 2005, total investment activities in the 
UAE were worth US$ 25.5 billion, or 19.3 per cent of the concurrent GDP. The private 
sector undertakes a large role in investment. Its contribution of total investments
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implemented in 2005 was slightly higher than one-half (50.9 per cent). However, private 
sector investments are basically directed to manufacturing industry, trade, restaurant and 
hotels, real estate transportation and warehousing (UAE Annual Economic and Social 
Report, 2005). Overall, the economic diversification efforts have led to sustained 
investments in non-oil sectors such as the development of free zones, tourism, 
manufacturing, banking, re-exports, information technology, and other sectors that are 
increasingly dominated by the private capital (Elhiraika and Hamed, 2002:3).
4.5 The global business environment of the UAE
This part reviews the global business environment of the UAE which led to the 
proliferation of the phenomenon of the SAs. It is divided into four sections. A brief 
explanation of the emergence of SAs in the Middle East is provided in the first section. 
The second section discuses the foreign direct investments (FDI) including free zone 
investments. The UAE foreign trade is discussed in section three. Section four gives 
some global indices of the UAE’s global business environment.
4.5.1 Foreign direct investment in the Middle East
Strategic alliances in general and joint ventures in particular in the Middle East were 
mainly formed for the purpose of oil production (Sulej, 1998). According to Stevens 
(1976), three types of JVs have operated in the Middle East for the purpose of oil 
production. The first type is the “old style” concessions which have dominated during the 
period 1901-1972. The first successful agreement of this type in the area was the 
concession granted to D’Acry in 1901 by the Persian Government. The second is the 
contract agreement, which first appeared in the area in 1966. Of the 19 new oil
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agreements signed in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Egypt between 1957 and 1965, 
2 were concession agreements and 17 were joint venture agreements. The third type is the 
equity joint venture, which first came in use in 1972.
4.5.2 Foreign direct investment in the UAE
Although for the UAE, FDI is the highest in the region at around US$19 billion in 2007, 
the government has been active in its efforts to improve conditions to meet with the 
aspirations of international, regional, and local investors (UAE Year Book, 2009). 
Among key incentives to investors is the very favourable tax environment especially in 
the free zones where in most cases there are no corporate and income taxes. It helps that 
the UAE per capita income is one of the highest in the region. Coupled with this, its 
population growth rate is among the highest worldwide. These factors create a ‘virtuous 
cycle’: i.e. a market with very high, and rapidly growing, purchasing power, which 
attracts further FDI (UAE Year Book, 2009). A survey of more than 800 foreign 
companies in the UAE conducted by the Ministry of Economy and Planning in 2008, 
investigated conditions for FDI. It identified a range of pluses and minuses in terms of the 
country’s FDI attractiveness. Among major attractions were the UAE’s political stability, 
its excellent access to regional markets, its favourable geographical position and the 
convenience of access to world markets. Among significant negative factors were rising 
operating costs, fuel prices and tough foreign competition. Following years of success in 
promoting diversification of the UAE’s economy and creating numerous opportunities for 
private investment in UAE-based businesses, leading government officials and finance 
experts are the first to admit that there is still considerable scope for investment growth,
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both through encouragement of private national investment in the UAE and through 
further attraction of foreign direct investments (UAE Yearbook, 2006).
The IMF Country Report No. 05/268 (2005) described the global business environment 
of the UAE as being:
“An outward-oriented development strategy, based on: first, an, open trade 
regime and unrestricted capital outflows; second, a deregulated and 
competitive business environment with low taxes; third, a well-developed 
physical and institutional infrastructure; and fourth, an open and 
unrestricted labour market, has resulted in an impressive economic growth 
and diversification o f the UAE’s economy” (2005:6).
The report further shows that the UAE fares very well in most of the priority areas of 
investment climate constrains that a World Bank Investment Climate Survey has 
identified based on responses from more than 26,000 firms in 53 developing countries 
(see Tables 4.2, 4.3 and Figures 4.3 and 4.4).
T ab le 4.2: G row th  com p etitive in dex
C oun try R a n k Score
UAE 16 5.21
Singapore 7 5.56
Hong Kong 21 5.06
Chile 22 5.01
Bahrain 28 4.91
Tunisia 42 4.51
Morocco 56 4.06
Source: T h e IM F  C o u n try  R ep ort N o. 05 /268  (2005)
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T able 4.3: D o in g  b usin ess -  sn apsh ot o f  b u sin ess en v iron m en t
In d ica tor
U A E
A verage
R eg ion a l O E C D
Rigidity of employment index (Avg. hours, hiring and firing) 11 33 .0 38.7 34 .4
Cost to create collateral (per cent of income per capita) 
Protecting investors
9.4 18.5 5.2
Disclosure of index (ownership, audit, financial information) 21 
Enforcing contract
2.0 2.6 5.6
Number of procedures 53 .0 38.0 19.0
Cost (per cent of debt) 16.0 17.9 10.8
1/ Lower score = less rigid
2/ Higher score = more disclosure of information
Source: T h e IM F  C ou n try  R ep ort N o . 05 /268  (2005)
F igu re 4.3: A d m in istra tive  regu la tions
U.A.E.
Bahrain
Qatar
Oman.
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
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1
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1
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) 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 —'burdensome;-7 = n o t  burdensome
Source: T he IM F  C ou n try  R ep ort N o . 05 /269  (2005)
F igu re 4.4: T ech n o logy  in dex
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Source: T he IM F  C ou n try  R ep ort N o . 05 /268  (2005)
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FDIs are regarded as crucial in order to transfer knowledge and expertise to areas that are 
not yet the country’s core competencies, open new market opportunities by the creation 
of new networks and create employment in knowledge intensive and high value-added 
sectors (UAE Yearbook, 2007). However, the primary aim of attracting FDIs is not so 
much to do with money but more to do with expertise, technology and experience, 
contributing to the improved production methods and enhanced infrastructure (UAE 
Yearbook, 2007). Strategic alliances play a vital role in this respect. SAs help to establish 
long-term collaborative agreements to share resources, knowledge, and marketing 
channels between foreign companies and those from the UAE.
4.5.2.1 Free zones
The UAE Annual Economic and Social Report (2004) defined a free zone as a zone 
within the geographic borders of a state, but in terms of customs it is treated like a foreign 
country as concerns its relationship with the rest of the parts of its original country. It is 
called free because of the freedom that the concerned zone enjoys in trading with the rest 
of the world, that is, no customs fees are imposed on trading exchanges between the free 
zone and other countries. However, the legislation of the state and other regulations are 
valid within the free zone; it is subject to the state’s sovereignty, except for taxation 
sovereignty, in its relationship with foreign countries. Establishing free trade zones has 
been a significant step taken by the government to diversify the economy (Moore, 2004). 
The no-tax policy and the relaxed rules for foreign ownership within these zones, 
combined with the strategic location of the UAE, have enabled the country to become a 
business hub for trade and export. The mid 1980s witnessed the emergence of several 
free zones in the Emirates. The first of which was Jebel Ali in Dubai in 1985, then free 
zones started to spread all over the Emirates, whether at sea ports or airports, such as the
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free zone in Fujaira (1987), the free zone in Um-Ulquwain (1987), the free zone in 
Ajman (1988), the free zone in Shaija (at Shaija International Airport) (1985), A1 
Hamriyah free zone in Shaija (1996), the free zone at Dubai International Airport (1996), 
and Abu Dhabi free zone (1996). The UAE founded free zones in order to realize several 
aims, among which, are: attract foreign capitals and technology, beside national capital; 
to work inside the country, through providing financial and legislative facilities for 
projects operating at the free zone, whether national or foreign projects. Another aim is to 
encourage industries for exports to help to realize surplus in the state’s trade balance (see 
figure 4.5). Several factors helped the UAE to establish the free zones. According to the 
UAE Annual Economic and Social Report, 2004, among the most important factors are: 
i Availability of capitals;
a The UAE, by virtue of its location, is considered an important trading centre; 
a The UAE represent an open economy in terms of trading; 
a Availability of some raw materials required by industry; 
a Availability of energy resources required by industry.
F igu re 4 .5 : F ree  zo n e  exports
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4.5.3 Foreign trade
Foreign trade is a main indicator that reflects the openness of any economy. In this 
connection, the UAE was the second largest trading nation in the Arab world in 2007 
(UAE Year Book, 2009). Trade for the year totalled Dhl.01 trillion (US$244.1 billion) in 
2007 (see Figure 4.6), accounting for 22.2 per cent of the total Arab commercial 
exchange of US$1,234 trillion, despite the fact that its population accounts for just 1.4 
per cent of the total Arab population. Economists attributed the surge in trade to an 
increase in crude oil and gas exports, higher non-oil exports by free zones and other 
areas, and a sharp rise in imports as a result of strong domestic demand and a steady 
increase in re-export (UAE Year Book, 2009). Total trade (exports and imports) relative 
to GDP were 149 per cent, which means that total trade exceeded GDP by 49 per cent 
(UAE Annual Economic and Social Report, 2005). Statistics also show that the trade 
surplus grew from US$ 21.2 billion in 2004 to 43.6 billion in 2005. Looking at the 
structure of foreign trade, it is noted that merchandise exports grew by 27 per cent in 
2005 as these increased to US$ 115.5 in 2005 from 91 billion in the previous year. Crude 
oil constituted 38 per cent of merchandise exports in 2005, free zone exports and re­
exports 33 per cent and the balance was mainly petroleum products, gas and exports from 
the free zone areas (see Table 4.4 and Figure 4.7). By contrast, a review of merchandise 
imports shows an increase by 12 per cent in 2005 where the total value was US$ 72.2 
billion in 2004 and went up to 80.8 billion in 2005 (UAE Annual Economic and Social 
Report, 2005).
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Figure 4.6: Exports structure for the Year 2005
Source: Annual Economic and Social Report, Ministry of Economy and planning (2005)
Table 4.4: Foreign trade structure (2005)
Merchandise Exports Merchandise Imports
Crude Oil 43.7 Consumption goods 28.3
Petroleum Products 5.7 Intermediate goods 29.1
Gas 5.7 Capital goods 23.4
Industrial and a Agriculture 4.9
Goods 17.4
Free Zone Exports and Re-exports 38.1
Gross 115.5 80.8
Source: Annual Economic and Social Report, Ministry of Economy and Planning (2005)
Figure 4.7: Imports and Exports of Goods (in billions of U.S dollars)
Source: The IMF Country Report No. 07/347 (2007)
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According to the UAE Yearbook (2005), efficiently functioning ports and customs with 
minimal administrative procedural and logistical obstacles have contributed to the growth 
of trade and trade of related services through the provision of good quality backbone 
services such as transportation, finance, and information and communication technology. 
The high quality infrastructure and efficient operations of the ports and airports have 
reduced time and transactions cost in: (i) trade-related activities; (ii) clearing of goods in 
customs: and (iii) shipping goods overseas. In comparison with other developing 
countries see Figure 4.8 below.
Figure 4.8: Clearing customs for imports
U.A2L 1/ ; 
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Georgia 1 
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Source: The IMF Country Report No. 05/268 (2005)
The UAE has had a history of one of the lowest tariff and non-tariff barriers among 
Singapore, Hong Kong, and Australia. Compared to an average tariff rate of 19 per cent 
for the Middle East region in 1997, the UAE had an average tariff of 8 per cent (see 
Table 4.5). Reflecting the trade policies followed thus far, share of non-oil exports 
(including re-exports) to GDP has grown from less than 10 per cent in the early 1980s to 
more than 35 per cent in 2004 and larger than the share of oil to GDP (The IMF Country 
Report No. 05/268, 2005).
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Table 4.5: Simple average tariffs*
Country Name
2004
Average Tariffs
1997
Bahrain 8.0 5.0
Egypt 35.5 9.1
Iran 28.0 22.7
Jordan 23.7 13.0
Kuwait 6.0 5.0
Lebanon 17.5 5.7
Libya 21.5 18.5
Oman 4.8 5.0
Pakistan 35.0 16.5
Qatar 7.0 5.2
Saudi Arabia 12.3 6.0
Sudan 28 22.6
Syrian Arab Republic 35.0 25.0
United Arab Emirates 8.0 5.0
Republic of Yemen 12.9 12.6
Average 19 12
* Average tariff is the un-weighted mean of all tariff lines and includes other duties and charges 
Source: The IMF Country Report No. 05/268 (2005)
4.5.3.1 Foreign trade agreements
The attractive business environment of the UAE helped in encouraging trade and 
investments with countries from all over the world including the European Union’s 
countries and the United States of America. The attractiveness of the UAE’s business 
environment is attributed to, among other factors, a government philosophy which states 
that economic strength derives from trade partnerships and free trade agreements with 
countries around the world (UAE in Intensive Talks, 2006). Moreover, in addition to 
pursuing one-on-one partnerships with various nations such as the United Kingdom, 
United States, France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea, the UAE is working 
collectively with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to set up agreements for
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the region. Although talks with the United States faced impediments, trade between the 
US and the UAE amounted to US$ 10 billion in 2005, making it the third largest US 
trading partner in the Middle East. Discussions with China for a bilateral free trade 
agreement have been also moving forward (Free Trade Agreement with China, 2007). 
The free trade agreements (FTA) between the GCC and the EU is expected to boost trade 
between the two regions from its current level of 40 billion Euros in 2006 to at least twice 
that figure in the future. Talks to establish FT As have also begun with both Australia and 
New Zealand (UAE Yearbook, 2007). Additionally, the UAE will participate in the GCC 
talks with China, Pakistan, India, Turkey, and the European Free Trade Association 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland). All in all, the UAE is negotiating 
eight FT As with key economic blocs that will significantly impact on trade. Whilst the 
potential benefits of such agreements are clear, final deals have proven to be somewhat 
elusive. Agreements with the European Union and the US are particularly important for 
exports, economic diversification and attracting foreign investment into the region (UAE 
Year Book, 2009).
4.5.4 The regulatory environment
Laws that can affect the organization and the operations of business being conducted 
within the country are the (1) Federal Companies Law, (2) Commercial Agencies Law,
(3) Federal Industry Law, and (4) Government Tenders Law (Dark, 2004). The Federal 
Companies Law is regulated by the Ministry of Economy and Panning and applies to 
limited liability companies and to branch offices of foreign companies. Business may 
establish a presence in the country as a limited liability company (LLC), which requires a 
UAE national to have 51 per cent ownership, although profits may be distributed
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differently. Alternately, foreign investors may choose to set up a branch or a
“representative” office. Both require the appointment of a UAE national as agent who
will have no financial interest in the business but will be paid an annual fee. Alternately,
a company may set up in a free trade zone (Getting Started, 2006). A business being
established must register in and follow the regulations of the respective emirate.
Procedures for obtaining a business license will vary. Applications made to the Abu
Dhabi Municipality require approval from other government departments. In Dubai, the
Department of Economic Development (DED) handles branch office licensing and
exempts certain services/activities from requiring ministry approval. The Commercial
Agencies Law applies to the relationship between foreign investors and the local agent or
distributor. The agent/distributor must be a UAE national or a business wholly owned by
a UAE national. The law stipulates terms and conditions such as exclusivity of the
relationship, compensation, and termination actions. The July 2006 amendment modified
the regulations about relationship fixed terms, termination and registering an agency with
the Ministry. According to the Minister of Economy and Panning:
“A revision o f the Commercial Agencies Law was required to bring it fully 
into conformity with the laws and regulations o f other jurisdictions as far as 
concerns commercial contracts and exclusive agency rights, to improve 
transparency in the agent-principal dispute resolution process through the 
referral o f disputes to the courts and to ensure that price stability is 
maintains through the enforcement o f price controls with respect to exclusive 
agencies ” (Khalifa Issues, 2006:19).
The Federal Industry Law relates specifically to industrial projects. Again, national 
ownership must be at least 51 per cent. Alternately, should the business have a board of 
directors, the majority must be UAE nationals. Industries exempted include those that 
engage in the extraction and refining of oil, gas, and other natural resources. Other
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exemptions may be extended to firms with small capital investment or projects that are 
convened under special laws and agreements (UAE Investment Guide, 2004). The 
Government Tenders Law sets out the regulations for any supplier or contractor wishing 
to tender a bid for public-sector work or to sell to the federal government. The “seller” 
must be a UAE national individual or wholly owned business, a foreign business entity 
with 51 per cent national ownership or a foreign business entity that is represented by a 
national agent. The law is applied federally rather than to individual emirates’ contracts 
(Dark, 2004).
4.5.4.1 Tax law
According to A1 Tamimi and Company "There is no federal tax legislation on the 
taxation o f corporations in the UAE; instead each emirate has its own tax” (n.d:9). 
Within the Abu Dhabi emirate, oil and gas companies are taxed at a rate that is specified 
in concession agreements; branches of foreign banks are taxed at a flat rate on annual 
profits, and a flat- rate service tax is applied to hotels and entertainment. Abu Dhabi has 
a sliding-scale formula for an incorporated business based on taxable income. Dubai has 
a similar percentage scale formula for businesses. However, in practice, no tax is paid. In 
Dubai, oil companies are taxed at 55 per cent of UAE taxable income and according to 
concession agreements; banks pay 20 per cent on UAE taxable income. Property taxes 
vary across emirates and are generally a percentage of annual rents. In Abu Dhabi, the 
rate is approximately 10 per cent for businesses and 5 per cent for residences. Dubai 
charges residential tax based on employment status. Banks are levied 15 per cent property 
tax, whereas other business endeavours pay 5 per cent. For residential tenants in Shaijah,
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the annual property tax is 2 per cent. Personal income taxes are not levied, and double 
taxation treaties have been signed with a number of countries. Businesses located in the 
free trade zones are exempted (A1 Tamimi and Company, n.d.). The UAE joined the GCC 
Customs Union in January 2003. A 5 per cent tariff was established on 1,500 imported 
items from non-member countries. Imports of liquor, which are available in all emirates 
except Shaijah, are subjected to 50 per cent custom duty. Tobacco is levied a 100 per cent 
tariff. Even at that, prices are considerably lower than in many Western developed 
countries. Duty exemptions are in place for more than 50 food and agriculture items 
(National Bank of Dubai, 2006).
4.5.4.2 Intellectual property rights
The UAE leads the region in the protection of intellectual property rights and is a 
contracting party to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The UAE also 
supports the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) as 
part of its WTO membership and has signed the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property (patent, trademark and related industrial property). In 2002, the 
government enacted the copyright law and amended the trademark law. The government 
is committed to “amend and expand the scope o f landmark copyright, trademark and 
patent laws ” (UAE Investment Climate Statement, 2006:6). All these actions augmented 
the country’s global business environment and made it an attractive hub for international 
business.
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4.6 Summary and conclusion
Despite its small geographical area and population size, the UAE is one of the fastest 
growing economies in the world. This was not solely due to a rise in value of the oil and 
gas sectors, but also to the economic diversification policy and tree-market economy 
policies adopted by the UAE government. The economic diversification efforts have led 
to sustained investments in non-oil sectors such as the development of free trade zones, 
tourism, manufacturing, banking, re-exports, information technology, and other sectors 
that are increasingly dominated by the private capital. The fast economic growth and the 
diversification efforts necessitated partnerships and strategic alliances with foreign 
companies which in turn encouraged the government to pursue free-market policy. The 
UAE has an attractive global business environment. Among key attractive factors is the 
very favourable tax environment especially in the free zones where in most cases there 
are no corporate and income taxes. It helps that the UAE per capita income is one of the 
highest in the region. Other attractive factors include the UAE’s political stability, its 
excellent access to regional markets, its favourable geographical position and the 
convenience of access to world markets. All these factors, and others, accelerated the 
number of strategic alliances.
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CHAPTER 5
Research methodology
5.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to explain the research methodology used in this study. This 
study is a phenomenological, exploratory one which entails multiple types of evidence 
gathered from different sources, often using different data collection methods to explore 
and understand the formation process of SAs. Hence, following a phenomenological 
approach to the use of qualitative research, this study is based on a case study and 
interviews method to help in data collection and analysis. The grounds for this choice are 
elucidated below, considering the objectives of the present study.
5.2 Research approach
Social research is characterized by a number of different perspectives or philosophies 
(Stiles, 2001), where the positivist and phenomenological schools of thought have been 
argued as addressing the philosophical extremes of social research (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990; Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; May, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Some of the 
frequently referred perspectives include positivism, symbolic interactionism, 
ethnomethodology, realism, idealism, and phenomenology. The perspectives can vary 
significantly in, for example, their theoretical background, or in their substantive interest 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1981). Also the implications of these different approaches, their 
underlying views, and their application to the research phenomenon are, however, an 
important consideration when undertaking any research project. Each will influence the
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design of the research methodology and the interpretation rof the investigation at hand 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; May, 1993). In what follows, key characteristics of the two 
extremes, positivist and the phenomenologist paradigms, and key characteristics of the 
resultant qualitative research and quantitative research are described.
5.2.1 Positivism vs. phenomenological approach
5.2.1.1 The positivism approach to research
This approach primarily claims that reality is external and objective, and knowledge is 
only of significance if it is based on observations of this external reality (Easterby-Smith 
et al., 1991). Similarly it holds that facts and values are distinct and scientific knowledge 
consists only of facts (Archer, 1988). Accordingly, the scientific knowledge is utterly 
objective and only scientific knowledge is valid, certain, and accurate (Crotty, 1998). To 
achieve such a scientific knowledge, this approach, according to Lee (1991), involves the 
manipulation of theoretical propositions using the rules of formal logic and the rules of 
hypothetico-deductive logic, so that the theoretical propositions satisfy the four 
requirements of falsifiability, logical consistency, relative explanatory power, and 
survival. Heidegger (1962) and Evered and Louis (1991) argue that the overall aim of the 
positivist research process is to construct a set of theoretical statements that are 
generalizable and service the development of universal knowledge. This approach 
therefore tends towards the use of questionnaires for data collection and analytical 
statistical analysis such as hypothesis testing, random sampling, aggregation, precision 
and measurement (Stiles, 2003).
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5.2.1.2 The Phenomenology approach to research
The foundation of this approach is that knowledge comes from human experience, which 
is inherently continuous and non-logical, and which may be symbolically representable 
(Evered and Louis, 1991). Such an approach aims to understand phenomena from the 
point of view of participants directly involved with the phenomenon under study 
(Cavaye, 1996) or from the actor’s own frame of reference (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975). 
Rather than concentrating on a generalizable result, the ultimate aims of the study from 
this perspective are to develop situational relevance. This may then be used as the basis 
for future more generalizable investigation. Phenomenological approaches, according to 
Stiles (2003), therefore tend to favour such techniques as observation, in-depth 
interviews, and case studies in an attempt to gather depth and idiographic perspective 
upon which the phenomenological paradigm relies. Researchers working with the 
phenomenology approach are more likely to work with qualitative data, investigating 
small samples in depth or over time, and using multiple methods to establish different 
views of phenomena (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). Data derived in this way are arguably 
characterized by a greater richness than the positivist stance and allow the researcher to 
discover the basis for new ideas and theories. Table 5.1 summarizes the distinguishing 
features of positivism and phenomenology, considering the basic beliefs underpinning 
each approach, role played by the researcher, and preferred methods of analysis 
associated with each approach.
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Table 5.1: Key features of positivist and phenomenological paradigms
Positivist Paradigm Phenomenological Paradigm
Basic beliefs: The world is external and objective 
Observer is independent 
Science is value free
The world is socially constructed 
and objective
Observer is part of what is observed 
Science is driven by human interest
Researcher should: Focus on facts
Look for causality and
fundamental laws
Reduce phenomena to simplest
Elements
Formulate hypotheses and then test 
them
Focus on meaning
Try to understand what is
happening
Look at the totality of each situation 
Develop idea through induction 
from data
Preferred methods 
include:
Operationalizing concepts so that 
they can be measured 
Taking large samples
Using different methods to establish 
different views of phenomena 
Small samples investigated in depth 
or over time
Source: Adopted from Easterby-Smith M., Thorpe R., and Lowe A. (1991) “Management research: 
An introduction”, pp. 27, Sage Publications, London.
It is noteworthy that the selection of a particular approach depends on the research 
objectives, research questions, and the interest of the researcher (Easterby-Smith et al., 
1991; Morgan and Smircich, 1980). Hence, the realism approach is used for the purpose 
of conducting this research. Realism embraces a middle ground in a dichotomy identified 
as positivism and phenomenology (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Knor-Cetina, 1981; May, 
1993; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Stiles, 1995). The continuum is identified (Stiles, 1995 
after May 1993) as positivism-empiricism-realism-idealism with idealism being at the 
phenomenological extreme. This research uses the perspective of realism in which Stiles 
(1995) observed that there is a need to understand the process by which people interpret 
the world and that theory is used to explain observations from the social world. 
Proponents of this perspective argue that it is also necessary to explain observations from 
the social world through the use of theoretical frameworks in order to determine the 
underlying mechanisms that influence people’s actions. Consequently, the realist 
methodological approach tends to favour a process of mixed methods and therefore,
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provides an element of unification by offering a philosophical “bridge” between the 
positivist and the phenomenologist view because it relies on semi-structured interviews 
or group observation to enable the collection of rich, subjective data (Stiles, 2003). This 
is, however, reinforced or underpinned by the inclusion of more deductive methods such 
as supporting questionnaires and extant research. The information is then analyzed 
through a process of triangulation. Stiles (2003) argues that a critical area of importance 
for the research focused around the need to gain a full and true understanding of the 
reality in question (the formation process of SAs in our case) rather than concentrating 
upon the need to establish universal applicability. Stiles (2003) also argues that for the 
purpose of exploratory research into strategic alliance partnerships, the realist paradigm 
presents the most appropriate basis from which to develop a specific method of enquiry. 
Under these circumstances the chosen approach needed to offer the ability to achieve 
depth, opportunity and support for an exploratory approach (Evered and Louis, 1991).
5.2.2 Qualitative vs. quantitative research
It is also important to further understand the distinction between qualitative research and 
quantitative research. The gathering, analysis and interpretation of data are always 
conducted within some broader understanding of what constitutes legitimate inquiry and 
warrantable knowledge (Henwood and Pidgeon, 1993). Some key theoretical principles 
of quantitative research are: reality is objective, i.e. there is one reality in nature, one 
truth; explanation is restricted purely to positive phenomena; and the logical form of a 
theory is deductive (Sarantakos, 1998). Quantitative evidence, however, appears to be 
both precise and hard because it deals with numbers, though the value of the numbers
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depends both upon the assumptions under which they are produced or calculated and on 
the way in which they are interpreted (Remenyi et al., 1998:127).
The aim of q u a li ta t iv e  r e se a rc h  is  not to uncover the “fact” but to offer an interpretation 
of participants’ meanings, understandings and experiences (Sarantakos, 1998). In 
particular, qualitative research allows theory development to be pursued in a highly 
effective and economical manner (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983). Thus, the research 
questions in the qualitative study may not be formulated in detail until the research 
problems and context are clarified (Maxwell, 1998). However, it has been often argues 
that qualitative research does not provide as a great reliability as does quantitative 
research (Sarantakos, 1998). One way of approaching this is through attempting to use a 
variety of methods and multiple data sources in order to provide richer insights -  so 
called “triangulation” (Maxwell, 1998). Qualitative researchers often study only a small 
number of individuals or sites, using theoretical or purposeful rather than probability 
sampling. The perceived value of qualitative research has been increased, because the 
qualitative research allows theory development to be pursued (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1983; Maxwell, 1998).
This study seeks to explore the process the decision makers use to form SAs in the UAE. 
It also attempts to find out factors responsible for success or failure of SAs in UAE ’s 
enterprises. According to Cherry (2000:12) a qualitative exploratory research design is 
very useful when we know little about a group of people or phenomenon. In addition, 
methodologists have strongly argued that qualitative methods are suitable and vital when
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the research is exploratory (Darlington and Scott, 2002; and Yin, 2003) and when the 
research questions are: what is, how or why (Amaratunga et aL, 2002; Spencer et al., 
2003; and Yin, 1994). In certain cases, exploratory research is undertaken in order to 
provide a basis for further study, while in other cases it is undertaken to gain information 
on the issue itself. Thus, based on the premise and the features of phenomenological 
approach, the exploratory research design is considered suitable for the purpose of 
conducting this qualitative research.
5.3 Research methods
Based on the research questions and objectives of this study, it has been found that the 
case study method based on in-depth interviews, where two types of interviews were 
used: semi structured interviews along with structured interviews (self administered 
questionnaires), and documentary records and observation is more appropriate to follow 
in this study. In what follows the rationale and justification of using this method is given.
5.3.1 Case study
A case study is defined by Eisenhardt as “a research strategy which focuses on 
understanding the dynamics present within single settings” (1989:534). Another relevant 
definition of a case study is provided by Yin as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources o f  
evidence are used” (1989:23). Similarly, Hartley argues that “case study research 
consists o f detailed investigation, often with data collected over a period o f time, o f one
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or more organizations, or groups within organizations with a view to providing an 
analysis o f the context and processes in the phenomenon under study” (1994:208).
The above mentioned definitions indicate that a case study is an appropriate investigative 
framework for understanding a phenomenon alongside its context. Case study is widely 
used in the field of management and organizational studies. In that sense, in strategic 
studies such as SAs, empirical data have been collected by means of case studies and 
interviews (Chandler, 1962; Allison, 1971; Mintzberg, 1973; Quinn, 1980; Eisenhardt 
and Bourgeois, 1992; Lorange et al., 1992; Frankel et al., 1996; Qi, 2000). Starting from 
theories and known facts in literature, qualitative data generated by interviews and case 
studies are utilized to gain a better direction for the deep explorative study. There are 
three types of case study that have been identified in the literature on research methods 
(Locke, 2001). The first type, the intrinsic case study, focuses on the uniqueness of a 
particular case; researchers are interested simply in understanding the case itself for its 
particularity and uniqueness. The second type, the instrumental case, is where researchers 
are interested in a particular case because of the potential it has to offer providing insight 
into a substantive issue or to advance a theory. The third type is collective cases, when 
the instrumental case extends to more than one case. This typology is embedded in Yin’s 
(1989) approach, which indicates that case studies can involve either single or multiple 
cases, and numerous levels of analysis. If there are multiple cases, the logic is of 
replication rather than sampling. Furthermore, Eisenhardt (1989) argues that case studies 
typically combine data collection methods such as archives, interviews, questionnaires, 
and observations. The evidence may be qualitative (e.g., words), quantitative (e.g., 
numbers), or both. Moreover, Eisenhardt (1989) added that case studies can be used to
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accomplish various aims: to provide description, test theory or generate a theory. Stake 
suggests that case studies have become “one of the most common ways to do qualitative 
inquiry” (2000:435).
The present research uses case study as the main research strategy in investigating the 
process by which enterprises in the UAE form SAs. There are three reasons why case 
study method has been employed in this study.
First, as it is mentioned in chapter one, this study is the first of its kind to explore the 
process of forming SAs in a particular context, accordingly this study is basically an 
exploratory attempt to describe “how” SAs are formed in a developing context (i.e. 
United Arab Emirates) and to explain “why” it is developed in that particular way. When 
research work involves knowledge generation and acquiring understanding of a complex 
subject a case study is the only appropriate method (Yin, 1989). Yin (1989) further 
argues that when the research objectives evolve around how and why with regard to a 
contemporary set of events, over which investigator has little or no control, the case study 
will be the most appropriate investigative framework. Case studies can be particularly 
useful for studying a process, program or individual in an in-depth, holistic way that 
allows for deep understanding o f a particular phenomenon. Therefore, “a case study is 
employed to gain an in-depth understanding o f the situation and meaning for those 
involved. The interest is in the process rather than outcomes, in the context rather than a 
specific variable and in discovery rather than confirmation ” (Merriam, 1998:19)
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Second, Rosen (1991) clearly argues that to understand a social process, one must get 
inside the world of those generating it. The simplest way to do this would seem to be to 
get access to the actors themselves and to elicit their interpretations directly (Johanson, 
1987; Nandhakumar, and Jones, 1997). This could be satisfactorily done only through 
being involved within each site and in-depth interviewing of these actors. Also case 
studies allow one to target multiple responses within and across cases, and thus may 
provide in-depth information to address the research problems (Maxwell, 1998). A case 
study, therefore, has been chosen because it is a useful and important qualitative research 
method that helps to understand complex phenomena in their natural setting especially 
when the researcher does not know the important variables to examine (Creswell, 2003).
Third, for a sound understanding of the process of ISAs formation, both inner content 
(organizational) and outer context (environmental) should be considered. According to 
Merriam (1998), in focusing on a particular phenomenon in a case study, it is impossible 
to separate the phenomenon from its context. Hartley (1994) cogently argues that case 
studies are useful where it is important to understand social processes in their 
organizational and environmental contexts. Yin (2003), who is also in line with Merriam 
and Hartley, argues that case studies are often necessary where the object needs to be 
studied within its real-life context. However, in this study, it is important to note that the 
context is understood as part of the process. Thus, using a case study approach allows for 
gaining significant knowledge and in-depth understanding of the process of SAs in 
particular contexts.
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Based on these foregoing arguments, it has been judged that the case study method would 
be the most appropriate strategy for understanding the complexities surrounding the 
process of ISAs in a developing context through an in-depth interviewing of those who 
have been involved in its making. In this respect, Eisenhardt (1989) attempted to produce 
a roadmap for building theories from case study research. This roadmap is summarized in 
Table 5.2 below.
A common criticism of the case study method, however, is that it provides little basis for 
scientific generalization. However, Yin argues that “case studies, like experiments, are 
generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to population or universe” (1989:21). 
Yin contends that the case study, because it does not represent a “sample”, should be 
regarded in the same way as the experiment. With the case study method, the investigator 
aims to expand and generalize theories, “analytic generalization”, and not to enumerate 
frequencies, “statistical generalization” (Yin, 1989). In this study the researcher started 
with developing a framework for SAs from the theory, which then subjected to rigorous 
tests. The research is a deductive one where research questions are deduced from the 
theory to generate a set of testable propositions about the formation process of SAs in a 
developing context and the outcome of the inquiry is examined.
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Table 5.2: Process of building theory from case study research
Step Activity Reason
Getting Started Definition of research question 
Possibly a priori constructs
Focuses efforts
Provides better grounding for construct 
measures
Selecting Cases Neither theory not hypotheses 
Specified population 
Theoretical, not random, 
sampling
Retains theoretical flexibility
Constrains extraneous variation and sharpens
external validity
Focusing efforts on theoretically useful cases 
-  i.e., those that replicate or extend theory by 
filling conceptual categories
Crafting Instruments 
And Protocols
Multiple data collection methods 
Qualitative and quantitative 
data combined 
Multiple Investigators
Strengthens grounding of theory by 
triangulation of evidence 
Synergistic view of evidence 
Fosters divergent perspectives and 
strengthens grounding
Entering the Field Overlap data collection and 
analysis, including field notes 
Flexible and opportunistic data 
collection methods
Speeds analyses and reveals helpful
adjustments
to data collection
Allows investigators to take advantage of 
emergent themes and unique case features
Analyzing Data Within-case analysis 
Cross-case pattern search using 
divergent techniques
Gains familiarity with data and preliminary 
theory generation
Forces investigators to look beyond initial 
impressions and see evidence thru multiple 
lenses
Shaping Hypotheses Iteractive tabulation of evidence 
for each construct 
Replication, not sampling, logic 
across cases
Search evidence for “why” 
behind relationships
Sharpens construct definition, validity, and 
measurability
Confirms, extends, and sharpens theory 
Builds internal validity
Enfolding Literature Comparison with conflicting 
literature
Comparison with similar 
literature
Builds internal validity, raises theoretical 
level, and sharpens construct definition 
Sharpens generalizability, improves 
construct definition, and raises theoretical 
level
Reaching Closure Theoretical saturation when 
possible
Ends process when marginal improvement 
becomes small
Source: Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) “Building theory from case study research”, Academy of 
Management Review 14(4): 532-550.
5.3.2. Interviews
Byrne (2001:22) argues for the usefulness of interviewing as a data collection technique 
for researching strategy processes by stating that;
“interviewing is one o f the most common methods for collecting data in qualitative 
research. Interviews allow participants to provide rich, contextual descriptions o f events.
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The process o f interviewing is time consuming, and the quality o f data often is dependent 
on the aptitude o f the interviewer”.
Types of interviews are commonly divided between: structured, semi-structured, and 
unstructured (Saunders et al., 2000). The types chosen for this qualitative research were 
structured interviews and semi-structured interviews with more emphasis on semi- 
structured ones. To sum up, the reasons for choosing these forms of interview are 
explained below:
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S e m i s tr u c tu r e d  in te r v ie w s
This form of interview utilizes open-ended questions which give depth as well as
flexibility to interviews and allow interviewees to provide extensive and developmental
answers and can be used to obtain facts and attitudes. According to Dane:
“The semi structured interview is flexible as it allows the interviewer to 
investigate more fully the opinions and behaviours; therefore, the total 
collection o f responses should contain more information that is diverse in 
details” (1990:125).
Moreover, Denzin (1989) argues that semi-structured interviews would adequately 
provide for a combination of objectivity, flexibility and depth. Prior to the interviews the 
writers prepare themes and questions to ask. However, if necessary new questions or 
follow up questions were asked to the interviewees in order to maximize the benefit of 
the interview. The interviews consisted of a series of open-ended questions discussing 
perceptions of past and present phenomenon. According to Bryman (2001), in a semi- 
structured interview the researcher has a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be
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covered, often referred to as an interview guide, but the interviewee has a great deal of 
leeway in how to reply. Therefore, semi-structured interviews enabled the researcher to 
pose some questions regarding specific issues, while allowing participants to respond 
with knowledge and experience from their own work environment, and to add whatever 
other issues they deemed relevant. Interview guides were prepared before each interview 
took place. Each interview’s questions were based on feedback from the previous 
interviews. The emphasis was to discover the processes through which SAs were formed 
and carried out.
S tr u c tu r e d  in te r v ie w s  ( s e lf -a d m in is te r e d  q u e s tio n n a ir e s )
This was the second type of interviews used for data collection. Bryman (2001) argues 
that it utilizes closed and probing questions. Closed questions were used to save 
interviewees’ time, establish exact facts, and confirm an opinion. Towards this goal, 
closed questions were designed in a form of self administered questionnaires which were 
later being administered in my presence. Although both interview questions and the self 
administered questionnaire contained the same parts of questions, questions in each part 
were different (see Appendices 3,4 &5).
5.3.3 Documentary records
Evidence for case studies come form six documentary sources: archival records; 
interviews; direct observation; participants’ observation; and physical artifacts (Yin,
1989). In this connection, Lincoln and Guba (1985) defined a document as any written or 
recorded material. In addition, Punch (2000) described documents as a rich source of data
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for social research. Documentary evidence sought to “corroborate and augment evidence 
from other sources” (Yin, 2003:31). Multiple sources of data are used in case studies to 
increase validity and reliability (Yin, 1994). Information derived from documents also 
can be used to generate interview questions or identify events to be observed. However, 
the effective use of archival information in organizational research is often achieved 
through it being used alongside data from other sources such as interviews (Poole and 
Lampard, 2002).
5.4 The research journey
The process of collecting data passed through a number of stages. This process can be 
conceptualized as a journey which has been completed over a period of time. Before 
deciding to move from one stage to the next, a report is prepared showing the progress 
made, difficulties faced and their proposed solutions and a plan is prepared for the next 
stage to secure maximum success. However, the journey was not as straight forward as it 
seems here. Many difficulties were encountered at each stage and some steps had to be 
repeated. Formal as well as informal relationships and social networks were utilized to 
get to the end of this journey which started in March 2007 and ended in December 2008. 
In order to secure the achievement of research goals, the journey was preceded by some 
preparatory steps.
5.4.1 Preparation for the research journey
Some preparatory steps were taken, before the research journey, to facilitate the 
successful completion of the journey. These steps included conducting a pilot study;
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requesting research director’s support; and attempting collaborative agreements with 
some organizations.
5.4.1.1 Conducting the pilot study
A pilot study was conducted to test the efficacy of the research instrument and cases, the 
clarity of the questions and instructions, and the time required to complete the interview. 
A pilot study is as “an abbreviated version o f a research project in which the researcher 
practices or tests the procedures to be used in the subsequent main study  (Dane, 
1990:43). Similarly, Champion argues that “pilot studies allow the researcher to detect 
any faults with the methods o f data collection and to gain ideas with regards to the 
effective execution o f the main study ” (1998:233). To save researcher’s limited resources 
and to avoid repeating the process of contacting enterprises to participate in the pilot 
study, the researcher decided to send request letters to as many companies as possible to 
secure a large pool of respondents for future selection. Nine enterprises that had 
formulated SAs in United Arab Emirates were contacted to participate in this study, only 
four replied among them two agreed to participate in the study and two apologized. Three 
executives from the participating enterprises were interviewed. The interview questions 
were checked for clarity by colleagues from the College of Business and Economics on 
the United Arab Emirates University. The interview questions were revised in light of the 
results of pilot study. Some questions had to be deleted, other questions had to be added, 
while others had to be clarified. That is why some clarifications and explanations were 
sent to the executives prior to the interviews. The pilot study also revealed a problem 
relating to the difficulty of getting access to the proposed enterprises. The researcher 
observed that there was negative attitude towards research and reluctance among the top 
executives to participate in such studies. Accordingly, it was expected that the process of
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collecting data by conducting in-depth interviews with the top executive would be a 
complicated one. Therefore, it was thought that a pilot study was needed for this study in 
order to refine the data collection plan with respect to both the content of the data and the 
procedures to be followed.
5.4.1.2 Seeking support from the study supervisor
To increase the possibility of getting the maximum positive response from the potential 
enterprises, it was decided to approach them with a support letter from the research 
supervisor. This was discussed with the supervisor who promptly provided me with a 
letter directed to the targeted enterprises. The letter explained the objectives and the 
importance of the study and requested executives to facilitate the process of getting 
access to data while emphasizing the fact that the data would be only used for academic 
purposes and ensured maximum confidentiality and anonymity (see appendix 1 A).
5.4.1.3 Attempting collaborative agreements with organizations
Attempts were made to find established collaborators who were expected to share similar 
research interests with the researcher. Organizations, both governmental as well as 
private, were contacted for this purpose. These organizations were mainly research and 
consultancy organizations such as Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research 
(ECSSR) and Institute for International Research (HR). The goals of collaboration, the 
roles of each party, and the expected benefits for each party were explained (see appendix 
1 C). The researcher’s major goal was to utilize the contacts and influence of these 
collaborating organizations to find access to enterprises that were believed to be 
restrictive. Some benefits were secured to these organizations from their collaboration 
such as providing them with the study results and findings and mentioning their names in
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the thesis as establishing collaborative organizations. Unfortunately, no organization was 
interested in this offer since all of them apologized for not being able to participate in the 
project.
5.4.2 Starting the research journey
The research journey involved three phases. To start with, the process of searching for, 
negotiating with and securing access to target enterprises is provided in phase 1. Phase 2 
involves selection of enterprises and selection of cases studies and respondents within 
each company. Phase 3 is the conduct of data collection. In what follows each stage is 
discussed.
Phase 1: Searching the Target Enterprises and Negotiating and Securing Access
The researcher started by searching for enterprises which had formed SAs (either
successful cases or failed ones) in order to learn about these enterprises and the process 
of forming SAs. The sources of data about these enterprises were the Directory of Abu 
Dhabi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Directory of Dubai Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, Directory of the Ministry of Economy and Planning, national newspapers, 
and business magazines and bulletins. Although the search process resulted in finding a 
large number of enterprises engaging in SAs, the researcher’s intention was to find large 
enterprises in the sense that they have clear SAs’ plans. Therefore, in order to ensure 
suitability of selected enterprises and accuracy of data, enterprises were selected 
according to specific criteria, as follows:
• A company should have formed at least one strategic alliance;
• A company should have a clear strategy for strategic alliance formation;
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• A company should be either 100 per cent locally owned or a joint venture 
between a local company and a foreign company with at least 51 per cent local 
equity share;
• A company should be from the private sector, public sector, or jointly owned by 
the private and public sector;
• A company should be either from the manufacturing sector or service sector;
• A decision maker should be available and accessed to conduct interviews;
• Documentary records should be available and accessible.
Based on these criteria, the researcher was able to select 31 enterprises to be contacted 
(see appendix 2). These enterprises are relatively big, either private, public, or joint 
venture (private and public), and covering a wide range of business activities such as 
telecommunications, energy, oil and gas, manufacturing, airline, real estate, trade and 
investment, and operations of ports and free zones.
To ensure good quality of response, an introductory letter together with a letter of support 
from my research supervisor were sent to the chief executive officers/presidents of the 
potential enterprises prior to the administration of the interviews (see appendix 1 A and 
B) . In this letter, I introduced my self, explained the research purpose, asked for access 
to data, and assured confidentiality and anonymity. Different responses were received 
from the enterprises. There were three different outcomes: no response (12.9 per cent); 
agreed (32.2 per cent); and apologized (54.9 per cent). The justifications for apologizing
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were ‘confidentiality’, ‘executives too busy’, or ‘decision makers involved in SAs not 
available’. However, some enterprises provided conditional approval. For example, Jebel 
Ali Free Zone, The UAE Offset Group, Emaar Properties, and Emirates Group agreed to 
answer all interview questions and to mail them back to my address together with 
documentary reports required for the research without having face-to-face interviews 
with executives. The UAE Offsets Group further asked for the signing of a confidentiality 
agreement regarding the information provided. Despite these hurdles, the researcher 
accepted their offers and conditions with the intention of having a second opportunity in 
the future to get full access to the decision makers.
However, due to time constraints, an alternate action had to be made by the researcher in 
order to progress the research. A second attempt was made by the researcher to have full 
access to enterprises. In this turn, the researcher decided, instead of sending letters, to 
focus on and to conduct field visits to a smaller number of enterprises in an attempt to 
convince their top executives of the importance of the study and the benefits that they 
would have from participating in this study. This new research approach was preceded by 
using informal relationships and social networks to build rapport and break the ice during 
the visits. The new strategy was successful in having the researcher secure six 
enterprises. They are: 1) Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC); 2) Emirates 
Telecommunication Corporation (ETISALAT); 3) Dubai Ports World (DPW); 4) Dubai 
Aluminum Company (DUBAL); 5) Dubai Cables Company (DUCAB); and 6) Ras A1 
Khaimah Ceramics Company (RAS Ceramics).
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Eventually, three enterprises were excluded later. Dubai Ports World (DP World) was 
excluded mainly because they provided only general information about the company. 
When the researcher reached the stage of in-depth interviews and documentary analysis, 
respondents began to postpone our meetings until I gave up. Dubai Cables Company 
(DUCAB) and Ras A1 Khaimah Ceramics Company (RAK Ceramics) were also excluded 
mainly because of the unavailability of the decision makers who had participated in 
forming and managing alliances. This is in addition to the unavailability of documentary 
records and the lack of appropriate cases to be studied. On the positive side, full and 
unconditional access was given by three enterprises which proved to have suitable cases 
to be studied, availability of decision makers involved in forming recent alliances, and 
accessible documentary records. The enterprises were: 1) Emirates Telecommunication 
Corporation (ETISALAT); 2) Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC); and 3) 
Dubai Aluminum (DUBAL). Meanwhile and fortunately, at a conference organized by 
the College of Business and Economics of the United Arab Emirates University (where I 
work as a senior lecturer) I met his Excellency Mr. Abdulla A1 Saleh, the Under 
Secretary, Ministry of Economy and Planning, who was also in charge of the UAE-World 
Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations. I had the opportunity to introduce my self to 
him and to explain the purpose and objectives of my research. Fortunately Mr. A1 Saleh 
was interested in my research study and invited me to his office. Later, I conducted two 
interviews with him and other two interviews with members of his team which was 
involved in the negotiations between the WTO and UAE and in charge of managing and 
supervising UAE’s foreign investments. Mr. A1 Saleh was very helpful as he facilitated 
getting prompt access to the foregoing mentioned three enterprises and asked his office 
staff to provide me with all necessary and available data I needed to complete my study.
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Phase 2: Selecting Sites, Cases and Respondents
Based on the criteria of company selection and the results of enterprises search process, 
following interviews with Mr Al-Saleh and his team and discussions with my research 
supervisor only two enterprises were selected. These enterprises are Emirates 
Telecommunications Corporation (ETISALAT) and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company 
(ADNOC). The reasons for selecting these two enterprises for the purpose of conducting 
this study are as follows. First, the quality of access in both enterprises were very 
favourable in such a way that the executives, I met in these enterprises possess rich and 
relevant data. Second, respondents were either in charge of forming and managing SAs in 
their respective enterprises; had participated in making decisions relevant to SAs, a 
situation that secures the issue of theoretical relevance; or had direct access to data. 
Third, the executives I met in these two enterprises showed some degree of enthusiasm 
for the study and maintained proper documentary records which are considered important 
for studying a phenomenon such as the process of strategic alliance formation. Fourth, 
the selected enterprises share some similar aspects and some differences. They are similar 
with respect to the fact that both of them have recent as well as established SAs. Also, 
they are similar in being large and important to the economy of the United Arab 
Emirates. However, the two enterprises differ in size, culture, and industry.
Once the sites were selected, negotiations started with top executives to select the cases 
to be studied within each company. The process of case selection started at the first 
interview when the interviewees were asked to explain the most important ISAs to their 
enterprises. The importance was broadly defined in terms of novelty (non-routine), 
complexity and difficulties faced, demand for a commitment of a substantial amount of
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resources, shareholders reaction, industry reaction, and expected outcome. Therefore, the 
case studies were selected on the basis of their importance to the company, their 
continuity status (either ended or still Under operation), recently formed vs. established 
alliances, and their performance status (succeeded, failed, or experiencing difficulties but 
still running). Recently formed alliances had to be selected in order to reduce as much as 
possible the errors of distortion and memory failure of actors when collecting data 
(Mintzberg et al., 1976; Papadakis et aL, 1998). However, in all instances the researcher 
had no opportunity to select the case under study because the case was nominated in 
advance by the company’s executive. Consequently, two case studies were nominated by 
selected enterprises (see Table 5.3 below), one is quite recent and the other is quite old. 
Then, executives in each company were asked to identify the decision makers involved in 
each alliance and to permit them to attend interviews and provide necessary data. 
Respondents were selected on the basis of roles occupied in the strategic alliance and 
they were in the capacity of directors, department heads and project managers. Table 5.4 
below, shows the names and positions of respondents who participated in the study.
T ab le  5.3: S tra teg ic  a lliances n om in ated  b y  execu tives for  the stud y  in  each  com p an y
C o m p a n y  N am e S trateg ic  A llian ce / J o in t V en tu re  S elected /N om in ated  for S tu dy
Abu Dhabi National Oil 
Company (ADNOC)
Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Limited (ADGAS): a joint venture formed in 
1973 by ADNOC, BP-UK, Mitsui and Co. Ltd.-Japan, and Total-France to 
produce and sell and deliver Liquid Natural Gas (LNG), Liquid Petroleum 
Gas (LPG) and Sulphur.
Emirates
T elecommunications
Corporation
(ETISALAT)
Etisalat Egypt: a joint venture formed in 2006 by Etisalat, Egypt Post, 
National Bank of Egypt, and Commercial International Bank (Egypt). The 
goal of this venture is to establish and operate Egypt’s third mobile phone 
network.
143
C hapter 5: Research m ethodology
T ab le 5.4: N am es and  p osition s o f  resp on d en ts w h o  p artic ip a ted  in  the stud y
C o m p a n y A rea  o f  B u sin ess P erson(s) In terv iew ed
Abu Dhabi National Oil 
Company (ADNOC)
Energy (Oil and Gas) Mohamed A1 Suwaidi (Chief Executive 
Officer, ADNOC), Saif Ahmed A1 
Ghafli (General Manager, ADGAS), 
and Hassan A1 Marzouqi (Deputy 
General Manager, ADGAS)
Emirates Telecommunication 
Corporation (ETISALAT)
Telecommunications Mohamed A1 Qamzy (Chief Executive 
Officer), Abdalla A1 Jarwan (Vice 
President, International Investments) 
and Ali A1 Saeygh (Transaction 
Manager, International Investments)
The use of these two case studies is appropriate for this research because of their 
reliability and validity of respondents and data collected. It is also similar to other studies 
in this respect. For example, Yan and Gray (1994) used a sample of four enterprises when 
they studied the U.S-Chinese JVs. Neuman (1997) argues that judgmental sampling was 
often used where a small number of cases was to be examined in depth, and where cases 
were to be selected on the grounds that had been particularly informative. Therefore, this 
researcher is in line with Yin who contends that “case studies, like experiments, are 
generalisable to theoretical propositions and not to population or universe” (1989:1). Yin 
(1989) further argues that with the case study method, the investigator aims to expand 
and generalize theories, “analytic generalization”, and not to enumerate frequencies, 
“statistical generalization”. Also, the decision regarding the number of cases depends on 
accessibility, availability of resources, research objectives, etc. (Eisenhardt, .1989). 
Considering this, the number of enterprises was not of crucial importance. Another 
important issue relating to case study selection is theoretical relevance which is ensured 
by selecting these two enterprises. The area of study, here the formation process of 
international strategic alliance, is kept similar or as Eisenhardt puts it “is likely to 
replicate or extend the emergent theory” (1989:539).
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Phase 3: Data Collection
Data were mainly collected by conducting in-depth interviews. Data obtained from one
interview were cross-checked with data from other interviewees, and against the 
documentary evidence and observations (i.e. triangulation).
Conducting interviews
The researcher prepared an interview guide which includes a sequence of themes to be 
covered as well as suggested questions. Detailed interview questions were developed 
from the literature in relation to the research objectives and the research questions. These 
questions were grouped into nine sets; each is directed toward exploring a specific 
research question, stage/decision or factor in the process of strategic alliance formation 
(see Appendix 4). Questions relating to general company’s information were located in 
the first part. The second part includes questions relating to the reasons (motives) for 
forming the strategic alliance (the case under study). In the third part, the researcher 
attempted to collect data relating to partner selection (partner search, evaluation and 
selection). Part four is about building and maintaining trust among partners and the 
potential effect of such trust on the strategic alliance formation process. Questions 
relating to choice of the alliance’s form of structure and factors affecting such a decision 
are covered in part five. Part six is about managing and controlling SAs. Questions in part 
seven explored criteria used to measure the strategic alliance’s performance and the 
factors influencing the performance. Questions in part eight were directed to explore the 
process of knowledge transfer and organizational learning and their relation to SAs. 
Finally, questions relating to the impact of organizational and national cultures were 
located in part nine.
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Structured interviews (self administered questionnaires) were also utilized by the 
researcher. Closed questions were used to save the interviewees’ time, establish exact 
facts, and confirm an opinion. Closed questions were designed in a form of self 
administered questionnaires which were later administered in the researcher’s presence. 
Although both interview questions and the self administered questionnaire contained the 
same parts of questions, the questions in each part were different (see Appendix 5)
At the beginning of each interview I firstly introduced myself, research topic and the 
purpose of the interview; asked interviewees if they had any questions or concerns; and 
requested permission to tape-record the session. These interviews averaged 80 minutes in 
length. Interviews were conducted in Dubai and Abu Dhabi from February 2008 to 
November 2008. The people interviewed include managing directors/chief executive 
managers, departmental heads as well as top government officials in relevant ministries. 
The questions were produced in English and answered in English and were checked for 
accuracy and suitability by my supervisor and two independent advisors; one is a 
professor in UAE University and the other is the General Director of Dubai Cables 
(Ducab). Prior to the meeting, interviewees were asked if they would allow the interview 
to be recorded. It is worth noting at this point that all respondents seemed quite reluctant 
to tape-record the interviews. Despite its time consumption, the researcher preferred to 
rely on note-taking because it was observed to be more convenient to interviewees. There 
are several advantages and disadvantages of these two types of reporting media (see 
Walsham, 1995:78).
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Reviewins documentary records
The researcher had the opportunity to access internal documentary evidence in 
conjunction with interviews. Internal documentary analysis is important because 
information contained in documents may not be available in spoken form and such texts 
endure and thus give historical insights (Hodder, 1998; Yin, 1998). Considerable 
materials were collected about the enterprises, cases under study, and the broader context 
from files and official records of companies studied. Documentary records used included 
joint venture contracts, annual reports, promotional material, and parent company 
documentation. In addition to the available documents reviewed in each company, the 
researcher has also used latest data from the Institute of Administrative Development, the 
UAE Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, the Federal Research Division, 
Chambers of commerce and industry, the UAE University, and relevant ministries. Other 
reports produced by the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund as well as local newspapers and business magazines were also utilized for the 
purpose of conducting this study.
5.4.3 Difficulties encountered in data collection
Data collection in the UAE, especially through case studies and interviews, proved to be 
a challenging process. In the capacity of a senior lecturer of management in the premier 
university in the United Arab Emirates (i.e. United Arab Emirates University) and 
although I was provided by support letters from my research supervisor and from my 
employer to facilitate the process of data collection, many difficulties were encountered 
during the stage of data collection. Following are some, but not exhaustive list of these 
difficulties.
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5.4.3.1 Difficulties in getting and maintaining access to the selected companies
Getting access to data was not as straight forward as the researcher was expecting. This 
was mainly due to the high confidentiality policy followed by most companies in the 
UAE and due to executives’ time limitation. Furthermore, maintaining access to the 
selected companies was not less difficult than getting initial access. It was noticed in all 
selected companies that once the first interview was successfully conducted it was not 
easy to get appointments for subsequent visits/interviews. Moreover, getting access to 
documentary records was much more difficult than getting access to interviews with key 
managers because such records are considered strictly confidential.
5.4.3.2 Difficulties resulted from reluctance and negative attitude towards research
With very few exceptions, reluctance was a common attitude shared by almost all 
respondents. It was also observed that most companies contacted for the purpose of data 
collection showed negative attitude towards research. Seventeen out of thirty one 
companies contacted did not reply at all and four apologized for reasons such as time 
limitation and unavailability of the right person. The reason for such an attitude, I 
believe, is the strategic nature and sensitivity of the study which led to unwillingness to 
provide data. This situation required the researcher to spend more time and effort to build 
trust to access interviewees’ minds and to convince them to actively participate in this 
study. In this respect, Nandhakumar and Jones (1997) contend that relations between 
field researchers and their subjects rest on a base of trust, which in turn, rest on a base of 
relationships.
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The meetings that I had with his Excellency Mr. Abdulla A1 Saleh, the Under Secretary, 
Ministry of Economy and Planning (see section 5.4.2) not only resulted in getting access 
to data in the said ministry and in the department in charge of UAE-WTO negotiations, 
but also helped in getting access to the selected companies as he formally and informally 
requested these companies to provide support. However, when access is secured and 
meetings started the researcher exerted substantial effort to build trust and to maintain 
access.
5.5 Validity and reliability of the research methods
Validity and reliability tests were conducted to measure the soundness of the data 
collected. According to Bernard (2000), validity refers to the accuracy and 
trustworthiness of data and the findings from their analysis. By contrast, reliability is to 
illustrate the level at which the instrument is stable and consistent with measuring the 
concept to allow repeating the same research using the same data collection method and 
sample to obtain the same results of those previous study (Sekaran, 1984). Therefore, 
some of the main steps that the researcher has taken to ensure the validity and reliability 
of the research methods interviews were:
B To define the main research questions, the researcher relied on the theoretical 
foundations during the initial stages of the study and reviewed the underlying 
theories or constructs that explain the formation process of SAs.
a Companies, case studies, and interviewees have been selected systematically, 
according to established criteria.
a Research questions were cross-checked with the study supervisor for their 
suitability.
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B Interview question were cross-checked for suitability by the study supervisor and 
two professors from the UAE University.
, A pilot study was conducted, as explained above, on a selected group of 
respondents. Based on the results of the pilot study, the interview questions were 
revised and some changes were made accordingly, 
a Interview questions were designed and administered in a way that they are 
consistently understood in a way that ambiguous words were avoided and key 
terms in questions were defined.
a The role of the interviewer was reduced to the minimum possible in order to 
avoid any bias or guidance of the data collection process by the researcher, 
a All interviews were recorded in note-taking because it was found more 
convenient for the interviewees than tape-recording, 
a To avoid misunderstandings and to maintain the reliability of the data, the 
interviews were transcribed and sent back to the interviewees for accuracy 
checking and comments. This cross examination increased the quality of the data, 
a The initial findings of the interviews were discussed with the research supervisor 
and it was necessary to verify some information again with the respondents and to 
recheck some documents.
a Data was also cross-checked with and feedback received from other independent 
sources. These sources were different independent informants such as professors 
from the College of Business and Economics-UAE University. Comments and 
additional information received from feedback sessions were very valuable as 
they increased the quality of this research.
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The researcher made all possible attempts to reach maximum openness of this study. The 
researcher attempted to provide the reader ample opportunities to examine the particulars 
of the study such as what choices were made by the researcher with respect to the 
construction of the study, what were the steps in the process of forming the research 
questions, selecting a site, generating and collecting the data and processing and 
analyzing the data.
5.6 Ethics of research
Involvement in research requires a general awareness and acknowledgement of 
appropriate and inappropriate conduct (Strydom, 2002). Specified ethical issues and 
aspects should be considered in the qualitative research, in particular the entire research 
process in relation to research design and data collection and analysis (Ticehurst and 
Veal, 2000). Moreover Punch (2000:59) identified some important issues and concerns 
that the researcher has to consider and fulfil as follows: (1) informing the participants in 
detail about their involvement in the research; (2) avoiding harm and risk; (3) allowing 
free choice; (4) ensuring privacy; and (5) guaranteeing confidentiality and anonymity. 
The researcher has considered these concerns and has adhered to the University Code of 
Practice in Doing Research (University of Abertay Dundee, 2002, http://qualitv/) and was 
granted ethical approval by the School Research Ethnics Committee to conduct this 
research.
Prior to each interview, letters were sent to the respondents to uncover the researcher’s 
identity, explaining the nature and objectives of the study and emphasizing that collected 
data would be used only for academic purpose and ensuring maximum confidentiality
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and anonymity. At the beginning of each interview the researcher made sure that the 
participants had full information about the nature and objectives of the study. Also the 
participants were given free choice to continue or withdraw from the study at any time 
they chose. In fact, the researcher made every possible effort to ensure that 
confidentiality was kept as promised. Ensuring confidentiality, privacy and anonymity of 
the participants’ responses and identities throughout the research was one of the main 
principles of conducting this research. All participants had no objection that their names 
to be mentioned in the draft of the research thesis.
5.7 Data analysis and presentation
The final stage of doing this research is a systematic analysis of the data collected. This 
section is to describe how data were analyzed and interpreted. However, before 
discussing the data analysis process, it is important to note that there is, according to 
Babbie and Mouton (2001), no single neat and tidy approach to qualitative data analysis, 
nor even one approach to each specific type of analysis under reference. Overall, 
qualitative data analysis refers to the manipulation of large volume of words obtained by 
interviews or observations or from documentary records which require describing and 
summarizing, and subsequently the researcher has to look for relationships between 
various themes that have emerged through the analysis process to answer the research 
questions (Lacey and Luff, 2001:3). In view of the fact that qualitative research deals 
with words rather than numbers, there are few accepted rules and standardized 
procedures for analyzing qualitative data (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988). Nevertheless, 
any technique should be related to the conceptual framework and the research questions 
or hypotheses and, thus, the collected qualitative data must be categorized through and
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assessed with respect to the research questions posed and the identified concepts 
(Ticehurst and Veal, 2000).
Obviously, there are two basic types of qualitative data analysis: content analysis and 
grounded theory approach (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; May, 1993; Strauss and Corbin,
1998). Content analysis, on the one hand, is a systematic way of analyzing qualitative 
data by counting the occurrences of certain key words and phrases that appeared in the 
data. The frequencies are then analyzed (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). The central aim is 
to render issues of interpretation as controllable and non-contentious as possible in order 
to move quickly on to the more ‘scientific’ process of counting things (Slater in Seale, 
1998:235). Furthermore, this type implements meaning categorization which implies that 
the interview is coded into categories. Grounded theory, by contrast, provides a more 
open approach to qualitative data analysis. With grounded theory approach, researchers 
go by feel and intuition and theory created or discovered through observation of 
particular cases (Silverman, 2000; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). However, it has been 
criticized as very time consuming, if it is to be conducted properly to give convincing 
results (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). Content analysis and grounded theory seem to be 
opposite in almost every way. More constructively, however, they could be seen as 
complementary (Slater in Seale, 1998:244). Miles and Huberman (1994), therefore, 
suggest analyzing qualitative data by adopting an approach which came halfway between 
content analysis and grounded theory. This researcher adopts Miles and Huberman’s 
suggestion and its practicalities for doing such qualitative analysis. Thus the researcher 
had tried to combine the rigor of content analysis with the depth and ‘analytic power’ 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998) of grounded theory.
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In this research, data analysis started earlier along with data collection and involved what 
is referred to by Strauss and Corbin (1998) as microanalysis of data. The purpose of this 
analysis is to organize the recording of information collected during the interview when 
the memory is fresh. In this respect, Straus and Corbin (1998) argue that microanalysis 
demonstrates that analysis is not a structured, static or rigid process; rather it is a free- 
flowing and creative one in which analysts move quickly back and forth between types of 
coding, using analytic techniques and procedures. For this purpose, the data analysis 
stage is divided into three phases. The first phase involves the generation and description 
of propositions. The second phase involves the interpretation of the generated 
propositions; and the third phase three deals with elaboration of and reflection on these 
propositions.
Phase 1: Generation and description of propositions
After completing each interview, the researcher began transcribing the interviews, field 
notes, documents, and summarizes relevant information gained from the interview. The 
transcribing of data is a process of converting verbal words into readable written format. 
Therefore, transcribing the interview from an oral to a written mode was the beginning of 
the analysis. Transcribing entails organizing and reducing a large volume of collected 
qualitative data and field notes. Data reduction aims at reducing the amount of collected 
data without stripping the data from their context. Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that 
data reduction refers to the course of selecting, focusing, simplifying, summarizing and 
converting the data of written field notes and the transcriptions of interview data. 
Therefore, one purpose of data analysis was to reduce this data by excluding irrelevant 
material and grouping together things that are similar (Kvale, 1996).
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Transcribing in this research was in the form of writing up the selected cases from the 
interviewee’s view, using a narrative approach, to describe what was going on in each 
case, what the case looks like, and how the people involved were acting. This helps in 
dealing with a surge of data. Having read the case narratives, a categorizing strategy in 
the form of coding was applied. The goal of coding is to fracture the data and rearrange it 
into categories that facilitate the comparison of data within and between these categories 
and that aid in the development of theoretical concepts (Strauss, 1987). Initial coding 
consists of reading through material and identifying where themes of particular interest 
are illustrated (Seale, 1998). Accordingly, the transcripts were printed out in code words 
that identified particular groups of lines as being about a particular topic. Every line of 
the transcripts was numbered in page. It was certainly necessary to do this detailed type 
of analysis at the beginning of a research project to discover categories and to uncover 
the relationships among concepts. However, this did not mean that the researcher steadily 
codes every bit of data, word by word and phrase by phrase, in each transcript. Rather, 
the researcher learnt to scan these materials, looking for potentially interesting or relevant 
analytic information (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Coding, thus, broke the material down 
into manageable phrases ready for analysis.
Having coded data, they were then conceptualized. The conceptualization was used to 
convert data described earlier into abstract concepts, categories, and subcategories, with 
the intention of relating them to each other. This is what Strauss and Corbin (1998) 
referred to as conceptual ordering. The identification of concepts and categories was 
linked to the research questions. The categorization displayed data in a way that made it 
possible to investigate both similarities and differences within and across cases as well as
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along the dimensions of the categories. Relational statements are then generated out of 
the categories after they are integrated and refined. This phase is concluded by writing up 
a descriptive account of the first and second cases based on the categories generated 
earlier and using these descriptive accounts to generate propositions about each case as a 
stand-alone entity.
Phase 2: Interpretation of generated propositions
This phase involves three steps. The first step entails presenting the reduced data in 
organized and understandable shape to allow the researcher to reach about research 
propositions. The main goal of this process is to represent the data in a more 
comprehensive way. The second step was an interpretation of the generated propositions 
and generation of broad characteristics about the formation process of ISAs within each 
case as a stand-alone entity. This process implies giving meaning and sense to the 
analyzed data through searching for descriptive patterns. Arriving at this point requires 
stepping back and systematically examining and re-examining the data, using a variety of 
what Miles and Huberman called “tactics for generating meaning” (1994:244-262). The 
third step was performing across case analysis for revealing common patterns from the 
cases studied (Eisenhardt, 1989). Each case confirms the emergent findings within the 
other.
Phase 3: Elaboration and reflection
This phase includes two steps. The first one is elaboration within which each of the 
generated patterns is explained from the cases. It was found that the generated patterns fit 
the evidence from each case very well. Eisenhardt states that “a close fit is important to
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building good theory” (1989:541). The second step is reflection, in which each of the 
generated patterns is compared with the existing theories of SAs (chapters two and three). 
This stage revealed how the findings of this study were similar or different to others’ 
findings and attempted to find interpretation for similarities and contradictions.
5.8 Summary and conclusion
The realism approach is utilised to conduct this research. Realism adopts a middle ground 
in a dichotomy identified as Positivism and Phenomenology. This approach is utilized by 
this study because it takes the advantages of both positivism approach and 
phenomenology approach and helps to understand the process by which people interpret 
the world. In so doing, the realism approach also calls for the utilization of the qualitative 
approach. Researchers argue that the qualitative research approach is designed to enable 
researchers to obtain a detailed description and to attain in-depth information for a better 
understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. In addition, methodologists 
strongly argue that qualitative methods are suitable and vital when the research is 
exploratory. The research method used in this research is the case study based on in- 
depth interviews, structured interviews (self administered questionnaires), and 
documentary analysis, which is referred to as triangulation. For the purpose of data 
analysis, this study utilized some of the procedures and techniques suggested by the 
within case and across case analysis recommended by Eisenhardt (1989) and the 
replication logic suggested by Yin (1989) to detect similarities and differences between 
cases. The two next chapters will be devoted to describing the process of international 
strategic alliance formation within the two companies that have been studied and to 
generate propositions of such description.
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CHAPTER 6
Description and analysis of findings:
Abu Dhabi Liquefaction Company (ADGAS)
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. The first is to familiarize the reader with the 
background and context within which the formation process of ISAs in Abu Dhabi 
National Oil Company (ADNOC) was developed. To this end, a brief background about 
the oil industry in UAE, ADNOC and Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Company (ADGAS), 
and the case under study are presented in sections 6.2, 6.2.1 and 6.3 respectively. The 
second is to describe the formation process of ADGAS by ADNOC and its partners and 
to generate some propositions about the strategic alliance formation process. The chapter 
ends with concluding remarks.
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6.2 Oil in the UAE
Oil production is currently near capacity at about 2.5 million barrels per day, accounting 
for three per cent of world oil production. This makes the UAE the 9th largest crude oil 
producer and 6th largest net oil exporter in the world. With official reserves of around
98.2 billion barrels, which will last for more than 100 years at the current production rate, 
the country owns almost 10 per cent of the world’s proven oil reserves. The UAE also 
has the world’s fifth largest natural gas reserves after Russia, Iran, Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia, the proven recoverable reserves are estimated currently at 200 trillion cubic feet 
or 4 per cent of the world’s total (UAE Yearbook, 2007). Oil and gas production has been 
the mainstay of the economy in the UAE and will remain a major revenue earner long
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into the future due to the vast hydrocarbon reserves at disposal of the country. The oil and
gas sector provides around a third of the UAE's Gross National Product, and remains the
dominant contributor of government revenues. Abu Dhabi is by far the biggest oil
producer in the UAE, controlling more than 85 per cent of the UAE's total oil output
capacity and over 90 per cent of its crude reserves. Principal offshore oil fields are Umm
Shaif, Lower Zakum, Upper Zakum, A1 Bunduq and Abul Bukhoosh (ADNOC’s internal
records). The main onshore fields are Asab, Bab, Bu Hasa, Sahil and Shah. Almost 92 per
cent of the UAE's gas reserves are also located in Abu Dhabi and the Khuff reservoir
beneath the oil fields of Umm Shaif and Abu al-Bukhoosh ranks among the largest single
gas reservoirs in the world. Dubai produces around 240,000 barrels a day of oil and
substantial quantities of gas from offshore fields, while Sahaijah has smaller oil and gas
fields (ADNOC ’ s internal records).
6.2.1 Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC)
The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) is a state-owned enterprise engaged in 
all phases of the oil and gas industry. It has a complex holding company structure 
involving, in a manner unusual for Middle East oil companies, equity partnerships with 
large Western oil companies. It is necessary to understand the historical development of 
Abu Dhabi's oil industry in order to understand the present structure of ADNOC.
6.2.1.1 History of Abu Dhabi oil industry
Abu Dhabi was a latecomer to the Middle Eastern oil industry, only beginning production 
in 1962. However, the search for oil had begun nearly 30 years earlier. As elsewhere in 
the Middle East, this search was in the hands of foreign oil interests organized in a
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consortium. In 1928 a group of U.K., Anglo-Dutch, and U.S. international oil companies
formed the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) with a concession which came to cover most
of Iraq. Once the IPC was formed, each partner agreed that it would not hold concessions
in any other part of the former territory of the Ottoman Empire except in association with
all the other partners, and in the same proportions as the IPC. Most of the Persian Gulf
states, including Abu Dhabi but excluding Kuwait, were included in this area. Thus,
when attention turned to searching for oil in the Trucial States, as the UAE was known
until 1971, a consortium with exactly the same ownership structure as IPC was formed.
In 1935 a new U.K. company was formed, Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd.,
commonly referred to as PDTC. PDTC's ownership was identical to that of IPC, with the
Anglo-Persian Oil Company (later British Petroleum), Shell, Companie Franqaise des
Petroles, and a group of two U.S. companies - Exxon and Mobil Oil - owning 23.75 per
cent each of the shares, and investor Calouste Gulbenkian's interests the remaining 5 per
cent. PDTC contacted all the sheikdoms offering arrangements for concession rights to
explore for oil, and to develop production should oil be found. In January 1939 Abu
Dhabi granted PDTC such concessions for a period of 75 years (UAE Yearbook, 2005).
Oil discovery and shipment by foreisn companies
Oil exploration in Abu Dhabi was slow to get started. It was delayed first by World War 
II. Thereafter, the IPC group focused on the search for oil in Qatar, where oil exports 
began in 1949. At the same time knowledge of the geology of Abu Dhabi was limited, 
and economic conditions there were very underdeveloped. The town of Abu Dhabi itself 
was no more than a tiny village, and there were no roads in the entire emirate until the 
1950s. Drilling finally began in 1950, but the search for oil proved a prolonged one. In
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July 1953 a well was drilled in the Bab field but mechanical difficulties led to its being
abandoned despite evidence of the presence of oil. Further drilling at Bab finally
established the potential of the field by 1960. The Bu Hasa field was proved soon after oil
was discovered in commercial quantities, and exports started in 1963. In the following
years, PDTC relinquished its concessions in the other Trucial States to concentrate its
efforts on Abu Dhabi. In 1963, PDTC was renamed the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company
(ADPC) (UAE Yearbook, 2005).
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Meanwhile, oil had also been discovered offshore by other companies. In 1951 Abu 
Dhabi had established that the concession granted to PDTC did not include the 
continental shelf belonging to the emirate. As a result, Abu Dhabi granted a concession to 
cover the offshore territory first to the International Marine Oil Company, which failed to 
achieve results, and then, in 1954, to Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Ltd. (ADMA), a new 
company two-thirds owned by British Petroleum (BP) and one-third by Companie 
Fran9aise des Petroles. In 1959 ADMA’s drilling barge struck oil at Umm Shaif, which is 
located 80 miles into the gulf near Das Island. In 1962 the first shipment of oil was 
loaded from Das Island. The onshore and offshore oil discoveries made Abu Dhabi a 
large-scale oil producer. Its total oil production grew from zero in 1960 to 102.8 million 
barrels by the end of 1965 and 253.7 million barrels by 1970 (UAE Yearbook, 2006). By 
that date its production was one of the largest in the Middle East, and about one-quarter 
of that of Kuwait.
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Chansins the oil ownership structure
During the late 1960s there was growing resentment in Abu Dhabi, as elsewhere in the 
Middle East, of foreign ownership of oil resources, especially the consortium system. The 
government concluded a 50-50 profit-sharing agreement with ADPC in 1965 and with 
ADMA in 1966. In 1971 the government established the Abu Dhabi National Oil 
Company (ADNOC) as a wholly state-owned company. Following the formation of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Abu Dhabi followed the general 
policy of requesting participation in the foreign oil companies active in its territory. 
Effective January 1, 1973 ADNOC acquired 25 per cent of the assets of ADPC and 
ADMA. The finalization of the ADMA participation agreement was complicated by BP’s 
announcement in December of 1972 of the sale of a 30 per cent interest in ADMA to the 
Japan Oil Development Co. (JODCO), formed by a consortium of Japanese companies. 
The government withheld its approval of this deal until March 1973, when BP agreed to 
finance the construction of an ADNOC-owned refinery in Abu Dhabi (UAE Yearbook,
2006).
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By a further agreement in December 1974, the ADNOC interest in the ADPC and 
ADMA concessions was raised to 60 per cent. These two companies were later 
reincorporated as Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operation and Abu Dhabi 
Marine Operating Company. However, Abu Dhabi is distinctive among the OPEC 
members in the gulf in retaining the former concessionaire companies as equity holders 
in the operating companies. It did not, as elsewhere, seek to remove foreign ownership 
entirely. ADNOC, therefore, developed as a holding company with an intricate web of
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majority and minority equity stakes in other producing companies. The government was
motivated to follow this strategy by a desire to pursue production and exploration as
energetically as possible. As part of this aim, from the 1960s various new concessions
were granted to mostly independent oil companies in areas relinquished by ADPC and
ADMA, all of which included provisions for ADNOC to have the option to take up to 60
per cent interest in successful ventures (UAE Investment Climate Statement, 2006).
6.2.1.2 The structure of ADNOC Group of Companies
Since its establishment, ADNOC has steadily broadened its activities through its 
subsidiaries, creating an integrated oil and gas industry in Abu Dhabi. Today ADNOC is 
the parent company, or owner of all or majority of the shares, of 14 companies (see Table
6.1) known as the "ADNOC Group of Companies". These companies are involved in oil 
and gas exploration and production, petrochemical industries, marine transportation, 
distribution of petroleum products, exploration and production services and facilities, and 
natural gas processing. ADNOC Group has developed as one of the better managed state 
oil companies by expanding to different oil and gas sectors through ISAs with foreign 
companies. Therefore, ISAs with Western oil companies have given ADNOC access to 
skills and technologies which would have been hard to generate internally. In what 
follows a brief background is provided about each of the companies of ADNOC group. 
These companies are classified into six sectors according to area of specialization.
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T ab le  6.1: A D N O C  G roup  o f  C om p anies
C o m p a n y  N am e__________________ _________________ _____
S ector  1: E xp loration  an d  P rod uction  o f  O il and  G as
Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO)
Abu Dhabi Marine Operating Company (ADMA-OPCO) 
Zakum Development Company (ZADCO)
S ecto r  2: E xp loration  an d  P rod u ction  Services
National Drilling Company (NDC)
T yp e o f  O w n ersh ip
Joint Venture (ADNOC, BP, TOTAL, 
Shell, Mobil, ExxonMobil, Partex) 
Joint Venture (ADNOC, BP, TOTAL, 
JODCO)
Joint Venture (ADNOC, ExxonMobil, 
JODCO)
Wholly Owned subsidiary of ADNOC
ESNAAD Wholly Owned subsidiary of ADNOC
Abu Dhabi Petroleum Ports Operating Company (IRSHAD)
S ector  3: O il and  G as P rocessin g
Abu Dhabi Gas Industries Limited (GASCO)
Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Industries Limited (ADGAS)
Abu Dhabi Oil Refining Company (TAKREER)
S ector  4: C hem icals an d  P etroch em ica ls
Ruwais Fertilizer Industries (FERTIL)
Joint Venture (ADNOC and Land and 
Marine National Contracting 
Company-Lamnalco),
Joint Venture (ADNOC, Shell, 
TOTAL, Partex)
Joint Venture (ADNOC, Mitsui, BP, 
TOTAL)
Wholly Owned subsidiary of ADNOC 
Joint Venture (ADNOC, TOTAL)
Abu Dhabi Polymers Company Limited (BOROUGE) Joint Venture (ADNOC, Borealis)
S ector  5: M aritim e T ran sp orta tion
Abu Dhabi National Tanker Company (ADNATCO) Wholly Owned subsidiary of ADNOC
National Gas Shipping Company (NGSCO) 
S ector 6: O il and  G as D istr ib u tion
Joint Venture (ADNOC, Mitsui, BP, 
TOTAL)
ADNOC Distribution Wholly Owned subsidiary of ADNOC
Source: M od ified  b y  the research er from  A D N O C ’S F ive  Y ea r  A ch ievem en ts R ep orts 2000 -2004 , 
P ages 14-18
ADNOC also has diversified overseas, again favouring joint venture and mixed 
ownership structures. Together with the Pakistani government, ADNOC formed Pak 
Arab Fertilizers Ltd., which started producing chemical fertilizers in Pakistan in 1978 
and, by 2004 it was producing 450,000 tons of calcium ammonia nitrate, 350,000 tons of 
nitro phosphate, 90,000 tons of urea and 847,000 tons Multi Product (ADNOC’S Five 
Year Achievements Reports 2000-2004). The Pak Arab Refinery, another joint venture
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between ADNOC and the Pakistani government, started production in 1981. The Dolphin
is another project formed by the ADNOC from the UAE, Qatargas from Qatar and
foreign oil and gas companies. The project aims at transporting gas from Qatar's huge
reserves to industrial consumers in the UAE, Oman and other countries to provide a
framework to stimulate investment in a variety of related industries.
6.3 Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Industries Limited (ADGAS)
While on a visit to Das Island in the early 1970s, H.H. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al- 
Nahyan, the late President and Founder of the UAE, keenly observed and enquired about 
the burning of associated gases, produced during oil extraction and production, into the 
atmosphere -  a process called flaring. Gas flaring was a standard procedure at the time, 
but Sheikh Zayed decreed it to be a waste of precious natural resources and an avoidable 
cause of damage to the environment. This visit resulted in H.H. Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed 
Al-Nahyan, then the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, issuing a joint directive to cease the 
unnecessary flaring of associated gases immediately. By laying the groundwork for 
natural gases to be captured and sold as fuel, this visionary decision has had a tremendous 
impact on protecting the country’s environment, and contributing to the nation’s 
economic development, ultimately benefiting the citizens and residents of the UAE.
C hapter 6: D escrition  and  analysis o f  finding:
A bu  D habi L iquefaction Com pany (AD GAS)
While extensive studies were showing that natural gas was one of the cleanest and most 
environment-friendly fuels available, several large industrialized countries were looking 
for a reliable, clean and efficient energy supply to address their growing demands. Based 
on these factors, the decision was made to construct a gas liquefaction plant on Das
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Island. In 1972, the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) signed an agreement to
purchase the Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) to he
produced at the plant for a 20-year period for use in power generation in and around
Tokyo, the Japanese capital. The following year, ADGAS was officially founded and
registered in Bermuda as a joint venture with an initial 20 per cent shareholding for
ADNOC (which gradually raised to 70 per cent), 35 per cent for Mitsui and Co. Ltd.
(which gradually reduced to 15 per cent), 30 per cent for BP (which gradually reduced to
10 per cent) and 15 per cent for TOTAL (which gradually reduced to 5 per cent). It is
interesting to note here that ADGAS was the sixth LNG plant to be built in the world,
next to Arzew GL4Z (Algeria, October 1964), Kenai (Alaska, October 1969), Marsa El
Brega (Libya, April 1970), Lumut (Brunei, December 1972), and Skikda GL1K (Algeria,
December 1972).
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T ab le  6.2: A D G A S  ’ h isto ry  and evo lu tion
D ate E v en t
07/09/1971
14/12/1972
10/03/1973
23/03/1973
04/12/1973
25/12/1975
28/03/1977
29/04/1977
04/10/1977
15/10/1990
23/06/1993
11/07/1994
01/1995
24/06/1997
11/04/2006
The Gas Liquefaction Project Agreement signed 
The 20-year Sale Agreement with TEPCO signed
ADGAS registered in Bermuda with ADNOC holding 20 per cent of the shares
Contract for the construction of ADNOC plant on Das Island signed
Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahyanm lays the Plant’s foundation stone
ADNOC’s shareholding increased to 51 per cent
ADGAS incorporated in Abu Dhabi
First LNG shipment loaded
The UAE president officially inaugurates the plant
ADGAS and TEPCO sign a new 25-year agreement under which TEPCO buys
ADGAS ’ doubled LNG production as from 1994
First Sulphur shipment exported
Production started from the 3rd LNG Process Train
ADGAS first LNG shipment to Europe exported
ADNOC’s shareholding increased to 70 per cent
22 million man-hours worked without any LTI (LTI)_________ ___________
S ource: A D G A S: T h ir ty  Y ears S tory  o f  Success, 2007
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Table 6.2 provides a brief snapshot of the history and evolution of ADGAS. In 1977 the
company was incorporated in Abu Dhabi, shortly before the plant became operational. In
the same year two processing trains came online, producing the Middle East’s first ever
LNG and LPG and effectively ending the era of associated gas flaring. The two
processing trains were designed to produce LNG with an annual designed capacity of 2.5
million tons; 800,000 tons per year of LPG; 220,000 tons per year of Butane, in addition
to 220,000 tons per year of Pentane (ADGAS’s internal records). It was not only the first
of its kind in the Middle East, but also was, and still is, the only plant in the world
capable of processing both associated and non-associated gas streams.
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ADGAS’s first shipment of LNG left Das Island on April 29th, 1977, making ADGAS 
the pioneer of the Middle East’s gas liquefaction industry. In the 1980s, the company’s 
core operations proceeded smoothly and several improvement projects were undertaken 
to increase the safety and overall efficiency of the Das Island plant. In addition, 
construction of seven LNG and LPG storage tanks, and an ambitious sea-water intake 
project were completed in 1986 and 1988 respectively. In 1990, ADGAS upgraded the 
Das Island plant control system to a fully computerized digital command centre. Later 
that same year, as testimony to the strong business relationship that had developed over 
almost two decades, ADGAS and TEPCO signed a new 25-year agreement -  doubling 
the amount of LNG to be delivered to TEPCO as of 1994. To meet its obligations under 
this new agreement, ADGAS immediately constructed a third, LNG processing train at 
Das Island adding another 3 million tons annually to the plants production and doubling 
capacity (ADGAS’s internal records). ADGAS shareholders also decided to renew and
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expand the LNG tanker fleet. The new fleet comprises eight of the world's most modem
tankers, each with a capacity of about 135,000 cubic meters. In 1997, ADNOC expanded
its commitment in ADGAS by increasing its shareholding to 70 per cent (ADGAS’s
internal records).
6.3.1 Formation process of ADGAS
This section describes and analyses the findings about ISAs formation process within 
ADNOC taking the formation process of ADGAS as a case study. It also generates 
propositions from such a description (see Appendix 6). The process by which such a 
strategy was developed within this particular company falls into five basic phases. The 
generated phases were: the recognition of the motives for forming the alliance, selection 
of the alliance’s partners, selection of the alliance’s form of structure, alliance’s 
management, and the alliance’s performance evaluation. The process is found to be 
affected by two factors: partners’ culture and tmst between partners. In what follows, 
each of these generated phases as well as factors affecting the process will be described, 
and some propositions will be generated with respect to each phase and factor.
6.3.1.1 Phases of the formation process of ADGAS
In this part, five phases of the process of forming strategic alliances within ADNOC are 
analyzed and discussed. These phases are: i) identifying motives for the formation of 
ADGAS strategic alliance; ii) selecting alliance’s partners; iii) selecting alliance’s form 
of structure; iv) alliance management; v) and alliance performance evaluation. The major 
factors influencing the process are also discussed.
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Phase 1: Motives for forming ADGAS strategic alliance
The major motives for forming ADGAS strategic alliance emerged as a reaction to a 
presidential decree to stop gas flaring and to utilize gas resources. This phase, therefore, 
deals with the identification and justification of the reasons behind forming this 
international, strategic alliance. When asked about the motives for forming the strategic 
alliance of ADGAS, Mr. Mohamed A1 Suwaidi, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of 
ADNOC explained that the motives appeared with different forms and at different levels, 
some of which directly fell within ADNOC’s internal environment (organizational 
motives), and other motives were related to the relationship between the ADNOC and its 
immediate and distant contexts (contextual motives).
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The orsanizational motives for the formation of ADGAS stratesic alliance
With regard to the organizational motives for the formation of ADGAS strategic alliance,
Mr. A1 Suwaidi mentioned that:
“At the organizational level the motives for the formation o f ADGAS 
strategic alliance falls within ADNOC’s strategy for maintaining business 
relationships and partnerships with foreign companies as a way to expand 
into different sectors o f oil and gas to best utilize these resources and 
generate maximum profits. This strategic intention was supported by the 
availability o f partners who possess the technology, which we lack, to 
process oil and gas and who also have the knowledge and experience in the 
Gulf region and the UAE. ADNOC also followed this strategy to share cost o f 
growth and expansion with other companies and to reduce risk o f expected 
substantial investments
The documentary analysis of ADGAS’s internal records support the aforementioned 
statement of Mr. A1 Suwaidi and revealed the fact that the process of gas liquefaction is 
highly sophisticated and complex and, therefore, requires use of advanced technology
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and investment of substantial amount of money. The gas liquefaction is a relatively new
branch of modem technology, and it is highly sophisticated and complex as well. In
order to make it practical and commercially viable to transport gas from one country to
another, its volume has to be greatly reduced. To obtain maximum volume reduction, the
gas has to be liquefied through the application of proprietary refrigeration technology
which makes it possible to cool the gas down to approximately minus 160° C. The unit
where LNG is produced is called a train. Liquefying natural gas reduces its volume by a
factor of 1:610. The reduction in volume makes the gas practical to transport and store. In
international trade, LNG is transported in specially built tanks in double-hulled ships to a
receiving terminal where it is stored in heavily insulated tanks. The process of gas
liquefaction passes through four stages: production stage which involves compression of
natural gas, sweetening (purification), drying (dehydration), fractionation, liquefaction;
storage stage; loading stage; and shipping of LNG and other associated products. This
process also requires very strict safety measures and precautions during all liquefaction
stages, due to the highly vulnerable and inflammable nature of the gas involved.
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To conclude, establishing and operating ADGAS entailed the use of advanced technology 
and investment of tremendous amount of money in gas processing trains, shipping 
tankers, equipment and machines, utilities, loading facilities, storage facilities, buildings, 
and so on which result in high investment risk. Therefore, having access to technology 
and sharing economic risk and cost were important motives for entering this strategic 
alliance.
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T he c o n tex tu a l m o tive s  fo r  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  A D G A S  s tr a te s ic  a llia n ce
The strategic alliance of ADGAS was also formed in response to the increasing demand
for clean energy in the international market, the pressure from the local community to
stop waste of resources, and the pressures from the international community to cease
environmental pollution resulting from burning gas in the atmosphere which was a
common practice in the gas industry. Quoting Mr. A1 Suwaidi’s words here in explaining
the contextual motives for the formation of ADGAS strategic alliance:
“The 1960s witnessed a desire and pressing need by suppliers and customers 
to find a solution that would help the producing countries stop flaring gas 
away, utilize it and make it easily available for the importers. Burning gas in 
the atmosphere leads to, instead o f utilizing it, waste o f a valuable resource 
and polluting the environment. At the time, demand for energy in general and 
for clean, environment-friendly energy in specific was increasing in many 
industrial countries, including Japan, a situation led to rise in the price o f 
energy worldwide. These factors stimulated ADNOC to plan for a project 
that utilizes gas resources. This plan was supported by the availability o f 
Western companies which possess the required technology, the willingness to 
invest in the UAE, and the knowledge and experience o f working in the 
UAE”.
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Therefore, three contextual factors motivated ADNOC to form ADGAS strategic 
alliance. These factors are the international pressures to stop environment pollution 
resulted from burning associated gases in the atmosphere, increasing demand for and 
prices of clean and environment-friendly energy, and the availability of Western 
companies which possess the required know-how to process gas.
S u m m a ry
The motives for forming the strategic alliance of ADGAS are multilevel in nature; 
organizational and contextual. The formation of ADGAS strategic alliance was attributed 
to a number of reasons; some fall within ADNOC’s terrain (organizational motives) and
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others emanated from its environment (contextual motives). These motives are mutually
affected by each other. For instance, motives falling within ADNOC’s domain affect and
are affected by the ones that fall within ADNOC’s context. This point indicates that
ADNOC could be considered as an open system that heavily influences and is influenced
by its external environment. Obviously, there were three major organizational motives for
the formation of ADGAS strategic alliance. The first and probably the most important
one was the utilization of abundant gas resources at the disposal of ADNOC which were
not utilized until early 1970s because of two reasons. First, until the last decade, demand
for gas in the gulf region and the Middle East was low because of the underdeveloped
nature of the region’s economies. Second, although demand for natural gas was rising in
most industrial countries in the Western countries and Japan, a major problem that faced
ADNOC was the delivery of gas to these countries. Therefore, ADNOC was looking for
an opportunity to utilize its gas resources. In that sense, the second organizational motive
for the formation of ADGAS strategic alliance was the desire of ADNOC to access
technology and know-how to liquefy and transport natural gas. Since demand for natural
gas was mainly rising in industrial countries like some European countries, Japan, and the
United States of America, the only option for ADNOC was to liquefy gas before it can be
transported using sea tankers, a process that requires adoption of advanced and complex
technology. This process also requires very strict safety measures and precautions during
all liquefaction stages due to the high vulnerable and inflammable nature of the gas
involved. Operating and maintaining this technology requires the use of advanced and
sophisticated know-how, competencies, and technical and managerial systems which
ADNOC lacked at the time of ADGAS establishment. Therefore, forming a strategic
alliance was the only option available for ADNOC to access the technology needed to
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utilize gas resources. Moreover, such a big project as ADGAS requires huge investments.
Based on this finding I maintain that the third organizational motive for forming ADGAS
strategic alliance was the desire of ADNOC to share entry cost and economic risk to enter
new and potentially profitable markets. The establishment of ADGAS required
substantial financial investments which entail high levels of economic risk. The process
of gas liquefaction passes through a number of complicated and hazardous stages which
requires employment of advanced and sophisticated technology and which must be
implemented under high standards of safety, health and environment protection. This
process, therefore, entailed huge investments in machines, equipments, buildings, storage
facilities, shipping vessels and so on. Thus, the substantial cost of establishing ADGAS
and the economic risk associated with such investments have induced ADNOC to look
for partners to share cost and risk.
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At the contextual level, there were three motives for the formation of ADGAS strategic 
alliance. The empirical evidence showed that the pressure of the international community 
on the oil producing countries to stop environmental pollution resulted from gas flaring in 
the atmosphere induced ADNOC to look for partners to establish a company to better 
utilize gas resources and cease environmental pollution. The process of extracting and 
producing oil which began in the UAE in the early 1960s required ADNOC to bum 
associated gas in the atmosphere which led to waste of substantial amounts of gas and 
environmental pollution. This state created a pressure by the international community on 
the UAE and the oil producing countries to stop environmental pollution resulted from 
burning gas in the atmosphere and from the national community on ADNOC to cease
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resource waste and utilize it along with other natural gas reserves for the benefit of the
UAE nationals. It was also evident that the presence of Western companies investing in
the UAE which possess know-how and technology of gas liquefaction and knowledge of
the UAE also motivated ADNOC to form ADGAS strategic alliance. A number of
leading oil companies including BP, Shell, Total, Exxon and Mobil were operating in the
gulf region and the UAE at the time of the formation of ADGAS strategic alliance. These
companies were investing in the UAE since early 1960s and were searching new business
opportunities in the UAE. The third motive was the rising demand for LNG in the
international markets associated with steep price rise. Demand for energy, specifically
clean energy, and its associated prices were rising since 1970s due to industrialization
and world economic growth. This state eventually encouraged ADNOC to go a further
step in the formation of ADGAS strategic alliance.
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All in all, the formation of ADGAS strategic alliance was a reaction to organizational 
factors which can be referred to here as strengths and weaknesses within ADNOC and 
contextual factors which we refer to as opportunities and threats within ADNOC’s 
external environment. Organizational strengths within ADNOC emanated from the 
availability of huge reserves of gas at the disposal of ADNOC. Organizational weakness 
resulted from ADNOC’s lack of technology and know-how to properly liquefy and 
transport gas. The formation of ADGAS strategic alliance was also a reaction to 
environmental opportunities. These factors were the steep increase in demand for and 
prices of gas and the availability of some international oil companies operating in the 
country which possess the experience and willingness to invest in new oil and gas
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projects. Environmental threats appeared in the form of pressures by the international
community on oil producing countries to stop environmental pollution resulted from gas
flaring in addition to the entry cost and associated economic risk of the project.
Obviously, ADNOC realized that the establishment of its new gas venture should be done
with foreign partners who possess resources and knowledge which ADNOC lacks and
who have the financial capabilities and willingness to share economic risk. Therefore, the
second phase in the process was the selection of the alliance partners.
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Therefore, to conclude, the following propositions are generated from the above analysis: 
P rop . 6.1a.
The motives for forming ADGAS strategic alliance are multilevel in nature; 
organizational and contextual.
P rop . 6.1b.
There were three organizational motives for the formation o f ADGAS alliance which 
include: utilization o f abundant gas resources; accessing technology and know-how to 
process liquefied gas; sharing economic risk and entry cost to new and potentially 
profitable markets.
P rop . 6.1c.
There were three contextual motives for the formation o f ADGAS alliance which include: 
responding to the pressures o f the international community to stop environmental 
pollution resulted from gas flaring; increasing in demand for LNG in the international 
markets associated with price hikes; and the presence o f Western companies investing in 
the UAE which possess know-how and technology o f gas liquefaction and knowledge o f 
the UAE.
Phase 2: Selection of ADGAS alliance partners
The process of selecting partners of ADGAS strategic alliance passed through three 
stages; i) search for partners, ii) evaluation of partners, and iii) selection of a partner 
which are closely interrelated, interconnected and overlapping.
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i) S ea rch  fo r  p a r tn ers  o f  th e  a llia n ce
A comprehensive feasibility study carried out by Abu Dhabi government for the purpose
of establishing a gas liquefaction plant. This study revealed the fact that the commercial
viability of the project is conditioned by the availability of long-term buyers. In this
connection, Mr. Hassan A1 Marzouqi, Deputy General Manager of ADGAS stated that:
“At the first stages o f the feasibility study, a major issue that received 
considerable attention and discussion by the executive directorates o f 
ADNOC was the marketing aspect o f the project’s products. ADGAS plant 
was initially designed to produce 2.5 million tons per year o f Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG), in addition to 800,000 tons per year o f Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas (LPG). This production capacity necessitated finding markets 
and guaranteeing long-term buyers to absorb the plant’s production and to 
ensure smooth operations o f the plant. This is mainly because storage 
expenses are very high as the liquefied gases must be stored according to 
specific technical specifications. Obviously, there was almost all no demand 
for the project’s products in the UAE, the Gulf region and the Middle East at 
that time at least in the short-run. Meanwhile, demand for clean and 
environment energy was rising in industrial countries. These reasons induced 
ADNOC to look for a partner at the international level to join the strategic 
alliance as a long-term contract buyer”.
In June 1971, ADNOC sent an offer to Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) to 
supply it with gas products on a long-term base. The offer presented the new plant’s 
products and offered Japan an opportunity to buy these products to meet its increasing 
demand for energy. Few weeks later, ADNOC received an initial acceptance of the offer 
from TEPCO. The documentary analysis further revealed that a team of executive 
directors was sent to Japan to negotiate and finalize the deal. When the nominated team 
arrived Tokyo and started negotiations they were surprised that TEPCO accepted the 
offer not as a buyer but as a partner. TEPCO asked for a 45 per cent shareholding in the 
project. The team was in continuous contact with the chairman, exchanging information 
and receiving directions. The chairman in turn was in contact with the Minister of Oil and
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Energy. The negotiations between the two parties proceeded quickly towards a
momentous outcome. Firstly, TEPCO joined the project (through Mitsui and Co.) with a
35 per cent shareholding (reduced in 1975 to 24.5 per cent and again in 1997 to 15 per
cent). Secondly, successfully signing an agreement by which TEPCO purchases the entire
LNG production of ADGAS for a period of 20 years (ADGAS official website).
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Having secured a long-term buyer, another issue that had received considerable attention
was the technical and administrative issues of producing and transporting LNG and the
associated gas products. Based on ADNOC’s strategy of favouring partnerships and JVs
with western companies, another search process began to find partners to provide gas
liquefaction technology and expertise. When asked about the criteria used by ADNOC to
select its partners, Mr. A1 Marzouqi stated that:
“The technical and administrative issues o f producing and transporting LNG 
and other associated gas products was another challenge faced the project. 
ADNOC was searching for partners to provide technology and know-how to 
process LNG. The major criterion set by ADNOC for the selection o f the 
partners o f its new project was the partners ’ competency and expertise in the 
area o f gas liquefaction. Other criteria set by ADNOC for partners ’ selection 
were financial capability o f partners, compatibility and trust between 
ADNOC’s management and partners’ management teams, partners’ 
willingness to form a strategic alliance and commit resources, and partners ’ 
readiness to form a strategic alliance and commit resources ”.
ii) E va lu a tio n  o f  p a r tn ers
At the evaluation step, ADNOC firstly identified a number of potential partners. The 
identified companies were British Petroleum (BP), Total, Exxon, Mobil and Shell. 
ADNOC then used a number of partner’s selection criteria to evaluate each company. 
These criteria include: partner’s competency and expertise in the area of gas liquefaction; 
partner’s financial capability; compatibility and trust between ADNOC’s management 
and partner’s management teams; partner’s willingness to form a strategic alliance and
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commit resources and partner’s readiness to form a strategic alliance and commit
resources. This was demonstrated by ADGAS’s deputy manager’s words:
“Using a set o f selection criteria, ADNOC evaluated some potential partners, 
such as British Petroleum (BP), Total, Exxon Mobil, and Shell. The 
evaluation process revealed that very few number o f oil and gas companies 
worldwide can satisfy ADNOC’s selection criteria. However, the focus was 
on two companies; British Petroleum (BP) and the French, Total. Both 
companies possess the required technology to start this project. They were 
and still are among the biggest oil and gas companies all over the world. 
Moreover, the two companies were already operating in the UAE and, 
therefore, ADNOC had historical ties and good relationships with these 
companies”.
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Documentary analysis of ADNOC’s internal records supported the above statement with 
regard to the historical relationships between BP and TOTAL on the one hand and 
ADNOC on the other. BP has been in Abu Dhabi, in one form or another, and has 
supported the government in the exploration for, and subsequent production of, the 
country’s massive oil reserves since the early 1960s. In addition to its equity share in 
ADGAS, today BP has shareholdings in four other major projects. These equity shares 
are 14.67 per cent in Abu Dhabi Marine Operating Company (ADMA-OPCO), 9.5 per 
cent in Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO), 10 per cent in 
National Gas Shipping Company Ltd. (NGSCO), and 33.3 per cent in Bunduq Company 
Limited (ADNOC Five Year Achievements Report, 2000-2004). TOTAL is one of the 
leading oil companies in the world. With operations in more than 100 countries, the 
company's activities span all aspects of the energy industry from upstream-oil and gas 
exploration and production to downstream refining and marketing of refined products as 
well as international trading in both crude and refined products. Total has been one of the 
partners in ADMA-OPCO, ADCO, GASCO, FERTIL, and NGSCO. The company also is
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involved in several other Abu Dhabi ventures. These historical joint operations of the two
potential partners have tightened their relationship and collaboration with ADNOC and
hence created trust.
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Hi) S e lec tio n  o f  p a r tn ers
The evaluation process of the five potential partners - British Petroleum (BP), Shell,
TOTAL, Exxon and Mobil, revealed that all of these companies possess the required
technology and financial capability to start the new project. However, BP and TOTAL
were selected because of an advantage they possessed over the other partners. Quoting
Mr. A1 Marzouqi’s words here in explaining the reasons for selecting BP and Total:
“Although all o f the potential partners possessed the required technology 
and know-how to process liquefied gas, BP and TOTAL were selected 
because o f a considerable advantage over the other companies. This 
advantage is that that BP and TOTAL possess considerable knowledge and 
experience in the oil and gas operations in the UAE due to their presence in 
the country. Moreover, these historical investments helped both companies to 
build strong relationships with the government o f Abu Dhabi. In turn, these 
relationships enhanced trust between the companies and the government ”.
Having convinced and satisfied with BP and TOTAL as being its partners in the new gas 
venture, ADNOC approached the two companies. As the two companies were already 
having joint operations with ADNOC, discussion of the issues of the new venture was 
simple and straight forward and held in the premises of ADNOC. BP and Total have 
immediately shown interest in the new venture. This was mainly due to the fact that they 
were interested in the field of LNG (ADGAS’s internal records).
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S u m m a ry
The process of partners’ selection passed through three stages: search for the partners of 
the strategic alliance; evaluation of partners; and selection of partners. The evidence 
revealed that ADNOC confined its search to companies which have, in addition to the 
know-how aM technology to liquefy and transport natural gas, the operational experience 
in the UAE or the Gulf region. Another important issue appeared in the surface was the 
marketing aspect of the products of the new project. The empirical evidence also showed 
that the commercial viability of ADGAS was conditioned by the availability of long-term 
buyers of the company’s products. The plant’s initial huge production capacity and the 
subsequent doubled capacity in 1994 in addition to high storage costs induced ADNOC 
to firstly secure long-term buyers of LNG and other associated gases to ensure smooth 
operations of the plant. It was also clear that the underdeveloped nature of the economy 
of the UAE, Gulf countries and the Middle Eastern countries and the lack of demand for 
LNG in the region at the time of establishing ADGAS directed the search process for 
long-term buyers to the international markets. This state pressed ADNOC to find long­
term buyers for its new LNG products in the international markets where demand for 
LNG was rising. At the same time, the fast growing and industrialization nature of the 
Japanese economy induced the Japanese government to find long-term suppliers who can 
meet its industries’ needs for clean and environment-friendly energy. This state induced 
Japan’s government to search for long-term suppliers to supply its industries’ massive 
demand for clean and environment-friendly gas products. As the trade relationship 
between UAE and Japan was strengthening, ADNOC offered Japan government, through 
Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), the opportunity to supply it with LNG and 
other types of clean and natural sources energy, in the form of LNG and LPG. TEPCO
j
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accepted to join the new project as a shareholder having 35 per cent equity share and to
be the sole buyer of the new project’s products for a period of 20 years. Although it was a
hard condition, ADNOC accepted the proposal offered by TEPCO because of two
reasons. Firstly, ADNOC had no an alternate buyer at that time and secondly, this state
comes in accordance with ADNOC’s strategy to extend partnerships with foreign
companies to invest in new oil and gas projects.
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Having secured a long-term buyer for its new project’s products, ADNOC turned to 
searching partners to provide technology and know-how to liquefy, store, and transport 
gas. A number of potential partners were available for ADNOC such as BP, Shell, Total, 
Exxon and Mobil. Systematic selection of partners necessitated ADNOC to develop and 
use criteria for evaluation and selection. The criteria used by ADNOC for partners 
selection included: partners’ technology and knowledge in the area of gas liquefaction, 
financial capability of partners, compatibility and trust between ADNOC’s management 
and partners’ management teams, partners’ willingness to form a strategic alliance and 
commit resources, and partners’ readiness to form a strategic alliance and commit 
resources. Although, these criteria are essential to the success of this ISA, partners’ 
knowledge of the process of gas liquefaction is the essence of developing this strategic 
alliance. It reflects complementarities of partners’ resources since ADNOC possesses gas 
resources and lacks know-how to process these resources. Partner’s financial capability 
and performance reflect partner’s ability to commit resources and stick to the project and 
hence form the bases for trust and confidence between partners which in turn secure long­
term cooperation between partners. Finally, partner’s willingness and readiness to form
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the strategic alliance reflect the actual implementation of the project. Following intensive
studies, ADNOC selected two companies namely BP and TOTAL to join the new project.
Although all competing companies were highly qualified in terms of technical and
financial capabilities, the historical knowledge and experience of BP and TOTAL in the
UAE and their close ties and relationships with the government of Abu Dhabi provided
them an advantage over the other competing companies. Therefore, the implication of
such an argument is that the decision of selecting BP and TOTAL was influenced by their
prior experience, trust and relationship with ADNOC.
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Therefore, to conclude, the following propositions are generated from the aforementioned 
analysis.
P rop . 6.2  a.
The process o f partners’ selection passed through three stages: search for partners, 
evaluation ofpartners and selection o f a partner.
P rop . 6.2b.
The commercial viability o f ADGAS was conditioned by the availability o f long-term 
buyers o f the company’s products. Therefore, securing long-term buyers o f the 
company’s products was a major issue in the discussion agenda o f ADNOC.
P rop . 6.2c.
The developing nature o f the UAE’s economy, Gulf countries and the Middle Eastern 
countries directed the search process for long-term buyers to the international markets. 
Meanwhile, the fast growing and industrialization nature o f the Japanese economy 
induced the Japanese government to look for long-term suppliers who can satisfy its 
industries ’ needs for clean and environment-friendly energy.
P rop . 6.2d.
Having secured a long-term buyer o f its new company products, ADNOC began 
searching for partners to provide technology and know-how to liquefy, store and 
transport gas.
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P rop . 6.2e.
Criteria set by ADNOC for partners selection were: partners’ competency and 
knowledge o f developing new technology in the area o f gas liquefaction, financial 
performance o f partners, compatibility and trust between ADNOC’s management and 
partners’ management teams, partners’ willingness to form a strategic alliance and 
commit resources, and partners’ readiness to form a strategic alliance and commit 
resources.
P rop . 6.3f.
The decision to select BP and TOTAL was influenced by the trust gained from their 
previous relationship and experience with ADNOC.
Phase 3: Choice of the form of ADGAS alliance structure
Having concluded the project agreement and signed a 20-year contract with TEPCO to 
sell the company’s products, the partners entered a new phase of the alliance formation. 
This phase entailed the agreement on the form of structure of the new project. All 
partners favoured the equity joint venture form of structure which requires founding a 
new independent company. This was obvious in the words of Mr. Saif Ahmed A1 Ghafli, 
General Manager of ADGAS:
“All partners with no exception were interested in the equity joint venture 
form o f strategic alliance which requires establishing an independent 
company to be managed by an independent management. Consequently, 
ADGAS was founded and registered in Bermuda in 1973 with an initial 
shareholding o f 20 per cent for ADNOC, 35 per cent for Mitsui, 30 per cent 
for BP and 15 per cent for TOTAL ”.
However, when asked about the reasons for selecting this particular form, Mr. A1 Ghafli 
said:
“The selection o f this particular form o f structure was based on several 
reasons. Firstly, the project is strategic in its nature which requires long­
term commitment o f huge resources. Therefore, to ensure future cooperation 
and desirable behaviour, partners were willing to commit and tie each other 
to the project by having an equity share. Secondly, as the project appeared to 
be very successful and profitable, each partner was keen not only to have an
183
equity share but to maximize its share in the project. Thirdly, from the 
perspective o f ADNOC, the form o f equity joint venture aligns with its 
strategy followed since the 1960s which aims at maintaining collaborative 
relationships and partnerships with western companies to provide technology 
that ADNOC lacks ”
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Documentary analysis also revealed that ADNOC was not satisfied with its 20 per cent 
shareholding. Accordingly, ADNOC struggled to increase its equity share and establish a 
controlling stake in the project. ADNOC was successful in increasing its shareholding 
O  twice. The negotiations for the first rise started immediately after the construction of
ADGAS plant on Das Island in Abu Dhabi progressed. In 1975 ADNOC was successful 
in increasing its shareholding to 51 per cent. This achievement led ADNOC to decide to 
incorporate the company in Abu Dhabi in 1977, shortly before the plant became 
operational. Negotiations for the second rise, from 51 per cent to 70 per cent, started 
immediately after the company built a third LNG processing train to meet the increasing 
demand for its products. This U$$1.3 billion train (including the cost of installations and 
storage tanks) was totally financed by ADNOC. The third train was added to meet the 
increasing demand for the company’s products.
Demand for LNG and other gas products in Japan was steeply increasing due to the 
industrialization of the economy. This led TEPCO to sign another 25-year agreement in 
1990 by which TEPCO will buy a doubled quantity of LNG products. The empirical 
evidence revealed that the job of ADNOC to convince its partners to reduce their equity 
share in the venture was very hard and time consuming as it extended for seven years, 
from 1990 to 1997. This was mainly because ADGAS has been quite profitable, annual
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income was about US$1.5 billion against total expenditure of US$600 million in 1995. In
order to convince its foreign partners to reduce their equity share and consequently
increase its own, ADNOC offered the partners two kinds of incentives. First, foreign
partners were granted new oil concessions in Abu Dhabi to invest in new oil and gas
projects. Second, foreign partners’ participation in ADGAS was extended until 2019.
After lengthy negotiations an agreement was signed between the partners in July 3, 1997
which raised ADNOC’s share to 70 per cent and reduced that of the others. The new
(current) equity of partners is shown in Figure 6.1. It is worth noting here that ADNOC
has met its promise of providing its partners new oil concessions. Today BP, TOTAL and
TEPCO are shareholders or project leaders of a number of ADNOC’s oil projects
(ADGAS Corporate Brochure).
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Figure 6.1: ADGAS’ partners shareholding
Source: ADGAS company’s records
Summary
From the beginning the partners agreed on equity joint venture as a form of the structure 
of their new project. The selection of equity joint venture form of structure was based on
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three reasons. Firstly, the strategic nature of the project requires long-term commitment
of huge resources and thus partners were willing to commit and tie each other to the
project by having an equity share to ensure long-term commitment and positive
behaviour of partners. The decision of joining a project as huge as ADGAS is strategic in
nature which is hard to reverse. Such a project may extend over a long period of time,
usually more than 20 years in which partners are expected to commit large amounts of
resources. Because resources of partners are complementary, failure of any partner to
commit resources or to remain inactive will threaten the success of the project. Therefore,
each partner strives to ensure long-term commitment of other partners by having equity
share in the project. However, despite the fact that ADNOD is the sole owner of gas
resources, it was not intending to have full ownership of the new project. Allowing other
partners to own equity share in the project will ensure best utilization of its gas resources.
Secondly, the promising success and profits of the project encouraged each partner to
maximize equity share in the project. The feasibility study conducted by the partners
revealed promising success and profits. This state encouraged the partners to work hard
not only to form an equity joint venture but also each partner to maximize its own share.
Apparently, ADNOC was looking for companies to contribute and commit resources on
long-term bases in a relatively new business field. The number of buyers of the new
company’s products around the world was very low and the number of companies which
possessed knowledge and expertise in this new field was also very small. This state
weakened the bargaining power of ADNOC which found itself in a situation to accept
only 20 per cent equity share in order to have the strategic alliance formed. However,
ADNOC prepared itself for future bargaining rounds to increase its share. Thirdly, this
form of structure provides a degree of protection to the know-how possessed specifically
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by BP and TOTAL. Opportunistic behaviour is a relational problem in strategic alliances
where one partner may terminate the alliance as soon as they learn that the production
processes. To avoid such a situation and in order to commit partners for a long term
alliance, BP and TOTA1 selected equity joint venture form of structure for the new
project.
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ADNOC was interested in maximizing its equity share as a means of achieving control 
over the strategic alliance. ADNOC’s powerful position as the sole owner of gas 
resources provided the company with the bargaining power to negotiate this issue. 
However, the task of increasing ADNOC’s equity share was a hard one for which 
ADNOC spent about seven years negotiating with its partners to increase its own share. 
In that sense, I maintain that ADNOC was successful to increase its equity share only 
after granting some incentives to its partners. These incentives were: first, providing 
partners concessions to invest in new oil and gas projects in Abu Dhabi and second, 
extending the foreign partners’ participation in ADGAS until 2019. Consequently, BP 
was granted equity share in, and heading, the ADMA-OPCO consortium in offshore 
operations, ADCO group in onshore operations as well as 10 per cent in NGSCO. Total 
becomes one of the partners in ADMA-OPCO, ADCO, GASCO, FERTIL, and NGSCO. 
TEPCO through Mitsui is granted 14 per cent partnership in the Abu Dhabi Water and 
Electricity Authority (ADWEA), 10 per cent in NGSCO, and led Independent Water and 
Power Producing (IWPP) venture which also includes International Power pic of the UK. 
TEPCO signed another 25-year agreement with ADGAS to buy the majority of the 
company’s production. These incentives and other future promises convinced the partners
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of ADNOC to accept decreasing their equity share for the benefit of ADNOC. We refer
to the use of such incentives by ADNOC to influence its partners as internal politics.
C hapter 6: D escrition  and  analysis o f  finding:
A bu  D habi L iquefaction C om pany (ADGAS)
Therefore, to conclude, the following propositions are generated from the above analysis: 
P rop . 6.3 a.
The selection o f the equity joint venture form o f structure by the partners was based on 
two reasons: (1) the strategic nature o f the project requires long-term commitment o f 
huge resources and thus partners were willing to share cost and reduce risk and to 
commit and tie each other to the project by having an equity share to ensure long-term 
commitment and positive behaviour o f partners; (2) the promising success and profits o f  
the project encouraged each partner to have equity share in the project and (3) it 
provides a degree o f protection to the know-how possessed specifically by BP and Total.
P rop . 6.3b.
The allocation o f equity share among partners changed twice upon request ofADNOC. It 
was firstly changed after the construction works o f the plant started in Das Island/Abu 
Dhabi. The distribution o f equity share among partners was changed again after 
constructing a new (third) LNG processing train which was financed by ADNOC.
P rop . 6.3 c.
ADNOC was successful to increase its share only after granting incentives to its partners. 
These incentives were: first, providing partners new concessions to invest in new oil and 
gas projects in Abu Dhabi and second, extending the foreign partners ’ participation in 
ADGAS until 2019
Phase 4: ADGAS alliance management
Following the conclusion of the contract, ADNOC and its partners carried out a number
of activities to put the project into effect. However, when asked about the way ADGAS
had been managed, Mr. A1 Marzouqi said:
“From the very beginning, the partners agreed on the management o f the 
project and the role o f each partner. The agreement was that the plant 
management, including the production o f LNG and other associated gas as 
well as the technical aspects such as health and safety and environmental 
issues are to be handled by BP and TOTAL with BP playing the role o f the 
project manager. Under the leadership o f ADNOC, ADNOC and Mitsui 
perform the administrative work, including sales and marketing; human
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resource management; financial management and other support activities. 
However the overlapping nature o f the technical work and the administrative 
work requires high levels o f coordination, cooperation and trust between the 
alliance partners
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Mr. A1 Marziuqi went further to illustrate the overlapping nature of the technical and 
administrative work and the importance of coordination and cooperation between 
partners to ensure smooth functioning and operation of the plant. In this connection, A1 
Marzouqi said:
“To achieve a smooth plant’s operation, ADGAS works in cooperation with 
its sister companies; ADMA-OPCO and the National Gas Shipping Company 
(NGSCO). ADMA-OPCO supplies ADGAS with the gas resources while 
NGSCO operates eight LNG ships to transport the LNG products from Das 
Island to the customer terminals. The management o f the relationship with 
ADMA-OPCO lies within the domain o f BP’s responsibility while managing 
the relationship with NGSCO is a responsibility o f ADNOC. These kind o f 
overlapping responsibilities require cooperation and coordination between 
the partners ”.
Documentary analysis further revealed that until 1997 ADGAS’ general manager was a 
BP man in charge of the company’s daily operations. Immediately after the increase of 
ADNOC’s share and the consequent decrease of the others, the positions of the general 
manager and the deputy general manager filled by ADNOC whereas the position of the 
plant manager is filled by BP. The chairman of ADGAS’ board of directors, according to 
the project agreement, must be a top-ranking ADNOC representative. The current 
chairman is Mr. Yusuf Bin Omeir, ADNOC’s chief executive officer and secretary 
general of the Supreme Petroleum Council of Abu Dhabi (ADGAS’s internal records).
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S a le s  a n d  M a r k e tin s  o f  A D G A S ’ P ro d u c ts
To recap, sales and marketing functions are performed by ADNOC and Mitsui, but again 
in coordination and participation of BP and TOTAL. LNG is sold under long-term 
contracts, most of which stipulate that the product is to be delivered to the client’s 
terminal and that shipping charges are to be agreed with the National Gas Shipping 
Company (NGSCO), a subsidiary of ADNOC Group Companies, which operates a 
modem LNG carrier fleet. The first long-term contract was signed in 1972 with Tokyo 
Electric Power Company (TEPCO), under which TEPCO would receive approximately 
two million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and 800,000 tons of liquefied petroleum 
gas (LPG) each year, over a 20-year period. The second one was signed in 1990 with the 
same company. Under this agreement, ADGAS agreed to double its production by 1994, 
and TEPCO agreed to purchase an additional volume of this doubled production for a 25- 
year period. ADGAS is dedicated to ensuring a continuous and reliable supply of LNG 
and LPG, which TEPCO transforms to provide Tokyo with electricity. The solid 
relationship between ADGAS and TEPCO, that dates back to 1972, is duly and 
continuously inspired, developed and strengthened through the close, friendly 
cooperation and mutual trust existing between the two companies. The Tokyo Liaison 
Office (TLO) within ADGAS acts as the company's contact point in Tokyo with the 
major customer, TEPCO. In 1998, ADGAS signed an LNG sale agreement with Edison 
Gas of Italy, and made its first LNG shipment to South Korea. Production and sales for a 
single year broke the 8 million tons barrier for the first time in 1997. Since then 
production and sales are in the average of 7.5 to 8.00 million tons a year. A fourth long­
term agreement was signed in 1999 with the American company “ENRON” under which 
ADGAS would export 480,000 tons of LNG annually to “Dabhol Power Company” of
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India from 2001 to 2021. ADGAS also exports LPG, Pentane plus and Sulphur under
contracts with some of the world’s major companies. The validity of these contracts
ranges from one year to three years (ADGAS Corporate Brochure).
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Gas pricing for long-term contracts, especially for TEPCO, is another issue that receives 
special attention by the alliance partners. As these contracts extend for long period of 
time, 20 to 25 years, agreement on gas price is not an easy task because of price 
instability. Again trust, cooperation and understanding play a significant role in 
concluding price change agreements throughout the contract period. For example, as a 
compromise, the two parties in April 1994 froze the price at an agreed one on an 
understanding that a final agreement would involve a higher price, and TEPCO 
undertook to pay the difference retroactively to April 1994. As oil prices fell steeply in 
1998, ADGAS and TEPCO failed to reach an accord but they agreed to another six- 
month extension of the provisional pricing system. Later, ADGAS and TEPCO agreed on 
a constant pricing formula (ADGAS’s internal records).
A D G A S  ’ w ork fo rce
Staff recruitment and training received considerable importance by all partners to ensure 
quality business standards. This is clear from the words of Mr. A1 Marzouqi when he 
said:
“Employing some 1,100 highly trained professionals, ADNOC and its 
partners have been working hard to provide high standard training and 
development programs for its worlforce. We have a cross-posting agreement 
that allow our employees to attend necessary training courses in our 
partners ’ companies
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Also ADNOC prepares and provides highly qualified and competent workforce to its
group’s companies. Towards this end, September 2001 saw the opening of the Petroleum
Institute in Abu Dhabi. The Institute is a partnership between ADNOC, BP, TOTAL,
Shell and Japan Oil Development Company (JODCO) and under the academic
accreditation of Colorado School of Mines. The major aim of the Institute is to bring
world class engineering education and applied petroleum research to the UAE. ADNOC
Technical Institute (ATI) was also opened in 1978 to provide an alternative route for
young UAE Nationals who prefer to follow a less academic educational track. Since its
establishment more than 3,000 trainees have graduated in electrical, mechanical,
instrumentation or process operations and joined ADNOC’s operating companies for
further on-the-job training. The ADNOC Scholarship Program was also established in
1974 to offer academically gifted UAE National School graduates the opportunity to
follow undergraduate programs in engineering and applied sciences at leading
Universities, mainly in the USA and the UK (ADNOC Corporate Brochure).
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S u m m a ry
AD AG AS strategic alliance has been managed jointly by all partners who work closely 
and cooperatively to achieve common goals as well as individual goals. However, 
partners agreed to assign administrative and technical responsibilities according to their 
areas of expertise. The empirical evidence shows that BP, as project manager, and 
TOTAL are responsible for the plant management including the production, storage and 
transportation of the company’s products and the technical activities such as health and 
safety and environment protection. Project management is performed by BP and TOTAL
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because of their knowledge and expertise in the area of oil and gas. BP had long
experience in the oil and gas operations, specifically in the Gulf region. It was BP
(D’Arcy's Anglo-Persian) which had first put Abu Dhabi on the world's oil map. That was
before World War Two. At the international level, BP is also involved in Australia's
North West Shelf (NWS) LNG project and Qatar’s Qatargas strategic alliance. TOTAL
has become involved in a number of gas ventures around the world. Now it is a major
investor in the LNG business, being the leader in Qatargas’ upstream element and a key
partner in its downstream venture. It is a partner in Oman's LNG venture and leader of
Yemen's LNG project. In 2000, TOTAL became the biggest supplier of gas to the
Bontang LNG complex in Indonesia, the biggest in the world. By contrast, ADNOC and
Mitsui perform the administrative work which includes sales and marketing; human
resource management; financial management and other support activities. Since its
establishment in 1971, ADNOC gained experience in operating and managing oil and gas
companies and in forming IS As. In addition to its own concession areas and operations,
ADNOC has major shareholdings in 9 of its 14 companies constituting its group. In
addition, ADNOC owns and operates two refineries and gas pipeline distribution
network. ADNOC also expanded overseas. ADNOC, again favouring equity joint venture
form of structures, expanded its operations to Pakistan, Qatar and Oman. Mitsui brought
in to the strategic alliance of ADGAS by TEPCO as a buyer of the LNG output and most
of the associated liquids produced by ADGAS. In addition to being a major investor in
Middle East’s LNG projects, especially in the UAE; Qatar; and Oman, Mitsui plays a
crucial role in Russia’s huge LNG project on the Far Eastern island of Sakhalin.
Consequently, both companies gained experience in managing oil and gas companies.
C hapter 6: D escrition  and  analysis o f  finding:
A bu  D habi L iquefaction Com pany (AD GAS)
193
Until early 1997, the general manager of ADGAS was appointed by BP to be in charge of
the company’s daily operations whereas his deputy was appointed by ADNOC.
Following changes in the ownership structure and as a result of the controlling stake of
ADNOC, the positions of the chairman and the general manager are now filled by a top-
ranking ADNOC representative. Therefore, since 1997 the majority shareholding of
ADNOC qualified the company to hold the positions of chairman, general manager and
deputy general manager. Nevertheless, I maintain that ADNOC does not rely merely on
its majority shareholding in ADGAS to have control and influence decisions. It also relies
on its bargaining power gained from being the sole owner of oil and gas resources in Abu
Dhabi and its power to grant new concessions for oil and gas projects. Although ADNOC
enjoys more control over its partners, empirical evidence shows that cooperation,
commitment and trust between ADGAS partners is the foundation for the smooth and
successful operation of the company. To this end, partners work shoulder to shoulder and
constantly meet to keep in contact. Frequent contacts between partners enhance
understanding of common goals of the project and goals of individual partners and help
in resolving conflicts which may arise among partners immediately as they arise.
Therefore, partners’ relationship is characterized by good faiths, honesty, and
cooperation.
Therefore, to conclude, the following propositions are generated from the above analysis: 
Prop. 6.4a.
BP and TOTAL are responsible for the plant management including the production, 
storage and transportation o f LNG and other associated gas products and the technical 
activities such as health and safety and environment protection. ADNOC and Mitsui 
perform the administrative work which includes sales and marketing; human resource 
management; financial management and other support activities.
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Prop. 6.4b.
The majority shareholding o f ADNOC qualified the company to hold the positions o f 
chairman, general manager and deputy general manager.
Prop. 6.4c.
Staff training and development and gas pricing are core activities that receive especial 
attention by all partners.
Prop. 6.4d.
Although ADNOC enjoys more control over its partners, cooperation, commitment and 
trust between partners are the basic themes for the smooth and successful operation o f  
the plant and the company as a whole.
Phase 5: ADGAS alliance performance evaluation
ADGAS partners entered this strategic alliance with pre-established common and private
goals. The major goals of ADNOC were: i) to stop gas flaring in the atmosphere which
resulted in waste of resources and environmental pollution; and ii) to utilize and turn
these resources into a source of income for the nation. While TEPCO, through Mitsui,
aims at securing long-term supply of clean energy to support Japan’s growing economy
and industrialization, BP and TOTAL seek access to new business opportunities
overseas. Despite the fact that each partner entered this alliance with its own private
goals, it is obvious that attaining individual partner’s goals led to the attainment of the
common goals of the strategic alliance (ADGAS, From Vision to Reality-the first 25
years, 2003). However, when asked about the criteria used by partners to measure the
alliance performance, Mr. A1 Suwaidi stated that:
“To ensure attainment o f their private goals and the common goals o f the 
alliance, partners o f ADGAS agreed to measure the performance o f the 
alliance on a regular basis. Partners agreed on common criteria to be used 
for performance evaluation. These criteria are the project’s sales, 
profitability, growth and longevity. Partners also have another undeclared 
criterion used for performance evaluation which is transfer o f knowledge and 
organizational learning. The evaluation process takes place on a regular
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basis and the results are discussed by partners by the end o f each year during 
the board o f directors ’ meetings
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The empirical evidence revealed the fact that all partners have attained their goals and are 
very satisfied with the company’s performance. ADNOC stopped gas flaring and 
technology used by ADNOC today resulted in reducing no environmental pollution by 72 
per cent (ADNOC Annual HSE Report, 2007). Between 1977 and 2007, ADGAS 
successfully delivered over 100 million tons of LNG to TEPCO. This amounts to almost 
1,600 round-trips made by tankers between Das Island and the receiving terminals in 
Tokyo. Over the same period, nearly 15 million tons of LPG, which count for almost 400 
tanker consignments, was also supplied to TEPCO (ADGAS, Thirty Years Story of 
Success, 2007). This is very clear in the words of Mr. Susumu Shirakawa, TEPCO’s 
Executive Vice President:
"... over these three decades, ADGAS has exported almost 30 per cent o f all 
the LNG TEPCO has received, which equals to 8 years o f electric power, 
based on the electricity demand o f today’s Tokyo with a population o f 13 
million people. It is clear how this project is important to the Japanese 
government. However, we have had many difficulties and challenges up until 
today, but every time we have faced a new challenge, the power to overcome 
these challenges was the cooperation attitude based on the relationship o f 
trust ofpartners involved in the project” (ADGAS News, March 2007).
During the last three decades ADGAS experienced many performance difficulties 
especially when prices of oil and gas collapsed. Nevertheless, these days were passed by 
having the partners focusing on the long-term goals of the project and building and 
developing a relationship based on trust and cooperation. This is clear from the words of 
Mr. A1 Marzouqi when he said:
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“For the smooth operation o f the project, in good times and bad times, the 
spirit o f mutual cooperation and trust o f the partners as well as o f the seller 
and buyer is substantial since the contract runs on a long term. Because this 
project was established on a one to one relationship which is unique in 
LNG transaction, fortunately, strong exhibition o f such spirit o f mutual 
cooperation and trust can be seen as a proof o f the 30 years until today”.
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Obviously, the growth of the LNG market over the last several years and the 
dramatic increase in the number of players on the production side as well as the consumer 
side have helped ADGAS reach outstanding performance. In this regard Mr. Shirakawa
commented:
“I  believe the value o f the LNG in the world has been recognized. Although 
this project’s contract period is until 2019, I  am sure that we will be able 
to meet the challenges o f the era o f dramatic change together and to continue 
to mark the history by enhancing the project and by further strengthening the 
mutual trust relationship which we have cultivated over a long period o f time 
under the cooperation o f the related people o f both the seller and buyer ” 
(ADGAS News, March 2007).
It is interesting to note here that the performance of ADGAS encouraged partners to 
expand the operations of ADGAS and to look for new opportunities to expand in the 
region and beyond. For example, the four partners are planning for the addition of a 
fourth train and storage facilities. However, the short space of Das Island required the 
project's implementation to be rationalised. Major equipment, new facilities and large 
portions of the process train will have to be pre-fabricated and brought in on a large 
barge. Manufacture, assembly and tie-in with the existing plants will be done by utilizing 
roll-on, roll-off facilities on Das. ADGAS also intends to expand the Das jetty, with 
Halcrow Group having done the study for this. The project will include dredging and land
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reclamation. An additional LPG storage tank is to be built in another project (ADGAS
Corporate Brochure, 2007).
Summary
Although each partner joined ADGAS strategic alliance with its own goals and 
expectations, the partners agreed on common criteria to be used for performance 
measurement. These criteria are the company’s sales, profitability, growth and longevity 
of the alliance. The selection of these criteria may be attributed to the fact that they 
reflect both short-term and long-term goals of all partners in the project. While sales and 
profitability reflect the short-term financial interests of partners, growth and longevity 
reflect partners’ long-term interests in the project. Partners are satisfied with their 
company’s performance. The following episode supports my argument about partners’ 
satisfaction with the project’s performance. To start with, due to the success of ADGAS 
in satisfying customer needs, an agreement was signed by partners in 1990 allowing 
ADGAS to double its production in 1994. As a result, a third LNG train, the largest of its 
kind in the world, was built adding another 2.5 million tons annually to the plants 
production and doubling production capacity. The success of the third gas processing 
train along with the increasing demand for LNG encouraged the partners to plan for the 
addition of a fourth train along with its storage facilities and shipping vessels. The plan is 
progressing despite the short space of Das Island which required the project’s 
implementation to be modularized. Major equipment, new facilities and large portions of 
the process train will have to be pre-fabricated and brought in on a large barge. ADGAS 
also intends to expand the Das jetty, with Halcrow Group having done the study for this.
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Despite the agreement between partners to use common criteria for performance
evaluation, each partner implicitly monitors its progress in learning new technology and
acquiring knowledge from partners. Transfer of knowledge and organizational learning is
another undeclared criterion used by each partner individually to measure performance of
the alliance. It was observed that partners have an undeclared criterion for performance
measurement which is transfer of knowledge and organizational learning. This criterion is
used individually by each partner to gauge the degree to which the strategic alliance
helped in acquiring new technology and learning new systems. ADNOC was motivated
to form this strategic alliance by having access to new production technology and
management systems and by transferring this knowledge to its subsidiary companies. In
that sense, ADNOC successfully learned gas processing technology and utilized this
technology to independently establish a new gas project; Abu Dhabi Oil Refining
Company (TAKREER). BP, Total and Mitsui acquired local market knowledge and
learned about gas opportunities in the gulf region and consequently developed new gas
projects in Qatar, Oman and Yemen and beyond in Malaysia, Indonesia and Russia. All
partners learned from the project and became international players in LNG processing.
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Therefore, to conclude, the following propositions are generated from the above analysis: 
Prop. 6.5a.
Partners agreed on common criteria to be used for performance measurement. These 
criteria are the company’s sales, profitability, growth and longevity o f the alliance.
Prop. 6.5b.
Transfer o f knowledge and organizational learning is another undeclared criterion used 
by partners to measure performance o f the alliance.
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6.3.1.2 Factors influencing the formation process of ADGAS alliance
This part discusses the two factors that have influenced the formation process and 
management of ADGAS strategic alliance. These factors are: i) the partners’ culture; and 
ii) trust between alliance partners. Although trust could be considered as one of the 
cultural values shared in a society, it is discussed in a separate part because of its critical 
influence on the formation and management of ISAs.
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i) Partners ’ culture
Differences in the partners’ cultures are a factor that was found to have influence on the
process of ADGAS alliance formation. When asked about the effect of the differences in
the national culture of the alliance partners, Mr. A1 Suwaidi said:
“It is obvious that partners o f ADGAS come from four different cultural 
backgrounds that are UAE, Japanese, British and French cultures. This 
cultural difference has positive as well as negative effects on the alliance 
formation process. Positively, it provided the opportunity to tap different 
skills, attitudes and management styles. This led to partners learn new 
problem solving and decision making methods. Negatively, cultural 
differences made communication between partners more difficult especially 
at the early stages o f the alliance. Mis communication resulted form 
differences in language, values and beliefs complicated and lengthened the 
processes o f decision making and problem solving. However this negative 
aspect o f cultural differences was found to have no negative effect on the 
alliance performance ”.
Summary
The partners in the strategic alliance have different cultures. Using Hofstede’s (1991) 
cultural dimensions, it appears that the UK and France are more individualistic cultures 
than Japan and the UAE which are more collectivist. Partners also differ in all other 
Hofstedes’ dimensions of culture namely power distance, uncertainty avoidance, 
masculinity versus femininity and time orientation. National cultural differences between
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partners is reflected in organizational cultural differences. Differences in organizational
culture influenced partners’ management systems such as decision making and problem
solving styles. In this connection, I maintain that cultural differences between partners
have both positive as well as negative influence on the formation process of the alliance.
The negative influence of cultural differences was clear mainly at the first stages of the
alliance formation. Preliminary meetings and negotiations were difficult and agreements
were not easy to conclude. However, goals and interests commonly shared by partners
induced them to work hard and to learn about each other’s goals, management systems,
future plans, strategies and policies, and to promote an environment of understanding
through continuous communication. By contrast, the positive aspects of cultural
differences between partners appeared later in managing the alliance. Cultural differences
helped in taping different skills, competencies and management systems. Such diversity
gives partners the opportunity to learn new management systems from each other and to
apply this new knowledge and skills to better manage their alliance. The empirical
evidence shows that the reason for this positive outcome of the cultural difference is the
existence of long-term common goals and interests and long-lasting and enduring
relationship between partners in addition to the desire to get benefits from cultural
differences which are positively reflected in the alliance performance.
Therefore, to conclude, the following propositions are generated from the above analysis: 
Prop. 6.6a.
Cultural differences between partners have both positive as well as negative effects on 
the formation process o f the alliance.
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Prop. 6.6b.
Cultural differences between partners have positive influence and no negative influence 
on the alliance performance.
ii) Trust between partners
The aforementioned discussion revealed that the relationship between ADGAS partners is 
based on trust and cooperation. This attitude is stimulated by all partners and has been 
built and developed throughout several years by ADNOC’s strategy of strengthening its 
relationships with foreign companies since the early 1970s. In this respect, Mr. A1 
Suwaidi commented that:
“In the early 1970s, ADNOC’s decision to select TEPCO to be its long-term 
buyer o f LNG and other gas products was based on the ground that ADNOC 
believed that the capabilities and long-term behaviour o f TEPCO will make it 
a reliable buyer. In a similar way, the historical relationships between 
ADNOC, BP and TOTAL and the resulting decision o f selecting these 
partners to form the alliance were based on trust and cooperation between 
the partners. Moreover the early negotiations between the partners to decide 
the alliance’s form o f structure and the subsequent changes in the structure 
that led to increasing the equity share o f ADNOC and decreasing that o f the 
other partners were also completed on the basis that foreign partners trusted 
ADNOC’s promises to provide them more business opportunities in the 
UAE’s oil and gas field. It is obvious that trust and cooperation also have a 
vital role in the successful joint management o f the alliance. Depending on 
trust and cooperation, partners were able to overcome difficulties and 
challenges faced by the company’s operations over three decades ”.
Summary
Trust and cooperation between partners play a vital role throughout the different phases 
of the alliance formation process. Trust and cooperation helped partners to create value of 
the strategic alliance and to facilitate the process of alliance formation and management. 
Trust and cooperation also helped in combining partners’ capabilities so that the strategic 
alliance as well as the competitive advantage of all partners is improved in a way that 
each of the partners alone could not. Moreover, trust and cooperation helped the partners
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to quickly commit more resources as needed and to cooperate; a situation that led to
speeding up decision-making which eventually represents an essential requirement for
alliance success especially in today’s fast changing environment. To promote trust and
cooperation, partners work regularly close to each other to enhance communication and
understanding of alliance’s goals. They also work hard to show good faith by committing
resources to the project as needed and by meeting each one’s promises. Obviously,
building trust among partners is a process that required hard work from all partners. This
point indicates that trust and cooperation is an outcome of a long-lasting positive
relationship which is characterized by mutual respect, honesty and share of common
interests and goals. The adoption of the equity joint venture form of structure to ADGAS
strategic alliance helps in developing a sense of strategic importance of the project and
hence promoting trust and cooperation between partners. The implication of this
argument is that the adoption of the equity joint venture form enhanced trust between the
alliance partners.
Threfore, to conclude, the following propositions are generated from the aforementioned 
analysis:
Prop. 6.7a.
Trust and cooperation between partners play a vital role throughout the different phases 
of the alliance formation process.
Prop. 6.7b.
Trust and cooperation is developed over a long lasting relationship which is 
characterized by mutual respect, honesty and sense o f common interests and goals.
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Prop. 6.7c.
The adoption o f the equity joint venture form o f structure enhanced trust and cooperation 
between the alliance partners.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter provided a brief review of the history of the oil and gas history in the UAE, 
the context within which the formation process of ADGAS was developed. This part is 
followed by a discussion about Abu Dhabi National Oil Company with emphasis on its 
historic relationships with Western oil companies dated back to the early 1960s in order 
to shed light on the context within which the formation process of ADGAS alliance was 
developed. The major part of the chapter described and analyzed the findings and 
generated propositions from such a description with regard to the aforementioned 
strategic alliance formation process. ADGAS strategic alliance is formed in a process of 
five interrelated phases that included recognition of motives for forming a strategic 
alliance, selection of the strategic alliance’s partners, selection of the alliance’s form of 
structure, alliance management, and the alliance’s performance evaluation. The formation 
process is found to be influenced by two major factors which are trust among alliance 
partners and the partners’ national culture. The generated propositions are summarized in 
appendix 6 and will be discussed in chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 7
Description and analysis of findings 
Emirates Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat)
7.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, it is to introduce a background of the context 
within which the formation process of Etisalat Egypt alliance was developed by Emirates 
Telecommunication Corporation (Etisalat). To this end a brief background about the 
telecommunication industry in the UAE and Emirates Telecommunication Corporation 
(Etisalat) followed by a background about the telecommunication industry in Egypt and 
Etisalat Egypt Corporations are given in sections 7.2, 7.2.1, 7.3, and 7.3.1 respectively. 
Second, it is to describe the formation process of Etisalat Egypt (Etisalat Misr as it is 
known in Arabic), the case under study, by Etisalat and its partners.
7.2 Telecommunications in the UAE
Since 1976 the majority government-owned telecommunication corporation, Etisalat, has 
maintained and developed the national and international fixed-line network, mobile 
telephony, Internet access and cable television services in the UAE. However, in 2005 the 
government decided to deregulate the telecommunication market, leaving the way open 
for other operators to offer mobile and fixed line telephony in accordance with the legal 
framework being implemented by the Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (TRA) 
(UAE Yearbook 2006). A decree issued in September 2005 by the president of the UAE 
revised Articles 2, 26 and 80 (Para 5) of the Federal Law No. 3 for 2003 that dealt with
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deregulation. The new Article establishes a committee to oversee the telecommunications
sector, to be called the ‘Higher Committee for Supervision of Telecommunications
Sector’ (UAE Yearbook 2006). The first step in the liberalization of the sector was taken
in May 2005 when the TRA granted a license to a new US$1.09 billion telecom provider
following a federal government decision to set up a company in which the Pensions and
Social Security Authority and other private sector shareholders hold a 40 per cent stake.
The remaining stakes were earmarked for public sector shareholders and were put to
public offering (UAE Yearbook 2007). Etisalat is meeting the deregulation challenge on
three fronts: the first focuses on the corporation’s package of services, products and
quality of delivery; the second on reshaping the organization to reflect the new market
reality; and the third on making the transition to an international corporation through
strategic investment abroad, aided by new partnerships and alliances (UAE Yearbook
2007).
7.2.1 Emirates Telecommunications Corporation (Etisalat)
Etisalat, a publicly listed-joint stock company, began operations in 1976 with 33,000 
fixed telephone lines and 1,600 telex lines to become an international player operating in 
16 countries in a region that extends from Pakistan to West Africa. By 2007, Etisalat had 
access to a potential market of over 400 million subscribers and served over 32 million 
subscribers (UAE Yearbook, 2007). Etisalat was the sole telecommunications service 
provider in the UAE from 1976 until the arrival of its rival, Emirates Integrated Telecoms 
(du), in February 2007. For three decades, since the birth of the UAE, it has played a key 
role in driving and supporting the nation’s prosperity. Its network has always and
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continues to be the backbone of the UAE. Penetration of Etisalat’s mobile phone service
in the UAE was 127 per cent in 2006. At the end of August 2006, fixed line services
reached 1.3 million lines and internet dial-up subscribers reached 443,000 and 241,000
broadband internet subscribers (see Table 7.1 and Figures 7.1 to 7.6). Internationally
Etisalat has over 510 international roaming partners. It created a world-class
communications infrastructure for the UAE, enabling UAE companies to compete on a
global stage (UAE Yearbook, 2007).
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T ab le 7.1: U A E ’s te lecom  in d u stry  b en ch m ark s (2005 -2006 )
2005 C h an ge (% )
Number of Fixed-Line Subscribers 1,237,000 1,310,000 5.9
Penetration Rate -  Fixed-Line (%) 30.1% 30.3% N/A
Number of Mobile Subscribers 4,534,000 5,519,000 21.72
Market Share -  Mobile 100% 100% N/A
Penetration Rate -  Mobile 110% 127% N/A
Percentage of Post-paid Subscribers 11.6% 10% N/A
Post-paid SMS Rate (US$) 0.05 0.05 0.00
Source: E tisa la t’s A n n u a l R ep o rt (2007)
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Figure 7.2: Fixed telephone lines penetration
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Figure 7.4: Mobile penetration
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Figure 7.6: Internet penetration
Source: E tisa la t’s A n n u a l R ep ort (2007)
The Middle East magazine (August, 2007), ranked Etisalat first in the United Arab 
Emirates and fourth in the Middle East among the top 100 companies, based on its 
financial performance and capital growth. The corporation was also ranked 140th in the 
Financial Times Top 500 Corporations in the world in terms of market capitalization. The 
Arabian Business International magazine (February 2008), reported Etisalat as the most 
admired telecommunications company in the Gulf in 2007. In this respect, Mr. Ahmed 
Bin Ali, Vice President of Corporate Communications, said: “Etisalat’s advanced 
technologies are one o f the most important tools that have helped the company achieve 
its success and improve the UAE’s economy” (Arabian Business International, February
2008). Famous for over 30 years for delivering technological excellence, innovation and 
reliability, Etisalat is on track to be a top 20 Global Telecom by 2010. By the end of 
Etisalat’s 2007 fiscal year, it had reported consolidated revenues for the period at US$5.8 
billion, showing an increase of approximately 31 per cent, over 2006 figures. Net Profits 
reached US$1.95 billion, a healthy increase of 25 per cent on 2006 (UAE Yearbook, 
2007).
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7.2.1.1 Services
Apart from enabling the nation with basic telecommunication services, Etisalat offers a 
range of innovative and modem services that have served to position the UAE as one of 
the most advanced nations in terms of telecom services. Etisalat has invested more than 
US$5 billion over the past decade to build the UAE's telecom sector, including mobile 
phone services, among the most advanced in the world (Etisalat’s Official Website). The 
major services provided by Etisalat today include Mobile phone services where mobile 
users enjoy the benefits of excellent voice and data applications such as WAP, GPRS, 
3G, MMS, Push to Talk, Blackberry and other services; fixed line phone service; internet 
service; Business One service which is internet service designed to appeal to the small to 
medium sized business customer; Weyak service which provide features news, finance 
and infotainment as well as social/community tools such as bloc entries and picture 
sharing; Network and data services such as SMS, ISDN and ATM services provided to 
Enterprises; E-Vision service which provides over 200 TV channels in different 
languages.
7.2.1.2 Business subsidiaries
A number of business subsidiaries and divisions (see Table 7.2) were established within 
Etisalat to provide support services and complementary businesses. These subsidiaries 
include E-marine which operates in the field of submarine cable installation, maintenance 
and repair throughout the region and beyond; Etisalat International which is an 
independent subsidiary responsible for forming and managing all Etisalat’s foreign 
investments; Etisalat University College which was established as a centre of excellence 
for training UAE nationals in telecommunications and related technologies; Thuraya,
with a network coverage to nearly two thirds of the globe’s population, it operates as
multiregional mobile satellite services (MSS) provider; UAE Network Information
Centre (UAEnic) is the authority that manages domain name registration under .ae TLD
(Top Level Domain) as well as IP Address assignment; Ebtikar, is a major card
manufacturer and related service provider catering mainly to the needs of telecom
operators in the local, regional and international markets; Emirates Data Clearing House
(EDCH), which is a service provider to GSM mobile operators handling international
roaming data and arranging for settlement amongst their various roaming partners;
Etisalat Academy, is a comprehensive technical and business training institution; and
UAELAB which provides a test and certification service for telecom products.
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T ab le 7.2: R ela ted  su b sid iar ies/a ssoc ia tes
Name C ou n try H old in g
E-Marine UAE 100.00%
Emirates Data Clearing House( EDHC) UAE 100.00%
Emirates Cable TV and Multimedia (e-vision) UAE 100.00%
Ebtikar UAE 100.00%
UAELAB UAE 100.00%
Etisalat International UAE 100.00%
UAE Network Information Centre (UAEnic) UAE 100.00%
Etisalat Services Holding UAE 100.00%
Etisalat University College UAE 100.00%
Thuraya Satellite Telecommunications Company UAE 27.43%
UT Technologies (under construction) UAE -
Source: E tisa la t A n n u a l R ep ort (2007)  
7.2.1.3 International growth
The empirical evidence shows that Etisalat is committed to international growth with 
emphasis on opportunities in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and Europe. The “2007
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Annual Report of Etisalat depicts that the company began its international growth
strategy in 2004 by acquiring 35 per cent stake in Etihad Etisalat Company (Mobily),
Saudi Arabia's second licensed mobile operator. The report also shows that today Etisalat
operates across 15 markets (see Table 7.3) with investments in nine African markets
including Nigeria, Zanzibar and West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Togo, Gabon, Ivory
Coast, Niger, and Central Africa Republic). In the Middle East, Etisalat subsidiaries can
be found in Egypt, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, whilst in Asia, Etisalat has operations in
Afghanistan, India, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia and Pakistan with total foreign
investment reaching US$10 billion (Etisalat Annual Report, 2007). Etisalat international
growth is a deliberate process based on criteria for market selection and market research.
This is clear in the words of Mr. Mohamed A1 Qamzy, CEO of Etisalat, when he said:
“International growth and formation o f international strategic alliances are 
at the heart o f Etisalat’s corporate strategy. This strategy is followed, in part, 
as a reaction to the saturation o f the local telecommunication market and 
lack o f growth opportunities, the arrival o f a new competitor to the 
telecommunication market in UAE, and as a desire to enter highly 
competitive global markets to gain the experience and essential know-how to 
make operations more efficient and effective and to expand the range o f 
opportunities. This strategy is backed by the availability o f financial 
resources accumulated from the previous year’s successful performance. 
Between 2004 and 2006 the region witnessed unprecedented opportunities 
for new telecommunication licenses. Etisalat’s core strategy for new foreign 
markets selection remains around low penetration rate o f telecommunication 
services and high population o f the potential market. This is backed by strong 
market research on high growth potential, consumer behaviour and 
opportunities for value creation ”.
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Therefore, it can be concluded that international growth and the formation of ISAs are 
followed by Etisalat in response to a number of factors which will be discussed later in 
this chapter.
j
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T ab le 7.3: In tern a tion a l in vestm en ts
N am e C ou n try H old in g
E tisa la t S o ftw are Serv ices P riva te  L im ited  (E S SP L )-T echn olog is Malaysia 100.00%
Millicom Sri Lanka (TIGO) Sri Lanka 100.00%
Etisalat International Afghanistan* Afghanistan 100.00%
Canar Telecommunication Company* Sudan 82.00%
Atlantique Telecom (operating in 7 West African countries)* Ivory Coast 70.00%
Etisalat Egypt* Egypt 66.00%
Etisalat DB Telecom India PVT LTD. India 100.00%
Zanzibar Telecom* Tanzania 51.00%
Etisalat Nigeria (EMTS)* Nigeria 40.00%
Etihad Etisalat Company* Saudi Arabia 35.00%
PTCL, Pakistan* Pakistan 26.00%
Excelcomindo (XL) Indonesia* Indonesia 16%
Etisalat Software Solutions India 6%
Sudan Telecommunications Company Sudan 4.60%
Emirates-Sudan Bank Sudan 2.50%
Qatar Telecom Qatar 1.00%
* Directly operated by Etisalat 
Source: E tisa la t A n n u a l R ep ort (2007)
7.3 Telecommunications in Egypt
The Egyptian government has made information and communications technologies a 
developmental priority and has modernized and upgraded the sector’s infrastructure, 
services, regulations and human resource capacity. According to the Egyptian Ministry of 
Telecommunications and Information Technology, Egypt had an antiquated ICT 
infrastructure until the early 1990s. People waited sometimes for years to have fixed 
phone lines installed and the old copper infrastructure made connections unstable. Phone 
lines outside major cities were failing. However, since 1995 the government extended 
fibre optic connections throughout Egypt, upgraded the copper lines and data centres, 
improved the integration of applications and in general provided more fixed-line
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connections (Egyptian Ministry of Telecommunications and Information Technology’s
official website). On December 31, 2005 Telecom Egypt's monopoly over international
voice and data services ended. Until then, the whole telecommunication market in Egypt
was a monopoly market served by the government-owned, Telecom Egypt. The
incumbent operator was also the monopoly operator for international connectivity. By
December 2006, Egypt's telecommunication regulator, National Telecommunication
Regulatory Authority (NTRA) had issued more than 200 telecom licenses. The regulator
issued three cellular licenses, two payphone licenses, two prepaid calling card licenses,
four VSAT licenses and four international GMPCS operators. The regulator had also
issued four carrier internet licenses (Class A) and 8 data service providers licenses (Class
B), in addition to more than 200 service-based ISPs' licenses (Class C) (NTRA’s official
website).
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The mobile phone market in Egypt is led by two well-branded operators, Mobinil and the 
UK-based, Vodafone Egypt. Mobinil was the first operator in Egypt, being operational in 
May 1998, followed by Vodafone which started providing the mobile service by the end 
of the same year. Both companies were operating under the second generation (2G)- 
based network, where Mobinil and Vodafone market shares were 51.6 per cent and 48.4 
per cent, respectively in 2006 (NTRA’s Official Website). Both Mobinil and Vodafone 
appear to be hard at work preparing for the new competition resulting from the arrival of 
a new mobile operator. In fact, the two companies began reducing rates and offering 
more affordable total ownership packages to subscribers long before the third license was 
even issued. The new efforts resulted in doubling the number of mobile phone
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subscribers in Egypt from 7 million in 2004 to 14 million in 2005 and over 16 million by
December 2006 (NTRA’S Official Website). The Egyptian telecommunication ministry
expects the total number of cellular subscribes in Egypt to reach 40 million users by 2011
out of the country’s population of about 78.8 million people according to July 2006
estimates (NTRA’S Official Website).
7.3.1 Etisalat Egypt
This section describes and generates propositions about the formation process of Etisalat 
Egypt (the case under study) which is a strategic alliance between Emirates 
Telecommunication Corporation (Etisalat), Egypt Post Authority, National Bank of 
Egypt, and Commercial International Bank (Egypt).
7.3.2 The formation process of Etisalat Egypt
Taking Etisalat Egypt as a case study, this section describes and analyses strategic 
alliance formation process within Etisalat and generates propositions from such a 
description (see Appendix 7). The process by which such a strategy was developed within 
this particular company falls into five basic phases: i) recognition of the motives for 
forming a strategic alliance; ii) selection of the alliance’s partners; iii) selection of the 
alliance’s form of structure; iv) alliance’s management; and v) alliance’s performance 
evaluation. The process is found to be influenced by two factors: partners’ culture and 
trust between partners. In what follows, each of these generated phases as well as factors 
influencing the process will be described, and some propositions will be generated with 
respect to each phase and factor.
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Phase 1: Motives for forming Etisalat Egypt strategic alliance
In response to a question introduced by the researcher with regard to the reasons for the
formation of Etisalat Egypt strategic alliance, Mr. Jamal A1 Jarwan; General Manager of
Etisalat’s International Investments stated that:
“Basically, the International Investments Division within Etisalat was 
directed by the CEO to find the reasons and justifications to form this 
strategic alliance and thereafter to seek the authorization for the project 
implementation ”.
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This phase, therefore, entails two major aspects. The first one deals with the identification 
and justification of the reasons behind forming this ISA to convince the board of directors 
of the viability of the project. The second aspect deals with the authorization and taking 
actions of project implementation. 1
1. Identification and justification of reasons behind formins Etisalat Egypt
According to Mr. A1 Jarwan, the reasons for forming Etisalat Egypt alliance were
identified at both organizational and contextual levels. This is clear in the words of Mr.
A1 Jarwan, when he stated:
“There are numerous reasons for the formation o f Etisalat Egypt. However, 
these reasons can be classified at two levels; organizational reasons which 
include the abundance o f cash at the disposal o f the company, desire to share 
cost and risk o f the new project and learning and gaining experience in the 
Egyptian market. Contextual motives include lack o f growth opportunities in 
the UAE market, attractiveness o f the Egyptian market, attractiveness o f the 
technical specifications o f the license offered by the Egyptian authorities, 
foreign investments policy o f the government o f the UAE and the regulations 
o f the Egyptian government ”.
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The organizational motives for forming Etisalat Egypt
The first reason for forming Etisalat Egypt strategic alliance, according to Mr. A1 Jarwan, 
is the abundance of cash at the disposal of the company. This was made clear by Mr. A1 
Jarwan when he replied:
“Successful operations for more than thirty years resulted in surplus o f 
financial resources available for investment in new projects.
By the end of 2007, Etisalat had revenues for the period at US$5.8 billion, showing an 
increase of approximately 31 per cent, over 2006 figures with net profits reaching 
US$1.95 billion, a healthy increase of 25 per cent on 2006 (Gulf News, February 2008). 
Without any significant borrowings, Etisalat had plenty of potential partners eager to 
fund its stated ambition to break into the top 10 international telecoms companies by 
2010. An agreement signed in July 2007 with a syndicate of 22 local, regional, and 
international banks gave the company a US$3 billion to fund international investments 
(Gulf News, February 2008).
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A second reason is that Etisalat was encouraged by its technical competency and
knowledge in the area of telecommunications and its experience in establishing and
managing foreign subsidiaries. In that sense, Mr. A1 Jarwan commented:
“Etisalat also was encouraged by getting benefit o f its technical and 
administrative competencies in establishing and operating 
telecommunication companies in UAE and foreign markets. Over the last 
thirty years, Etisalat became experienced in delivering high quality 
telecommunication services with technological excellence, innovation and 
reliability by utilizing the most advanced and up-to-date telecom 
technologies. This helped Etisalat in building excellent technical and 
administrative systems and competent human capital which in turn 
encouraged the company to expand internationally. Etisalat also gained
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knowledge and experience in operating and managing foreign subsidiaries, 
mainly in the form o f JVs with foreign partners ”.
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A third reason stated by Mr. A1 Jarwan was the Etisalat’s desire to share cost and risk of 
this new venture.
“Etisalat realized that expansion to new telecommunication markets require 
substantial investments. With reference to the case o f Etisalat Egypt, Etisalat 
realized that in addition to the price o f the license o f the new company that 
must be paid to the Egyptian government there are other costs, including the 
cost o f a new network, towers, buildings and equipment, the total cost was 
estimated to exceed US$3 billion. Although Etisalat posses the required cash 
for this investment, sharing economic cost and risk with partners is a strategy 
followed by the company ”.
The fourth reason for the formation of Etisalat Egypt is to learn and acquire knowledge in
forming and managing new SAs. This reason was stated by Mr. A1 Jarwan as follows:
“Exposure to highly competitive global markets will help the company to 
acquire experience and essential knowledge needed to effectively and 
efficiently expand to new foreign markets and manage new international 
projects. In line with the corporate strategy, we also intend to utilize lessons 
learned and experience gained from previous international projects and to 
apply them to Etisalat Egypt and to new future projects. For example, 
Etisalat has effectively utilized its knowledge and experience o f setting up 
new operations in Saudi Arabia and Sudan in the formation o f Etisalat Egypt 
strategic alliance
The contextual motives for forming Etisalat Egypt
At the contextual level, Mr. A1 Jarwan pointed out that the first reason for forming this 
strategic alliance was the lack of growth opportunities in the UAE market. A1 Jarwan 
pointed out that:
“The penetration rate o f Etisalat’s mobile phone service in the UAE was 127 
per cent in 2006, which was equivalent to over 6.1 million subscribers out o f 
a population o f 5 millions. This is in addition to 1.3 million fixed telephone 
lines and large number o f internet subscribers. At the time, the arrival o f a
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new competitor to the UAE telecommunication market made the situation 
more complex as competition becomes more severe and growth within the 
local market becomes a hard task. Because there were no growth 
opportunities in the local market, the only option available for Etisalat is to 
seek opportunities at the international market
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A second reason was the attractiveness of the Egyptian market. Market research
conducted by Etisalat revealed that Egypt is considered one of the leading
telecommunication markets in the Middle East. With a population of about 79 million,
O  mobile market penetration in Egypt stood just at 19.6 per cent or 15 million subscribers in
September 2006 while the Ministry of Telecommunications in Egypt expected the total
number of cellular subscribes in Egypt to reach 40 million users by 2011 (A1 Jarwan
said). These statistics turned the attention of Etisalat to the Egyptian market. This was
very clear in the words of Eng. Mohammed Hassan Omran, Chairman of Etisalat:
"... the market still has enormous growth potentials, as we estimate the 
penetration rate to leap as high as 50 per cent, or even more, within three 
years. With mobile subscription growth o f close to 20 per cent a year and a 
penetration rate o f about only 20 per cent there is certainly room for a third 
operator in the Egyptian market. The Egyptian economy is growing strongly 
due to recent reforms. So the low penetration and strong economic growth 
will help us to achieve our aim o f winning at least 30 per cent share in three 
to five years through a combination o f new technology, better tariffs and a 
raft o f new services ” (Third Quarter Report, Etisalat, 2006).
A third reason highlighted by Mr. A1 Jarwan is the attractiveness of the technical 
specifications of the operator license offered by the Egyptian authorities. This was also 
clear in the words of Eng. Mohammed Hassan Omran, Chairman of Etisalat:
“Etisalat will purchase not only one but two licenses for its money, second 
generation (2G) and third generation (3G) services, leaving existing 
competitors UK-based Vodafone and Mobinil scrambling to apply for 3G 
licenses o f their own ” (Third Quarter Report, Etisalat, 2006).
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The 3G technology is not only a high speed data carrier but also it expands the network
capacity and improve the quality of the voice and data transfer. In addition, the 3G
technology provides new services, such as video calling, internet connectivity and
television streaming” (Etisalat’s internal records).
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The fourth reason for forming this strategic alliance is, according to Mr. Mohamed A1 
Jarwan, the stimulating foreign investment policy of the UAE government. Mr. A1 
Jarwan stated that:
“The government o f the UAE is following a free market economic system and 
implementing a strategy that encourages local companies to expand 
internationally. The fact that the government owns 60 per cent o f the 
company’s stock allowed the government to influence the decisions o f board 
o f directors including those relating to international growth and strategic 
alliances
The fifth reason for the formation of Etisalat Egypt is to conform to the Egyptian
government policy in terms of the ownership structure of the new project. This reason
was stated by Mr. A1 Jarwan as follows:
“The regulations o f the Egyptian telecommunication authority clearly stated 
that the new mobile phone company is to be formed in a joint venture 
between local Egyptian companies and foreign investors. Therefore, Etisalat 
could not enter the Egyptian market without forming this strategic alliance ”.
2. Authorization
Having the motives for forming Etisalat Egypt alliance identified and justified by the 
company’s executive directorates, the executive team proceeded to the authorization level 
of the project which involves two steps. The first step is to convince the board of 
directors of the viability of the project and to get the approval to start it. The second step
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is to get the approval of the UAE’s government. Before the authorization process started,
Etisalat was waiting for the formal announcement of the new mobile phone license by the
Egyptian authorities (Mr. A1 Jarwan said). In what follows the process of announcing the
third mobile phone license is discussed.
The announcement of a new mobile phone license
On the Egyptian side, in February 2006 the National Telecom Regulatory Authority 
(NTRA) invited investors to submit proposals for the international auction for the third 
mobile license in the Arab Republic of Egypt. Alliances of international and national 
companies were requested to submit their proposals to the NTRA. Terms and conditions 
of the auction are available in Third Mobile Network Specifications Handbook against 
payment of US$ 25,000. The announcement of the third mobile operator made it clear 
that the introduction of a third mobile operator in Egypt is an important catalyst to 
enhance competition as 2G and 3G services will be introduced in the market for the 
benefit of the consumer. The NTRA released Egypt Communications Projections Report 
to the Arab Advisors Group's Telecoms Strategic Research Service subscribers on 
December 20, 2005. The 105-page report, which has 91 detailed exhibits, provides a 
detailed analysis of the Egyptian fixed and cellular markets and profiles the major players 
in the country. The report includes 5-year historical data and 5-year projections on fixed 
and cellular uptake and revenues. Moreover, the report provides a detailed and 
comprehensive picture on the fixed and cellular markets' strategies and regulations 
(National Telecom Regulatory Authority’s official website).
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Seeking authorization to implement the new project
Being formally aware of the new opportunity, Etisalat began the authorization process.
The aim of the authorization process was to get the official approval of the board of
directors and the regulatory bodies of the UAE government. The process of authorization
is explained by Mr. A1 Jarwan as follows:
“The decision to enter to the Egyptian market through strategic alliance with 
Egyptian partners was debated with three authorities for its authorization.
One o f them fell within the formal hierarchy o f Etisalat; explicitly, the board 
o f directors. The other two fell outside the formal hierarchy, namely the 
Ministry o f Foreign Trade and the Telecommunication Regulation Authority.
As long as Etisalat’s strategy emphasizes international growth, the board o f 
directors authorized the venture by general consensus. The process o f getting 
final approvals o f the outside authorities was also smooth and 
straightforward as long as the project aligns with the UAE’s government 
strategy o f economy diversification and expansion to international markets
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Summary
The motives for forming the strategic alliance of Etisalat Egypt are multilevel in nature; 
organizational and contextual. The formation of Etisalat Egypt strategic alliance was 
attributed to a number of reasons; some fall within Etisalat’s terrain (organizational 
motives) and others emanated from its environment (contextual motives). These motives 
are mutually affected by each other. For instance, motives falling within Etisalat’s 
domain affect and are affected by the ones that fall within Etisalat’s context. This point 
indicates that Etisalat could be considered as an open system that heavily influences and 
is influenced by its external environment.
Apparently, there were four major organizational motives for the formation of Etisalat 
Egypt strategic alliance. The first and perhaps the most important organizational motive
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was the availability of abundant financial resources at the disposal of the company.
Surplus of substantial financial resources accompanied by lack of growth opportunities in
the UAE market induced the company to adopt an internationalization strategy, which
actually began in 2006. Despite the financial capabilities of the company, Etisalat was
keen to expand internationally through IS As. Strategic alliances helped the company
share the economic cost of the new projects and allow the company to invest in other
projects instead of limiting investments to one project. Etisalat was also motivated to
~ capitalize on its accumulated know-how and expertise of operating and managing
telecommunication companies in the UAE and foreign markets. Etisalat has accumulated
knowledge and experience in forming and managing IS As. To capitalize on these
strengths, Etisalat decided to search for new opportunities to expand internationally.
Etisalat was also motivated to form Etisalat Egypt strategic alliance by the desire to learn
and acquire knowledge of the local Egyptian market. This could be done through local
partners who provide knowledge of the local market, an important factor that usually
foreign investors need and lack. This finding also implies that the third reason for the
formation of Etisalat Egypt was the desire of the company to share cost and risk of the
new project with partners. Therefore, I maintain that, Etisalat’s international business
strategy is to expand into foreign markets through partnerships. By contrast, there were
five contextual motives for the formation of Etisalat Egypt strategic alliance which
include. Firstly, lack of growth opportunities in the UAE market has induced Etisalat to
look for growth opportunities in foreign markets. Lack of growth opportunities in the
UAE market was mainly because of high penetration rates of Etisalat’s services. This
situation left few opportunities for future growth of the company’s operations in the
UAE’s local market. Needless to say, the arrival of a new competitor, Emirates Integrated
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Telecoms (du), in February 2007 has complicated the situation. All these factors together
left few opportunities for future growth. At that time Egypt announced a bid for its third
mobile phone license which represents a good business opportunity for Etisalat.
Generally speaking, Egypt is witnessing fast economic growth leading to an increase in
the level of income and purchasing power of people. Egypt has been in the top five
countries with highest growth in Africa. Market conditions are indeed attractive because
the country boasts the second largest population on the continent, a strong economy due
to recent reforms, and a regulatory framework that has encouraged competition in the
telecommunications sector. Market penetration is still, 19.6 per cent which represents 15
million subscribers out of population of 79 million as in September 2006. In addition, a
study performed by the Ministry of Telecommunications in Egypt expects the total
number of cellular subscribes in Egypt to reach 40 million users by 2011. Therefore, I
maintain that the second factor which motivated Etisalat to invest in Egypt and form this
strategic alliance was the attractiveness of the Egyptian market. Thirdly, Etisalat was also
attracted by the technical specifications of the license. The NTRA also issued the Third
Mobile Network Specifications Handbook. The Handbook is issued according to
international technological standards and specifications. It includes second generation
(2G) service and third generation (3G) services, provided for the first time in Egypt.
These new services were expected to put the new company in a competitive advantage
relative to its competitors. This is in addition to the fact that existing competitors would
have to pay a substantial amount of money to buy 3G license. Fourthly, the UAE’s
government adopts a policy that encourages local companies to invest in foreign markets.
Etisalat has formed this strategic alliance to comply with the home government’s policy
which directs local companies to expand their operations and invest in foreign markets.
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This is especially true for Etisalat in which the government owns 60 per cent of the equity
ownership and hence is expected to influence the decisions of the board of directors.
Finally, the regulations of the Egyptian telecommunication authorities require that the
new project be jointly owned and managed by local and foreign investors. This implies
that Etisalat has formed this strategic alliance to comply with the policies of the host
governments.
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On the whole, the formation of Etisalat Egypt strategic alliance was a reaction to 
organizational factors which can be referred to, here, as strengths and weaknesses within 
Etisalat and contextual factors which we refer to as opportunities and threat within 
Etisalat’s external environment. Organizational strengths within Etisalat emanated from 
the abundance of financial resources at the disposal of Etisalat and the accumulated 
know-how and expertise of operating and managing telecommunication companies in the 
UAE and foreign markets. Organizational weaknesses resulted from Etisalat’s lack of 
knowledge of the Egyptian market and the associated risk of the project. The formation 
of Etisalat Egypt strategic alliance was also a reaction to environmental threats and 
opportunities. On the one hand, a major threat is the lack of business growth 
opportunities within the UAE’s market. On the other hand, environmental business 
opportunities include the attractiveness of the Egyptian market, attractiveness of the 
technical specifications of the license offered by the Egyptian authorities, the foreign 
investments policy of UAE’s government and the Egyptian authority’s regulations which 
require forming a joint venture with local Egyptian partners. Hence, the second phase in 
the process was the selection of the alliance partners.
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Therefore, to conclude, the following propositions are generated from the above analysis:
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Prop. 7.1a.
The motives for forming the strategic alliance o f Etisalat Egypt are multilevel in nature; 
organizational and contextual.
Prop. 7.1b.
There were four organizational motives for the formation o f Etisalat Egypt alliance 
which include: abundance offinancial resources at the disposal o f the company, desire to 
capitalize on its knowledge and expertise on the areas o f telecommunication and foreign 
investments, desire to share cost and risk o f the new project; and learning and acquiring 
knowledge o f the local Egyptian market.
Prop. 7.1c.
There were five contextual motives for the formation o f Etisalat Egypt alliance which 
include: lack o f growth opportunities in the UAE market, the attractiveness o f the 
Egyptian market, attractiveness o f the technical specifications o f the license offered by 
the Egyptian authorities, foreign investments policy o f UAE’s government and the 
regulations o f the Egyptian government.
Phase 2: Selection of the partners of Etisalat Egypt alliance
When asked about the process that Etisalat followed to select its partners to form the new 
strategic alliance, Mr. Ali A1 Saeygh, the Transaction Manager, International Investments 
pointed out that:
“Etisalat was very selective in the process o f partner selection, not only 
because the partner mix affects future performance but also because 
qualified partners help in meeting technical evaluation criteria set by the 
Egyptian regulators and ultimately help in negotiating and wining the 
license. The process o f partners’ selection passed through three stages; i) 
search for partners, ii) evaluation o f partners and Hi) selection o f partners ”.
i) Search for partners
Mr. A1 Saeygh went further to explain, that:
“The partner selection process began when the National Telecom Regulatory 
Authority (NTRA) called investors to submit proposals. The NTRA played the 
role o f the linking point between the Egyptian and foreign investors. It aimed
to link partners together in order to limit the number o f bidders and facilitate 
the search process. Later, the NTRA announced the names o f the local 
companies and the foreign companies to help these companies know about 
each other and select their potential partners
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On the one hand, local bidding companies included Egypt Post, National Bank of Egypt, 
Commercial International Bank, Egyptian Financial Group (EFG-Hermes), Bahgat 
Group, TeleTech, Banque Misr of Egypt, National Telecom Company of Egypt, National 
Bank for Development of Egypt, Aman Trading, Naaem Group, Telecom Egypt, Raya 
Holding of Egypt, Sharbatly Group, Pico Telecom and Electronic Media, Arts, and 
Communication (EMAC) of the USA. On the other hand, foreign companies included 
Etisalat of UAE, MTC of Kuwait, MTS of Russia, TurkCell of Turkey, Gulf Finance 
Company of the UAE, TeleNor of Norway, Wataneyia International of Kuwait, Qtel of 
Qatar, Singapore Tech Telemedia, Telecom Italia, Saudi Telecom Company, MTN of 
South Africa, Telecom Malaysia and Reliance of India (Etisalat’s internal records).
Mr. A1 Saeygh went further to complete:
"... the Egyptian bidders classified foreign bidding companies into three 
groups according to their reputation, financial capabilities and technical 
competencies. Group 1, includes companies which rank high in these criteria. 
Group 2 includes companies which are lower. While group 3 includes 
companies which least match criteria. Companies in group 1 were targeted 
by all local companies. This situation in turn gave foreign companies in 
group 1 a good chance to choose the best local partners. Etisalat was a 
major company in Group 1 which means it has been targeted by almost all 
local companies. This situation gave us the chance to select from a large pool 
o f local partners ”.
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To recap, the search process was straight forward as the NTRA worked at the mid point
between 15 Egyptian and 14 foreign companies to limit the number of bidders and
facilitate the search process.
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ii) Evaluation o f  partners
The evaluation process began when Etisalat was approached by 13 Egyptian public and
private companies. The evaluation process was carried out by the International
Investment Department which is responsible for managing and overseeing all Etisalat’s
foreign investments. That was clear in the words of Mr. A1 Saeygh:
“The General Manager o f International Investments formed a committee o f 
experts consists o f engineers, accountants and administrators. The committee 
was then assigned the task o f designing the technical specifications and other 
criteria used for evaluating partners and completing the selection process.
After the evaluation criteria were set, the committee worked on a process o f 
evaluation which consists o f two successive steps. Firstly, a preliminary 
screening o f the general features o f the local partners was carried out by the 
committee. The second stage entailed in-depth evaluation o f the technical, 
financial and administrative capabilities o f the potential partners ”.
Prelim inary screening
The aim of this stage was to reduce the number of potential partners by excluding some
of them according to certain criteria. In this respect Mr. A1 Saeygh stated that:
“During the preliminary screening, privately owned companies were 
excluded. This was mainly because the policy o f Etisalat for selecting foreign 
partners gives priority to government companies. Etisalat believes that 
government companies are more reliable, trustable and committed to their 
business than privately owned companies. Etisalat was keen to this decision 
by the availability o f a number o f good potential government companies that 
approached Etisalat. With regard to the remaining companies, the committee 
enumerated the strengths and weaknesses o f each company and its features. 
Consequently, more companies were also excluded”.
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However, when asked about the main sources of data used for partner’s evaluation, Mr.
A1 Saeygh pointed out that the main sources were partner’s internal records, government
annual reports, consultants, accounting firms, and stock markets.
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In-depth evaluation
In this step, Etisalat performed intensive study for each of the remaining partners. The in-
depth evaluation process is based on two major factors; namely recognition of the
motives for forming the alliance and the selection of the alliance’s form of structure. This
is made clear in the words of Mr. A1 Saeygh by saying that:
‘Etisalat has performed in-depth evaluation o f potential partners which is 
based on two factors. The first factor is the recognition o f the motives for the 
alliance formation. As long as the project is long-term and strategic in its 
nature, Etisalat was looking for a dependable partner who has long-term 
business orientation and who can effectively work in a long-term basis 
toward meeting the project’s goals. The in-depth evaluation process was also 
influenced by the form o f structure. The equity joint venture form o f structure 
utilized in this project requires long-term commitment o f huge resources and 
therefore, entails high economic risk. This situation has stimulated Etisalat to 
look for partners whom it can trust as being committed to long-term 
operations. Based on these requirements, the major criteria used for partner 
evaluation were: (1) financial capability and administrative competencies,
(2) complementarities o f resources, (3) partner’s readiness to start the 
project and (4) partner's ability to negotiate with the Egyptian authorities ”.
Based on the partners’ evaluation criteria, preliminary contacts and negotiations were
made with the potential partners. The chairman of the board of directors nominated and
sent an investigative team, whose members were selected from the evaluation committee,
to visit all potential partners at their home country and to collect field information
necessary for the evaluation process. In this connection Mr. A1 Saeygh maintains that:
“.... upon its return from the field trip, the investigative team provided 
comprehensive reports about each potential partner which are used along
230
with the evaluation criteria by the evaluation committee to make a final 
selection decision. Taking in consideration all technical, financial and 
administrative requirements, the committee designed an evaluation form.
Based on this form, the committee compared the potential partners item by 
item. Every item was evaluated with regard to several dimensions relating to 
the technical, financial and administrative aspects. In addition, the committee 
collected some information about each o f the potential partners’ history, 
reputation, strengths and weaknesses and included them into the evaluation 
process. Based on the results o f the in-depth evaluation, further rounds o f in- 
depth contacts and negotiations were carried out with potential partners 
before arriving at the final decision. In-depth negotiations were mainly made 
with respect to the financial issues, equity share o f each partner in the 
alliance, control and decision making methods, staff management as well as 
other technical issues ”.
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On the whole, the evaluation process was performed by a specialized committee 
developed by the International Investments Department within Etisalat and that the 
formation of the committee was based on expertise and specialization in the required 
fields for evaluation. The process of evaluating the alliance partners consists of two 
successive stages, namely preliminary screening and in-depth evaluation. Based on 
Etisalat’s policy of giving priority to government owned companies, privately owned 
companies were excluded at the preliminary screening step. The in-depth evaluation step 
is supervised by the chairman of the board of directors and executed by the evaluation 
committee and entailed three stages: preliminary contacts and negotiations, sending an 
investigative team to the potential partners at their home countries, and rounds of in- 
depth negotiations with the potential partners.
iff*) Selection o f  alliance partners
In light of the results of partners’ evaluation, the board of directors and some invited 
members from the evaluation committee held a meeting to discuss the final views and
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make the final partner selection decision. The discussion was materialized in the approval
of a decision of selecting three partners. The selected partners are Egypt Post, National
Bank of Egypt, and Commercial International Bank of Egypt. Quoting the words of Mr.
Jamal A1 Jarwan, General Manager of Etisalt’s International Investments here in
explaining the reasons for selecting these particular partners:
"... the three partners were selected because they were believed to be the 
best among the other partners and are expected to bring exceptional 
contributions which, when added to those o f Etisalat, will add value and 
increase the likelihood o f success o f the strategic alliance
Having selected its partners, Etisalat and its partners began intensive meetings to discuss 
the bidding issues. The four partners agreed on the technical, financial and administrative 
issues of the project as well as the issues relating to the bidding and, thereafter, submitted 
their proposal to the NTRA. On the Egyptian side, eleven ISAs bought the Third Mobile 
Network Specifications Handbook to enter in the most talked-about public auction. These 
alliances were:
■ Etisalat of UAE, Egypt Post, National Bank of Egypt (NBE) and Commercial 
International Bank (CIB);
B MTC Group Operations of Kuwait and Egyptian Financial Group (EFG-Hermes), 
Bahgat Group
B Mobile TeleSystems-OJSC (MTS) of Russia and TeleTech of Egypt; 
a TurkCell of Turkey, Banque Misr of Egypt and Gulf Finance Company; 
h TeleNor of Norway and National Telecom Company (NTC) of Egypt; 
a Wataneyia International of Kuwait, Univest, National Bank for Development of 
Egypt, and Aman Trading;
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B Qtel of Qatar, and Naaem Group, and Singapore Tech Telemedia;
,  Telecom Egypt and Telecom Italia;
a MTN of South Africa, Raya Holding of Egypt and the Sharbatly Group.
Two alliances were disqualified from the technical evaluation process which are: 
a Saudi Telecom Company, Telecom Malaysia and Pico Telecom; 
a Reliance of India and Electronic Media, Arts, and Communication (EMAC) of 
the United States (Etisalat’s internal records).
Chapter 7: D escrip tion  and  analysis o f  findings:
Em irates Telecom m unication Corporation (Etisalat)
Documentary analysis revealed that on 4 July 2006 the international auction started with 
US$ 435 million. With US$2.9 billion Etisalat was way head of the competition, 
compared to a US$2.47 billion bid by MTC of Kuwait with Egyptian investment bank 
EFG-Hermes and Bahgat Group. The third-highest bid, at US$2.12 billion, was from an 
alliance led by Qatar Telecom (Qtel). The fourth offer worth US$1.93 billion in a joint 
bid from majority state-owned Telecom Egypt and Telecom Italia. Brokers had said they 
expected the license to go for at least US$1.10 billion, maybe as much as US$ 1.80 
billion (NTRA’s official website). After weeks of lengthy negotiations on the details of 
the third mobile license between the National Telecom Regulatory Authority (NTRA) 
and the winning alliance, the Third Mobile Operator License was signed. On top of the 
initial license fee, Etisalat alliance agreed to pay the government 6 per cent of revenues, 
as against the 3 per cent minimum which the government had stipulated (National 
Telecom Regulatory Authority’s official website).
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Sum m ary
The process of partners’ selection passed through three stages namely; the search for the 
alliance partners, evaluation of partners and selection of partners. The process of 
partners’ search was organized and facilitated by the Egyptian authorities which prepared 
a list of potential Egyptian investors along with foreign investors and worked as a mid 
point between the two parties. In order to precisely determine the local and foreign 
investors interested in buying the third mobile phone license, NTRA formally announced 
the license and requested investors to submit proposals. This step helped the NTRA in 
limiting the number of potential companies. Because of its reputation in the region, 
Etisalat was a major foreign company that was approached by the majority of local 
companies to join them as a major partner. This in turn, provided Etisalat a competitive 
advantage relative to its rivals because it helped it to choose from a large number of local 
companies.
Having completed preliminary screening of potential partners, Etisalat developed and 
used a number of criteria for partners’ evaluation. To start with, the first and probably the 
most important criterion was complementarity of partners’ resources. Obviously, Etisalat 
was not looking for partners who possess and can provide know-how and technology for 
operating telecommunication projects. That is mainly because it possesses and can 
provide such technology. Rather, Etisalat was looking for partners who can provide 
resources it lacks. Most notably it was lacking knowledge of the Egyptian market. Being 
for the first time in Egypt, Etisalat lacks knowledge of many features of the Egyptian 
market. For example, Etisalat needs to learn about consumer behaviour, competitors’
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strategies and behaviour and market condition. Etisalat also needs to learn about the
economic, political, social and legislative systems of the country. Learning and acquiring
this knowledge independently may require investment in resources such as time and
money. Time factor was very crucial for Etisalat as long as there was a deadline for the
license bidding. Etisalat was also looking for partners who possess and can provide
financial resources because it was keen to share cost of project to reduce economic risks.
Etisalat was also looking for partners who possess and can provide administrative
competencies because from the beginning it has realized that the new company would be
jointly managed by all partners which necessitated finding local partners who possess
administrative competencies. In so doing, Etisalat was successful in selecting partners
with complementing resources. For instance, Egypt Post has a century worth of
experience and knowledge in operating its nationwide distribution network and is
committed to continuously modernizing and enhancing its services. Egypt Post, with its
special trust and reputation within the Egyptian community as a large percentage of
population depends on it for both mailing and money deposits and saving accounts, is
expected to provide access to database and addresses of large number of potential
subscribers. Egypt Post also owns more than 3400 sites/locations in the major cities of
Egypt which can be used as sales points and sites to fix telecommunication towers. The
National Bank of Egypt is the nation’s first and largest bank with an extensive country
wide presence and knowledge of the local market. This is in addition to the similar
resources provided by Commercial International Bank (Egypt). Both banks helped in
billing generation and quick distribution of service by using their databases and branches.
The second criterion used by Etisalat to evaluate its partners was the partner’s readiness
to start the project. Etisalat was also looking for partners who are ready to start
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implementing the project as soon as they win the license. This criterion is important
because the license contract determined a starting date for launching the new mobile
phone service in the market. Failure to meet the contract conditions may result in
penalties for the contractor. The third criterion was the partner’s influence on the
Egyptian authorities. Etisalat was facing three major challenges in this project which
were winning the license, launching the service before the deadline set by the NTRA, and
effectively managing the new company. To meet these challenges, Etisalat, based on its
previous experience, was looking for partners who have extended relationships with the
Egyptian government. Such social networks would help the new company overcome
expected problems and benefit form opportunities. This argument is supported by the fact
that Mr. Jamal Anwar A1 Sadat (Son of the former President of Egypt) is appointed as the
Chairman of the company. Mr. A1 Sadat is well known for his good contacts with the
government officials and his influence in Egypt.
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Therefore, to conclude, the following propositions are generated from the above analysis: 
Prop. 7.2 a.
The process o f partners’ selection passed through three stages: search for partners, 
evaluation o f partners and selection o f partners to ensure that its selected partners are 
trustable and committed to the new venture.
Prop. 7.2b.
The process ofpartners ’ search was organized and facilitated by the Egyptian authorities 
who prepared a list ofpotential Egyptian investors and foreign investors and worked as a 
mid point between the two parties.
Prop. 7.2c.
Good reputation o f Etisalat led to almost all Egyptian investors to approach the company 
to become a partner.
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Prop. 7.2 d.
The policy o f Etisalat for selecting foreign partners favours government companies over 
privately owned companies.
Prop. 7.2e.
The major criteria used by Etisalat for partners evaluation and selection were: (1) 
complementarities o f resources, (2) partner's readiness to start the project, and (3) 
partner’s influence on the Egyptian authorities.
Phase 3: Choice of the form of Etisalat Egypt alliance structure
Having won the license, partners of Etisalat Egypt alliance began their intensive meetings
to discuss the new project’s implementation plan in line with the regulations of the 
NTRA. However, an important issue that received considerable attention in the 
discussions was the decision of the alliance form of structure.
It was made clear in the NTRA’s announcement of the new mobile phone license (see 
section 7.3.1.1, phase 1) that the form of alliance structure was predetermined by the 
Egyptian authorities to be equity joint venture which requires the partners to establish an 
independent company managed by an independent management. However, when asked 
about the factors that led to the selection of the equity joint venture form of structure, Mr. 
A1 Jarwan stated three factors. These factors were the Egyptian government’s regulations, 
the economic risk of the project resulted from huge investments and resources committed 
by partners, and Etisalat’s strategy and previous experience with this form of structure. In 
this respect, Mr. A1 Jarwan said:
“Although this form o f structure was predetermined by the Egyptian 
authorities, this form conforms to Etisalat’s preferred form o f structure 
because it aligns with the alliance’s long term goals, motives and operations.
This form o f structure will tie all partners to the alliance because every 
partner is obliged to commit financial and other resources for long-term use
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in the project. This is very essential for Etisalat because in order to protect 
our reputation as the project leader and to protect our investments as a 
major shareholder (66 per cent) we need to have all our partners commit 
long-term resources to the alliance in order to ensure their future 
cooperation and positive behaviour. This is in addition to our experience 
with this form o f structure ”.
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The form of equity joint venture required the four partners to agree on the equity 
shareholding of each partner in the new venture. The partners agreed on 66 per cent 
shareholding for Etisalat, 20 per cent for Egypt Post, 10 per cent for National Bank of 
Egypt, and 4 per cent for Commercial International Bank. The shareholding of each 
partner reflects its financial contributions and control in the venture. This was made clear 
in the words Mr. A1 Jarwn:
"The majority shareholding o f Etisalat reflects not only our financial 
contribution in the alliance’s capital but also our key role in the project as 
the sole provider o f telecommunication technical and administrative 
expertise and the controlling stake resulting from this situation ”.
Summary
The equity joint venture’s form of structure was selected because of three reasons. 
Firstly, this form conforms to the regulations of the host government. Obviously, the 
NTRA determined the form of alliance structure to be equity joint venture which requires 
partners to establish an independently managed company. The selection of this form by 
the Egyptian authorities could be attributed to a number of reasons. Firstly, the Egyptian 
government believes that bringing foreign investors into the strategic alliance will 
increase competition which will result in better services and lower prices to consumers. It 
was also convinced that opening the bid to foreign investors wiould increase competition 
between bidding companies and eventually would generate a better price for the license.
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The government was also willing to provide an opportunity to local companies to form
strategic partnerships with foreign investors to help generate profits and learn new
production technologies and management systems. Secondly, equity joint venture form of
structure reduces the cost and economic risk of entering the alliance because it requires
all partners to share cost and commit long-term resources. Such a project is strategic in
nature because it entails long-term investment of huge resources that can not be easily
reversed. This is especially true for Etisalat, which contributed 66 per cent of the
project’s capital and used its brand name for the project.
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Therefore, to conclude, the following propositions are generated from the above analysis: 
Prop. 7.3 a.
The equity joint venture form o f structure was selected because o f two reasons: (1) this 
form conforms to host government regulations; and (2) it ties partners to the project and 
reduces the cost and economic risk o f entering this alliance because it requires all 
partners to share cost and commit long-term resources.
Prop. 7.3 b.
The majority shareholding o f Etisalat reflects its financial contribution and its key 
technical role as the provider o f the telecommunication know-how.
Phase 4: Etisalat Egypt alliance management
Having completed the procedures for establishing the new company, Etisalat and its 
partners started their administrative work along side the technical work of establishing 
their network. As per the contract terms and conditions, Etisalat Egypt had to launch its 
services in two phases. The first phase of the coverage plan which had to be completed 
by May 21, 2006 included six Egyptian major cities in addition to other govemorates. 
The second phase was to provide service coverage to the whole country within five years
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(Etisalat’s internal records). Therefore, the task of building and operating a network
station was a priority task. In relation to this development, Mr. A1 Saeygh stated:
‘Etisalat’s top priority was to form a rigorous plan to build its network and 
meet the NTRA’s requirements. In October 2006, following strict evaluation 
o f technical and commercial bids, Etisalat announced selection o f Huawei (a 
China-based network company) to be its partner in the construction o f the 
telecommunication network. Etisalat sought Huawei’s support with regard to 
building a network and forming a business plan. Huawei responded to 
Etisalat’s request by preparing a highly competitive network construction 
scheme and business solutions and was also able to ensure the resultant 
network’s speedy deployment”.
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For the construction of the Etisalat’s network, the selection of a proven equipment
supplier was merely a first step. Considerable effort had to be done to launch the service
and that was clear in the words of Mr. A1 Saeygh when he said:
“Great efforts and expertise were also required in site acquisition, 
engineering implementation, equipment installation, network optimization 
and maintenance and customer service and retention. Ultimately, customer- 
oriented service consciousness became a cornerstone o f Huawei’s efforts in 
building a core team for the turnkey project ”.
However, as a non-local operator which was totally new to a highly competitive market, 
Etisalat Egypt faced many implementation challenges. These challenges were described 
by Mr. A1 Saeygh as follows:
“We faced two major challenges: First, the existing competitors, Mobinil and 
Vodafone, appeared to be hard at work preparing for the new competition. In 
fact, the two companies began reducing rates and offering more affordable 
total ownership packages to subscribers long before the third license was 
even issued. In 2006 Mobinil launched several campaigns with new products 
to attract low-income customers. The company has also cancelled 
administrative fees on pre-paid cards. Mobinil and Vodafone were also 
negotiating with the NTRA on the economic feasibility o f acquiring a 3G 
license. Second, with the two existing competitors attracting a total o f around 
300,000 new subscribers each month, Etisalat Egypt was naturally eager to
240
commercialize its brand as quickly as possible because every day we are 
delayed there is a relevant opportunity cost ”.
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However, one important factor for the project management was the exchange of
knowledge and information between the alliance partners. When asked what kind of
knowledge and information did Etisalat need to exchange with its partners and why this
issue is important for the success of the alliance, Mr. A1 Saeygh said:
“Because we were new to the Egyptian market, we need to learn many 
features o f the Egyptian business environment. Specifically, we need to learn 
about the legal system o f the country so as to avoid falling in legal disputes.
Also we need to understand the behaviour o f the local consumer which helps 
in identifying new opportunities in terms o f new products, services and 
markets. It is also important to know about our new competitors and 
suppliers. For this purpose, we found that our partners are the most reliable 
source o f information ”.
Another important factor for the success of the project is the staff recruitment and 
training. Mr. Omran pointed out that:
“With regard to recruitment o f key positions (especially technical ones), 
Etisalat intended to capitalize on its current skills and competencies. Etisalat 
fills these key positions mainly from the incumbent company in UAE and 
from its subsidiaries in Saudi Arabia, Sudan and other countries where 
Etisalat has operations. We follow this strategy because we possess 
competent staffs who are experienced in the field o f telecommunication. 
However, Egypt has an abundance o f skilled labour and professionals; 
therefore it is not unlikely to recruit from the local market. By the end o f 
2006, Etisalat has successfully recruited 850 staff to service its customers o f 
which 95 per cent are Egyptian nationals ”.
Having reviewed some documents provided by a manger, the researcher found that staff 
training was also performed by Etisalat. Etisalat Academy (UAE-based subsidiary of 
Etisalat) delivered training programs for the first batch of 250 administration, technical
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and operations personnel in June 2006. These training programs are part of Etisalat
Academy’s training programs delivered to Etisalat staff in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) region and adds to the recent training programs of staff from Saudi
Arabia’s Mobily, Sudan’s Canar, Pakistan’s PTCL, Etisalat Afghanistan and Etisalat
International Nigeria. These training programs support Etisalat’s efforts to successfully
implement its ambitious plan and reach the maximum customer service standards across
all advanced telecommunication services. That was obviously demonstrated by Mr.
Omran’s words:
"... in order to implement our plan to the highest international standards, 
we are involved in a number o f training and development programs which 
aim at preparing a talented team o f employees
Another training program was launched in October 2006 to train and prepare 800 
personnel. The program consists of an integrated system for developing the required 
professional skills in the areas of management, marketing and sales, customer service, 
customer profiling and segmentation, fault reduction control, call centre upgrades, 
broadband applications, information technology security as well as accounting and 
human resources. The training programs were implemented over a period of 12 months 
and prepareed the personnel for entering a competitive market. By so doing, Etisalat 
aimed to prepare an ideal work environment so staff who can respond effectively 
according to the requirements of competition in the Egyptian telecommunications market. 
Fresh Egyptian graduates are trained to support their practical needs and manage 
effectively at work which is consistent with the general vision of the company in 
capturing 30 per cent market share by 2010 (Etisalat’s internal records).
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Trust, cooperation and commitment of partners were factors that led to the successful
management of the new alliance. Etisalat and its partners worked hard to promote trust
and cooperation and to commit resources. This is done by holding regular meetings
between partners in the premises of the new company to develop future plans and review
and correct the current ones. Partners worked shoulder-to-shoulder under the leadership
of Etisalat and this was obviously testified by Mr. A1 Jarwan when he said:
“The partners worked very professionally in reaching this great success ”. 
Partners made their resources at the disposal o f the new alliance which 
''~N provided the new company with a source o f strength. For example Egypt post
made all its branch offices in the country (about 3400 office) available for the 
use o f Etisalat Egypt. Etisalat Egypt capitalized on these resources whenever 
suitable and has deployed over 700 base stations across the country, 
providing 3.5G, high-speed data connectivity in over 40 cities. The 
availability o f well established branches, sales points and service centres o f 
Etisalat’s partners across Egypt helped in quick market penetration. 
Partners ’ resources were also used for accounting purposes as well as for 
recharge o f SIM cards. With the cooperation o f these partners, Etisalat Egypt 
is extremely well placed to deploy its services quickly in strategic areas and 
in the most efficient and cost effective manner ”.
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Summary
Etisalat Egypt was challenged by meeting the deadline set by the NTRA to launch its 
services in the market. Time factor was very crucial not only to meet the NTRA’s 
deadlines for launching the new services but also because there was an opportunity cost 
resulting from every day delay. Competitors were working hard to attract more 
subscribers before Etisalat Egypt launches its services. Etisalat’s joint venture with 
Huawei saved the company’s time and effort and helped in focusing the company’s 
attention on other technical and administrative issues. These technical and administrative 
issues required more cooperation and exchange of information between partners which
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ultimately helped in commercializing the new services on time. Therefore, Etisalat had to
conduct many studies and had to collect and share information with partners. For
example, market research had to be conducted to understand the behaviour, needs and
preferences of the Egyptian consumer, market prices, distribution channels and product
features. Also the new company needs to learn about the government laws, rules and
regulations governing the telecommunication sector. Intensive studies also had to be
conducted to know more about competitors and local suppliers. The implication of such
an argument is that exchange of knowledge and information between partners was very
crucial especially at the first stages of the project implementation.
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Technical positions were filled by Etisalat’s staff brought from the incumbent company 
in the UAE and other subsidiaries in the region. The rationale behind this agreement was 
that Etisalat would be the sole provider of the know-how and expertise of establishing 
and operating the project. This agreement also could be attributed to the fact that Etisalat 
had been responsible for the technical and production aspects of the project. By contrast, 
partners agreed that middle and lower level administrative positions to be filled by local 
staff from the Egyptian labour market. This agreement aligns with the goals and policies 
of the Egyptian government with regard to aiming at creating new jobs. All these efforts 
helped in successfully launching the new company’s services as planned and was 
successful in attracting over 1 million subscribers within its first fifty days of operations. 
However, this success would have not been materialized without mutual understanding 
and cooperation between the partners. Therefore, I maintain that the spirit of trust, 
cooperation and commitment promoted by partners helped in the successful and quick
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implementation of the company’s plan and achievement of operation’s goals in a short
period of time.
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Therefore, to conclude, the following propositions are generated from the aforementioned 
analysis:
Prop. 7.4a.
Etisalat Egypt developed a rigorous plan to ensure launching the service o f the new 
mobile phone according to deadline set by the government authorities.
Prop. 7.4b.
Exchange o f knowledge and information between partners was very crucial especially at 
the first stages o f the project implementation.
Prop. 7.4 c.
While technical positions are filled by Etisalat’s staff brought from the incumbent 
company in the UAE and the other subsidiaries in the region, middle and lower level 
administrative positions are filled by local stafffrom the Egyptian labour market.
Prop. 7.4d.
Etisalat Egypt, in cooperation with Etisalat Academy (subsidiary o f Etisalat), developed 
and delivered intensive training programs to its administrative and technical staff.
Prop. 7.4e.
The spirit o f trust, cooperation and commitment promoted by partners helped in the 
successful and quick implementation o f the company’s plan and achievement o f 
operation’s goals in a short period o f time.
Phase 5: Etisalat Egypt alliance performance evaluation
In this phase of the formation process two issues will be discussed. The first one is the 
evaluation of the offer made by Etisalat to buy the third mobile license, and the second is 
the performance of the alliance. In what follows, each aspect is discussed and 
propositions are generated.
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Evaluation o f  the offer made by Etisalat
The issue of the viability and the price paid by Etisalat alliance to buy the third mobile
phone license in Egypt has received considerable attention and debate by the media both
in the UAE and Egypt. For example, according the Gulf News:
"... the third mobile license had been long delayed due to fears within 
Egypt’s National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (NTRA) that a 
third operator would not be economically viable. Hence, the entrance o f a 
third operator is not a guarantee for success and analysts have been taking 
their calculators to the US$2.9 billion paid for the third mobile license”
(Gulf News, issue, date?).
In the light of such a huge investment made by Etisalat to acquire the mobile operator
license, a group within the board of directors questioned the viability of the project.
However, documentary analysis revealed an interesting statement made by Etisalat’s
CEO who maintains that Etisalat paid the right price to enter a competitive market. After
intensive feasibility studies, using different scientific techniques such as Key
Performance Indicator (KPI) which is used for pre-evaluation of projects, Etisalat
concluded that this license is viable (Etisalat’s internal records). Also Mr. Mohamed A1
Qamzy, CEO of Etisalat justified the price paid by Etisalat, which came about
US$500,000 more than the second highest bid by saying that:
“We had a maximum price limit to offer, however the offer made was less 
than the maximum. We believe that the license worth what we paid because 
we consider Egypt to be a strategic long-term investment, and one o f the most 
important telecom markets in the region, having remarkable growth 
potentials ”.
Moreover, Etisalat believed that the acquisition of this license would result in creating a 
competitive advantage for Etisalat over its rivals. This was clear from the internal records 
of Etisalat where it was state that:
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“Etisalat paid the right amount and now it is in a competitive advantage for 
two reasons. Firstly, the license duration extends for fifteen years, whilst the 
existing licenses expire within five years or so. Secondly, the acquired license 
includes third generation (3G) services, whereas the two current operators 
have to apply for 3G license o f their own ” (Etisalat’s internal records).
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Performance evaluation o f  E tisalat E svv t
When asked about the criteria used by partners to measure the alliance performance, Mr.
Jamal A1 Jarwan, General Manager of Etisalat’s International Investments stated that:
“The criteria used by the partners to measure the performance o f the alliance 
are related to the goals o f the partners from entering this alliance. The 
partners formed this alliance with some pre-established goals for each. The 
major goals for Etisalat were to expand internationally and access new 
markets, to share economic cost and risk o f the project and to maximize 
profitability. Each o f the Egyptian partners also has its own private goals.
Egypt Post aimed at business diversification by entering new business sectors 
and gaining profits. The goals o f the two banks also are to diversify their 
investment portfolios and generate profits. Despite the fact that each partner 
entered this alliance with its own private goals, achieving individual 
partner’s goals led to the achievement o f the common goals o f the alliance. 
However, effective performance evaluation requires an agreement between 
partners on the criteria that will be used for the measurement. Towards this 
end, partners agreed on common criteria to be used for performance 
evaluation. These criteria are sales and market share (measured by the 
number o f subscribers), return on investments and profitability ”.
After a year of operation, the NTRA generated some statistics showing the number of 
subscribers and market share of Etisalat Egypt. The number of subscribers exceeded 
300,000 within just 20 days of its May 2007 commercial launch. After fifty days of 
operation, the new network succeeded in attracting a staggering 1 million subscribers 
which is equivalent to 6.6 per cent market share. The company is on track to achieve its 
target of three million subscribers by May 1, 2008 and has set a target of reaching 30 per 
cent market share by 2010 which is equivalent to 10 million subscribers (Etisalat’s 
internal records). Moreover, additional investments of USS 1.2 billion to US$ 1.6 billion
will be made in the next three years. In this respect, Jamal A1 Sadat, the company’s
chairman commented:
"... these investments will be allocated to all aspects o f our business 
including new base stations, enhancing the network, customer service 
centres, and so forth. Although, we feared the introduction o f the 3G services 
by the existing competitors would affect its original plans and forecasts, this 
did not happen, and we are on track to achieve our number o f subscribers ’ 
projections. Our outstanding performance is attributed to the partners’ 
expertise in the telecommunication industry and international business 
investments and their commitment and cooperation ”.
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^  Summary
The criteria used for performance evaluation include market share (measured by the 
number of subscribers), return on investment, and profitability. The selection of these 
criteria may be attributed to the fact that they reflect both short-term and long-term goals 
of all partners of the strategic alliance. While all partners, with no exception, joined this 
strategic alliance for financial profits, they were also interested in reducing economic risk 
of the project through sharing cost and minimizing the pay back period of the invested 
capital. Achieving short-term goals of the individual partners will eventually lead to the 
achievement of the ultimate long-term goal which is the survival and longevity of the 
project. Etisalat Egypt has shown strong performance which could be attributed to 
Etisalat’s knowledge of operating and managing telecommunication projects, its 
experience in operating foreign investments, and the positive relationship between the 
alliance’s partners which is characterized by trust, commitment and cooperation.
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Therefore, to conclude, the following propositions are generated from the above analysis:
Prop. 7.5a.
Partners agreed on common criteria to be used for performance evaluation. These 
criteria are related to the alliance goals and they include: market share (measured by the 
number o f subscribers), return on investments and profitability.
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Prop. 7.5b.
The alliance outstanding performance is attributed to the Etisalat’s expertise in the 
telecommunication industry and international business investments and to the trust, 
commitment and cooperation promoted by partners.
13 .2 .2  Factors affecting the formation process of Etisalat Egypt alliance
In this part, the two factors affecting the formation process of Etisalat Egypt strategic 
alliance are analysed. These factors are the partners’ culture and trust between partners. 
Although trust could be considered as one of the cultural values shared in a society, its 
special importance led to discussing it in a separate part. 1
1) Partners’ national culture
When asked about the effect of the national culture of the alliance partners on the
formation process of Etisalat Egypt alliance Mr. A1 Jarwan said:
“Cultural similarity between the partners o f Etisalat Egypt strategic alliance 
helped in smoothly concluding negotiations between partners at the early 
stages. Cultural similarity also facilitated joint management and the joint 
evaluation o f the alliance performance. However, the experience o f Etisalat 
in international investments helped in reducing the negative impact o f minor 
differences in partners’ culture. Currently, Etisalat successfully operates 
across 16 markets most o f them are in the African and Asian markets with 
partners from different culture backgrounds. Minor cultural differences 
between alliance partners may lengthen the formation process and 
complicate alliance management; however they do not represent a major 
factor in the alliance success or failure. It has been noticed that unlike other 
strategic alliances formed by Etisalat, partners and government officials 
dealt more formally in Etisalt Egypt. For example, it has been noticed that in 
most o f the meetings held with the Egyptian authorities, teams o f large
249
number o f people along with ministers and top governmental officials 
attended these meetings. Moreover, the ceremony o f signing the license’s 
contract was attended by the Egyptian prime minister and some other 
ministers ”.
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Summary
Cultural similarities between Etisalat and its partners facilitated the process of 
preliminary negotiations, alliance management and alliance performance evaluation. 
These similarities made the initial agreements between partners on the one hand and 
between partners and the government on the other quite simple and straight forward. This 
feature of the alliance partners also resulted in smooth management of the new company. 
Partners’ decision making and problem solving styles are similar which helped in 
bringing thoughts, attitudes and goals of partners closer. Moreover, the partners easily 
agreed on the criteria to be used for the alliance’s performance evaluation. These factors 
are reflected in a strong performance of the company. Therefore, I maintain that cultural 
similarities between partners have positively influenced the performance of the alliance.
Therefore, to conclude, the following propositions are generated from the above analysis: 
Prop. 7.6a.
Cultural similarities between Etisalat and its partners facilitated the process o f 
preliminary negotiations, alliance management and alliance performance evaluation.
Prop. 7.6b.
Cultural similarities between partners have positive influence and no negative influence 
on the alliance performance.
Prop. 7.6c.
Etisalat’s experience in cross-border investments lessens the negative impact o f minor 
differences in partners ’ culture.
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2)Trust between partners
The ensuing discussion shows that trust among partners of Etisalat Egypt strategic 
alliance is an important factor in the formation process of this strategic alliance. 
Therefore, when asked why trust is considered an important factor, Mr. A1 Jarwan 
mentioned that:
“From the beginning, trust among partners influenced the decision o f the 
alliance partners ’ selection. This is clear when we did intensive 
investigations and studies prior to the decision o f selecting any partner not 
only to ensure their financial and administrative capabilities, but also to 
ensure their future desirable behaviour and long-term commitment to the 
venture. Only those who are trusted by Etisalat for their future behaviour and 
believed are capable to be committed to the venture were selected. The 
alliance management also entailed enhancing trust and cooperation between 
partners. Partners worked together to improve trust and cooperation which 
has successfully led to more commitment and quick transfer o f resource 
between partners; reducing the extent and cost o f legal contracts; smooth 
exchange o f knowledge and information, avoidance o f routine and 
bureaucracy and enhancement o f decision making process ”.
Mr. A1 Jarwan went further to explain:
“The form o f equity joint venture enhanced trust between partners because 
this form requires long-term investments and resource commitment. 
Therefore, having each partner committed considerable resources to the 
alliance, all partners worked professionally to show desirable behaviour and 
commitment and to enhance trust in a way leading to achieving common 
strategic goals, given that each partner has joint benefit in the venture ”.
Summary
The foregoing analysis shows that trust among partners has direct positive influence on 
the formation process of the strategic alliance of Etisalat Egypt. The phases of the 
partners’ selection, selection of the alliance form of structure and alliance management 
were directly influenced by trust and cooperation between the partners. Trust and 
commitment were the basis for partners’ selection. Etisalat was looking for partners 
whom it can trust to show long-term commitment to the project and who are expected to
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show positive behaviour. Similarly, Etisalat’s partners were looking for partners who
possessed the technical know-how and whom they could trust to have long-term
commitment to the project and who were expected to show positive behaviour. A major
reason for selecting equity joint venture form of structure is the trust and commitment
promoted by this form. Promoting trust between partners also facilitated the process of
alliance management. For instance, improving trust between partners led to increasing the
amount of resources contributed by partners; increasing the amount and speed of
information and knowledge exchanged between partners. Therefore, I maintain that the
adoption of the equity joint venture form enhanced trust between the alliance partners.
Chapter 7: Description and analysis o f  findings:
Emirates Telecommunication Corporation (Etisalat)
Therefore, to conclude, the following propositions are generated from the above analysis: 
Prop. 7.7a.
Trust among partners directly affected the decision o f partner selection and the process 
o f alliance management. With regard to alliance management, improving trust between 
partners led to more and quick resource commitment by partners; reducing the extent 
and cost o f legal contracts; smooth exchange o f knowledge and information and 
avoidance o f routine and bureaucracy and enhancement o f decision making process
Prop. 7.7b.
The form o f equity joint venture enhanced trust between the alliance partners.
7.4 Conclusion
This chapter started with a brief overview of telecommunications’ history in the UAE, 
Emirates Telecommunications Corporation with emphasis on its international growth, 
and the telecommunication market in Egypt in order to shed light on the context within 
which the formation process of Etisalat Egypt alliance was developed. The major part of 
the chapter described and analyzed the findings and generated propositions from such a
252
description with regard to the aforementioned strategic alliance formation process. The
strategic alliance of Etisalat Egypt is formed in a process of five interrelated phases that
included recognition of the motives for forming the alliance, selection of the alliance’s
partners, selection of the alliance’s form of structure, alliance’s management, and the
alliance’s performance evaluation. The formation process is influenced by two major
factors which are trust among alliance partners and partners’ national culture. The
generated propositions are summarized in appendix 7 and will be discussed in next
chapter 8.
Chapter 7: Description and analysis o f  findings:
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CHAPTER 8 
Discussion
8.1. Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to discuss the characteristics of the formation 
process of international strategic alliances (ISAs) in the UAE. These characteristics are 
the main findings that have been developed from the propositions generated in chapters 6 
and 7 from the analysis of the data collected. The discussion will answer the question of 
“why” each of the two alliances studied was formed in such process and to compare and 
contrast between them. Also, the discussion will relate the findings of this study to 
similar studies from the literature reviewed in chapters 2 and 3, and within the context of 
the UAE and other Arab countries. The chapter ends with a conclusion summarizing the 
main issues discussed and presents a theoretical framework for the formation of ISAs in 
the UAE and other developing countries with similar business environment.
8.2. Emergent characteristics of ISAs’ formation process in the UAE
This section develops the main characteristics on the formation process of ISAs across 
UAE’s enterprises that have been studied. In developing these common characteristics, 
the researcher draws on the similarities across the two cases with regard to the generated 
propositions from chapters 6 and 7 (summarized in appendixes 6 and 7). The common 
characteristics, which are the main findings of the study, are:
1. Phases of identifying and justifying motives for the formation of a strategic alliance, 
and selecting alliance partners, the alliance form of structure, alliance management and
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alliance performance evaluation are basic steps of the formation process of IS As within 
the UAE’s enterprises studied.
2. IS As within the UAE’s enterprises are formed in reaction to organizational and 
environmental factors and become a part of corporate strategy.
3. The process of partners’ selection in IS As within the UAE’s enterprises passes through 
three stages: search for partners, evaluation of partners and selection of partners, and is 
carried out by employing evaluation and selection criteria.
4. Strategic alliance processes within the UAE’s enterprises is extensively influenced by 
trust and confidence based on previous relationships between partners.
5. The formation of IS As within the UAE’s enterprises is widely influenced by partners’ 
culture.
6. The performance of IS As within the UAE’s enterprises is evaluated by all partners.
8.2.1. Phases of identifying and justifying motives for the formation of a strategic 
alliance, and selecting alliance partners, the alliance form of structure, alliance 
management and alliance performance evaluation are basic steps of the formation 
process of IS As within the UAE’s enterprises
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The first phase in the process is identifying and justifying motives for the formation of 
ISAs. Despite the fact that ISAs lie at the heart of both companies’ strategies, Etisalat and 
ADNOC were motivated by specific factors to form ISAs. These factors emanated from 
both inside the company (organizational factors) and outside the company (contextual 
factors). Organizational factors involve companies’ strengths such as availability of 
abundant idle resources and companies’ weaknesses such as the lack of complementary 
resources to capitalize on the strengths. Contextual factors appeared in the form of 
opportunities and threats. Opportunities appeared in the form of new attractive markets 
and products while threats appeared in the form of lack of growth opportunities in the 
local market and changes in the policies of host government. Each of these factors has 
presented a problematic situation which in turn required actions by these companies to 
find ways to capitalize on their strengths, correct weaknesses, capture opportunities and 
avoid threats.
Having identified motives, companies had to justify the decision of forming a strategic 
alliance. Both cases of alliances studied were neither willing nor able to have an action to 
deal with its problematic situation. This finding is supported by Brouthers et al. (1995) 
who argue that firms lack the internal resources (e.g., skills, technology, market access, 
capital) required to achieve a sustainable competitive advantage on their own. Lack of 
complementary resources in terms of technological know-how, lack of knowledge of 
foreign markets, and the substantial cost and risk of starting a new project were found to 
be the major reasons for forming and entering ISAs. Compared to ADGAS, the phase of 
identifying and justifying motives was simple, straight forward and systematic and took 
shorter time in the case of Etisalat Egypt. This could be attributed to a couple of
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organizational and contextual factors. The organizational factor was that at the time of 
Etisalat Egypt formation, Etisalat had a clearly stated internationalization strategy 
supported by a well established structure. Such a strategy worked as a guideline that 
directs and coordinates efforts of decision makers towards the progress of this project. 
The contextual factor mainly centres on the government policy to encourage local 
enterprises to invest in foreign markets included the declared government policy to 
encourage local companies to investment in foreign markets. By contrast, at the time of 
ADGAS formation, ADNOC had no clearly defined strategy for foreign investments; 
instead decisions were made by personal judgment. This is supported by the finding that 
the identification of motives within ADGAS was made by personal judgment of the 
former President; Shiekh Zayed Bin Sultan A1 Nahian, who during a field visit to the oil 
fields issued a presidential decree to establish a new company to utilize gas flared in the 
atmosphere.
The appearance of motives and the realization that dealing with the problematic situation 
can not be dealt with independently pushed the companies to the second phase to find 
qualified partners who could provide complementary resources and share cost and risk of 
the new project. Motives for the alliance formation were also checked against the 
problematic situation because they were usually thought of as the alliance goals which 
were expected to handle the problematic situation. Partners’ selection entailed going 
through three stages namely search for partners, evaluation of potential partners and 
selection of partners. The partners’ selection phase recycles the process back to the 
motives identification and justification phase. For instance, the identification of 
evaluation criteria recycles the process back to the motives phase to match criteria with
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the motives. Complexity and duration of partners’ selection phase varies from one case to 
another. In the particular case of ADGAS, despite failure of ADNOC to find qualified 
partners in the Middle East, a situation that was expected to complicate and prolong the 
search process, the limited number of such partners around the world and the previous 
relationships between ADNOC, BP and TOTAL made the selection process simple and 
straight forward than was expected. By contrast, in the case of Etisalat Egypt, the stage of 
partner selection was organized by the Egyptian authorities. The Egyptian authorities 
limited the number of potential foreign and Egyptian companies, prepared and distributed 
a list of potential partners.
Having selected their partners, enterprises studied moved to the third phase in the process 
which is the selection of a form of structure. This phase has a couple of recycles, one to 
the motives phase and the other to the partners’ selection phase. The decision of form of 
structure selection was recycled to the motives phase in a way that the decision of 
selecting equity joint venture form of structure was based on the motives for alliance 
formation. The decision of selecting a form of structure is also recycled to the partners 
selection phase in a sense that form of structure had to be decided by all partners. The 
fourth phase is alliance management, which involved three recycles towards the phases of 
motives, partners’ selection, and the form of structure selection. The alliance 
management phase recycles towards motives phase in a sense that enterprises’ mission, 
vision, goals and strategies are all based on the motives for alliance formation. The 
alliance management phase also recycles towards partners’ selection phase in a way that 
during partners’ selection phase, partners should agree on jointly managing the strategic 
alliance, defining and setting management policies, strategies, and systems and should
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develop trust and cooperation necessary for smooth functioning of the alliance. The 
alliance management phase also recycles towards the form of structure phase because 
selection of equity joint venture form of structure requires establishing an independent 
company to be managed jointly by all partners. The last phase is alliance performance 
evaluation. Evaluating alliance performance requires recycling back towards all previous 
phases. For instance, evaluating alliance performance requires developing measurement 
criteria which are related to and derived from the motives for the alliance formation 
(recycle towards motives phase. Evaluation of alliance performance also requires a 
consensus among partners regarding common goals of the strategic alliance and private 
goals of each partner and regarding the evaluation criteria (recycle towards partner 
selection phase. Equity joint venture form of structure necessitates the use of specific 
performance measurement criteria which may differ from those used in other forms of 
structure (recycle towards form of structure selection phase. Finally, the results of the 
performance evaluation may necessitate changes in the alliance’s goals, style of 
management and strategies (recycle towards alliance management phase). It is obvious 
that the four phases of selection of alliance partners, selection of the alliance form of 
structure, alliance management and alliance performance evaluation are directly 
influenced by partners’ cultures and trust among partners.
When analysing the above phases in relation to the literature reviewed in chapters 3 and 4 
it appears that a significant gap exists in the literature between the necessity of alliances 
and the understanding of how to successfully operationalise the development process. 
According to Whipple and Frankel (1998), few researchers question that successful 
alliances are beneficial, yet little research exists that provides an understanding of how to
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develop a successful alliance. Thus, high rates of failure in SAs could be attributed, in 
part, to the lack of proper and comprehensive strategic alliance formation models. For 
example, Brouthers et al. (1995) attribute failure of strategic alliances to the fact that 
most companies adopt a ‘seat of the pants’ style in their approach to joint management, 
and learn lessons the hard way. Although numerous researchers have offered assorted 
types of frameworks for developing joint ventures (Datta, 1988) and inter-organizational 
cooperation (Hagedoom, 1993; Inkpen and Beamish, 1997), none of these approaches 
necessarily captures the overall process of strategic alliance formation given the greater 
impetus being placed on globalization (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1991). Also a recent 
research has provided evidence of this haphazard approach, showing that in the U.S. only 
one in five companies has guidelines for creating and maintaining alliances (Schmitz et 
al. 1995). Furthermore, other researchers argue that in spite of availability of several 
strategic alliance models in the literature there is a historic problem with using these stage 
models. For example, Whipple and Frankel (1998) argue that one historic problem with 
using stage models is the inability to determine where one stage ends and another begins. 
Moreover, stage models have the tendency to ignore, at an individual level the strategies, 
mechanisms, and behaviours employed in actually bringing about movement from one 
stage to the next (Weitz and Jap, 1995). This study attempts to capture the overall 
formation process of SAs. However, despite the paucity of strategic alliance formation 
models, this study’s finding is consistent with Whipple and Frankie’s (1998) study of the 
alliance formation process. Whipple and Frankie (1998) identified four development 
levels of SAs. The first is the alliance conceptualization which begins when a firm 
determines an alliance has appeal and provides an alternative to traditional relationships. 
The second is alliance pursuance which finalizes the decision to form an alliance and
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establishes the strategic and operational considerations that will be used to select the 
alliance partner. The third level is confirmation which focuses on partner selection and 
confirmation. At this level strategic and operational expectations for the arrangement are 
jointly determined by partners and the relationship is solidified. The fourth is alliance 
implementation/continuity which occurs over time during which the alliance is 
continually administered and assessed through a feedback mechanism to determine 
whether the alliance is sustained, modified or terminated.
Moreover, Whipple and Frankie’s (1998) argue that it is critical to understand not only 
the process of alliance formation, but also the strategic and operational considerations 
associated with each stage. The strategic component refers to the strategic considerations 
that correspond to each stage to provide an understanding of how alliance success is 
evaluated. While the operational component includes the operational considerations that 
correspond to each stage to provide an understanding of how alliance success is achieved 
on a daily basis. Whipple and Frankie (1998) also clearly examined the influence of 
culture and trust on the alliance formation process. Similarly this study’s finding is in line 
with Brouthers et a l (1997) who proposed a five-stage strategy process for cooperative 
ventures. The stages include (1) entry mode: selection or deciding whether cooperative 
ventures are the best way to service a market, (2) partners, selection: identifying potential 
partners, (3) negotiation of a cooperative agreement with potential partners, (4) managing 
the ventures: dealing with the daily issues of making the venture a viable business, and 
(5) venture evaluation: deciding if the venture is a success or not. Although they 
examined the effect of differences in management systems and communication methods
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between partners, Brouthers et al. (1997) ignored the influence of culture and trust on the 
alliance strategy process.
In a similar vein, Das and Teng (1997) provided options and guidelines for sustaining 
SAs. To a substantial extent, Das and Teng’s (1997) study is in line with this study’s 
findings. They suggest seven stages for the process strategic alliance management. The 
first stage is considering strategic alliance which deals with evaluating alliance as a 
strategic option, along with other alternatives such as vertical and horizontal integration 
and market-based transactions. The second is selecting alliance partners. This stage aims 
at selecting the appropriate partners who can help in achieving competitive advantage. 
The third is negotiating the alliance agreement, which deals with specifying the 
governance structure of the alliance, as well as other contractual clauses that bind 
partners. The fourth stage is setting up the alliance, which aims to select a form of 
structure and agree on control system and staffing issues. The fifth stage is operating the 
alliance. This stage deals with implementing the alliance to carry out the project goals. A 
major concern at this stage is promoting trust and cooperation between partners. The 
sixth is to evaluate the alliance performance to provide feedback on the status of the 
alliance. The last stage is modifying the alliance. Das and Teng (1997) clearly examined 
the influence of partners’ culture and trust on the alliance process.
The findings of this study are also in line with Reid et aV s (2001) study of alliance 
formation issues for knowledge-based enterprises. Reid et al. (2001) suggest three stages 
for knowledge-based alliance formation. The first stage is pre-formation which deals with
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identifying motives for knowledge-based alliances. The second is formation stage which 
includes three steps namely examining partners’ characteristics, agreeing on operating 
structures and norms, and selecting forms of structure. The third stage is performance 
evaluation which concerns with measuring alliance performance. However, Reid et al.
(2001) ignored the influence of partners’ culture and trust on alliance formation process. 
The findings of this study also support Pett and Debrel (2001) research findings in this 
respect. In their study of a process model of international strategic alliance formation, 
Pett and Debrel (2001) suggest a four-sage model. The first stage is exploration which 
involves scanning the environment, studying organizational factors and industry factors 
and examining national culture. This stage also involves tentative discussions with 
potential partners to establish tentative agreements. The second stage is recurrent contract 
which involves discussion of each organization’s motives, the risks associated with the 
alliance, the structure needed for the alliance, and evaluation of trust of partners. The 
third is relational contract, which aims at ensuring that opportunistic behaviours are, or 
nearly are, extinct from the partners in order for the alliance to move forward. The last is 
outcome stage, which involves measuring the potential of the alliance to gain some 
competitive advantage. Pett and Debrel (2001) also examined the effect of partners’ 
culture, trust and risk, which they referred to as relational contracts.
This study has found that the relationship between phases is non-sequential and non­
linear and involves several recycles from different phases to others, as well as delays. 
This finding is in line with Lindblom’s (1959) early work in the American public sector 
which found that decision processes in public institutions were ‘incremental’ and 
involved periods of recycling, iteration and reformulation. This finding is also in line
263
Chapter 8: Discussion
with Mintzberg et al. (1976) who found clear evidence for decision recycling and 
recycling from different phases to another. Moreover, this finding is also supported by 
Fahy’s (1981) work on energy management, which was based on a case of eleven large 
multidivisional firms. Fahy (1981) arrived at a similar conclusion about the non­
sequential nature of strategy formulation process.
8.2.2. ISAs within the UAE’s enterprises are formed in reaction to organizational 
and environmental factors and become a part of corporate strategy
Despite the fact that SAs are formed in reaction to environmental changes and 
organizational circumstances, they become a part of strategies of the UAE’s enterprises 
studied. In the UAE’s enterprises studied, ISAs are formed as a reaction to a problematic 
situation. This problematic situation is attributed to one or more of four reasons namely; 
availability of abundant idle resources (strength), lack of valuable resources (weakness), 
positive environmental factors (opportunity), and negative environmental factors (threat). 
Therefore, any change initiative begins with awareness of a problem or need (Bennis, 
1987). In that sense, Whipple and Frankel (1998) also argue that alliance 
conceptualization begins when a firm determines a change in business strategy and 
practice is justified. Similarly, Vyas et al. (1995) argue that scanning the environment for 
opportunities is the first step in developing strategic alliances. Environmental scanning 
involves searching and analyzing firm’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats 
(SWOT). The problematic situation resulted from the appearance of one or more of these 
factors that induced the firms to form SAs to capitalize on strength, correct a weakness, 
exploit an opportunity or avoid a threat which they can not perform independently. In 
what follows each factor is explained in more detail.
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Strensths: Abundance of idle resources
In both cases studied, the enterprises enjoy the availability of plenty of idle resources. 
These resources, if well utilized, can be turned into a competitive advantage. ADNOC 
has huge reserves of natural gas and Etisalat possess excess financial resources and 
valuable technology and experience in establishing and managing telecommunication 
projects. However, these resources were not utilized because of a lack of other 
complementary resources. A basic assumption of resource-based theory is that resource 
portfolios are heterogeneous across firms (Wemerfelt, 1984, Barney, 1991). Based on a 
1980-1989’s study of 166 corporations operating in three sectors worldwide (US, 
Japanese and European), Gulati (1995) found that strategically interdependent firms, for 
example companies operating in complementary market niches, formed alliances more 
often than did firms possessing similar resources and capabilities. Similarly, Tsang 
(1998) found that the greater the degree of heterogeneity among firms in the market, the 
higher is the chance of forming alliances. Previously allied firms were more likely to 
engage in subsequent partnerships, suggesting that over time, each firm acquired more 
information and built greater confidence in its partner. Therefore, one of the motives for 
strategic alliance formation in UAE’s enterprises studied is to maximize profits in the 
long-term through utilizing and developing their resources. One immediate opportunity 
of such strategic alliance is to put idle resources into use. In turn, the ability of companies 
to best utilize idle resources at their disposal could be a source of competitive advantage. 
This argument is supported by Dussauge et al. (2000) who concluded that competitive 
advantage may be a product of the firm’s preferential access to its idiosyncratic 
resources, especially those that are tacit and knowledge-based. The resource-based 
argument for SAs formation suggests that companies use alliances to locate the optimal
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resource configuration in which the value of their resources is maximized relative to 
other possible combinations (Das and Teng, 2000a). As such, alliances have been 
examined as a means for developing and exploiting the firm’s resource base (Tsang,
1998).
Weaknesses: Lack of valuable resources
The lack of particular valuable resources within the cases studied was another factor that 
induced them to form SAs. While ADNOC suffered lack of technological know-how to 
utilize gas resources and add a new product line, Etisalat lacks knowledge of the 
Egyptian business environment. Therefore, in both cases enterprises need knowledge and 
competencies that neither company possess. This implies that firms search for partners 
with resources they lack (Gulati et al., 2000). Thus, a firm’s resource profile plays an
important role in alliance formation (Stuart, 2000). In particular, firms search for partners
\
having specialized resources that are not readily available from others (Doh, 2000). 
Specialized resources can involve management teams with significant and specialized 
experience (McGee et al, 1995) or unique technological know-how (Nagarajan and 
Mitchell, 1998). Hence, one of the primary benefits of alliances is the access to 
previously unavailable resources and the joint development of new resources through the 
alliance. Alliances provide access to information, resources, technology and markets (Hitt 
et al, 200Id; Ireland et al, 2001a). Stuart (2000), for example, found that large firms with 
leading technologies were considered highly valuable partners, particularly for younger 
and smaller firms often without the resources that could allow them access such 
technology. Hitt et al, (2000a) also argue that firms from emerging markets with lower 
access to technology use technological capabilities as a primary partner selection
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criterion. Thus, alliances are used to develop a collection of value-creating resources that 
a firm cannot create independently (Ireland et al, 2002). This is in contrast with 
transaction cost theory’s assumption that "firms transact by the mode which minimizes 
the sum of production and transaction costs" (Kogut, 1988:322).
Opportunities: Positive environmental factors
Enterprises studied in the UAE were motivated not only by their resource characteristics 
to form SAs but also by some positive factors within their environment. These factors are 
related to market conditions, regulatory laws. This finding supports the work of Todeva 
and Knoke (2005) who argue that alliance formation is broadly shaped by general 
economic conditions and the institutional frameworks in countries of operation, including 
legal requirements, macro-economic policies, price controls, financial capital markets, 
distribution channels, and methods of contract enforcement. In both cases studied, market 
conditions encouraged the enterprises to form SAs. For instance, ADNOC was motivated 
by the increase in demand prices of LNG and Etisalat was encouraged by the steady 
economic growth of the Egyptian economy and the large market size which is 
characterized by low rate of mobile phone penetration service. Both enterprises also were 
motivated by the positive foreign investment policies and regulations of the UAE which 
encourage local enterprises to diversify their business and to expand to foreign markets. 
This is also in line with the work of Todeva and Knoke (2005) when they argue that 
government intervention provides the major constraints and opportunities for strategic 
alliance formation.
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Threats: Nesative environmental factors
Substantial entry cost and economic risk associated with expansions to new and 
potentially profitable markets and lack of growth opportunities in the UAE market are the 
major threats that motivated UAE’s enterprises studied to form SAs. This finding is 
consistent with the findings of Gyenes (1991) which claim that many structural changes 
in manufacturing industries have become the driving forces for strategic alliances; for as 
growth slows, as markets shrink or become crowded, and as technological change 
accelerates to speeds where individual companies cannot recover initial investments, 
strategic alliances are used to share costs and risks, and to penetrate new markets. To 
illustrate, Gyenes (1991) states that Japanese pharmaceutical companies want to expand 
overseas since the Japanese market was not large enough to recover the heavy 
expenditures in research and development. In this study, the projects of both alliances 
studied are characterized by their substantial cost and risk. ADNOC’s gas liquefaction 
project and Etisalat’s new mobile phone project entail investments of substantial financial 
resources which, in turn involve high degrees of risk. This finding is also consistent with 
Stanek’s (2004) finding that the costs of developing and marketing a new product can be 
expensive and failure rates can be as high as 50 per cent, suggesting that sharing the 
burden with another firm has the advantage of spreading the potential risk over more 
organizations. Therefore, it makes more sense to involve one or two other companies in 
the project to share the risk even though the company itself may have all the required 
resources to do it alone. Resources released from such collaboration can be used for 
developing other new projects resulting in risk reduction (Tsang, 1998).
The enterprises studied were also encouraged by the lack of growth opportunities within 
the UAE’s market to form their SAs. Much of the recent growth in global alliances is due
j
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to both the shrinking of the world markets and increased competition (Pett, and Dibrell, 
2001). The more turbulent the environment, the more willing the organizations to enter 
some sort of alliances (Hamel, 1991; Parkhe, 1993b). As rapid changes occur within 
either the internal or external industry, a firm will seek to reduce its exposure to risk. 
Similarly, a study by Coopers and Lybrand rates growth strategies and entering new 
markets among the top reasons for forming strategic alliances (Coopers and Lybrand,
1997). Partnering with an international company can make the expansion into unfamiliar 
territory a lot easier and less stressful for a company (Ohmae, 1992). Also it is found, in 
the particular case of Etisalat, that conforming to the Egyptian government policy of 
foreign investment is a motivating factor to form Etisalat Egypt strategic alliance. One of 
the rationales for the formation of IS As is building links with local enterprises in order to 
accommodate host government policy. Many governments in developing countries and 
the former Soviet block insist that access to the local market can occur only if the foreign 
company works in cooperation with a local partner (Beamish, 1988). Pressures by host 
government to form SAs also apply in particular industries. For example, companies in 
the defence industry, telecommunication and parts of the financial services industry are 
often obliged by host government requirements, concerned to safeguard particular sectors 
of the economy, to establish links with local firms (Glaister and Buckley, 1996).
Formation of IS As within the UAE’s enterprises studied began as a reaction to factors 
emanated from within the firm and/or from within the firm’s environment. This finding is 
consistent with Heide and Minor’s (1992) finding, which states that strategic alliances are 
a response to an environmental uncertainty and market imperfections rather than a 
strategic response aimed to manipulate and influence the environment. This, in turn,
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implies that scanning the environment for opportunities is the first step in developing 
strategic alliances (Vyas et al, 1995) and it involves analyzing companies strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT analysis). Therefore, IS As within 
enterprises studied in the UAE are formed in response to environmental change and 
organizational strategic needs. However, IS As become an integral part of corporate 
strategy of both enterprises. This finding is consistent with that of Schifrin (2001b) who 
contends that top executives should consider alliances as a key part of the firm’s 
strategies. It has also been found that ADGAS and Etisalat Egypt meet all the five criteria 
developed by Wakema (2003) that differentiate strategic alliances from conventional 
ones. Therefore, IS As lie at the heart of the corporate strategy in both enterprises. To 
implement their international growth strategies, both enterprises were restructured in a 
way that new departments were found which are responsible for foreign investments.
8.2.3. The process of partners’ selection in ISAs within the UAE’s enterprises passes 
through three stages: search for partners, evaluation of partners and selection of 
partners and is carried out by employing evaluation and selection criteria
Selection of partners of ISAs within UAE’s enterprises studied passes through a 
systematic process that involves three phases namely search for partners; evaluation of 
partners and selection of partners. This finding is consistent with that of Lorange and 
Roos (1991) who suggest that a systematic process for partners’ selection includes five 
steps namely: i) statement of the firm’s strategy; ii) development of a partnership 
benchmark; iii) elimination of undesirable business sectors; iv) selection of promising 
business sectors; and v) selection from potential candidates. The aim of the partner 
selection process is to find and select the right partners with the right mix of resources
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that will contribute to the alliance long-term success. However, towards this end, both 
enterprises developed a set of criteria used for partners’ evaluation and selection. On the 
one hand criteria used by ADNOC include partners’ competency and knowledge of 
developing new technology in the area of gas liquefaction; financial performance of 
partners; compatibility and trust between ADNOC’s management and partners’ 
management teams; partners’ willingness to form a strategic alliance and commit 
resources; and partners’ readiness to form a strategic alliance and commit resources. On 
the other hand, criteria used by Etisalat were: i) complementarity of partners’ resources; 
ii) partner’s readiness to start the project; and iii) partner’s influence on and ability to 
negotiate with the Egyptian authorities. These criteria are consistent with those proposed 
by Geringer (1988, 1991), who classified partner selection criteria according to their 
relatedness to operational skills and resources which a venture requires for its competitive 
success, which is referred to as task-related criteria, and the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the partner, which is referred to as partner-related criteria. To recap, typical examples 
of task-related criteria are technical know-how, financial resources, experienced 
managerial personnel and access to marketing and distribution channels. Examples of 
partner-related criteria are the national and corporate culture of a partner, compatibility or 
trust between the partners' management teams, the degree of favourable past association 
between the partners, and the size of corporate structure of the partner.
ADNOC and Etisalat were searching for partners with resources they lack (Gulati et al., 
2000) and who possess specialized resources that are not readily available from others 
(Doh, 2000). Specialized resources they were seeking involves management teams with 
significant and specialized experience (McGee et al., 1995), unique technological know­
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how (Nagarajan and Mitchell, 1998), distribution channels (Lorange et al., 1992), or 
access to local market knowledge (Geringer, 1991). ADGAS was searching for partners 
who possess technological know-how required for liquefying natural gas. Stuart (2000) 
found that large companies with leading technologies were considered highly valuable 
partners, particularly for younger and smaller companies often without the resources that 
could allow them access to such technology. By contrast, companies from emerging 
markets with lower access to technology use technological capabilities as a primary 
partner selection criterion (Hitt et aL, 2000a). In this study, Etisalat Egypt was looking 
for partners with knowledge of the local market and distribution channels that will speed 
up its entry to the Egyptian market. Another criterion used by both enterprises to select 
their partners was the readiness of partners to enter a strategic alliance and commit 
resources. This criterion was found to have a paramount importance in the case of 
Etisalat Egypt because the time factor was crucial as long as the agreement contract 
determined a starting date for the launching of the new mobile phone service in the 
market. Consequently, the strategic alliance had to be structured in a way that it is the 
intent of all parties that it will actually succeed -  through the need for speed adaptation 
and facilitated evolution (Lorange et al., 1992). Therefore, it is obvious that enterprises in 
both cases studied were looking for partners who possess complementary resources 
which they lack. Proper partner selection led to creating value for both enterprises. This is 
achieved by utilizing their resources through combining them with resources from other 
enterprises. This finding is supported by Doz and Hamel (1998) who argue that when 
considering the value creation aspect of alliance formation, perhaps the most critical 
determination of value creation is the degree to which the partners’ contributions are 
complementary. Similarly, Madhok and Tallman (1998) argue that alliances, where
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partners have the potential to create synergy by integrating complementary resources, 
have the highest probability of producing value. Different but complementary resources 
make it possible to gain economies of scope, create synergies and develop new resources 
and subsequent skills (Hitt et al., 200Id) and to develop new competitive advantages 
(Ireland et al., 2001b; March, 1991).
Also it has been found that the decision of partner selection is influenced by other factors 
such as partner’s global alliance experience and reputation, and previous experience and 
relationships between partners. The former factor was observed in the case of Etisalat 
Egypt, whereas the later was observed in the case of ADGAS. It was found that the 
global alliance experience and reputation of Etisalat was an important factor in being 
selected by its partners. Partners of Etisalat Egypt were searching for a partner who 
possesses technological know-how of telecommunication and managerial experience in 
managing ISAs. This is attributed to the fact that Etisalat partners lack technological 
know-how and experience in ISAs. This is consistent with Nielsen’s (2003) finding that 
firms which have no experience from previous ISAs may favour a partner with global 
experience, favourable reputation and ability to negotiate with foreign governments. 
Nielsen (2003) also argues that firms with experience in ISA activities may place more 
value on a partner with potential for development of new technology/knowledge and 
learning. This argument supports the finding that due to the technology it possesses 
Etisalat was not looking for partners possessing technology rather it was looking for 
partners who possess knowledge of the Egyptian local market. In the particular case of 
ADGAS, previous experience and relationships between ADNOC and its partners 
positively influenced the decision of partner selection. Gulati (1995) finds that previous
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alliances create ties that directly and indirectly influence the choice of partners. Similarly, 
in his early study of the selection procedure undertaken by related to the strategic alliance 
process in Pakistan and India, Tomlinson (1970) found that “favourable past association” 
was the most important selection criteria, while not being enough in itself to ensure sound 
strategic alliance’s performance. Gulati and Gargiulo (1999) also found that the 
probability of a new alliance between two specific firms increases with their 
interdependence, their previous ties, common third parties and their centrality in the 
alliance network.
8.2.4. Strategic alliance processes within the UAE’s enterprises are extensively 
influenced by trust and confidence based on previous relationships between 
partners
In the UAE, trust is considered a major factor in business deals. To recap, in an alliance 
context, trust suggests that a partner’s actions will meet expectations, including the 
absence of opportunistic behaviour (Ireland et al., 2002). Scholars such as Smith et al. 
(1995); Gulati (1995); Jones and George (1998) and Kanter (1994) agree on the 
importance of trust in achieving successful cooperation between firms. For example, in a 
study by Kanter (1994) of 37 companies from 11 countries, she found trust to be a key 
element of alliance success. This is because trust has the ability to reduce transaction 
costs by deterring opportunistic behaviour thus making partners take a long-term 
perspective to the relationship (Beamish and Banks, 1987). Accordingly, it has been 
found within the enterprises studied in the UAE that different phases of the formation 
process of ISAs were greatly influenced by trust between partners. There are several 
occurrences within enterprises studied in the UAE which show the exceptional
Chapter 8: Discussion
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importance of trust throughout the phases of strategic alliance formation process. Next, 
the importance of trust in each phase of the formation process within UAE’s enterprises 
studied will be elaborated:
Role of trust in strategic alliance’s partners selection
In both cases studied, enterprises followed a systematic process for searching, evaluating 
and selecting partners whom they can trust in their future behaviour and actions. Trust 
appears explicitly or implicitly in all criteria used for partners’ selection in both cases 
studied. This finding is supported by Glaister and Buckley (1997) who in their study of 
partnerships between UK companies and companies from Western Europe, the US or 
Japan found that task-related partner selection criteria associated with market access and 
partner-related criteria associated with trust and reputation to be most important. ADNOC 
and Etisalat believe that the existence of trust will facilitate and reduce cost of partner 
search and selection and hence will reduce transaction cost. This finding is also consistent 
with that of Gulati (1995) who argued that “trust substitutes for more formal control 
mechanisms, such as written contracts”. Nevertheless, the lack of trust and suspicion are 
common in business world. In that sense, Ahmed (1993) found that even though the 
Arabs may trust Western technology, they express often doubts about their sincerity and 
motives. In the particular case of ADGAS, where access to technology was the major 
motive for ADNOC to form this strategic alliance, it is obvious that the existence of 
previous relationships and experience between the alliance partners and between foreign 
partners and government of UAE enhanced their relational quality which is defined as the 
extent to which the partners felt comfortable with each other and were willing to rely on
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trust in dealing with one another and helped in developing trust (see also Arino et al.,
2001).
The term micro-level familiarity between partners is used here to denote the existence of 
previous relationships and common interests between partners. Knowledge and trust 
resulted from past business relationships between foreign partners of ADGAS and the 
government of Abu Dhabi was the major reason for selecting these particular partners. 
Similarly, in their study, Gulati et a l (1994) argued that familiarity between partners 
enhanced trust, which in turn replaced legal relationships like equity sharing as a 
governance system for managing the cooperation. Moreover, evidence suggests that 
alliance success is a function of the quality of relationships between partners (Glaister 
and Buckley, 1999). BP and TOTAL have been present in the UAE since the early 1960s 
and are involved in direct contacts with the government business relationships with 
ADNOC. This also implies that the positive relationship between partners of ADGAS 
strategic alliance is a product of a long-lasting cooperative relationship. This finding is 
supported by Ireland et a l (2002) who maintain that effective social capital is a product 
of relationships that have developed through long-term interactions between companies 
as partner firm representatives interact with each other. Also it is found in the particular 
case of Etisalat Egypt that Etisalat was looking for partners who have good connections 
and relationships with government agencies and officers which is a form of social capital. 
Etisalat believes that such connections and relationships will help in successfully and 
smoothly entering a new foreign market. In a similar vein, research has found that 
Chinese companies seek partners that have social capital largely because those
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companies’ broad experiences were seen as indicators that they were likely to be 
effective, trustworthy partners (Hitt et al., 2001a).
Role of trust in the selection of alliance’s form of structure
Selection of alliance form of structure is extremely influenced by trust between alliance 
partners. In both cases, partners selected equity joint venture as the form of structure for 
their projects. Empirically, Gulati and Singh (1998) found some evidence that cross­
region alliances (three regions including USA, Japan, and Europe) are likely to have 
more equity-based alliances than domestic (or within-region) ones. The selection of 
equity joint venture form of structure by UAE’s enterprises studied is attributed, in part, 
to two reasons. Firstly, desire of partners to promote a sense of trust and confidence. 
Secondly, desire of partners to bind each other to the project which requires long-term 
investments of substantial financial resources. Partners of ADGAS and Etisalat Egypt 
come from different cultural backgrounds and business environments and were relatively 
new to each other having no or little previous experience and relationships and follow 
different norms of business operations (Kostova, 1999). This situation led to suspicion 
and lack of trust at the early stages of the interactions. This finding is supported by Hitt et 
al. (200Id) who argue that cultural, economic, and institutional differences across 
countries increase the difficulty of developing trust between partners with home bases in 
separate countries. This situation justifies the employment of equity joint venture form of 
structure by partners in both cases studied when they lacked knowledge and experience 
of each other at the early stages of the alliance formation. This is consistent with the 
findings of Teng and Das (2008) who observed that since equity arrangements deter 
opportunistic behaviour, they are preferred when inter-firm trust is insufficient.
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It is also found that trust facilitates negotiations and agreements with regard to changes in 
partners’ equity share in SAs. It is found in the particular case of ADGAS that the 
acceptance o f foreign partners reduced their equity share for the benefit o f ADNOC was 
based on their trust and confidence that ADNOC will meet its promises o f granting them 
new oil and gas concessions and not on contractual agreements. This is supported by 
Dyer’s (1996) findings o f a comparative study of inter-firm collaboration in the auto 
industry between the USA and Japan which also supported an inverse relationship 
between trust and transaction cost where Japanese auto companies tended to trust their 
suppliers and made the investments based on oral promises of the automaker and without 
a written agreement. This is also supported by Sharma (1998) who found that as promises 
are kept, cooperation evolves and high risk behaviour is undertaken. Therefore, where 
levels o f relational capital are high, partners may be willing to behave fairly (Gulati,
1995) and may be willing to do more than is formally expected or may take care of the 
interest of the other (Sako, 1992).
R o le  o f  tru s t in th e  m a n a se m e n t o f  s tra te s ic  a llia n ces
Alliance management is extensively influenced by trust and cooperation between 
partners. In both cases it is found that trust and cooperation between partners facilitated 
alliance management which is performed jointly by all partners. More specifically, trust 
and understanding between partners helped in staffing and assigning management 
responsibilities. Partners also collaborate in staff learning and training to ensure 
implementation o f plans, improve alliance performance and attain operational goals. 
Trust and confidence also enhanced exchange of knowledge and information between 
partners which in turn helped in the operations’ smooth functioning and attainment of
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goals o f alliance. Generally speaking, trust is an important aspect o f day-to-day 
operations o f SAs within the enterprises studied in the UAE. This finding is consistent 
with Colemen’s (1990) observation that mutual trust and commitment are central to the 
success of the ISAs because no contract or other agreement, no matter how complete or 
detailed, can account for every issue or every contingency that might arise. Formal 
contracts can never anticipate and identify all the events and changes that occur over the 
lifetime of the strategic alliance. Likewise, it is not feasible that partner enterprises 
rewrite an agreement every time a new issue or situation arises. Necessarily, much o f  
what happens between partners in alliances develops informally in the alliance 
relationship.
Learning and knowledge transfer are also one of the motives behind the formation o f SAs 
in the UAE’s enterprises studied. Partners o f ADGAS and Etisalat Egypt were motivated 
to enter their SAs, partly because o f their willingness to learn from partners and to 
transfer knowledge to their parent companies. This finding is consistent with Inkpen and 
Crossan (1995) who defined learning as the primary objective o f SAs and state that the 
survival o f alliances is dependent upon the ability o f partners to extract knowledge and 
skills from each other. This finding is also supported by Morrison and Mezentseff (1997) 
who argue that without cooperative learning the success o f SAs will be limited in the 
long term. In this respect, it was found that leaders of both enterprises studied, work hard 
to promote trust and to provide an environment in which people can easily share their 
knowledge and information with each other (as in Parast and Digman, 2007). Open and 
prompt communication and free flow o f information through frequent meetings between
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partners’ top management are listed as a priority in the SAs in the UAE to ascertain 
proper functioning and to further mutual understanding (as in Gulati et al., 1994).
However, not all characteristics of alliance learning are positive. Hamel (1991) noted that 
alliances yield opportunities for learning races between partners. The partner who first 
learns the desired capabilities can then dissolve die alliance even if  the other partner has 
not completed learning the desired know-how. Nevertheless, Hamel’s (1991) argument is 
not observed in our two cases studied in the UAE. Also it has been found that the equity 
joint venture form of structure employed by partners in the enterprises studied 
encouraged partners to share knowledge and technology because such a form of structure 
will not be complete and successful without valuable resource contributions and 
commitment by all partners. Equity arrangement implies more commitment of partners to 
the alliance which is central to relationship development and governance (Beamish, 1988; 
Morgan and Hunt, 1994).
Therefore, I maintain that despite cultural differences between partners o f cases studied, 
there is a high level of trust and cooperation. This finding could be attributed to a number 
of reasons which I believe compensate for differences in culture. Firstly, all partners 
share closer strategic goals which induced them to work collaboratively to learn each 
other’s culture and management style and to remove obstacles resulted from cultural 
differences. Partners involved in both cases studied share the same motivation for 
becoming long-term partners and successfully created a win-win situation for all firms. 
This finding supports Arino et aV  s (2001) observation that building trust within IS As is
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influenced by strategic intent (the motivation for formation o f the alliances). Secondly, 
the alliances’ strategic goals shared by alliance partners encourage them to share and 
commit resources which in turn requires partners to communicate and work closely to 
each other on a daily bases, a situation that improved understanding through interaction. 
Thirdly, accumulated experience and increased familiarity of partners with different 
national cultures are conducive to overcoming mistrust, attenuating opportunism, and 
facilitating cooperation. Partners’ extensive involvement in foreign investments in both 
cases studied resulted in accumulating experience and knowledge cross-border business. 
In this respect, Gulati (1995) observed that firms with greater collaborative know-how 
are more likely to develop trust and reputation through repeated ties with other firms. 
Powell et al. (1996) also argue that previous experience in cooperating is essential to the 
management of a diverse portfolio of collaborative ties as well as to accumulate the 
capability to benefit from the resulting interdependencies.
R o le  o f  tru s t in th e  s tra te s ic  a l lia n c e ’s  p erfo rm a n ce  eva lu a tio n
The exceptional performance o f the enterprises studied within the UAE is attributed, in 
part, to the trust and cooperation between partners. Kanter (1994) reported trust to be a 
key element of alliance success for 37 companies competing in 11 countries while 
Sherman (1994) cited a lack o f trust to be a major cause o f alliance failure. In both cases 
studied, trust reduced transaction cost, and more specifically negotiating costs during 
alliance formation. In addition to lowering negotiation costs, trust also enhanced 
coordination, which led to lower administration costs. This is consistent with the works 
of McAlister (1995) and Zaheer et al., (1998). Trust can increase cooperation, improve 
relationship flexibility, shorten cycle time, increase quality and lower the costs o f
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coordination activities (Smith et al., 1995). Moreover, researchers have also argued that 
trust can improve strategic alliance productivity and efficiency (Ring and Van de Van, 
1992; Sitkin and Roth, 1993). Also it is found in both cases studied that partners jointly 
develop criteria for alliance performance evaluation and are satisfied with their alliance 
performance. Alliance satisfaction is defined as one o f the outcomes of strategic alliances 
(Zollo et al., 2002) and provides an assessment o f the overall satisfaction o f individuals 
(companies) in the alliances (Parast and Digman, 2007). Building trust among alliance 
members improves their overall satisfaction with the alliance. Therefore, trust positively 
affects alliance satisfaction.
8.2.5. The formation of IS As within the UAE’s enterprises is widely influenced by 
partners’ culture
It is found that culture (both national and corporate) has strong influence on different 
phases o f the formation process o f strategic alliance within the enterprises studied in the 
UAE. To recap, while national culture is defined by Hofstede as “the programming o f the 
mind acquired by growing up in a particular country” (1991:5) and by Tihanyi et al. 
(2005) as the homogeneity o f characteristics that separates one human group from 
another and which characterizes the norms, values, and institutions o f a society. 
Organizational culture can be defined as the shared, basic assumptions that an 
organization learnt while coping with the environment and solving problems o f external 
adaptation and internal integration that are taught to new members as the correct way to 
solve those problems (Park et al., 2004). Organizational culture has been defined as one 
of the firm-level variables in studying alliance performance (Zollo et al., 2002). On the 
one hand, partners of ADGAS ISAs come from four different countries, namely UAE,
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UK, France and Japan, which have extremely different cultural backgrounds. On the 
other hand, partners o f Etisalat Egypt come from two different Arab countries, namely 
UAE and Egypt, and consequently share similar culture, which is referred to by Hofstede 
(1980) as Arab culture. Before embarking into explaining and discussing the effects o f  
culture on the formation process o f IS As within UAE’s enterprises studied, the notion o f  
Arab culture is elaborated below.
A ra b  cu ltu re
Hofstede’s (1980) study of cultural values did include a category titled “Arab” countries 
which included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Iraq, and the United Arab 
Emirates. Along Hofstede’s four dimensions and as opposed to Western cultures, this 
Arab group scored high in power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, and 
masculinity. In business, Rice (2003) described the culture o f Gulf Arabs as being high- 
context which relies considerably on complex nonverbal communication and that 
businesspeople are expected to arrive late at meetings and take a considerable amount of  
time arriving at a decision before signing the contract. Also, Grant et al., (2007) noted 
that if  Arabs commit themselves to a date in the future and fail to show up, there is no 
guilt or concern on their part, because they have no control over time in the first place. 
Comparatively, Western practice is governed by the punctuality o f appointment times 
(Grant et aL, 2007). This is explained by Rice (2003), who states that Gulf Arabs tend to 
use circular patterns o f reasoning rather than the linear approaches common in Anglo- 
Saxon cultures, and they live according to polychronic time where time is flexible. In this 
context long-term plans seem to play a far less prominent role in Arab countries than in 
the West, because it is the will o f God that determines the future anyway (Ferraro, 1990).
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Arabs also attach a great deal o f importance to status and rank. However, the status o f  
people in the UAE is largely determined by family position and social contacts and 
connections, not necessarily by their own accomplishment. Connections are extremely 
important in conducting business. This could be attributed to the collectivist and high 
power distance of social and business culture in the UAE (Grant et al., 2007). This means 
that business negotiations and dealings are typically made with family relationships, 
social contacts, and social status in mind. Well-connected business people can get things 
done much faster than their counterparts who do not know the ins and outs o f the system.
The system of power and relationship in Arab culture is extended to business life and has 
been termed "sheikocracy" (Ali, 1995), whereby the rulers consider the wealth o f the 
nation their personal property and use such wealth to maintain the people's submission. 
The characteristics of sheikocracy include hierarchical authority, rules and regulations 
contingent on the personality and power o f the individuals that make them, subordination 
of efficiency to human relations and personal connections, indecisiveness in decision 
making, informality among lower level managers, and a generally patriarchy approach 
(Ali 1995). Muna (1980) also shows that fundamental changes in strategy (for instance 
new investments, new products, and new markets) are settled without much participation 
from middle management other than consultation. Arab culture is non-confrontational, 
which seeks the least conflict possible. Also, the concept of “Saving face” involves 
compromise, patience, and sometimes looks for the other way to allow things to get back 
to normal (Lu et al., 2005).
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As already explained in chapter 3, the impact o f culture on IS As received substantial 
importance in the literature, and scholars divided between those who observed negative 
effects o f cultural differences and those who found no empirical support for positive 
associations between cultural distance and alliance performance. However, the majority 
of the literature agrees on the potentially negative effects o f national cultural differences. 
Hence, national cultural distance has often been linked to alliance conflict (Lane and 
Beamish, 1990), misunderstandings (e.g. Lyles and Salk, 1996), collaborative problems 
(e.g. Mowery et al., 1996), knowledge transfer problems (e.g. Hamel, 1991), and poor 
performance or even failure (e.g. Meschi, 1997). Nevertheless Park and Ungson (1997) 
found no empirical support for positive associations between cultural distance and 
alliance termination, leading some experts to believe that cultural problems may be 
overstated. The declining influence of cultural difference on IS As is attributed to the 
impact of globalization which led to more convergence among global business segments 
(Preet and Madhok, 2002). The following part will shed light on the influence of culture 
on the phases of strategic alliance formation within UAE’s enterprises studied.
E ffec t o f  cu ltu re  on th e  se lec tio n  o f  a llia n c e ’s  form  o f  s tru c tu re
The selection of equity joint venture as a form of structure for ADGAS international 
strategic alliance can be attributed to two factors. Firstly, the desire o f foreign partners to 
use this form and secondly, this form aligns with ADNOC’s strategy of foreign 
investments. Therefore, all partners, local as well as foreign, were interested in using this 
form of structure mainly because by having an equity share in the project each partner is 
required to commit resources and therefore will be attached to the project which in turn 
will ensure long-term commitment and positive behaviour of partners. This is especially
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important because o f the strategic nature of the project which requires long-term 
investment o f huge resources and because o f the nature o f the partners’ cultures which 
are characterized by high level o f dissimilarities. This finding is supported by empirical 
evidence from both manufacturing and service sectors which suggest that companies 
favour collaborative modes such as JVs when investing in culturally distant markets 
(Erramilli, et al., 2002). In doing so, these studies associate international operations with 
high uncertainty and submit that higher cultural distance leads to higher transaction costs 
not only by increasing information costs, but also hindering the transfer of know-how 
(Buckley and Casson, 1976). This justifies the use of equity joint venture form of 
structure by Etisalat Egypt too. It is also suggested that the entry modes which provide 
the investor firm with higher levels of control (i.e., “hierarchy”) is a better solution to 
deal with such inconveniences (Contractor and Kundu 1998; Madhok, 1998).
E ffe c t o f  cu ltu re  on th e  se lec tio n  o f  s tra te s ic  a llia n c e ’s  p a r tn ers
As mentioned above partners o f ADGAS are different in their culture while the partners 
of Etisalat Egypt share similar culture. Hallen and Wiedersheim-Paul (1979) introduced 
the notion of ‘psychic distance’, through which partners who are closer on this measure 
presumably have fewer cultural differences and therefore lower transaction costs to 
overcome in setting up and managing the alliance. ADNOC’s selection o f partners 
different to its culture is attributed to several factors. Firstly, unavailability o f qualified 
partners from the Middle East directed the search for partners to distant environment 
which in turn resulted in selection of partners from different cultures. Secondly, Arab 
companies’ trust in the Western technology, directed ADNOC’s search for partners in the 
Western market. However, the negative impact o f dissimilarities between national
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cultures o f ADGAS’ partners is reduced by the existence of previous business 
relationships and experience which enabled partners to anticipate and avoid possible 
negative impact of differences in their national and corporate culture. This finding is 
consistent with Swierczek and Hirsch’s (1994) conclusion that it is important for future 
partners to understand the impact of differences in culture before they begin a joint 
venture. Therefore, the negative impact o f cultural differences between alliance’s partners 
could be offset by having partners involved in contacts and collaborative relationships 
prior to the alliance formation. This is because, as also found by Mohr and Spekman 
(1994), increased familiarity o f partners with different national cultures is conducive to 
overcoming mistrust, attenuating opportunism, and facilitating cooperation. However, 
with regard to Etisalat Egypt alliance, it is found that cultural similarities between 
partners, who were new to each other and having no previous business relationship or 
experience, contributed to improving the level o f trust and cooperation and helped in 
commencing their project immediately. This finding supports the work of Arino et al. 
(2001) who indicated that familiarity and shared experience were sources of trust, where 
differences in cultures and institutions had significant impact on trust. They argue that 
trustworthiness in SAs was rooted in the cultural context o f the companies within the 
alliance. Therefore I maintain that cultural similarities and previous relationships between 
partners are means o f developing trust and cooperation.
E ffe c t o f  cu ltu re  on  th e  m a n a se m e n t o f  s tr a te s ic  a llia n ces
In both cases, alliances are jointly managed by all partners. It has been found that cultural 
dissimilarities between the alliance’s partners have both positive and negative impact on 
alliance management whereas cultural similarities were found to have only positive
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impact. While ADGAS partners have different cultures, partners of Etisalat Egypt share 
similar culture. Cultural dissimilarities between partners o f ADGAS strategic alliance 
have insignificant negative effect mainly at the early stages o f alliance formation. 
Communication and negotiation between partners was to some extent complicated and 
lengthened. Although language barriers were another source o f delays and frustrations, 
the use o f English as a common language of communication between partners enhanced 
communication and understanding. This is in line with Browning et al. (1995) who in 
their study o f semiconductor firms, point out that cultural difference between firms 
hindered productive communication and hence trust among individuals in the alliance. 
However, once the alliance is formed and partners began to interact through collaborative 
activities and communication, partners began to know and understand each other’s 
values, goals, and management styles. This condition is supported and explained by 
Browning et aV  s (1995) study of strategic alliances which concluded that firms forming 
strategic alliances encountered an early phase of chaos and complexity. Such a chaotic 
environment was due to the mixed conceptions of culture o f firms within the alliance 
which created ambiguity about individual identity and status. However, Browning et al. 
(1995) also observed that as the degree o f understanding among individual firms 
increased (as more cultural practices were experienced), the alliance formed a base for 
common values and social networks. Through the formation of trust and morale among 
members, a new order (sets o f practices) developed in the alliance, which served as the 
norm and standard for fostering cooperation. Therefore, negative impact o f cultural 
dissimilarities between ADGAS’ alliance partners is offset by enhancing familiarity 
among partners through collaborative interaction. Knowledge gained thorough 
collaborative work between partners helped them to develop a refined understanding o f
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each other’s culture, management style, capabilities, and weaknesses (Zollo et al., 2002). 
This finding is also consistent with Arino et al.’s (2001) conclusion which indicates that 
the success of strategic alliances depends on their level o f relational quality which is the 
extent to which the partners felt comfortable with each other and were willing to rely on 
trust in dealing with one another.
Cultural similarity between partners of ADGAS strategic alliance is found to have 
positive consequences on the operations of the alliances. Cultural differences enabled 
partners to tap diverse competencies management systems to the alliance which led to 
better management of the alliance and improved organizational performance. This 
finding supported the work o f Tsang (1998) who states that despite the difficulties that 
arise from companies’ cooperation in research and development projects due to 
differences in both national and corporate cultures and work procedures of companies 
involved as well as more complicated decision-making processes leading to higher 
administrative cost, staff assigned to work in the project benefit from the fresh 
perspectives provided by their co-workers who come from different companies. They get 
to know more about other companies' research approach, methods, procedures, and so on. 
Moreover, there may be intensive exchange of information and knowledge within the 
project team. In that sense Park and Ungson (1997) highlighted that cultural 
complementarity rather than similarity leads to success of IS As. However, in the 
particular case o f Etisalat Egypt, it was found that despite the unique nature o f partners’ 
strategies, management systems and decision styles, national cultural similarities between 
partners played a vital role in having smooth negotiations and concluding agreements at 
the early stages of the alliance formation. However, some researchers argue that it is
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better to have similar corporate cultures for the purposes o f long-term cooperation and 
trust (Saxton, 1997). This reflects the importance of not only national culture but also 
corporate/organizational culture in the formation and management o f SAs. In that sense 
Dacin et al. (1997) contend that differences in organizational culture, a micro level 
concept, between partners o f strategic alliances is related to differences in national 
culture and result in the formation o f differing managerial ideologies which, in turn, have 
the potential to affect strategic decision processes in firms. However, in order to resolve 
organizational problems resulting from dissimilarities in organizational cultures, partners 
in both cases work closely to promote a business environment characterized by mutual 
understanding and respect. Use o f work teams and training programs and workshops in 
addition to maintaining regular contacts between top managers and lower levels o f  
management helped in sharing and transmitting knowledge and information which 
ultimately resulted in creating and strengthening common organizational culture. Other 
human resource practices such as the use of incentives, promotion, and recruitment and 
selection systems are also employed to resolve cultural problems related to the inability 
or rejection of collaboration.
E ffe c t o f  cu ltu re  on p erfo rm a n ce  eva lu a tio n
Despite differences in partners’ national and organizational cultures within UAE’s 
enterprises studied, the partners were successful in agreeing on a set of criteria for 
evaluating alliance’s performance. Partners in both cases studied were successful in 
agreeing on the use o f a set o f performance evaluation criteria which reflect their goals 
and interests in the strategic alliance. This finding is contrary to the finding o f Yan and 
Zeng (1999) which claims that evaluating international alliances is especially obscured
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because firms from different countries and cultures generally apply divergent success 
criteria. However, mutual goals and interests and similarities in strategic orientations o f  
partners played a vital role in bringing different styles and norms o f partners in both cases 
studied closer. Therefore, both cases proved exceptional performance and partners’ 
satisfaction despite cultural differences. Cultural dissimilarities were found to have no 
negative impact on the performance o f both cases studied. This finding is in contrast with 
the findings o f Simonin (1999) who argues that IJVs are purportedly more vulnerable to 
misunderstandings arising from incompatible national and corporate cultures, resulting in 
high managerial conflicts and early terminations. However, this finding is consistent with 
the results o f Zineldin and Dodourova’s (2005) study which shows little support for the 
hypotheses that cultural differences act as a hindrance and a reason for alliance or 
business relationship failure. Cultural and language barriers, often cited as important 
failure factors in the literature, seemed to be unimportant to both cases studied. Park and 
Ungson (1997) also found that, contrary to expectations, JVs between US and Japanese 
electronic firms lasted longer and were less likely to dissolve than domestic alliances 
between American firms.
8.2.6. The performance of ISAs within the UAE’s enterprises is evaluated by all 
partners
It has been found that, in both cases o f UAE’s enterprises studied, in order to ensure 
proper functioning and success o f their ISAs, the partners agreed to continually assess 
and evaluate performance against the short- and long-term goals and objectives. Strong 
performance and partners’ satisfaction in both cases studied contribute to stability and 
growth of these alliances. This finding is supported by Das and Teng (2002) who argue
C h a p te r  8: D is c u s s io n
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that if  the alliance has met the expectations o f its partners it will be stable and may even 
expand. Success o f IS As within UAE’s enterprises studied could be attributed to a 
number of factors including partner homogeneity, ownership structure, management 
control, partner selection, and market entry timing. These factors are discussed as 
follows:
Firstly, the characteristics of the partners o f IS As within UAE’s enterprises studied and 
the mix of skills and resources these partners bring to the collaboration were found to 
have paramount influence on the performance and success o f ISAs. Partners bring 
valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable complementary resources. Abundant gas 
resources owned by ADNOC and technological know-how of processing gas resources 
possessed by BP and TOTAL are considered rare and imperfectly imitable resources that 
complement each other. Likewise, abundant financial resources and technological know­
how to establish and operate telecommunication projects possessed by Etisalat and 
knowledge of the local market and distribution channels possessed by its Egyptian 
partners are considered rare and imperfectly imitable resources that complement each 
other. Valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable resources form the basis for competitive 
advantages, which lead to positive abnormal returns.
Secondly, equity joint venture form of structure adopted by partners in both cases studied 
has a critical influence on the alliance performance. The reason is that structural decisions 
impact almost all aspects of the alliance, including operational process, control 
mechanisms, and even exit possibilities. The form of equity joint venture adopted by the
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partners in both cases resulted in the contribution of substantial amount of funds and 
other resources by each partner. This finding is supported by Gulati (1995) who argues 
that equity joint venture form of structure helps in aligning the partners’ interests 
especially when the risk o f opportunism is significant. This condition promoted an 
environment of long-term trust and confidence among partners which resulted in better 
cooperation and eventually successful alliances. Inter-firm trust has been found to be a 
critical factor in partner satisfaction and alliance success (Inkpen and Currall, 1997; 
Kanter, 1994). Promotion o f trust and cooperation among partners o f strategic alliance 
also improved effectiveness and efficiency o f managing these alliances. Management 
functions such as planning, leading, staffing, training and orientation, and career 
development are given special consideration and importance by partners of ISAs within 
UAE’s enterprises studied. This in turn helped, as Parast and Digman (2007) also found, 
in coordinating and integrating business activities, processes, procedures and techniques 
of all partners (companies) involved in the alliance through continuous improvement o f  
processes to enhance performance and achieve customer satisfaction. This finding is also 
consistent with those o f Das and Teng (1998, 2001), Gulati and Singh (1998) and Oxley 
(1997) who contend that equity joint venture form of structure helps in promoting 
cooperative behaviour rather than opportunistic behaviour and reducing transaction costs.
Finally, the external environment has also played a vital role in the success of ISAs 
within UAE’s enterprises studied. Changing environmental factors such as technology 
and industry structure has also been examined in the literature by researchers such as 
Killing (1988), Kogut (1989) and Das and Teng (2002). Of particular interest here is how 
changing environmental characteristics affect the dynamics and outcomes of alliances.
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Steep increase in international demand and prices of liquefied natural gas due to the 
increased awareness by the international community of the green and environmentally- 
ffiendly energy created an opportunity for AD GAS not only to succeed but also to 
achieve outstanding performance. It has also been found that the increase in demand for 
mobile phone services in Egypt and the development in telecommunication technology, 
which resulted in reducing operation costs and introducing new services, are all 
environmental factors that contributed to the success of Etisalat Egypt strategic alliance.
C riteria  u sed  fo r  m e a su r in s  a llian ce  p erfo rm a n ce
In both cases studied, criteria used by partners to measure their alliance’s performance 
were derived form the long-term and short-term goals of both the strategic alliance and 
partners. Partners in both cases adopted two kinds o f criteria. These criteria are 
objective/tangible returns, as in Hyder (1999), Mohr and Spekman (1994), and Contractor 
and Lorange (1988) and subjective/intangible returns, as in Hyder (1999), Mjoen and 
Tallman (1997), and Parkhe (1993b). Tangible returns indicators employed by partners in 
both cases are financial criteria where performance is evaluated on the basis o f  
profitability and sales. Luo (2002a) maintains that these indicators constitute the 
dominant model of empirical strategy-performance research. Partners also use intangible 
returns indicators which involve partners’ satisfaction and relationship measured by the 
longevity of the alliance.
8.3. Development of a theoretical framework for the formation process of ISAs
The process o f forming ISAs within the UAE’s enterprises studied could be viewed as 
including five phases; identifying and justifying motives for the formation of a strategic
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alliance, selection of alliance partners, selection o f the alliance form of structure, alliance 
management and alliance performance evaluation. The process is also influenced by two 
major factors; culture o f partners and trust between partners. The process and phases o f 
forming IS As, as well as the outcome of the process are presented in Figure 8.1. The 
following part will provide explanation of the process; however each phase as well as the 
factors influencing the process were fully explained and reflected upon from the 
perspectives of existing theories o f SAs in part 8.2.
C h a p te r  8: D isc u ss io n
2 9 5
Chapter 8: Discussion
Figure 8.1: Phases of strategic alliance formation process
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The thicker arrows moving to the right represent the decisions to move from one phase to 
another in the process. The thinner arrows moving backward from right to left stand for 
the feedback of information and indicate that, in reality, no evidence for sequence 
between these phases is found. Recycling is a feature in this process where decision 
makers may recycle from one phase to a previous one to verify a decision or to clarify a 
point. The process involves 11 recycles which take the decision makers backward to from 
one stage to another. The first recycle is when the decision makers check the motives for 
the alliance formation against the problematic situation (Rl) their enterprise is facing. 
The motives were usually thought o f as the alliance goals which were expected to handle 
the problematic situation. The partners’ selection phase recycles the process back to the 
motives identification and justification phase. The identification o f the evaluation criteria 
recycles the process back to the motives phase (R2) to match criteria with the motives. 
The selection o f a form of structure phase has a couple o f recycles, one to the motives 
phase and the other to the partners’ selection phase. The decision o f form of structure 
selection was recycled to the motives phase (R3) in a way that the decision o f selecting 
equity joint venture form of structure was based on the motives for alliance formation. 
The decision of selecting a form of structure is also recycled to the partners selection 
phase (R4) in a sense that form of structure had to be decided by all partners. The fourth 
phase, alliance management, involves three recycles towards the phases of motives, 
partners’ selection, and the form of structure selection. The alliance management phase 
recycles towards motives phase (R5) in a sense that enterprises’ mission, vision, goals 
and strategies are all based on the motives for alliance formation. The alliance 
management phase also recycles towards partners’ selection phase (R6) in a way that 
during partners’ selection phase, partners should agree on jointly managing the strategic
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alliance, defining and setting management policies, strategies, and systems and should 
develop trust and cooperation necessary for smooth functioning o f the alliance. The 
alliance management phase also recycles towards the form of structure phase (R7) 
because selection of equity joint venture form of structure requires establishing an 
independent company to be managed jointly by all partners. Evaluating alliance 
performance requires recycling back towards all previous phases. For instance, evaluating 
alliance performance requires developing measurement criteria which are related to and 
derived from the motives for the alliance formation (recycle towards motives phase; R8). 
Evaluation of alliance performance also requires a consensus among partners regarding 
common goals o f the strategic alliance and private goals o f each partner and regarding the 
evaluation criteria (recycle towards partner selection phase; R9). Equity joint venture 
form of structure necessitates the use of specific performance measurement criteria which 
may differ from those used in other forms o f structure (recycle towards form of structure 
selection phase; RIO). Finally, the results o f the performance evaluation may necessitate 
changes in the alliance’s goals, style o f management and strategies (recycle towards 
alliance management phase; R11).
The outer thick-dashed box represents the effect o f partners’ culture on the process of 
forming IS As within the UAE’s enterprises studied. While the inner dotted box stands for 
the influence o f trust on the process. Dashed lines and dotted lines are used to denote that 
other factors might influence the process. However culture and trust were found to be the 
paramount factors. The trust’s box is located inside the culture box to imply that trust 
could be viewed as one of the values of UAE’s national and corporate culture. However, 
it is separated from culture because of the important influence it has on the process. The
2 9 8
C h a p te r  8: D isc u ss io n
double-line box represents the motives for the alliance formation. It is located outside the 
culture’s box and trust’s box and separated from the other four phases for two reasons. 
First, to imply that partner culture and trust have no direct influence on partners’ motives 
for the formation o f a strategic alliance. Second, to imply that identifying the motives for 
forming ISAs represent the foundation for this process. These motives emerge from 
organizational and contextual factors and are presented in the two dashed boxes located 
above and below the motives’ box. Again, dashed lines are used to denote that the list of 
motives is not an exhaustive one and that other factors might be present.
8.4 Summary and conclusion
To sum up, six emergent characteristics were found to characterize the ISAs formation 
process in the UAE. These characteristics include: Firstly, phases of identifying and 
justifying motives for the formation o f a strategic alliance, selecting alliance partners, 
selecting the alliance form of structure, alliance management, and alliance performance 
evaluation were basic steps o f the formation process of ISAs within the UAE’s 
enterprises studied. Enterprises in the UAE were motivated by both organizational factors 
that emanated from inside the enterprises and contextual factors which arise from outside 
the enterprises to form ISAs. Organizational factors involve companies’ strengths such as 
availability o f abundant idle resources and companies’ weaknesses such as the lack o f  
complementary resources to capitalize on the strengths. Contextual factors appeared in 
the form of opportunities and threats. Opportunities appeared in the form of new 
attractive markets and products while threats appeared in the form of lack o f growth 
opportunities in the local market and changes in the policies of host government. Each o f
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these factors has presented a problematic situation which in turn required actions by these 
companies to find ways to capitalize on their strengths, correct weaknesses, capture 
opportunities and avoid threats. The appearance of motives and the realization that 
dealing with the problematic situation can not be dealt with independently pushed the 
companies to the second phase to find qualified partners who could provide 
complementary resources and share cost and risk o f the new project. Having selected 
their partners, enterprises moved to the third phase in the process which is the selection of 
a form of structure. Equity joint venture is a common form of structure used by 
enterprises studied in the UAE. The fourth phase is alliance management. The last phase 
is alliance performance evaluation. It is obvious that the four phases o f selection of 
alliance partners, selection o f the alliance form of structure, alliance management and 
alliance performance evaluation are directly influenced by partners’ cultures and trust 
among partners.
Secondly, ISAs within the UAE’s enterprises are formed in reaction to organizational and 
environmental factors and become a part o f corporate strategy. SAs in the UAE’s 
enterprises studied were initially formed in reaction to environmental changes and 
organizational circumstances. However, they became an integral part of competitive 
strategies o f the UAE’s enterprises studied. In the UAE’s enterprises studied, ISAs are 
formed as a reaction to a problematic situation. This problematic situation is attributed to 
one or more o f four reasons namely; availability o f abundant idle resources (strength), 
lack of valuable resources (weakness), positive environmental factors (opportunity), and 
negative environmental factors (threat).
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Thirdly, the process o f partners’ selection in IS As within the UAE’s enterprises passes 
through three stages: search for partners, evaluation o f partners and selection of partners, 
and is carried out by employing evaluation and selection criteria. The aim of the partner 
selection process is to find and select the right partners with the right mix of resources 
that will contribute to the alliance long-term success. However, towards this end, both 
enterprises developed a set o f criteria used for partners’ evaluation and selection.
Fourthly, strategic alliance processes within the UAE’s enterprises is extensively 
influenced by trust and confidence based on previous relationships between partners. 
Trust has a profound influence on the various phases of SA formation process within 
enterprises in the UAE. It is found to directly influence partners’ selection phase, 
selection of alliance’s form of structure, management of strategic alliances, and alliances’ 
performance evaluation.
Fifthly, the formation o f ISAs within the UAE’s enterprises is widely influenced by 
partners’ culture. Similarities and differences of national and corporate cultures between 
partners of ISAs in the UAE were found to have a profound influence on the various 
phases o f SA formation process. It is found to directly influence partners’ selection 
phase, selection o f alliance’s form of structure, management o f strategic alliances, and 
alliances’ performance evaluation.
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Finally, the performance o f IS As within the UAE’s enterprises is evaluated by all 
partners. Partners of SAs in the enterprises studied in the UAE agreed to assess and 
evaluate performance on a regular basis. Criteria used by partners to measure their 
alliance’s performance were derived from the long-term and short-term goals of both the 
strategic alliance and partners.
These research findings were derived from the analysis o f the propositions that were 
generated from the analysis o f the data collected through the use o f interviews with the 
managers involved in the formation process o f strategic alliances and from the 
interpretation of documentary data. The implications of these research findings and the 
contribution of this research study to knowledge are discussed in the next chapter which 
is a conclusion to the thesis.
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CHAPTER 9 
Conclusion
9.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to pull together the conclusions o f the study by 
summarizing the main findings of the research, considering research objectives, 
highlighting the contribution o f the study, presenting recommendations, enumerating 
study limitations, and finally making proposals for further research.
9.2 Review of the thesis
This thesis is about the formation process o f ISAs in the UAE. The main themes that 
have been explored throughout this study were how ISAs are developed and why they 
were developed in that way. This study confined itself to two UAE’s major enterprises, 
by emphasizing one strategic alliance within each of them. The intention is to understand 
the process by which ISAs are developed within enterprises in the UAE, and to develop a 
guiding framework that could help to guide decision makers within enterprises which are 
subject to similar circumstances. In this respect this research made a theoretical 
breakthrough in two major grounds; description and explanation of ISAs. Six 
characteristics of the formation process o f ISAs in the UAE were generated. The first 
characteristic describes the formation process and the other five explain it.
In describing the formation process o f ISAs, the study developed a descriptive framework 
(Figure 8.1) based on the discussion of this study research findings. This consisted o f five
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phases which are recognition of motives for strategic alliance; selecting alliance 
partner(s), selecting alliance form of structure; operating and managing the alliance; and 
evaluating alliance performance. These phases are influenced by two major factors, 
namely trust among partners and partners’ national and corporate cultures. The 
framework is discussed in relation to relevant literature on strategic alliances. The 
discussion has revealed that there is some common ground, as well as some controversial 
areas. The common grounds include: firstly, all five phases that were developed within 
this study have been supported by almost all the studies reviewed. Secondly, the finding 
that the relationship between phases in non-sequential and non-linear and involves delays 
and several recycles from different phases to others is found to be supported by several 
studies.
Conversely, the controversial areas include: firstly, this study’s findings contradict the 
studies that omitted the influence of culture and trust on the formation process of ISAs. 
The common agreement on all five phases, as well as the non-linearity of phases o f the 
process, indicates the commonality o f such situations both in the developed contexts and 
in UAE as a developing country. The controversy about the consideration of the influence 
of partners’ culture and existence of trust among partners is due to the fact that most o f  
the studies on the formation process of ISAs were conducted in developed countries 
which share similar cultures and depend on the contractual agreements rather than trust 
and confidence in their business dealings. However, this finding is supported by few 
studies which are mainly conducted between companies in developed countries and 
companies in developing countries.
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In explaining the formation process of ISAs in the UAE, five characteristics have been 
developed:
First, formation of ISAs in the enterprises studied in the UAE began as a reaction to 
problematic situation; however, they became an integral part of the enterprises’ corporate 
strategies. This reflects the developing nature of ISAs from being a reactive decision to 
becoming a strategic one. Viewing strategic alliance development from such a lens, 
however, reveals that this finding contradicts and is supported by the existing Western 
literature. Authors in the Western literature are divided between the reactive view and 
strategic view of ISAs. No evidence is found in the literature suggesting the development 
nature of ISAs from being reactive to becoming strategic.
Second, the process of partners’ selection in ISAs within the UAE’s enterprises studied 
passes through three stages: search for partners, evaluation of partners and selection of a 
partner and is carried out by employing evaluation and selection criteria. This finding is 
consistent with some evidence from existing Western theory of ISAs. However, criteria 
employed for evaluating and selecting partners differ from one context to another and 
from one firm to another. Use of different criteria could be attributed to differences in 
partners’ cultures, goals and interests as well as differences in resource endowments 
between partners, national contexts between partners’ countries and levels of economic 
and technological development of partners. For example, partner’s know-how to liquefy, 
store and transport gas was a selection criteria used by ADNOC which reflects its goals, 
technological development and resource deficiency.
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Third, strategic alliance processes within the UAE’s enterprises studied is extensively 
influenced by trust and confidence based on previous relationships between partners. The 
existence of trust as an imperative factor for the formation of ISAs within enterprises 
studied in the UAE is part of the overall importance of trust and social capital in business 
dealings throughout Arab context. Despite different sources of trust, enterprises in the 
UAE were found to value previous business relationships and experience as a major 
source of trust. Unlike in Arab contexts, companies in Western contexts were found to 
rely on contractual agreements rather than trust and previous relations. The study also 
uncovered that macro-level familiarity between partners (cultural similarities) is less 
significant than the micro-level familiarity between partners (previous relationships and 
common interests) in developing trust between partners. Micro-level familiarity between 
partners can also be used to alleviate negative impact of cultural differences between 
partners by having partners work and collaborate with each other prior to the alliance 
formation. Contrary to the Western literature, also it has been found that opportunistic 
behaviour is not a characteristic of enterprises in the UAE. Enterprises in the UAE do not 
tend to quickly learn and imitate foreign partners’ technology and or achieve their goals 
before partners do and then end the strategic alliance. This trend is attributed to two 
reasons. Firstly, enterprises in the UAE lack the absorptive capacity and skills to operate 
and maintain these technologies independently and secondly because of the conception of 
the superiority of the Western technology among companies in the UAE and Middle East.
Fourth, formation of ISAs within the UAE’s enterprises studied is widely influenced by 
partners’ culture. Cultural similarity and dissimilarity between partners were found to 
have influence on the formation process of ISAs within the enterprises studied in the
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UAE. Culture dissimilarity between partners, as was found in the case of ADGAS, has 
negatively influenced the formation process only at the early stages as it complicated 
negations between partners and lengthened the formation process. However, it has no 
negative impact on the alliance performance and success. This finding is supported by 
several researchers from the literature reviewed. Conversely, cultural similarities, as in 
the case of Etisalat Egypt, were found to have positive influence on the formation and 
performance of IS As. This is mainly because cultural similarities help to bring different 
views of partners closer to each other and to enhance communication, coordination and 
cooperation between partners.
Fifth, performance of IS As within the UAE’s enterprises studied is evaluated by all 
partners who employed common evaluation criteria. Using common evaluation criteria, 
partners in both cases studied regularly evaluate performance of their alliances. This 
finding is consistent with findings of several studies from the literature reviewed. 
However, there are differences and similarities in the criteria employed by enterprises in 
each context. Differences in performance evaluation criteria are mainly attributed to 
differences in partners’ motives to join the alliance.
9.3. Reconsideration of the research objectives
The general aim of this research is to explore a central managerial process namely “the 
formation process of IS As” within the UAE’s enterprises. With respect to this aim, the 
specific objectives of this research were as follows:
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Firstly, to describe and explain the formation process of international strategic alliances 
within the two identified enterprises in the UAE.
This objective has been met as the study has explored different phases of the formation 
process of IS As in two enterprises in the UAE. Factors that influence the process were 
also explored and analyzed.
Secondly, to develop a guiding framework of strategic alliance formation that could help 
academics and practitioners understand and form successful alliances in a developing 
context.
This objective is also met as the study, based on the literature reviewed and the findings 
of the study, has successfully developed a framework for the formation of ISAs in a 
developing country context.
9.4 Overview of research contributions
This research has contributed to a better understanding of the formation process of ISAs 
in the UAE. The findings of the study have wider theoretical and practical implications 
not just for the UAE but also for other developing countries. In relation to the aim and 
objectives of this research, the following specific theoretical and practical contributions 
are claimed by this research:
Firstly, to the best of this author’s knowledge, this research is the first exploratory study 
of its kind that offers a description and explanation to generate an awareness of the 
existing phenomenon of ISAs in the UAE and the Middle East. The study was carried out 
by in-depth interviewing and taking into consideration the views of those involved in
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forming ISAs in the UAE and the views of some policy makers in the Ministry of 
Economy and Planning. So far, no study is found that describes and explains ISAs in the 
UAE. Therefore, it is claimed that this research contributed to filling the theoretical gap 
in the field of ISAs identified within the developing and particularly UAE context.
Secondly, in methodological terms, this research demonstrates the potency of a realist 
approach. Realism claims having a mid way between positivist and phenomenological 
approaches and calls for qualitative research based on case studies, in-depth interviews 
and documentary analysis as methods for undertaking research, especially when the issue 
is being explored for the first time. Also the personal experience of this researcher 
regarding access to and collection of data in the UAE context revealed the importance of 
understanding the cultural and social set up of the UAE’s society. It shows that access to 
data in the UAE relied mainly on personal connections and social networks. 
Understanding the influence of tribalistic nature of the UAE society, extended family, 
proxemics (use of space), and the orientation towards time would be very helpful for a 
researcher who wanted to conduct study in this context, as well as other contexts that 
share similar characteristics.
Thirdly, this is one of the first academic studies to be written in English language on the 
subject of strategic alliances in the UAE. The information, discussions, and analysis 
provided are contributions to the English literature on the subject. The English reader will 
find the two alliance cases useful and interesting case studies that can be analyzed further 
or compared with other studies. Hence, this study could be seen as a comprehensive
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source of reference on information about the UAE history, political system, economic 
structure in general and global business environment in particular, for the English speaker 
at an international level. Therefore, the study is expected to add to the current literature 
on the ISAs and educational philosophies that researchers, academics and practitioners 
find interesting and useful to their work.
Fourthly, this research offers practical implications for both policy makers and managers 
of organizations in the UAE when they deal with a sensitive issue such as forming an 
ISA. The findings of this study show how describing and explaining the formation 
process of ISAs could represent a sound ground for both policy makers and managers to 
gain a genuine understanding of the reality of this important phenomenon. In that sense, 
the findings of this research could be considered as a guiding framework to be used by 
both managers in the UAE and foreign managers for understanding and forming ISAs in 
the UAE or in contexts which are subject to similar circumstances as in the context 
studied.
9.5. Limitations of the research
Being the first of its kind in the UAE, studying the formation process of ISAs is a useful 
and interesting attempt yet it is a very complex and demanding task. In short, it is not an 
easy topic and therefore one has to recognize that there have been a number of limitations 
in trying to cover so many issues that are related to such a topic. Despite the importance 
and originality of the study, several limitations were inevitable:
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Firstly, the lack of relevant strategic alliance literature on developing countries in 
general, and the Middle East region in particular, is an inevitable difficulty. This 
researcher had to rely on Western-based publications on the subject, which have been 
criticized for overlooking strategic alliances in developing countries.
Secondly, the study focuses on a critical and sensitive strategic issue within the UAE 
enterprises and therefore most of the data is dealt with confidentiality. Due to this 
sensitivity, the issue of both obtaining and maintaining access to data was a real obstacle. 
On the one hand this researcher had to spend a considerable time negotiating access and 
building trust with respondents. On the other hand, some interviewees were not giving 
the full answers in spite of the insistence and persistence of the researcher. Adding to this 
is the negative attitude towards research and researchers in the UAE. Reluctance and 
missing and changing appointments were notorious phenomena amongst this researcher’s 
respondents. The value of research within the UAE context is gravely underestimated. 
These difficulties disturbed the researcher’s resources and time schedule and thereafter, 
limited the study to only two case studies.
Thirdly, cases studied within each firm were identified and selected by general managers 
of these enterprises. Being identified and selected by the respondents, there is the 
possibility that the identified alliances were only the successful ones.
Fourthly, this study focused on publicly owned and government types of organizations 
in the UAE. However, there is another type of organizations, which was not covered -  
namely private undertakings.
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Fifthly, the lack of proper documentation records and the difficulty of accessing 
available ones made the tracing of issues regarding the formation process of ISAs very 
difficult.
Sixthly, limited time and resources available to this researcher and the access difficulties 
made conducting simultaneous full analysis of the interviews with data collection a 
difficult task. This researcher had to make quick scanning of the interview contents to 
determine which candidate could e interviewed next, and which questions should be 
emphasized in the next interview. This inevitable difficulty limits the findings of study.
9.6. Suggestions for further research
This study was about the formation process of ISAs which involves a number of phases. 
Therefore, based on this research further studies can focus on each phase. The following 
areas for future research can be put forward:
Firstly, this study developed a descriptive framework for the formation of ISAs based on 
two leading enterprises in the UAE. In this respect, this study suggests two streams for 
further research. The first one is needed to explore the process in privately owned 
organizations. The second stream is needed to test the significance of this framework by 
considering large samples of enterprises in the UAE.
Secondly, having identified that ISAs become an integral part of the corporate strategies 
of the two enterprises studied, this could also be an interesting stream of further research. 
This situation needs to be further explored within a large sample, including all types of
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organizations in the UAE. Both the contextual and organizational factors underlining 
such a situation need to be investigated and examined in relations to processes and 
outcomes of IS As.
Thirdly, future research is also needed to further explore the influence of cultural and 
social factors on the formation of IS As.
Fourthly, the above proposed areas are just a few of the many suggestions that need to 
be researched in the UAE. The author hopes that this study would stimulate other 
scholars to conduct research on interesting and yet challenging subject.
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Appendix (1)
Section A. Sample of support letter provided by research supervisor
30 July 2007 Dundee Business School
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN
Access to Collect Data for PhD Research
Dear Sir/ Madam
Ref: Yasir Yasin Fadol
This is to confirm that Mr Yasir Yasin Fadol is registered as a PhD student at 
the Dundee Business School, University of Abertay Dundee, Scotland, UK, 
and to ask that he be granted access to collect data from your esteemed 
organization to help him to complete his PhD research.
The subject of Mr Yasir Vasin's research is ‘International Strategic Alliance 
Formation Process in the Developing Context: The Case of the United Arab 
Emirates/ This study is very useful for understanding processes of best 
practice in international strategic alliances and for formulating strategies that 
would help UAE organizations develop effective and successful alliances 
internationally.
As his PhD supervisor, I am confident that he will be able to conduct a high 
quality academic research and will treat the data he collects with utmost 
confidentiality. Therefore, I request you, Sir/Madam, to support him by giving 
him access to your organization to collect the data that he really needs to 
complete his PhD research.
if you require any information about the student s background and research, 
or about the University, please do hesitate to contact me and I will be pleased 
to oblige,
Yours faithfully.
Professor Mohamed Bra nine
Director of Postgraduate Programmes and Research
UNIVERSITY
O ld  College Bell Siree! Dundee DD1 1HC
Tp/: 01182 '108401 t , i x :  01 182 8)8400 flOsOs'afjertay.ac.uk
YBERTAY DUNDEE
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Section B. Sample of letters sent to respondents
Appendix (1)
Yasir Yasin Sid Ahmed
College o f Business and Economics
United Arab Emirates University
A1 Ain, P. O. Box: 17555
September 24, 2006
Dubai Alminium 
P .0  Box: 3627 
Dubai, UAE
RE: Seeking access to data collection 
Dear Sir,
I am a PhD researcher studying at the University of Alberta Dundee (UK) on part-time basis while working 
as a full-time lecturer at the College of Business And Economics - United Arab Emirates University. My 
thesis is entitled "The Formation Process of Global Strategic Alliances in a Developing Context: The Case 
of the United Arab Emirates ".
It has been noticed that the area of strategic alliances and joint ventures is poorly researched in the UAE. 
Since this study is the first o f its kind in the UAE, it will be beneficial to both academics and practitioners. 
It is expected to help in identifying best ways and models that can be used by practitioners and decision 
makers in strategic alliance formation. Furthermore, this research is expected to help in determining factors 
that affect alliance success developing countries in general and the UAE in particular. It has been noticed 
that the area of strategic alliances and joint venture is poorly researched in the UAE. This study is expected 
to make a significant contribution to the existing knowledge.
The research methodology implemented by the researcher requires using case studies based on mail 
questionnaires and in-depth interviews with the company’s top executives.
I would be very grateful if  you could:
Fill in the enclosed questionnaire and return it back to the above mentioned address.
Provide approval to conduct interviews in your highly reputable company, which will be used as a case 
study. The intention is to focus on and study one o f the alliances or joint ventures conducted by your 
company (find enclosed proposed interview questions).
I would like to assure you that any information provided as well as names will be treated with a high degree 
of CONFIDENTIALITY and ANONYMITY. I very much hope that you will spare a little o f your valuable 
time to help me with this useful academic research.
Thank you in advance for your cooperation and I look forward to receiving filled questionnaires and 
hearing from you an appointment to start interviews.
Yours sincerely,
Yasir Yasin
CC. Support Letter from the research supervisor 
Study Questionnaire 
Interview Questions
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Section C. Letter sent to organizations for the purpose of building collaborative ties
Yasir Yasin S. A. Fadol
College o f Business and Economics
United Arab Emirates University
A lA in ,P .O . Box: 17555
September 24, 2006
Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies and Research 
P .0  Box: 901,Abu Dhabi, UAE
RE: Seeking Collaboration
Dear Sir,
I am a PhD student studying at Dundee Business School, University of Alberta Dundee (UK). I am 
currently in the final stage o f my thesis, which is entitled "The Formation Process of Global Strategic 
Alliances in a Developing Context: the Case of the United Arab Emirates". Since it is the first o f its kind in 
the UAE, this study is expected to be beneficial to both academics and practitioners. It is very useful in 
understanding the processes by which enterprises in the UAE form international strategic alliances. The 
study also aims to design a model that would help UAE organizations develop effective and successful 
alliances globally.
I am looking forward to establish some bases o f collaboration between us towards achieving a joint goal. 
My intention is to find an organization to work as an establishing collaborator for this study. After doing an 
in-depth investigation and conducting a fruitful meeting with your Excellency, I realized that the Emirates 
Centre for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR) is the most appropriate organization for this role. 
Progress of the study:
This study is 4 years old; during this period the researcher has completed the literature review part, 
completed data collection stage, semi finalized analysis stage and I am planning to finalize this study by 
July 2008. However, during the analysis stage a need for further data from more two companies has 
emerged. In doing so, I contacted some companies to get access to data, but unfortunately my attempts 
failed to any get approval.
What the ECSSR is expected to contribute to this study?
Your organization is politely requested and expected to facilitate the process o f getting access to and 
approval to data collection from any two companies, preferably from the following group: Etisalat, 
ADNOC, Emaar, Emirates Air Line, or any other company proposed by your organization. Although I have 
been granted approvals from all o f the above mentioned companies, my documents were either transferred 
to the wrong person or they were transferred to the right person but still I have received no reply.
What benefits the ECSSR may gain from this relationship?
As expected, this study would be beneficial to different parties. Expected benefits to ECSSR are as follows:
1. The findings, results and recommendations o f the study could be used by the ECSSR for any 
purpose as you see convenient to your organization or to the UAE organizations. Moreover, the 
researcher will be pleased to participate in any activities and events to be organized by your 
organization such as consultancies, producing publications, organizing conferences and seminars, 
and conducting training courses.
2. ECSSR will be mentioned in the thesis as an establishing collaborator.
Your positive and prompt reply is highly appreciated
Yours sincerely 
Yasir Yasin
Appendix (1)
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Appendix (2): Enterprises approached by the researcher
No. Company Area of Business Response
1. Dolphin Energy Energy (Gas) Apologized
2. Dana Gas Energy (Gas) No response
3. EMARAT Energy (Oil and Gas) No response
4. Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) Energy (Oil and Gas) Approved
5. Gulf Total Tractebel Power Company Energy (Electricity) Apologized
6. Emirates Telecommunication Corporation (ETISALAT) T elecommunication Approved
7. Thuraya Satellite Telecommunications Company T elecommunication No response
8. Emaar Properties Real Estate Approved
9. Nakheel Properties Real Estate Apologized
10. Sorouh Real Estate No response
11. Deyaar Real Estate No response
12. Ras A1 Khaimah Ceramics Company Manufacturing Approved
13. Gulf Pharmaceutical Industries (Julphar) Manufacturing No response
14. Dubai Aluminum Company (DUBAL) Manufacturing Approved
15. Dubai Cables Company (DUCAB) Manufacturing Approved
16. Dubai Holding Manufacturing No response
17. National Paints Manufacturing No response
18. Tabreed Manufacturing No response
19. Borouge Manufacturing No response
20. Emirates Group Air Line Approved
21. Etihad Air Line Company Air Line No response
22. Abu Dhabi Investment Company (ADIC) Trade and Investment No response
23. Global Investment House Trade and Investment Apologized
24. Istithmar Trade and Investment No response
25. Dubai Investment Trade and Investment No response
26. Sama Dubai Trade and Investment No response
27. Abraj Capital Trade and Investment No response
28. Mubadala Development Company Trade and Investment No response
29. The UAE Offset Group Trade and Investment Approved
30. Dubai Ports World Operation o f Ports Approved
31. Jebel Ali Free Zone Authority Operation o f Ports Approved
347
Appendixes
Dear Sir/Madam,
The researcher is seeking answers for the following questions. Although it is not 
necessary to cover all the interview questions, it will be highly appreciated if you could 
help me by answering all the questions.
Please read the following prior to conducting the interview:
■ Identify only one alliance/joint venture, which has been already formed and 
implemented in your company, so that its results are known.
■ The interview questions address only the alliance/joint venture you have chosen 
above, not the general pattern of alliance formation in your company.
■ In your response, please describe exactly what happened as this alliance was being 
formed, not what you feel is the right answer or believe should have happened.
■ By participating in this interview, you will receive a summary of the results of this 
study. This summary will include some suggestions as well as a model for 
improving your team’s ability to successfully from and implement strategic 
alliances.
Part one: Introduction:
1. Would you please tell me about the establishment of your company and its 
development to date?
2. Have you ever been encouraged or hindered by the UAE government to enter 
certain alliances?
□ Yes □ No
If yes, what were the reasons?
3. Please describe the chosen alliance/joint venture (the project of Etisalat Egypt).
Part two: Motives for Strategic Alliances:
4. Would you please tell me about the reasons of forming this alliance?
Part three: Partner Selection: (partner search, evaluation and selection)
5. Did you follow a formal process for searching, evaluating and selecting benchmark 
partners?
If yes, what is this process?
6. Did your previous alliance experience with foreign partners help in finding 
appropriate partners?
□ Yes □ No
If yes, how did it help?
7. Did the decision of selecting this particular partner contribute to the success of the 
alliance? If yes, what was its contribution?
□ Yes □ No
If yes, how it has contributed?
Appendix (3): Sample of interviews’ questions:
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8. Have you ever experienced a situation where you had to select a particular partner 
because of unavailability or limited number of potential partners?
□ Yes □ No
If yes, give examples?
9. Was the decision of partner selection affected by motive for alliance?
□.Yes □ No
If yes, how was it affected?
10. Was the decision of partner selection affected by mode of entry?
□ Yes □ No
If yes, how was it affected?
11. Was the decision of partner selection affected by the prospective partners’ national 
culture?
□Yes □ No
If yes, how was it affected?
Part four: Partner’s Trust:
12. Before deciding to form this alliance, how did you ensure that the partner is capable 
to achieve the venture's stated outcomes and how did you ensure that his behaviour and 
objectives are consistent with yours?
13. Given that relationships in the context of strategic alliances may be perceived by 
partners as temporary projects, how did this weaken the state of trust based on a common 
future?
14. Given that organizational context changes, did existing trust change? How did you 
manage existing relationships (trust) against dynamic environment? An example is the 
desire of one partner to ally with a third one.
Part five: Form of Structure:
15. How did you select the structure of alliance? What factors did affect your decision 
of selecting this form of structure?
16. Before selecting this form of structure, did you study other alternative structures 
such as mergers, acquisitions, or wholly owned subsidiaries?
□ Yes □ No
If yes, why did you favour strategic alliances? If no, why?
17. Has the decision of selecting the current mode of structure affected by the motive 
for alliance?
□ Yes □ No 
If yes, how has it affected?
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Part six: Alliance Governance (Management):
18. How did your company and your alliance partner jointly control the venture? What 
is the control ratio? How this ratio is decided (on what basis)?
19. Is there any government interference regarding the alliance control? In other words, 
is there any minimum control ratio determined by the government?
□ Yes □ No 
If yes, what is form of control?
20. Did your venture experience any major modifications since its formation?
□ Yes □ No
If yes, what were these modifications? What were the reasons?
21. How did you decide on the amount and kind of resources you committed to the 
alliance? In other words, what factors did affect your decision regarding resource 
commitment to this alliance?
22. Did you form an independent team to run the alliance? If yes, who are the members 
of this team? Were there any members from outside the company (e.g. investment and 
legal advisors)?
23. Are you managing more than one alliance at once? How well are they performing?
24. What organizational and technical competencies/strengths did your alliance team 
require in order to successfully manage the alliance?
Part seven: Alliance Performance and Survival:
25. Do you measure the performance of your alliance on an on going base?
□ Yes □ No
If yes, what methods are used?
26. How could you ensure that the results given by the performance evaluation methods 
are reliable ones?
27. Have you experienced any venture ended (terminated) where one partner 
internalizes (acquired/bought) the project?
□ Yes □ No
If yes, what were the reasons? Please give examples.
Part eight: Transfer of Knowledge and Organizational Learning:
28. Did you follow any formal procedures to transfer knowledge and information 
between your company and your partnering company?
□ Yes □ No
If yes, what were these procedures?
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29. Did you face any difficulties with your partner with respect to transferring 
knowledge and information that was importance to the alliance operation?
□ Yes □ No 
If yes, of what were these difficulties?
30. Have you experienced opportunistic behaviour or the problem of leaking 
information by your partners?
□ Yes □ No 
If yes, what was your reaction?
31. Have you experienced any situations where you learned something valuable from 
your partner that led to gaining a competitive advantage by your company?
□ Yes □ No
If yes, how have you gained this knowledge?
32. Did the level of learning vary from one alliance to another?
□ Yes DNo
If yes, what factors did affect the level of learning?
33. Have you experienced a situation where the desire in proceeding with the 
partnership was reduced because one party has learned something valuable?
□ Yes □ No
If yes, what were the actions taken by the partners?
Part nine: Cultural Differences:
34. How did cultural match or mismatch affect alliance decisions?
35. Have you gained any benefits because of cultural differences of your partner?
□ Yes □ No
If yes, of what kind?
36. Overall could you please describe the process of forming a strategic alliance?
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Appendix (4): Interview questions distributed by research questions:
Research question Interview questions
• A re the m otives suggested  by the literature f o r  
fo rm in g  strategic alliances prevailing in the  
developing context? I f  yes, why? I f  not, w hat other 
m otives are responsible f o r  directing com panies to 
fo rm  such alliances?
1. Please describe the chosen alliance/joint venture (the case under study).
2. Would you please tell me about the reasons for forming this alliance?
3. Have you ever been encouraged or hindered by the UAE government to enter certain 
alliances? If yes, what were the reasons?
• D oes partner(s) selection affect alliance form ation  
and operation in developing countries? W hat fa c to rs  
do com panies in the UAE take into consideration  
when selecting a partner? W hat selection criteria are 
used by m anagers in UAE to select their venture's 
partners?  W hat is the relative im portance o f  these 
criteria? A re  these criteria affected by the m otives o f  
alliance?
1. Did you follow a formal process for searching, evaluating and selecting benchmark 
partners? If yes, what is this process?
2. Did your previous alliance experience with foreign partners help in finding 
appropriate partners? If yes, how did it help?
3. What criteria did your company use to evaluate and select the alliance partner(s)?
4. What were the main sources o f data used for partner’s evaluation?
5. Did the decision of selecting this particular partner contribute to the success of the 
alliance? If yes, what was its contribution?
6. Have you ever experienced a situation where you had to select a particular partner 
because o f unavailability or limited number o f potential partners? If yes, give 
examples?
7. Was the decision o f partner selection affected by motive for alliance? If yes, how was 
it affected?
8. Was the decision o f partner selection affected by mode o f entry? If yes, how was it 
affected?
9. Was the decision of partner selection affected by the prospective partners’ national 
culture? If yes, how was it affected?
• H ow  does increasing knowledge o f  and trust in each 
other partn er affect alliance governance and  
adaptation? W hat other fac to rs m ay lead to such  
adaptation? H ow  does alliance structure change in 
response to such fac to rs?
1. Before deciding to form this alliance, how did you ensure that the partner is capable 
to achieve the venture's stated outcomes and how did you ensure that his behaviour 
and objectives are consistent with yours?
2. How did you determine the level o f trust between your company and your partner?
3. What benefits did your company and your partner expect to gain from building trust?
4. What factors did complicate the process of building inter-organizational trust?
5. Given that relationships in the context of strategic alliances may be perceived by 
partners as temporary projects, how did this weaken the state o f trust based on a 
common future?
6. Given that organizational context changes, did existing trust change? How did you
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manage existing relationships (trust) against dynamic environment? An example is the 
desire o f one partner to ally with a third one.
• W hat are the m ost com m on fo rm s o f  structure used  
by com panies in the UAE to fo rm  strategic alliances?  
H ow  do com panies in UAE choose between the 
different structures? W hat fa c to rs  do affect 
managers* decisions?
1. What is the form o f structure o f this alliance?
2. How did you select the structure of alliance? What factors did affect your decision of  
selecting this form o f structure?
3. Before selecting this form o f structure, did you study other alternative structures 
such as mergers, acquisitions, or wholly owned subsidiaries? If yes, why did you 
favour strategic alliances? If no, why not?
4. Has the decision o f selecting the current mode o f structure affected by the motive for 
alliance? If yes, how has it affected?
• H ow  do firm s  in the U AE m anage strategic alliances 
jo in tly  with their partners?
1. How did your company and your alliance partner jointly control the venture? What 
is the control ratio? How this ratio is decided (on what basis)?
2. Is there any government interference regarding the alliance control? In other words, 
is there any minimum control ratio determined by the government? If yes, what is 
form of control?
3. How did you decide on the amount and kind o f resources you committed to the 
alliance? In other words, what factors did affect your decision regarding resource 
commitment to this alliance?
4. What terms and conditions did you most emphasize when designing the alliance’s 
contract?
5. Did you form an independent team to run the alliance? If yes, who are the members 
of this team? Were there any members from outside the company? (e.g. investment 
and legal advisors)
6. What organizational and technical competencies/strengths did your alliance team 
require in order to successfully manage the alliance?
7. Do you measure the performance o f your alliance on an on going base? If yes, what 
methods are used?
8. How could you ensure that the results given by the performance evaluation methods 
are reliable ones?
9. Have you experienced any serious problems with your partner that led or were about 
leading to the termination o f the alliance’s contract? If yes, what were the reasons?
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• W hat is the effect o f  organizational learning and  
alliance experience on deciding on the alliance 
motives, partn er selection, alliance governance and  
perform ance?
1. Why exchanging knowledge and information with your partner was important for 
the success of the alliance? In other words, what benefits this will add to the 
alliance?
2. What kind of information did you exchange with your partners?
3. Did you face any difficulties with your partner with respect to transferring 
knowledge and information that was importance to the alliance operation?
4. Have you experienced opportunistic behaviour or the problem o f leaking 
information by your partners? If yes, what was your reaction?
5. What methods did your company use to avoid opportunistic behaviour?
6. Have you experienced any situations where you learned something valuable from 
your partner that led to gaining a competitive advantage by your company? If yes, 
how have you gained this knowledge?
7. Did the level o f learning vary from one alliance to another? If yes, what factors did 
affect the level o f learning?
8. Have you experienced a situation where the desire in proceeding with the 
partnership was reduced because one party has learned something valuable? If yes, 
what were the actions taken by the partners?
• H ow  do culture sim ilarities and differences between  
partn ers affect the p rocess o f  strategic alliances?
1. How did cultural match or mismatch affect alliance decisions?
2. Have you gained any benefits because of cultural differences of your partner?
3. Have you experienced any difficulties because o f cultural differences between your 
company and partners? If yes, what were these difficulties?
4. What business areas did experience frequent conflict due to cultural differences?
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Appendix (5): Questionnaire 
Dear Sir/Madam,
The researcher is seeking answers for the following questions; it will be highly appreciated if 
you could help me by answering all the questions.
Please fill in the questionnaire in the following wav:
■ Identify only one alliance/joint venture, which has been already formed and 
implemented in your company, so that its results are known.
■ This questionnaire addresses only the alliance/venture you have chosen above, not 
the general pattern of alliance formation in your company.
■ In your response, please describe exactly what happened as this alliance was being 
formed, not what you feel is the right answer or believe should have happened.
■ This questionnaire should be completed by one of the executives who participated 
in the formation process of strategic alliances in your company.
■ By participating in this interview, you will receive a summary of the results of this 
study. This summary will include some suggestions as well as a model for 
improving your team’s ability to successfully from and implement strategic 
alliances.
Part One: Company’s Information
1. Company’s official name:
2. From the following, please select the area of business of your company:
□  Communication
□  Energy, oil and gas
□  Air line
□  Manufacturing
□  Real estate
□  Other, please specify................................................ ....................................
3. From the following, please select the form of ownership:
□  Single proprietorship
□  Family owned
□  Partnership (private sector)
□  Partnership (government and private sector)
□  Publicly owned enterprise
□  Government
4. When did your company form its first international strategic alliance or when did it 
enter its first joint venture?
□  1-3 years ago
□  4-6 years ago
□  7-9 years ago
□  10-12 years ago
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□  13-15 years ago
□  More than 15 years
5. How many alliances did your company form to date?
□  1 -5
□  6-10
□  11-15
□  16-20
□  More than 20
6. Please list your most important previous and current alliances:
Previous alliances:
I ............................................................................
I I  ............................................................................
I I I  ............................................................................
Current alliances:
I ......................................................................................
I I  ............................................................................
I I I  ............................................................................
Part Two: Motives for Strategic Alliances:
Please put ( / )  symbol in the appropriate boxes for the following questions. Note: 
please do not put more than one (S) for the same answer. Key: 1 = strongly applicable, 
2 = applicable, 3 = not certain, 4 = not applicable, 5 = strongly not applicable.
1. What were the motives / reasons for forming this alliance?
s . 1 2 3 4 5
1. Sharing economic risks in new business ventures. □ □ □ □ □
2. Sharing entry cost to new and potentially profitable markets. □ □ □ □ □
3. Sharing Research and Development costs. □ □ □ □ □
4. Conform to host government policy (in terms of local 
ownership, transaction costs and knowledge transfer).
□ □ □ □ □
5. Accessing parent’s patents and licensing.
6. Reaching economies of scale. □ □ □ □ □
7. Benchmarking company’s performance with the world's best. □ □ □ □ □
8. Controlling or reducing competition. □ □ □ □ □
9. Gaining access to valuable technology (learning), which would 
otherwise be difficult to independently develop or buy.
□ □ □ □ □
10. Gaining access to market and cultural knowledge. □ □ □ □ □
11. Gaining access to distribution channels. □ □ □ □ □
12. Gaining access to capital. □ □ □ □ □
13. Gaining access to labor. □ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
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Part Three: Partner Selection: (partner search, evaluation and selection)
s . 1 2 3 4 5
1. Partner’s degree of willingness to form strategic alliances and 
commit resources.
□ □ □ □ □
2. Partner’s degree of readiness to form strategic alliances and 
commit resources.
□ □ □ □ □
3. Partner's ability to negotiate with the government of the host 
country.
□ □ □ □ □
4. Partner's established marketing and distribution systems. □ □ □ □ □
5. Partner’s experience in developing new technology application. □ □ □ □ □
6. Partner's knowledge of local market and culture. □ □ □ □ □
7. Partner's experience in international strategic alliances. □ □ □ □ □
8. Partner's access to materials/natural resources. □ □ □ □ □
9. Partner’s past and current financial performance. □ □ □ □ □
10. Compatibility and trust between top management teams. □ □ □ □ □
11. Complementarities of partner's resource contribution. □ □ □ □ □
12. Patents and licenses possessed by partner. □ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
3. What were the main sources of data used for partner’s evaluation?
S. 1 2 3 4 5
1. Partner’s internal reports. □ □ □ □ □
2. Government annual reports. □ □ □ □ □
3. Business newspaper, magazine, and journal articles. □ □ □ □ □
4. Conference speakers. □ □ □ □ □
5. Industry and professional associations. □ □ □ □ □
6. Consultants and accounting firms. □ □ □ □ □
7. Stock market. □ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
Part Four: Partner’s Trust:
4. How did you determine the level of trust between your company and your partner?
S. 1 2 3 4 5
1. Assessing the partner’s amount and type of resources to be 
committed to the alliance.
□ □ □ □ □
2. Testing the compatibility and state of character similarity 
between your company and your partner’s company.
□ □ □ Q □
3. Testing the partner’s past and current financial performance. □ □ □ □ □
4. Assessing partner's state of reputation. □ □ □ □ □
5. Using third party reference. □ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
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5. What benefits did your company and your partner expect to gain from mile ing trust?
S. 1 2 3 4 5
1 . Quick exchange of resources. □ □ □ □ □
2. More resource commitment. □ □ □ □ □
3. Smooth exchange of knowledge and information. □ □ □ □ □
4. Reducing the extent and cost of legal contracts □ □ □ □ □
5. Avoidance of routine and bureaucracy and enhancement of 
decision making process.
□ □ □ □ □
6. 1
Other, please specify...................................................................................................
What factors did complicate the process of building inter-organizal.ional trust?
S. 1 2 3 4 5
1. Differences in cultures. □ □ □ □ □
2. Time pressure. □ □ □ □ □
3. Increasing level of environmental uncertainty (e.g. market and 
political changes).
4. Strict requirements and terms and conditions set by your 
company.
□ □ □ □ □
5. Strict requirements and terms and conditions set by your 
partnering company.
□ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
Part Five: Form of Structure:
7. What is the form of structure of this alliance?
S. 1 2 3 4 5
1. Equity joint venture. □ □ □ □ □
2. Minority equity interest. □ □ □ □ □
3. Strategic supplier arrangement. □ □ □ □ □
4. Research and development partnership. □ □ □ □ □
5. Joint production. □ □ □ □ □
6. Licensing and joint marketing and promotion agreement. □ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
8. What factors did affect the decision of selecting this mode of entry?
S. 1 2 3 4 5
1. Cost and benefit characteristic of the venture. □ □ □ □ □
2. Risk characteristic of the venture. □ □ □ □ □
3. Amount of resources to be committed by your company. □ □ □ □ □
4. The possibility that this mode could provide to learn and 
acquire new technology and transfer knowledge.
□ □ □ □ □
5. Desire and bargaining power of foreign partner. □ □ □ □ □
6. Level of trust between your company and partners. □ □ □ □ □
7. Amount of control to be given up by your company. □ □ □ □ □
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8. Home government regulations. □ □ □ □ □
9. Host government regulations. □ □ □ □ □
10. Your company’s prior experience with this structure. □ □ □ □ □
11. Time Limits. □ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
Part Six: Alliance Governance (Management):
9. What terms and conditions did you most emphasize when designing the alliance’s 
contract?
S. 1 2 3 4 5
1. Control systems. □ □ □ □ □
2. Scale of the venture. □ □ □ □ □
3. Duration of the venture. □ □ □ □ □
4. Distribution of the expected outcomes. □ □ □ □ □
5. Exchange and use of information. □ □ □ □ □
6. Research and development intensity. □ , □ □ □ □
7. Resource commitment. □ □ □ □ □
8. Venture dissolution conditions. □ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
10. What factors did affect the amount of resources you committed to the alliance?
S. 1 2 3 4 5
1. Degree of trust in your partner. □ □ □ □ □
2. Amount of resources committed by partner compared to yours. □ □ □ □ □
3. Potentiality of the venture’s success. □ □ □ □ □
4. Macro-economic factors (e.g. political, economic ...etc). □ □ □ □ □
5. Government rules and regulations. □ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
Part Seven: Alliance Performance and Survival:
11. What major areas relating to the alliance performance did you emphasize to measure?
S. 1 2 3 4 5
1. Profitability. □ □ □ □ □
2. Return on investment. □ □ □ □
3. Sales and market share. □ □ □ □ □
4. Alliance longevity. □ □ □ □ □
5. Degree of attaining and maintaining competitive advantage. □ □ □ □ □
6. Level of cooperation and harmony between partners. □ □ □ □ □
7. Transfer of knowledge, organizational learning, and innovation. □ □ □ □ □
8. Reaction of stock market and investors. □ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
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12. Have you experienced any serious problems with your partner that led to or were 
about leading to the termination of the alliance’s contract?
_________ □ Yes □ No, I f  yes, what were the reasons?__________________________
s. 1 2 3 4 5
1. Goal incongruence and inadequate advance planning. □ □ □ □ □
2. Failure to share risk. □ □ □ □ □
3. Dissatisfaction with the alliance relationship (e.g. financial 
performance of the alliance, the degree of commitment or 
competence displayed by the partner).
□ □ □ □ □
4. Unwillingness of giving up control over one’s own resources. □ □ □ □ □
5. Lack of organizational capabilities, competencies, and 
resources.
□ □ □ □ □
6. Lack of participation in decision making. □ □ □ □ □
7. Lack of coordination. □ □ □ □ □
8. Lack of cooperation and trust. □ □ □ □ □
9. Disagreement regarding distribution of alliance gains. □ □ □ □ □
10. Differences in management styles, attitudes, and operating 
procedures among partners.
□ □ □ □ □
11. Cultural mismatch and communication difficulties. □ □ □ □ □
12. Opportunistic behaviour shown by partner. □ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
Part Eight: Transfer of Knowledge and Organizational Learning:
13. Why exchanging knowledge and information with your partner was important for the
success of the alliance? In other words, what benefits this w ill add to the alliance?
S. 1 2 3 4 5
1. Helps in identifying new opportunities or markets. □ □ □ □ □
2. Helps in identifying problems and risks inherited in the 
alliancq.
□ □ □ □ □
3. Helps in learning new technology. □ □ □ □ □
4. Helps in learning new management styles. □ □ □ □ □
5. Helps in finding joint understanding of national policies, rules 
and regulations.
□ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
14. What kind of information did you exchange with your partners?
S. 1 2 3 4 5
1. New strategies and policies. □ □ □ □ □
2. New technologies and production process. □ □ □ □ □
3. New opportunities (e.g. products and markets). □ □ □ □ □
4. New resources and sources of supply. □ □ □ □ □
5. Environmental threatening factors.
6. Quality control systems. □ □ □ □ □
7. Management styles and processes. □ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
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15. Have you experienced a situation of opportunistic behaviour or exploitation in which
the intention of your partner was to achieve his private benefits?
□ Yes □ No
_____ If, yes, what factors made your partner behave opportunistically?
s. 1 2 3 4 5
1. Weak contract formation. □ □ □ □ □
2. Short alliance period. □ □ □ □ □
3. Increasing market uncertainty. □ □ □ □ □
4. Inadequate governance mechanisms. □ □ □ □ □
5. Appearance of environmental threatening factors. □ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
16. What methods did your company use to avoid opportunistic behaviour?
S. 1 2 3 4 5
1. Stimulating trust between the alliance partners. □ □ □ □ □
2. Encouraging mutual forbearance "mutual ignorance of short 
term advantages in favour of a long-term approach".
□ □ □ □ □
3. Using legally well designed agreement contract. □ □ □ □ □
4. Obtaining patents to prevent imitation. □ □ □ □ □
5. Limiting information access to few people in your company 
and your partner’s company.
□ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
Part Nine: Cultural Differences:
17. Have you experienced any difficulties because of cultural differences between your 
company and partners?
□ Yes______□ No, I f  yes, what were these difficulties?
S. 1 2 3 4 5
1. Communication difficulties. □ □ □ □ □
2. Adversely affecting the firm ’s learning capabilities. □ □ □ □
3. Creating ambiguities and mistrust in the relationship. □ □ □ □ □
4. Complicating and prolonging the negotiation process. □ □ □ □ □
5. Complicating or reducing the process of knowledge 
acquisition.
□ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
18. What business areas did experience frequent conflict due to cultural differences?
S. 1 2 3 4 5
1. Marketing. □ □ □ □ □
2. R and D. □ □ □ □ □
3. Finance. □ □ □ □ □
4. Human resources □ □ □ □ □
5. Management style “communication and problem solving 
styles)
□ □ □ □ □
Other, please specify
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Appendix (6) Summary of generated characteristics of the formation process of strategic alliances within ADNOC
S u m m ary  o f  gen erated  p rop ositions
P h ase  1: M otives for  
form in g  A D G A S  stra teg ic  
a lliance
P rop . 6 .1a: The m otives f o r  fo rm in g  the s tra teg ic  a lliance o f  A D G A S are m u ltilevel in nature; organ iza tional an d  
contextual.
P rop . 6 .1b: There w ere three organ iza tional m otives f o r  the fo rm a tion  o f  A D G A S alliance which include: utilization  
o f  abundan t g a s  resources; accessin g  technology a n d  know -how  to  p ro c e ss  liqu efied  gas; sh arin g  econom ic risk  an d  
en try co s t to  new  a n d  p o ten tia lly  p ro fita b le  markets.
P rop. 6 .1c: There w ere three con textual m otives f o r  the fo rm a tion  o f  A D G A S a lliance which include: responding  to  
the p re ssu res  o f  the in ternational com m unity to  s top  environm en tal po llu tion  resu lted  fro m  g a s  fla rin g ; increase in 
dem an d  f o r  LN G  in the in ternational m arkets a sso c ia ted  w ith  p r ic e  hikes a n d  the p resen ce  o f  W estern com panies  
investing in the UAE which po sse ss  know -how  a n d  technology o f  g a s liquefaction  a n d  know ledge o f  the UAE.
P h ase  2: S election  o f  
A D G A S  stra teg ic  a lliance  
partners
P rop. 6 .2a: The p ro c ess  o f  p a r tn e r s ’ se lec tion  p a s s e d  through three stages: search  f o r  partners, evaluation  o f  
p a rtn ers  a n d  se lec tion  o f  a  partner.
P rop . 6.2b: The com m ercia l v iab ility  o f  A D G A S w as con d ition ed  by the a va ilab ility  o f  long-term  buyers o f  the 
co m p a n y ’s  produ cts . Therefore, secu rin g  long-term  buyers o f  the co m p a n y’s  p ro d u c ts  w as a  m ajor issue in the 
discussion  agen da o f  AD N O C.
P rop . 6 .2c: The u n derdeveloped  nature o f  the U A E ’s econom y, G u lf  countries a n d  the M iddle E astern  countries 
d irec ted  the search  p ro c ess  f o r  long-term  buyers to the in ternational markets. M eanw hile, the f a s t  g row in g  an d  
industria liza tion  nature o f  the Japan ese econom y induced the Japan ese governm en t to look  f o r  long-term  su ppliers  
w ho can sa tisfy  its industries ’ needs f o r  clean  a n d  environm ent-friendly energy.
P rop . 6 .2d: H aving  secu red  a  long-term  buyer o f  its new com pany produ cts , A D N O C  began search in g  f o r  p artn ers  to  
p ro v id e  technology a n d  know-how to liquefy, store an d  tran sport gas.
P rop . 6 .2e: C riteria  se t by A D N O C  f o r  p artn ers selec tion  w ere: (1) p a r tn e r s ’ com petency an d  know ledge o f  
d evelop in g  new tech nology in the a rea  o f  g a s  liquefaction, (2) f in a n c ia l perform ance o f  partn ers, (3) com patib ility  
a n d  trust betw een  A D N O C ’s  m anagem ent a n d  p a r tn e r s ’ m anagem ent teams, (4) p a r tn e r s ’ w illingness to fo rm a  
stra teg ic  a lliance a n d  com m it resources a n d  (5) p a rtn ers ’ readiness to fo rm  a  s tra teg ic  a lliance a n d  com m it 
resources.
P rop . 6.2f: The decision  o f  se lec tin g  B P  a n d  TOTAL w as influenced by their p r io r  experience, trust a n d  rela tionsh ip  
w ith  A D N O C.
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P hase 3: C h oice o f  the  
form  o f  A D G A S  stra teg ic  
a lliance stru ctu re
P rop . 6.3 a: The selec tion  o f  the equ ity  jo in t  venture fo rm  o f  structure by the p a rtn ers  w as b a sed  on three reasons: (1) 
the s tra teg ic  nature o f  the p ro je c t requ ires long-term  com m itm ent o f  huge resources a n d  thus p a rtn ers  w ere w illin g  to  
share co s t a n d  reduce risk  a n d  tie each  other to  the p ro je c t by having a  equ ity sh are to  ensure long-term  com m itm ent 
a n d  p o s itiv e  behaviour o f  partn ers; (2) the p ro m isin g  su ccess a n d  p ro fits  o f  the p ro je c t en cou raged  each  p a rtn er  have  
equ ity  share in the p ro je c t a n d  (3) it p ro v id e s  a  degree o f  p ro tec tio n  to the know -how  p o sse sse d  specifica lly  by BP  
a n d  Total.
P rop . 6 .3b: The a lloca tion  o f  equ ity  share am ong p artn ers  ch an ged  tw ice upon request o f  AD N O C. I t w as f ir s tly  
ch an ged  a fter the construction  w orks o f  the p la n t s ta r ted  in D as Island/A bu D habi. The d istribu tion  o f  equ ity share  
am ong p a rtn ers  w as ch an ged  again  after constructing a  new (third) LN G  p ro c ess in g  train  which w as fin a n ce d  by  
A D N O C.
P rop . 6 .3c: A D N O C  w as successfu l to increase its share only after gran tin g  incentives to its partners. These 
incentives w ere: f irs t, p ro v id in g  p a rtn ers new concessions to invest in new o il a n d  g a s p ro je c ts  in A bu D hab i an d  
second, extending the fo re ig n  p a r tn e r s ’ partic ip a tio n  in A D G A S until 2019.
P h ase  4: A D G A S  stra teg ic  
a llian ce  m an agem en t
P rop. 6 .4a: B P  a n d  TOTAL are responsib le  f o r  the p la n t m anagem ent including the production , storage an d  
transporta tion  o f  LN G  a n d  other a sso c ia ted  g a s  p ro d u cts  a n d  the technical activ ities such as health  a n d  safely an d  
environm ent pro tection . A D N O C  a n d  M itsu i perform  the adm in istrative w ork  which includes sa les a n d  marketing; 
human resource m anagem ent; f in a n c ia l m anagem ent an d  other su pport activities.
P rop . 6 .4b: The m ajority  sh areh old in g  o f  A D N O C  qu a lified  the com pany to h o ld  the po sitio n s o f  chairm an, gen era l 
m anager an d  depu ty gen era l manager.
P rop . 6 .4c: S ta ff  tra in ing  a n d  developm en t a n d  g a s  p r ic in g  are core activ ities th a t receive esp ec ia l a ttention  by  a ll 
partners.
P rop . 6 .4d: A lthough A D N O C  en joys m ore con tro l over its partn ers, cooperation , com m itm ent a n d  trust betw een  
p artn ers are the basic  them es f o r  the sm ooth  an d  successfu l opera tion  o f  the p la n t a n d  the com pany as a  whole.
P h ase  5: A D G A S  stra teg ic  
a llian ce  p erform an ce  
eva lu ation
P rop. 6 .5a: P artn ers a g re ed  on com m on criteria  to be u sed  f o r  perform ance m easurem ent. These cr iteria  are the 
c o m p a n y ’s  sales, pro fitab ility , g row th  a n d  lon gevity  o f  the alliance.
P rop . 6 .5b: Transfer o f  know ledge a n d  organ iza tional learning is another u ndeclared  criterion  u sed  by p artn ers to  
m easure perform ance o f  the alliance.
P a rtn ers’ cu lture P rop. 6 .6a: C u ltura l differences betw een  p a rtn ers have both p o s itive  as w e ll a s negative influence on the form ation  
p ro c ess  o f  the alliance.
P rop. 6.6b: C u ltura l differences betw een  p a rtn ers have p o sitive  influence a n d  no negative influence on the a lliance  
perform ance.
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Trust between partners P rop . 6 .7a: Trust a n d  coopera tion  betw een  p artn ers p la y  a  v ita l ro le throughout the different p h a ses  o f  the a lliance  
fo rm a tion  p rocess.
P rop . 6 .7b: Trust a n d  coopera tion  is d eve lo p ed  over a  long lastin g  rela tionsh ip  which ch arac terized  by m utual 
respect, honesty a n d  sense o f  com m on in terests a n d  goals.
P rop . 6 .7c: The adoption  o f  the equ ity  jo in t  venture fo rm  o f  structure enhanced  tru st a n d  coopera tion  betw een  the 
a lliance partners.
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Appendix (7): Summary of generated characteristics of the formation process of strategic alliances within ETISALAT
S um m ary  o f  gen erated  find ings
P h ase  1: M otives for  
form in g  E tisa la t E gyp t  
stra teg ic  a lliance
P rop . 7 .1a : The m otives f o r  fo rm in g  the s tra teg ic  alliance o f  E tisa la t E gyp t are m u ltilevel in nature; organ iza tional 
a n d  contextual.
P rop . 7 .1b: There w ere fo u r  organ iza tiona l m otives f o r  the fo rm a tion  o f  E tisa la t E g yp t alliance which include: 
abundance o f  fin an cia l resources a t the d isp o sa l o f  the com pany, desire to cap ita lize  on its know ledge an d  expertise  
in the a reas o f  te lecom m unication  a n d  fo re ig n  investm ents, desire  to share co s t a n d  risk  o f  the new pro jec t; an d  
learn ing  a n d  acqu iring  know ledge o f  the lo ca l E gyptian  market.
P rop . 7.1c: There w ere f iv e  con textual m otives f o r  the form ation  o f  E tisa la t E gyp t alliance which include: lack o f  
grow th  opportun ities in the UAE market, the a ttractiven ess o f  the E gyptian  market, a ttractiven ess o f  the technical 
specifica tion s o f  the license offered  by the E gyptian  authorities, fo re ig n  investm ents p o lic y  o fU A E ’s governm en t an d  
the regu la tions o f  the E gyptian  governm ent.
P h ase  2: S election  o f  
E tisa la t E gyp t stra teg ic  
a llian ce  p artners
P rop. 7.2a: The p ro c e ss  o f  p a r tn e r s ’ se lec tion  p a s se d  through three stages: search  f o r  partners, evaluation  o f  
p a rtn ers  a n d  selec tion  o f  partn ers to ensure th a t its se lec ted  p a rtn ers are trustable a n d  com m itted  to the new venture.
P rop . 7.2b: The p ro c ess  o fp a rtn ers  ’ search  w as o rgan ized  a n d  fa c il ita te d  by  the E gyptian  au thorities w ho p re p a re d  a  
lis t o fp o te n tia l E gyptian  investors a n d  fo re ig n  investors an d  w orked  as a  m id  p o in t betw een  the tw o parties.
P rop. 7.2c: G o o d  repu tation  o f  E tisa la t le d  to a lm ost a ll E gyptian  investors to  approach  the com pany to becom e a  
partner.
P rop . 7.2d:The p o lic y  o f  E tisa la t f o r  se lec tin g  fo re ig n  p artn ers  fa vo u rs  govern m en t com panies over p r iva te ly  ow n ed  
com panies.
P rop . 7.2e: The m ajor cr ite ria  u sed  by E tisa la t f o r  p a rtn ers  evaluation  an d  se lec tion  w ere: (1) com plem en tarities o f  
resources, (2) p a r tn e r ’s read iness to s ta r t the p ro je c t a n d  (3) p a r tn e r ’s  influence on the E gyptian  authorities.
P h ase  3: C h o ice  o f  the  
form  o f  E tisa la t E gyp t  
stra teg ic  a llian ce  stru ctu re
P rop. 7.3a: The equ ity  jo in t  venture fo rm  o f  structure w as se lec ted  because o f  tw o reasons: (1) this fo rm  conform s to  
h ost govern m en t regulations; a n d  (2) it ties partn ers to the p ro je c t a n d  reduces the co s t a n d  econom ic risk  o f  en tering  
th is a lliance because it requ ires a ll p a rtn ers to  share co s t a n d  com m it long-term  resources.
P rop . 73b: The m ajority  sh areh old in g  o f  E tisa la t reflects its f in a n c ia l contribution  a n d  its key technical ro le  as the 
p ro v id er  o f  the te lecom m unication  know-how.
P h ase  4: E tisa la t E gvn t  
stra teg ic  a lliance  
m an agem en t
P rop. 7.4a: E tisa la t E g yp t d eve lo p ed  a  rigorous p la n  to ensure launching service o f  the new m obile ph one accord in g  
to deadline s e t by  the govern m en t authorities.
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P rop. 7 .4b: E xchange o f  know ledge an d  inform ation betw een  partn ers w as very  cru c ia l espec ia lly  a t the f ir s t  stages o f  
the p ro je c t im plem entation.
P rop . 7.4c: While technica l po s itio n s  are f i l le d  by  E tisa la t’s s ta ff  brought fro m  the incum bent com pany in the UAE  
a n d  the o th er subsid iaries in the region, m iddle a n d  low er leve l adm in istrative p o sitio n s  are f i l le d  by loca l s ta fffrom  
the E gyptian  labor market.
P rop . 7.4d: E tisa la t E gypt, in coopera tion  w ith  E tisa la t A cadem y (subsid iary o f  E tisalat), d eve lo p ed  an d  de livered  
in tensive tra in ing  p ro g ra m s to a ll adm in istrative a n d  technical staff.
P rop . 7.4e: The sp ir it o f  trust, coopera tion  an d  com m itm ent p ro m o ted  by p a rtn ers  h e lped  in the successfu l a n d  quick  
im plem entation  o f  the co m p a n y’s  p lan  a n d  ach ievem en t o f  o p era tio n ’s  g o a ls  in a  sh o rt p e r io d  o f  time.
P h ase  5: E tisa la t E ev n t  
stra teg ic  a lliance  
p erform an ce eva lu ation
P rop. 7.5a: P artn ers a g re ed  on com m on criteria  to be u sed  f o r  perform ance evaluation. These criteria  are d er ived  
fro m  the a lliance g o a ls  a n d  they include: m arket share (m easured  by the num ber o f  subscribers), return on  
investm ents a n d  profitab ility .
P rop . 7.5b: The a lliance ou tstanding perform ance is a ttr ibu ted  to the E tisa la t’s expertise in the telecom m unication  
industry an d  in ternational business investm ents a n d  to  the trust, com m itm ent a n d  coopera tion  p ro m o ted  by partners.
P a rtn ers’ cu lture P rop. 7.6a: C u ltural sim ilarities betw een  E tisa la t a n d  its p artn ers  fa c il ita te d  the p ro c e ss  o f  p re lim in ary  negotiations, 
a lliance m anagem ent a n d  alliance perform ance evaluation.
P rop . 7.6b: C u ltural sim ilarities betw een  p a rtn ers have p o sitive  influence a n d  no negative influence on the a lliance  
perform ance.
P rop . 7.6c: E tisa la t’s experience in c ross-border investm ents lessens the n egative im pact o f  m inor differences in 
partn ers ’ culture.
T rust b etw een  p artners P rop. 7.7a: Trust am ong partn ers d irec tly  a ffected  the decision  o f  p a r tn er  se lec tion  a n d  the p ro c ess  o f  a lliance  
m anagem ent. With re g a rd  to alliance m anagem ent, im proving trust betw een  p a rtn ers  le d  to m ore com m itm ent an d  
qu ick resource by  partn ers; reducing  the extent an d  co s t o f  leg a l con tracts; sm ooth  exchange o f  know ledge an d  
inform ation a n d  avo idance o f  routine a n d  bureaucracy an d  enhancem ent o f  decision  m aking p ro cess
P rop . 7 .7b: The fo rm  o f  equ ity jo in t  venture enhanced  tru st betw een  the alliance partners.
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